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INTELLIGENCE Essays

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MOSCOW "International Relations" 2014

STORY _ RUSSIAN FOREIGN

INTELLIGENCE Essays

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Foreword

The fifth volume of the "History of Russian Foreign Intelligence" covers the first two post-war decades - from the end of World War II in September 1945 to 1965, when, after the Cuban missile crisis, some détente occurred in international relations.

It was a difficult period, sometimes of a dramatic nature. The splitting of the world into military-political blocs and the encirclement of the Soviet Union by a network of military bases, many of which hosted nuclear weapons; withdrawal of former allies from previous agreements; the collapse of the colonial system and the struggle of the colonial powers to maintain their positions in the former possessions, including by military means; the war in Korea, the Berlin and Suez crises; aggravation of the situation in the Middle East; and finally, the aggression against Cuba, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear war - such was the outline of the events of these twenty years.

The alliance of states with different political systems, united by the desire to put an end to the aggression of the fascist bloc, was replaced by the Cold War with its irreconcilable confrontation due to the fundamental difference in geopolitical interests and approaches to the post-war world order.

The Soviet Union strove for a settlement that would exclude a repetition of German aggression and guarantee the security of its western borders. He pursued a policy of strengthening his positions in Eastern Europe, liberated mainly by his armies, sought to support anti-fascist forces here, as well as parties and groups friendly to the USSR.

These actions of the Western countries were considered as a threat to their own geopolitical interests, their economic, political and military positions on the European continent.

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The West could not reconcile itself to the fundamental change in the geopolitical situation in the world that had developed as a result of the Second World War. He made every effort to limit the influence of the USSR in the world, and above all in Eastern Europe, to belittle the importance of the Soviet Union as an independent factor in world politics. The most acceptable at the first stage was the formation of a belt of pro-Western states along the entire perimeter of the Soviet Union, its isolation from the rest of the world. But in those years, these calculations of the West failed.

At the end of the war, Soviet foreign intelligence received information about the intentions of the allies to try to limit the influence of the USSR on the process of post-war peace settlement. The Soviet leadership became aware of the contents of Churchill's secret telegrams, which he sent to Truman regarding the advance of the Red Army into Poland, the Balkans and deep into Germany. Churchill urged Washington to abandon the agreements reached at the Yalta Conference regarding the limits of advance and lines of demarcation of their troops in the course of the defeat of Germany and its allies, urged them to take decisive measures, including military

confrontation, so as not to allow Soviet troops to go further to the West, not to withdraw American units to the zones defined for them by the Yalta agreements.

At the same time, foreign intelligence began to receive information that in British and American political circles they did not exclude the possibility of a war between the USSR and the former Western allies because of the potential threat of the unification of Eastern European countries under the auspices of Moscow and the spread of Soviet influence on Western Europe. Intelligence was received on a number of measures that could be considered as practical preparations for military operations: the conversion of German airfields and other military installations for their use by the Anglo-American troops, attempts to keep a number of military contingents of the German army under arms, including and parts of the SS, armament and increase in the strength of the army of the Polish government in exile under the command of General Anders.

In June 1945, the Committee of Chiefs of Staff of the British General Staff, the supreme body of military-strategic and military-political planning of the country, sent a report to the government entitled "The Security of the British Empire", which substantiated the thesis that in the post-war period the Soviet The Union represents a security threat to the British Empire and is the main adversary of the Western countries. British military strategists recommended that the country's leadership strengthen relations with the United States in order to create a system of military-political blocs directed against the USSR, surround it with a network of military bases, isolate

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to organize by creating a system of regional organizations, to use the UN and other international organizations for these purposes. It was a strategy and tactic that had been thought out for a long time in the fight against the Soviet Union.

Foreign intelligence received the summary of this report, and then the entire document.

Churchill's speech on March 5, 1946 in Fulton, declaring the Soviet Union the successor of the "fascist enemy", and the so-called "Truman Doctrine", proclaimed a year later, justifying the US right to provide military and political assistance to third countries in the fight against "Soviet totalitarianism", confirmed the conclusions of intelligence about the course of the West towards confrontation.

Under the new conditions, the importance of information obtained by intelligence has increased. It was extremely important to reveal the secret military-political plans of the USA and England in relation to the Soviet Union, to highlight the progress of the Anglo-American negotiations regarding actions in the event of a military clash with the USSR, the development of rearmament plans, the creation of NATO and other military political blocs. . But the main task of foreign intelligence in the post-war years, set by the country's leadership, was to keep in view the preparation of a military attack on the Soviet Union with the use of nuclear weapons. As the information received in those years, including documentary evidence, shows, such plans were developed by the military circles of the USA and England.

Along with this, tasks were set for information support of current issues of the foreign policy of the Soviet state. Among them, for example, obtaining information about the plans of the Western powers on the German issue, coverage of crisis situations related to the problems of West Berlin, the Middle East, and the collapse of the colonial system.

To solve such important tasks, it was necessary to improve intelligence, its structure, organization of management and methods of conducting work. In 1947-1953, military and political intelligence services were restructured to increase the efficiency of their activities and to search for optimal forms of control in the face of increasing confrontational tendencies.

On May 30, 1947, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution on the establishment of the Information Committee (CI) under the Council of Ministers, which was entrusted with the tasks of political, military, and scientific and technical intelligence. As a result, the intelligence services of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Defense were merged into a single body headed by V.M. Molotov, who at that time was Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and at the same time Minister of Foreign Affairs. An experienced man was appointed his deputy, who was in charge of the foreign intelligence sector.

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kist, who in the past led the work of the intelligence and counterintelligence units of the Ministry of State Security, P.V. Fedotov. Ya.A. Malik, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and F.F. Kuznetsov from the Ministry of Defense. They represented the interests of their departments in the Committee.

Such a structure, as conceived by the reformers, was supposed to contribute to better coordination of various intelligence units, focusing their efforts on the main areas, and most importantly, would make it possible to put intelligence under the direct control of the country's leadership. Abroad, in the explored countries, the institute of chief residents was created. They had to ensure greater focus on the activities of "legal" residencies based on the foreign policy guidelines of the Soviet government.

In this status, the Information Committee existed until February 1949, when, after the departure of V.M. Molotov from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Committee was transferred under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the new Minister of Foreign Affairs A.Ya. Vyshinsky. He did not remain in charge of the CI for long. In the same year, 1949, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V.A. Zorin. S.R. became the first deputy responsible for the current operational work of intelligence. Savchenko, who previously headed the Ministry of State Security of Ukraine. P.V. Fedotov remained one of the vice-chairmen of the CI and continued to be engaged in the operational activities of foreign intelligence.

During its functioning, the Committee of Information has improved the activities of the central intelligence apparatus and residencies, strengthened them with experienced employees, prepared intelligence agencies for work in the post-war situation, including in new areas of the world where intelligence had not yet worked in full force.

At a certain stage, the creation of the Information Committee helped to increase the efficiency of intelligence activities. However, the unification of its various departments within the framework of one body, with all the advantages, made it difficult to manage the work of military and foreign intelligence intelligence, which was so specific in terms of methods of activity. Already in January 1949, the government decided to withdraw military intelligence information from the Committee. She was returned to the Ministry of Defense. In January 1951, a decision was made to unite foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence under the leadership of the Ministry of State Security and to create unified residencies abroad.

The Committee of Information as an intelligence body ceased to exist. Foreign intelligence became the First Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security. In 1949-1953 her
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whether in turn S.R. Savchenko, V.S. Rysnaya, and from 1953 to 1955 - A.S. Panyushkin. In 1956, A.M. was appointed head of intelligence. Sakharovsky, who remained in this post until 1971

of the year.

The struggle in the leadership of the country that followed the death of Stalin in March 1953 had a negative impact on the activities of foreign intelligence. Beria, who was striving for sole power, carried out reorganizations and purges that were not justified from the point of view of the interests of intelligence work. Many

the operatives of the "legal" residencies were recalled, some of them were fired; the network of agents was "cleansed", communication with a number of sources was terminated. This led to their loss for intelligence.

After the removal of Beria, instructions from the country's leadership to restore the life of the intelligence service followed. In March 1954, the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a detailed decision on ways to improve the activities of security agencies, a radical restructuring of their work, the eradication of previously used illegal methods, reliance on the public, and accountability to state and party bodies. By decision of the government in March 1954, the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was formed, foreign intelligence became part of it as the First Main Directorate (PSU KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR).

Important for intelligence was the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU of June 30, 1954 "On measures to strengthen the intelligence work of state security agencies abroad." It was proposed to concentrate efforts on the organization of intelligence in the main countries of the West - the USA and England, as well as on "the countries used by them to fight against the Soviet Union, primarily West Germany, France, Austria, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Japan". That was the list of priorities at that time, determined by the country's leadership.

The Council of Ministers approved the Regulations on the First Main Directorate of the KGB, which secured its right to conduct intelligence activities abroad, determined the structure of foreign intelligence, its functions, tasks, staffing. The relevant departments were charged with the duty to allocate cover positions both abroad and within the USSR, to provide assistance, strictly observing the requirements of secrecy.

The normative documents adopted in 1954 served as the main legal basis for the work of foreign intelligence for many years.

The decisions of the directive bodies also provided for measures to improve the training of intelligence officers.

In September 1948, by decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Committee of Information ordered the creation of its Higher Intelligence School (HRS) on the basis of the Intelligence School (RS) that existed at that time. The order emphasized that the main

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The School's dacha should be the training of highly qualified foreign intelligence personnel capable of performing tasks in the new, post-war conditions.

Intelligence officers, the order stated, should not only be able to conduct political, economic, scientific and technical intelligence at a high professional level, carry out counterintelligence work abroad, but, according to the level of their training, be able to occupy responsible positions in diplomatic, military diplomatic, trade and other Soviet missions and institutions in foreign countries.

It was a fundamentally new approach to the issue of personnel training: to teach not only the art of intelligence, but also to prepare for work in the field of external relations.

With the creation of the Information Committee, the recruitment system for foreign intelligence has changed somewhat. As before, students of the School were selected by the personnel apparatus according to a special apportionment and were personally approved in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. However, now, along with employees of the security agencies, much larger numbers of employees of party and Soviet bodies, foreign policy departments, and graduates of higher educational institutions, mostly those who went through the war, began to be sent to intelligence. As a result, the general educational and cultural level of the recruited personnel has risen sharply.

In accordance with the new tasks, the teaching staff of the School was strengthened. Along with experienced scouts, it was replenished with specialists in country studies, international relations, lawyers, and teachers of Western and Eastern languages. The material and technical base was also significantly strengthened. Library funds received a large number of units of special and open, mainly regional studies, literature in various languages.

N.F. headed the Higher Intelligence School during these years. Malanichev (1948-1950), V.V. Gridnev (1950-1960) and A.V. Tishkov (1960-1967).

By the end of World War II, intelligence was well positioned to obtain classified information on many political and military issues affecting the country's security. She had a particularly strong position in England, where the "Cambridge Five" had access to the documents of the main state institutions of the country, including the Foreign Ministry and the secret services.

With the end of the war, the situation began to change. Foreign intelligence had to carry out the tasks set by the country's leadership in a far from simple situation. Some sources have lost their opportunities, others have moved away from cooperation, believing that with the defeat of fascism they have fulfilled their tasks. There were also those who did not dare to continue cooperation with Soviet intelligence under the conditions of times

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the anti-Soviet campaign returned with the beginning of the Cold War, fanning spy mania and intimidation with the "threat of communism".

Foreign intelligence did a large-scale and complex job of creating a practically new intelligence apparatus, penetrating new facilities, primarily the headquarters and command and control bodies of the military-political blocs created against the Soviet Union, and deploying its network in countries where it had not previously worked.

Ultimately, intelligence managed to solve these problems. The anti-fascist basis in working with sources was increasingly replaced by ideas of common interests in the struggle for peace, disarmament, the prohibition of testing and proliferation of atomic weapons, against the creation of military political blocs and the deployment of foreign military bases on foreign territories, in support of the national liberation struggle. colonial peoples.

The increase in the volume and importance of information raised the issue of further improvement of information and analytical work for foreign intelligence. An independent information division was created in 1943. The complexity of the international situation, the transience and multifactorial nature of its development required a comprehensive analysis, re-verification and generalization of the information received.

Much credit for this belongs to F.A. Skryagin - a man of great natural intelligence, insight, and a developed sense of duty. He managed to create a reliable backbone of the information service from the most trained analysts who deeply knew the problems of international relations.

Thanks to the efforts of foreign intelligence, the Soviet leadership was well informed about the main stages of the secret negotiations between the United States, Britain, France and the Benelux countries on the creation of the Western Union, NATO, the economic integration of Western Europe on the basis of the Marshall Plan, on the formation in violation of the Yalta and the Potsdam Accords of the Federal Republic of Germany and its inclusion in NATO.

Intelligence was aware of the plans and activities of the governing bodies of NATO. In particular, documentary evidence was obtained of the existence in NATO of plans for nuclear strikes against the USSR, indicating the cities to be destroyed, military, industrial and other targets, with the calculation of the number of nuclear charges needed to destroy them.

The reader can learn about this in published essays. The closeness of the described events to our days does not allow the authors of a number of published materials to mention the methods of obtaining that information, unique in its top-secret content, that was obtained by Soviet intelligence in those years.

In a number of cases, the authors are forced to confine themselves to characterizing the informational significance of intelligence stored in the archives.

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ki documents of those years. However, even in this form, materials written on the basis of archival materials, some of which were declassified by intelligence and published for the first time in the appendix, give reason to conclude that the foreign policy measures of the Soviet government after World War II, aimed at ensuring security of the USSR arose from the developing situation and were a response to the actions of former partners in the anti-Hitler

coalitions.

Complex and large-scale tasks were set for foreign intelligence in connection with the collapse of the colonial system that began in the post-war period and the global activation of various forms of the national liberation movement. The Soviet leadership considered the struggle of the peoples of the colonial countries for their independence as part of the world revolutionary process, which weakened the position of the West in the confrontation between the two world systems during the Cold War. Based on the principles of its foreign policy, the Soviet Union provided assistance to the national liberation parties and movements of the peoples of the colonial countries and supported them in international organizations. At the initiative of the USSR, in January 1960, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial and Dependent Countries and legalized external assistance to the struggle of the peoples of the colonial countries.

In order to help the national liberation movements, the country's leadership needed information about the situation in them, about the policy of the West towards them. These tasks were assigned to foreign intelligence. It had to create new divisions in its structure, open residencies in countries in which it had not previously worked, master cover positions, train specialists in order to provide the country's leadership, which determines policy in the field of supporting anti-colonial movements, with a flow of information about the course of the liberation struggle of the peoples of the colonial countries, their leading parties and movements, their ideological and foreign policy orientation, influence among the masses, real opportunities to fight and gain power, and the work of Western countries to infiltrate the liberation movements in order to - orientation.

In those cases when the liberation organizations were forced to operate under conditions of underground and active opposition from the colonial authorities and their secret services, maintaining regular contacts with their leaders was entrusted to intelligence, which was supposed to carry out constant political work with them, transfer them materials. It was not in the full sense of the intelligence work. But the fulfillment of the tasks of the leadership on relations with organizations operating in the underground and their leaders required organization, composure and operational skill from intelligence.

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stva. The responsibility was high. Failures sometimes threatened with serious political consequences.

The confrontation during the Cold War was accompanied by the deployment of information wars on an unprecedented scale before. Soviet intelligence was faced with the task of countering, by specific methods and means, the threats arising from the activities of the West directed against the interests of the Soviet Union.

This kind of activity, which had the conditional name "active measures", later - "assistance actions", was further developed in the post-war years. Until 1959, however, there was no unit in the structure of foreign intelligence that would coordinate the work on the preparation and conduct of active measures. This task was solved by geographical (linear) intelligence units using the residencies supervised by them.

In January 1959, the country's leadership decided to create a department "D" in foreign intelligence, which was entrusted with the tasks of preparing and conducting active measures abroad. It was headed by an experienced intelligence officer I.I. Agayants. Subsequently, department "D" was constantly expanding, and in 1962 it was transformed into service "A".

The information, theses, and documents prepared by department "D" (service "A") were brought to the addressees using the means available to intelligence. Over the two post-war decades to which this volume is devoted, foreign intelligence carried out a significant number of actions that had a significant impact on foreign policy processes.

Illegal intelligence made notable progress after the war. The whole world knows the names of Soviet illegal intelligence officers of the Republic of Ingushetia. Abel, K.T. Young, the spouses Morris and Leontina Cohen and a number of others. This is far from exhausting their number, and, of course, not all of them can be discussed. Today.

Until 1954, there was no unit in the structure of foreign intelligence that would develop the enemy's special services and ensure the security of the intelligence activities of the residencies. In June 1954, such a unit was created. The concentration of counterintelligence work within a single unit staffed by experienced officers has borne fruit. Foreign counterintelligence managed to achieve tangible results. Some of them can already be said today. Thus, an agent of foreign counterintelligence, acquired in the apparatus of the US Department of Justice, for several years of cooperation handed over to Soviet intelligence about five thousand copies of documents on the work of the FBI against citizens and institutions of the USSR in the United States.

An extensive network of American and British intelligence agencies operated on the territory of West Germany, occupying

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engaged in recruiting work against Soviet citizens. However, their leaders did not know that this activity was controlled by Soviet intelligence through agents embedded in their network. Only one of the sources provided documentary data on several hundred American agents involved in the recruitment of Soviet citizens.

A large amount of materials on the structure, personnel and operational activities of the British and US intelligence agencies, including the deployment of agents to the territory of the USSR and to the countries of people's democracy, was received from Kim Philby. His information made it possible to take measures to prevent a number of failures.

Another valuable source of foreign counterintelligence was the British intelligence officer George Blake. On the basis of the materials received from him, dozens of British agents were exposed, and the operations of British and American intelligence services to eavesdrop on the communication lines of Soviet troops in Berlin and Austria were thwarted.

During the years of the Cold War, the scientific and technical direction of foreign intelligence acquired special significance for strengthening the country's defense capability and ensuring its security. In the middle of 1945, in order to concentrate the efforts and coordinate the work of all branches of the apparatus producing the relevant information for solving the main tasks, the department of scientific and technical intelligence was transformed into an independent department, which later became a department. The NTR was staffed with personnel not only with experience

intelligence activities, but also specialists in various fields of science and technology. The combination of operational experience and specialist knowledge led to positive results.

The main task of the scientific and technical direction of foreign intelligence throughout the entire post-war period was to keep in view the military-technical measures of the West to create conditions for a surprise attack on the USSR.

In order to prevent a breakthrough of a potential adversary in the field of armaments, scientific and technical intelligence carefully monitored the possible emergence in the West of fundamentally new solutions in the field of improving nuclear missile weapons and means of protection against it, conducted a search and development of non-traditional types of weapons of mass defeat, revealed the direction of development of the military scientific and technical thought of the United States and its NATO allies.

The Scientific and Technical Revolution carried out active intelligence work in the interests of national economic problems. She followed the development of new trends in world fundamental and applied science; individual scientific and technological achievements that qualitatively changed the technological base of the economy; using its intelligence and operational capabilities, it obtained secret information about ongoing research and development in the capitalist countries,

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aimed at creating fundamentally new and improving traditional technological processes, materials and equipment, which was of considerable interest to the national economy of the country. There were years when foreign intelligence sent tens of thousands of information materials to the national economy, including samples of the latest Western technology, promising new materials, strains, and so on.

In the early 1960s, there was a sharp aggravation of Soviet-American relations, caused by the difference in the positions of the parties in relation to Cuba. The United States continued to view Cuba as part of the Latin American world, within the zone of direct US interests.

Soon after the elimination of Batista's rule in Cuba, Soviet intelligence increasingly began to receive information indicating that the American government was preparing measures to overthrow the revolutionary regime in Cuba by the forces of Cuban emigrants through direct military intervention with the help of the United States. Intelligence knew about President Kennedy's plan for an armed invasion of Cuba, the date and possible location of the invasion.

After the failure of the Playa Giron operation, foreign intelligence received information about the preparations for a new, wider invasion of Cuba with the participation of American regular troops.

The Soviet leadership, as a measure of deterrence and assistance to Cuba in defense against external aggression, made a joint decision with the Cuban authorities to station a Soviet military contingent on the island and transfer medium-range tactical missiles there.

Having received in October 1962 air reconnaissance data on the transfer of Soviet missiles and Il-28 bombers to Cuba, the American leadership began to openly prepare an invasion of Cuba and in a harsh manner demanded the withdrawal of Soviet missiles.

Relations between the USSR and the USA escalated to the limit. At this critical moment, Soviet foreign intelligence not only provided the country's leadership with secret information about the US position, but also facilitated an informal exchange of views between the conflicting parties in search of a mutually acceptable compromise. The United States, as you know, abandoned plans to intervene in Cuba, and the Soviet Union withdrew its missiles.

The resolution of the Caribbean crisis, as it were, drew a line under the period of growing escalation of tension in international relations. There has come a period called "detente".

The confrontation between the two world blocks, although it continued, but in other forms.

A new direction in the activities of foreign intelligence in the post-war years was its cooperation with intelligence agencies of the countries of the socialist community. It originated as becoming in them

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state structures, the emergence and strengthening of security agencies, which, following the example of the Soviet Union, included foreign intelligence services. At first, this cooperation was mostly one-sided. This was assistance, mainly advisory, in the creation and strengthening of the intelligence agencies of the young socialist states, the transfer of accumulated experience to them, assistance in training personnel, equipping them with operational equipment.

Cooperation between the intelligence agencies of the socialist countries has gone a long and complicated way from simple forms of information exchange to complex joint operations in all areas of intelligence activity, including undercover work to infiltrate objects of intelligence interest. From year to year it became more and more profound, purposeful and mutually beneficial. Improved operational efficiency and effectiveness. In essence and form, it was the interaction of equal special services of friendly states. It met the interests of these countries and contributed to the strengthening of their foreign policy positions in the world.

In the preparation of the volume, mainly archives were used, as well as documents and materials published in our country and abroad. Many of the authors are witnesses or participants in the events of the post-war years. Participation in what was happening in the life of the country made it possible to keep the freshness of impressions, and acquaintance with archival information made it possible to take a deeper look at this dramatic period of national history.

In the archives of foreign intelligence, among the directives of the country's leadership that determined its activities and set tasks for it, among the reports of the intelligence leadership on its activities, nothing was found that would indicate that the Soviet leadership had any aggressive plans.

The Soviet Union, as noted, provided assistance to politically close foreign parties, organizations, movements, supported friendly states, often using the capabilities of foreign intelligence. In the post-war years, this was a common practice in many states. The same United States and Western countries supported nationalist movements in various regions of our country, dissident movements and their leaders. The task of foreign intelligence was to counteract these activities of Western countries.

At the same time, the information obtained by intelligence testified to the presence of a real threat to the security of the USSR. Secret documents were obtained from government, political and military circles in England, the USA, and other NATO countries, testifying to real military preparations against the USSR, the creation of a military

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political blocs, military bases, planning atomic and nuclear strikes, creating unfavorable conditions for the economic development of the USSR.

As early as 1948, foreign intelligence received information about the intentions of the United States, Britain and France to link the possibility of the West granting loans to the Soviet Union on terms that would put the economy of the USSR under the control of Western capital. Documentary information about the position of the American leadership on the issue of granting loans to the Soviet Union said, for example: <... with regard to a loan in the amount of 6 billion, it is assumed that the USSR will hardly be able to receive such a loan. Even if

the US government will agree to provide the USSR with such a loan, it will provide it by installments in separate loans, so that in exchange for each loan the US government could receive some political concessions. At the same time, there will be no guarantees that, having received one part of the loan, the USSR will be able to receive the remaining parts. The provision of such periodic loans will be subject to negotiation each time."

The authors express the hope that, after reading the materials of the fifth volume of essays, the reader will be able to form his own opinion on the question of who bears the main responsibility for the cold war, which for almost half a century hindered the development of normal, good neighborly relations in the world.

The published essays do not claim to be a chronicle of all the accomplishments of foreign intelligence for the designated period. Nevertheless, they reflect the most significant moments of activity aimed at ensuring the external security of the Soviet state.

As in previous essays, some surnames and pseudonyms, names of institutions and places of action have been changed for reasons of secrecy. But the factual basis of events has been preserved and documented.

The excerpts from documents cited in the fifth volume, to which there are no special references, are taken from the archival files of the SVR.

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Cold War: Origins and Consequences

The term "cold war" expresses the state of confrontation of the West against the Soviet Union, which does not turn into a military conflict after the victory over Nazi Germany. Schematically, the period of international relations under this name lasted in its most striking manifestations until the mid-60s of the twentieth century. One can argue to what extent it is completed and whether it is completed in terms of geopolitics in general. But the answer to this question lies with political scientists. This essay is devoted to intelligence and aims to highlight the most acute confrontation between the former allies, relying primarily on documents preserved in the intelligence archives.

The importance of the period itself, its turning point for the entire system of relations between East and West, cannot be disputed. There is no doubt that in a very short period of time, these relations, from cooperation and successful joint actions to crush the most dangerous attempt for humanity to establish world domination by Germany, Italy and Japan, as well as their satellites, grew into rivalry and hostility, which more than once put peace to the brink of a new conflict.

Therefore, it seems essential to identify the reasons behind such a sharp and dangerous turn in history, as well as to trace the main consequences that followed from this for the Soviet Union - and not only for it - in the military-political, economic, psychological and other areas.

This will help clarify, in particular, the question of which side is more responsible for the Cold War and its "hot" reflections.

Like every turn, the transition to the Cold War was brewing in advance and in secret. It is no secret that only the extreme degree of the threat from fascism united the Soviet Union during the war.

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Union, England and the USA - countries with different socio-political systems. The leader of England at that time, Winston Churchill, made no secret of his hostility to the USSR.

even in the early stages of its existence participated in the organization of interventions against it. And US President Harry Truman, being a senator at the time of the German attack on the USSR, publicly expressed the wish that both sides "kill each other as much as possible." Only in the event that the Nazis began to gain the upper hand, he admitted the possibility of helping the Russians.

The war, the Nazi-fascist aggression dampened but did not eliminate the antagonism. This found expression, for example, in the procrastination by the United States and Britain for three long years of opening a second front, in the struggle for spheres of political influence in liberated Europe.

However, hostility towards the eastern ally reached its apogee in two documents: "Memorandum 121" in the USA and "Unthinkable Plan" by Churchill. "Memorandum 121" was drawn up in August 1943 by the head of the US Office of Strategic Services, William J. Donovan, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that is, the highest military leadership of the US, and was submitted to the US President for consideration. The "Memorandum" outlined the possible directions of strategy and policy "with respect to Germany and Russia." Its third point was: "Try to turn against Russia the whole power of undefeated Germany, still ruled by the Nazis or generals."

"This," it went on, "will probably lead to the conquest of the Soviet Union by that same powerful and aggressive Germany that declared war against Russia and against us in 1941."

The "Memorandum" also considered the directions of the policy of the USA and England in such a development of events: "In order to prevent the subsequent domination of Germany over the entire power of Europe, we, together with Great Britain, will be obliged, after the conquest of Russia by Germany, to take up again and without Russia's help for the difficult, if not impossible, task of defeating Germany." It was also taken into account that in the USA and Great Britain "public opinion is decisively mobilized against Germany".

Hence the conclusion: it is still preferable to achieve the defeat of Hitler's Germany, but at the same time to carry out "some kind of settlement hostile to the interests of Russia."

This recommendation was given shortly before the meeting between US President Roosevelt and Churchill in Quebec, where the issue of opening a second front was to be finally decided. And although, after three years of delays, Washington and London finally agreed to a landing in France, they at the same time planned to infringe on the interests of the USSR-Russia, that is, lay mines under further relations with it.

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Stalin was fully informed by foreign intelligence about the decisions planned and adopted by the USA and England in Quebec. As regards, in particular, "Memorandum 121", it can now be found in a collection of documents declassified in 1978 by the Americans.

To implement his plans to "damage Russia", Churchill instructed the military to develop and submit to him a plan for an Anglo-American attack on the Soviet Union together with the Germans immediately after the end of the Allied war with Germany. This plan was reported to the Prime Minister of Great Britain on May 22, 1945, 14 days after the capitulation of the Nazis. It provided for a joint attack on the Soviet troops on July 1, 1945! 10 German divisions and 47 divisions of the USA and England were to fall on the unexpected troops of the Soviet ally. Intelligence had information about the military preparations already begun by the Allies after the surrender of Germany. In particular, many Germans were employed in the reconstruction and construction of airfields. A large number of fighters and bombers were based on them, ready for combat. Some parts of the German army retained their formations, including units of the SS troops, were not disarmed. They were housed in the barracks, received American food rations and salaries.

The plan's code name, "Unthinkable Operation," fit the bill perfectly. The purpose of the operation was "to force Russia to submit to the will of the United States and the British Empire." Poland was designated as the central arena of hostilities with the expectation of supporting the anti-Soviet armed forces in Poland itself. It was planned to conduct the main tank battle to the west of the Oder-Neisse line before the onset of winter.

The plan was then submitted to the Chiefs of Staff, Britain's highest military authority.

In October 1998, this monstrous plan was declassified and the materials of the British National Archives were published. What was the further fate of the plan? On June 8, 1945, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff A. Brook and the Chiefs of Staff of the Navy and Air Force sent their opinion to Churchill. After weighing the ratio of forces and technology, they came to the conclusion: "Achieving a quick limited success will be beyond our capabilities, and we will be drawn into a long war against superior forces."

By that time, starting from July 5, 1945, the demobilization of the personnel of the army and navy of the USSR began to be carried out, its number was reduced from 11 to less than 3 million. The number of troops in East Germany, Poland, Romania and other countries significantly decreased, released as a result of military actions of the Soviet Union.

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The USSR suffered huge losses in World War II. The main industrial areas of the country in the occupied territories were devastated, cities and villages were destroyed and burned. Under these conditions, the main task facing the country and its leadership was the restoration of the economy, the revival of all the lands that had suffered from the war.

For the USSR, therefore, the most important task was to prevent fascist revenge, to ensure the security of its borders both in the West and in the East, to prevent the militarization of Germany, and to preserve the generally favorable situation created by the victorious end of the world conflict for our country. This included the desire to establish friendly regimes in neighboring states liberated by the Soviet Army.

The terms of the post-war arrangement agreed at Yalta and Potsdam during the summit meetings of the leaders of the great powers favored the achievement of these goals. At the same time, the division of Germany, then Korea and Vietnam, attempts to isolate the USSR, to surround it with a network of military-political blocs placed on Soviet intelligence the difficult tasks of monitoring the situation and identifying the intentions of former partners.

And the West? For him, the cardinal line was to revise the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, especially on Germany, to counter the efforts of the USSR to create friendly regimes in the countries of Eastern Europe, to form military alliances for this purpose for political and political purposes.

military pressure.

Western researchers, as a rule, make the USSR responsible for the confrontation with the West, or tend to the thesis that the US and the USSR are equally responsible for the start of the Cold War.

What, however, do the archival materials of the Soviet intelligence of that time say?

Information obtained by foreign intelligence shows that after the war, Washington proceeded from the fact that the United States was the only state that had surplus resources, and sought to use this factor as efficiently as possible to secure its leading position in world politics. and the economy. To this end, they wanted to limit as much as possible the authority and influence of the USSR in the countries of Europe, which had grown as a result of the victory over fascism.

As can be seen from intelligence documents, the former partners of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition were gradually moving towards putting forward the slogan of "fighting the Soviet threat". Immediately after the end of the Second World War, public opinion in the West was favorable to the Soviet Union, and harsh attacks against it would have been doomed to failure. US President Roosevelt until his death in April 1945

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believed in the realism of the concept of ensuring post-war peace and security through the concerted efforts of the great powers, including the Soviet Union.

However, then anti-Soviet tendencies in the United States took over. As noted already in early 1943 in an intelligence report to the Soviet government, the US State Department began to form assumptions that "the real winner in the war could be the USSR and, as a result, Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia and the Balkans could be the Soviet system was established.

In December 1945, intelligence informed the Soviet leadership about the statements of the US military attaché appointed to the USSR, Major General Frank Roberts, whose point of view, according to him, was shared by the "top US leadership":

"... All the military, who know the real situation, are convinced that right now or in the near future, democracy must destroy every kind of dictatorship, wherever it exists ... The Russians are so tired, so hungry that even those of them who will not understand the truth, will lose heart and will not be able to resist.

That is why the war must not be postponed, especially since we have the greatest weapon of our era, the atomic bomb, while the Russians do not."

The London Foreign Intelligence Station received the text of Foreign Minister Eden's secret report "On Policy towards Russia" dated January 1942. The British minister then expressed fear about the possibility of such an increase in the prestige of the USSR after the war, in which "Moscow in European politics would cease to reckon with the interests of England and the United States."

On November 6, 1945, foreign intelligence reported to Stalin the memorandum "The Security of the British Empire", prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the British General Staff in June of the same year, that is, even before the Potsdam Conference, when the USSR and England were in allied relations. The memorandum defined the USSR as the main adversary of Great Britain and recommended to the government a number of measures to neutralize the "Soviet threat". Among them are the establishment of "special relations with the United States", their involvement in the defense of Western Europe, the creation of military-political blocs and military bases in Europe and other regions of the world.

"... The British Empire and the United States," the memorandum said, "will maintain the same unity in the field of basic defense issues that is observed now. We have no such ties with the USSR... The USSR proved that it had a military potential that could pose a serious threat to the British Empire..."

In March 1946, ex-Prime Minister Churchill, in the presence of President Truman, spoke in the United States at Westminster College.

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in Fulton with a speech that has since been regarded as a manifesto of the cold war. Intelligence knew that Churchill had coordinated his speech with Truman in advance, and therefore both of them were co-sponsors of the call to "lead the anti-communist crusade of Christian Democracy."

Here are excerpts from Churchill's speech at Fulton:

"I deeply admire and honor the valiant Russian people and my wartime comrade Marshal Stalin ... We understand that the Russians must feel safe on their western borders from any renewal of German aggression," said the author of "Inconceivable Operation", planned against the Russians immediately after the war. Later on, however, the tone of the speech tightened: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain descended on the continent... From what I observed among our Russian allies during the war, I was convinced that the Russians were the most - they admire strength, and there is nothing for which they would have less respect than military weakness.

Churchill proposed to abandon the doctrine of the "balance of power" and called for a "fraternal association of peoples who speak the English language." "It signifies a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire on the one hand, and the United States ~ on the other." He called for the joint use of "all naval and air bases belonging to both countries throughout the world. This, perhaps, would double the mobility of the American fleet and aviation..." And so on in the sense of increasing military and political pressure on the "valiant Russian" and other peoples friendly to him.

British Foreign Secretary Bevin formulated this strategic plan somewhat later at a meeting with his Western colleagues. Judging by the secret transcript received by Soviet intelligence, he focused the attention of his interlocutors on the fact that "expansion from the East is not only communist, but also Slavic" and that "it is impossible to put up with Slavic activity in the future."

Allegations of the threat of "expansion from the East" were for the West a screen behind which military preparations unfolded. In April 1946, intelligence sent a message to the Soviet leadership about the intensified dissemination in European states of statements about the upcoming war between England and the United States against the USSR. In most cases, it was said that this war would begin as early as 1946.

The report noted that British and American representatives were playing an active role in spreading rumors about the impending war against the Soviet Union. Thus, the US ambassador to Spain, in a conversation with the head of the regime, General Franco, asked whether he could

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Madrid to allocate 1 million people in case of war with the Soviet Union (Franco promised to allocate 2 million). The head of the US military mission in Bucharest, General Skyler, at meetings with local and foreign representatives, did not rule out the start of hostilities against the USSR in 1946.

Intelligence information also emphasized that in the political arena of the states liberated by the Red Army, forces began to appear that were interested in a military clash between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. Thus, in Poland, the anti-government underground was actively engaged in propaganda about the need to prepare for war. It was argued that the United States and England would attack the USSR, using, in particular, Anders' army. In turn, the London Polish government associated its plans for the future primarily with a probable conflict between the Western Allies and the USSR. new weapon.

The conclusion of intelligence about the transition of the United States and its Western allies to a policy of "from a position of strength" in relation to the USSR was correct. The intelligence archive contains a copy of the British Foreign Office memorandum of July 1945 on the country's foreign policy after the victory in Europe, which stated: "The Soviet Union is so weakened that Stalin is unlikely to be able to carry out his policy of ideological penetration by force. ... It is safe to say that he cannot go to another war in Europe." In the memorandum of the British Foreign Office dated October 1948 for the government delegation at the conference of the countries of the British

Commonwealth stated: "There are no signs that the Soviet Union or its satellites are preparing for an aggressive war." Thus, the policy of the West "from a position of strength" cannot be regarded as an adequate response to the plans or actions of the USSR.

Of particular interest in this regard are the Western intelligence agencies' assessments of the "Soviet threat" after the appearance of atomic weapons in the USSR. For example, the weekly summary of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the US High Commissioner in Germany dated December 30, 1949 stated: "Despite the possession of the atomic bomb, the Soviet Union does not intend to take military action against the West at the present time, but will continue its well-developed tactics of political struggle. A report dated January 20, 1950 noted that "the post-war construction of the armed forces of the satellite countries of the USSR was too unsystematic in order to have reason to agree with the provision on unified planning ... There are no signs that the Soviet Union wants or is trying to implement interaction between the armed forces of the satellites.

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The US government, guided by the "Truman Doctrine" proclaimed in March 1947, which affirmed the right of the United States to provide military and political assistance to third countries in the fight against "Soviet totalitarianism", set a course for creating a network of military blocs aimed at the USSR . The resumption of US-English-Canadian military cooperation, the conclusion of the Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk (1947) on security issues, as well as the formation of the Western Union (1948) were the main stages in the military unification of Western countries under the auspices of the United States .

In April 1949, the North Atlantic bloc was created with the participation of the USA, Canada and initially ten Western European countries. At the same time, at one of the final meetings of Western representatives in Washington to prepare the NATO treaty, the transcript of which became the property of Soviet intelligence, it was emphasized that "although at the moment there are no grounds for the assumption that the Soviet government is planning a military aggression, we must unite and proceed from the fact that the USSR is an irreconcilable enemy of Western civilization.

Recall that the Warsaw Pact Organization was established in 1955, six years after the creation of NATO.

With the creation of NATO, the West brought the cold war into an acute phase, the development of plans for a nuclear war by the members of the bloc against the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe began. Thus, one of the military scenarios, code-named "Dropshot" from 1949, provided for the use of hundreds of atomic bombs to disable the military and industrial potential of the USSR. Almost 250 divisions with a total strength of more than 6 million military personnel of the NATO countries were to eventually occupy the territory of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It was envisaged then to launch a powerful offensive by the United States and its allies in the Far East and Southeast Asia, primarily against China and Korea. The victory of the revolution in China in 1949, where the United States and Britain lost their former strong positions, aroused additional concern in the West and a desire to speed up military-political preparations.

Intelligence received information about a very symptomatic reaction of NATO to the departure from the political arena of I.V. Stalin. At a closed session of the Council of the North Atlantic bloc in April 1953, US Secretary of State Dulles declared that "nothing should be changed in our plans," despite the changes in the Kremlin.

In the 1950s, pursuing a "bloc" policy, the Western states organized the military-political alliance of ANZUS (USA, Australia, New Zealand), the European Defense Community (France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg), SEATO

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(USA, England, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Philippines and Pakistan) and the Baghdad Pact (England, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan). Efforts were made towards close coordination and actual subordination of their activities to the North Atlantic bloc.

This was followed by the involvement of the Federal Republic of Germany into the militaristic orbit of NATO. Thanks to the agent positions of Soviet intelligence in the FRG, the USSR had a clear idea of Bonn's plans. In particular, it was known that Chancellor Adenauer persistently demanded the admission of the FRG to NATO, promising in return, among other things, to intensify subversive work against the socialist countries from West German territory: to expand the American-German center of "psychological warfare" in Munich, to strengthen activities hostile to the USSR by various emigrant formations, to carry out the dropping of paratroopers-saboteurs into the USSR, Czechoslovakia, etc.

The German problem, as one of the key contradictions of the Cold War, was multifaceted. It included differences between the former allies on the issues of denazification and demilitarization of Germany, the prevention of conditions for the revival of revanchist campaigns from its territory in the future, the legal consolidation of post-war German borders, the determination of the prospects for reunification of the country, and a number of other issues. At the same time, the violation of the Potsdam agreements by the United States, Britain and France caused direct damage to the security interests of the Soviet Union, which, even in tense moments of the Cold War, firmly advocated the implementation of the decisions of the Potsdam Conference on the German issue.

Evidence of this is the assessment given by Britain's High Commissioner in Germany, Kirkpatrick, in a confidential message to Foreign Minister Eden. He pointed out that "the Russians had a constant tendency to follow in their zone the activities of the Western Allies in their zones. The establishment of the German Bizonal Economic Administration in Frankfurt in May 1947 was accompanied by the establishment in February 1948 of the German Economic Commission. After the implementation of the currency reform in the western zones in June 1948, the currency reform in the Soviet zone was carried out almost immediately. Following the creation of the Supreme Allied Commission in 1949, the Soviet Control Commission was established. After the creation of the Federal Republic, the GDR was formed."

The Western powers, securing the status of a full member of NATO for the FRG, simultaneously developed cooperation within the bloc and intensified the cold war, so that, according to Churchill, "the symptoms of disintegration appeared in the Soviet bloc in 10-15 years."

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In an effort to extract the maximum political advantage from the Yugoslav-Soviet disagreements, the United States and Britain in the early 1950s were preparing for the creation of a military-political bloc consisting of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Soviet intelligence received information that, in particular, Eden and US Secretary of Defense Pace went to Belgrade for special talks on this issue. Turkish Foreign Minister Kepreli met secretly with the Yugoslav ambassador in Paris, proposing the formation of a "continuous front of the Alps-Dardanelles".

Belgrade, however, did not agree to conclude a pact under the auspices of NATO, guided primarily by internal political considerations. In addition, Italy reacted negatively, which was afraid of a decrease in its role in the region in the event of a new bloc being created, a decrease in the volume of American assistance to Rome in this regard, as well as an unfavorable solution to the territorial issue of Trieste.

Simultaneously with military preparations, the United States stepped up covert measures "in the field of economic, political and psychological warfare in order to provoke and support unrest and uprisings in selected strategically important satellite countries" (meaning the allies of the USSR - Ed.), as well as "to carry out internal early changes in the Soviet system", acting in accordance with the directive of the National Security Council-68. In 1951, former US Chargé d'Affaires in the USSR Kennan revealed the meaning of the changes desired by the West: the elimination of the Soviet

authorities, the formation of "capitalist, liberal-democratic Russia", the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, primarily by tearing away the Baltic states and Ukraine, undermining the union of the USSR with the countries of Eastern Europe!.

The American ruling circles aimed at carrying out active subversive work in Eastern Europe to eliminate the "Soviet sphere of influence." In this regard, according to archival intelligence data, in April 1953, the adviser to the US diplomatic mission in Hungary, Abbat, wrote to the State Department in the document "American Policy for the Liberation of Hungary": "How can Hungary be free? a) By overthrowing the existing order with the help of an internal revolution; 6) by separating the real government from Moscow; c) thanks to the victory over Russia in a new world war, after which, apparently, point "a" would be implemented."

The theme of undermining the foundations of power in the states of Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union itself was permanent in the work of the governing bodies of NATO. Particular attention was paid to the deployment of "psychological warfare" against the socialist countries, in which Western intelligence services played a leading role. In 1951, President Truman approved the governing body for it - the Office of Psychological

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tags. An appropriate coordinating body was created at the headquarters of the North Atlantic bloc. Newsweek later noted in its issue of January 26, 1953, that "the Eisenhower administration intends, in carrying out a more active Cold War against the Soviets, to place greater emphasis on subversion and sabotage."

One of the main directions of the Cold War was the curtailment by the West of economic relations with the USSR and the states of Eastern Europe in order to slow down their economic development, to perpetuate the lag behind the West. According to Soviet intelligence, the United States exerted constant pressure on the Western European countries, seeking to limit their economic ties with the USSR and its allies. This pressure was carried out, in particular, through COCOM?, which not only prevented the expansion of Western Europe's trade with the socialist countries, but also in a number of cases forced the annulment of already concluded transactions. According to American data, in 1948-1953 deliveries from the USSR to the USA were reduced in value terms by more than 8 times. Accordingly, US exports to the USSR fell: already in 1946 it decreased by 2.5 times?.

As for the "Marshall Plan", under which the US provided Western European countries with \$16 billion over four years, foreign intelligence received timely information about secret negotiations between US Secretary of State Marshall and his Deputy Clayton with the Foreign Ministers of England and France. They discussed the economic integration of Western European countries and the creation of economic associations. At the same time, the United States expected that if the Soviet Union agreed with this procedure for providing assistance, Western countries would be able to impose their will on it and extend their influence to the countries of Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union spoke in favor of providing assistance only on the basis of bilateral agreements. He objected to the hasty revival of the German economic potential before the fulfillment by Germany of the requirements of the Potsdam Conference on the denazification, demilitarization and democratization of the country as a guarantee against the revival of German militarism. However, the West did not really count on the fact that the Soviet Union would fall into the trap set for it. According to US Secretary of State Acheson, the Americans foresaw in advance that their "narrow political goals of aid policy" would not be acceptable to the socialist countries.

The history of the Marshall Plan is further evidence of who is really responsible for the deepening of the Cold War.

As intelligence information shows, the organizers of "psychological warfare" and other subversive activities were quite frank in their internal documents. It was later, after public revelations of their hostile activities by the USSR and its allies, often using Western documents obtained by intelligence, that they began to use Aesopian language or cover up their aspirations with humanitarian arguments. Thus, for example, one of the first instructions of Radio Free Europe suggested: "...Use the technique of inciting one people against another, one group of the population against another... Never mention those facts that can inflict damage to your cause... Borrow the main propaganda ideas and arguments from your opponent and use them against him." A session of the NATO Council at the end of 1952 recommended that the bloc's joint bodies and individual participating countries "genuinely promote anti-Semitism in the countries of Eastern Europe (taking into account a possible negative reaction in Western circles)".

Of course, in the ensuing struggle, intelligence assessments and conclusions did not cover all aspects of the internal political situation in one or another country in Eastern Europe. To understand the complexity of that period, noteworthy is the point of view of the former head of intelligence of the GDR, Markus Wolf, that "the interpretation of conflicts in the countries of Eastern Europe, both provoked from the outside by "counter-revolution", and officially presented in the West as a "popular uprising", is a simplification that prevents the understanding of complex and contradictory processes. At the same time, the fact remains that the active intervention of Western organizations has always taken place. Western intelligence agencies conducted their activities without regard for the principle of inviolability of borders and actively intervened."

But one way or another, from the materials obtained by Soviet intelligence, it followed that the United States and Britain headed for the creation of such a structure of international relations in which their strength would provide them with a dominant position in the world, and the USSR was assigned only a secondary, subordinate role. The clash of interests of the former allies was inevitable, and the intelligence services of all countries had to play an important role in it.

In 1946, the tasks of covering the plans and activities of the United States were assigned to all residencies without exception. They had a lot of work to do: they needed reliable information about the plans for the rearmament of the United States and Britain, the creation of NATO and other military-political blocs, about the settlement of the German problem, about the future of the countries of Eastern Europe, about the attitude of the West to the events in India, China and Korea. The theme of the Cold War quickly took center stage in the activities of Soviet intelligence.

In 1950, in its documents, for the first time, the term "main adversary" was used in relation to the United States.

This was the picture that emerged from the information obtained by Soviet intelligence during the initial period of the Cold War, but then events followed that led to even greater international tension. The Berlin crises, the Korean War, the invasion of Vietnam by the French and then the American armed forces were followed by the collapse of the colonial system, when the confrontation between the West and the East was transferred to the "third world", to the former colonies of Asia and Africa. And then this confrontation unfolded off the coast of the United States, in the Caribbean, when the stubborn desire of the United States to return Cuba to a subordinate state and the steps of the Soviet leadership to import missile weapons to the island in order to counterbalance the American threat gave rise to unprecedented tension that threatened to develop into nuclear war.

NATO countries other than Iceland and Japan set up a Committee to Control Exports to Socialist Countries in 1949.

In 1965, the industrial output of the socialist countries exceeded the pre-war level by about 9.7 times. In 1950-1970, the volume of industrial production of the CMEA member countries increased by 6.8 times, and that of the USA and Western Europe by 2.8 times. Moreover, in the interwar period, the lag of Eastern Europe from Western Europe (after narrowing the gap in 1890-1914) increased, especially Poland and Hungary.

* Wolf M. On his own assignment. - M., 1992. - S. 98-100.

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Intelligence reveals US plans to use nuclear weapons

In our time, the previously well-known name "Manhattan Project" is less and less common in military periodicals. Meanwhile, this project became the source of the event that took place in 1945, before which the most serious shocks and disasters of mankind fade. In the victorious year 1945, the United States of America created nuclear weapons: on July 16, the world's first atomic bomb was tested in the United States. Wishing to show the whole world the strength of its military machine, the US decided to use new weapons in Japan. On August 9, atomic bombs were detonated over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And then the United States began intensive preparation of weapons of mass destruction.

Thus opened a new era in world history - nuclear. One of its apocalyptic signs was the creation of huge nuclear arsenals, a hundredth of which was enough to destroy the planet. And it all started in the small American town of Los Alamos. And here is the paradox: one of the creators of the atomic bomb, the scientific director of the project, Robert Oppenheimer, shocked by the results of using his offspring, was convinced that humanity would curse the very name Los Alamos.

Obtaining information about the creation of nuclear weapons in the West, and then about plans to use them, was one of the top priorities of Russia's foreign intelligence. The fulfillment of this task began even before the start of the Great Patriotic War.

From the middle of 1943, the foreign intelligence of the USSR concentrated great efforts on obtaining concrete information about the creation of a nuclear bomb in the United States. This was due, among other things, to the fact that in Germany, according to reliable data, the theoretical research of German scientists in the nuclear field came to a standstill, and scientific developments moved to the USA and England. The priority direction in the field of German armaments was the work on

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the building of "aircraft-projectiles" (the so-called "weapons of retaliation"), intended for the bombing of the British Isles, where, according to German intelligence, the concentration of the Anglo-American armed forces began to invade the continent. The main task of the scientific and technical department of our intelligence was to track the work carried out within the framework of the Manhattan Project.

"The general task of the Manhattan Project," noted its leader, General Leslie Groves, "was twofold: firstly, to create a weapon capable of ensuring our victory in the war, and, secondly, to do it before our opponents. In order to cope with these tasks, we had to work at an accelerated pace ... "And such a pace of implementation of the Manhattan Project was not only maintained, but also turned into a dangerous haste, although it was necessary, based on the strategic situation that had developed by the middle 1943 (especially after the defeat of the Germans on the Kursk Bulge) was gone.

The Manhattan Project was a separate organization that included several strictly secret and isolated from each other facilities subordinate to General L. Groves, who was accountable only to the Secretary of War, and through him to the US President. The main object of the project was the research laboratory at Los Alamos, where the design and technology of the atomic bomb were developed (the number of personnel of the laboratory with attendants was 45,000 people).

As part of the Manhattan Project, the Security Service was formed, which acted independently of the FBI and military counterintelligence, which also took care of the main objects. Compliance with conspiracy was carried out with the utmost care. All employees involved in the project were checked "up to the third generation", they were controlled, as they say, according to the full program: questioning, observation, censorship, wiretapping, etc. The leading specialists were assigned personal guards who accompanied them everywhere. The main especially guarded secret was the ultimate goal of the project. Of the 150 thousand employees employed in the Manhattan Project, only 10-15 people were aware of the tasks and the entire scope of work. Correspondence between objects was kept to a minimum and carefully coded. Here, for example, is the text of a telegram about the start-up of a nuclear reactor in Chicago on December 2, 1942, addressed to General Groves: "The Italian navigator landed safely in the New World. The natives are friendly." The Italian navigator is the creator of the reactor, Enrico Fermi (he is Italian), the natives are the commission for checking and evaluating the operation of the reactor.

The Manhattan Project remained a secret, including for the leadership of the US administration. Even the State Department

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At the beginning of the Yalta Conference in 1945, he knew nothing about the project, and Vice President G. Truman was fully informed about it only after the death of President F. Roosevelt. In conversations with his entourage, General Groves repeatedly proudly emphasized that he had succeeded in creating an impenetrable veil that preserved the secrets of the Manhattan Project. However, for Soviet intelligence, this "veil" was not so impenetrable.

When evaluating the Manhattan Project, one cannot fail to mention the conditions for its implementation, which turned out to be exceptionally favorable for the United States. Western military periodicals emphasize that the program to create a superweapon, which was carried out, moreover, during the war, was only possible for a state like the United States, which had a powerful scientific and technical potential, a colossal military-industrial complex, huge reserves of industrial and material resources, developed infrastructure, almost unlimited financial possibilities (total costs for the implementation of the Manhattan project are estimated at 2-4 billion dollars, a huge amount at that time) and, of course, the well-known American efficiency. All this is so. However, to all these factors it is necessary to add two more, the importance of which in the implementation of the project, apparently, can be considered decisive.

So, the first factor: theoretical, research support for the Manhattan Project. In this regard, the United States was very lucky: in the late 1930s, many of the most prominent scientists in the field of nuclear physics found themselves on their territory, who fled from the persecution of the fascist regimes in Europe. Among them were such stars of the first magnitude as Albert Einstein - the author of the theory of relativity; Leo Szilard, who substantiated the possibility of a nuclear chain reaction; Niels Bohr - the largest theorist in the field of nuclear research; Enrico Fermi, the creator of the nuclear reactor, and a number of other scientists, including the talented German physicist Klaus Fuchs, who made a great contribution to the success of the Manhattan project. There were only 12 Nobel Prize winners involved in the implementation of the project.

Factor two: The Manhattan Project was carried out in a stable, calm strategic situation. Indeed, the territory of the United States was not subjected to any air

bombardment, or strikes from the sea, or the invasion of enemy troops. From all this, America was covered by two oceans. The Americans did not experience hunger, deprivation, they did not know what a mass evacuation of people and industrial enterprises meant. All American plants, factories, transport, communications, energy, and educational institutions functioned normally, servicing the Manhattan Project facilities, the orders of which were considered top priority by the government's decision.

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Thus, the combination of the mentioned factors allowed the United States to successfully complete the implementation of the Manhattan Project. On July 16, 1945, in the early morning at the Alamogordo test site (New Mexico), the world's first atomic bomb was detonated, mounted on a special tower 33 meters high. "The success of the test," wrote General Groves in a memorandum to Secretary of War Stimson, "exceeded the most optimistic forecasts...x The power of the bomb was estimated "as equivalent to the energy of an explosion of 15-20 thousand tons of trinitrotoluene... However, our main goal has not yet been achieved, only testing the bomb under combat conditions can decide the outcome of the war with Japan.

On the whole, when evaluating the success of the Manhattan Project, it should be emphasized that, under all these favorable conditions, it took the Americans four years to create the atomic bomb. In the Soviet Union, this task was accomplished almost within the same time frame, but under conditions of an economy undermined by the war, a limited scientific and technical base, and a shortage of human resources and material resources. This happened primarily as a result of the selfless labor of many thousands of scientists, designers, engineers, and workers. But with all this, one cannot fail to say that Soviet intelligence managed to solve an incredibly difficult task, obtaining materials that made it possible to penetrate the secrets of the Manhattan Project, including its holy of holies - laboratories in Los Alamos, as well as in Great Britain. , where scientific and technical research was also carried out in the interests of the Manhattan Project.

In the post-war period, the atomic direction became the leading one in ensuring the country's security. After Hiroshima I.V. Stalin summoned to the Kremlin the leaders of the work on the creation of the atomic bomb I.V. Kurchatov and B.L. Vannikov, turning to them, according to their testimony, with a demand to give atomic weapons as soon as possible. Stalin noted that the use of atomic weapons by the United States in Japan upset the balance.

The first Soviet atomic bomb, modeled on the American bomb exploded in Alamogordo, was successfully tested on August 29, 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test site. Nevertheless, as academicians Yu.B. Khariton and Yu.N. Smirnov, back in 1948, experimental development of the original Russian design of the "nuclear charge" began, which was successfully tested on September 24, 1951, and its explosion "represented the second test of an atomic weapon in the USSR."

In Arzamas-16, where the Russian atomic bomb was created, it had the designation RDS-1, which was deciphered in different ways: "Russia makes itself", "Stalin's jet engine", "Special jet engine". The power of the RDS-1 was equivalent to 22 kilotons of trinitrotoluene.

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In the United States, the first Soviet bomb was called "Joe-1", referring to Joseph Stalin (Joseph in English Joseph).

So, the United States has successfully completed the implementation of the Manhattan Project. No less successful was the activity of the Soviet foreign intelligence, which provided the "atomic project" of the USSR with reliable scientific and technical data on the American project. In covering the Manhattan Project, Soviet intelligence monitored not only its technological process, but at the same time obtained important information about the impact of this process on the policy of the US administration towards the Soviet Union.

During the entire period of World War II, the United States carefully concealed the work on the Manhattan Project, only England was aware of these works. Moreover, the Anglo-American agreement signed in Quebec in July 1943 stated that the atomic bomb would be "a decisive factor in the post-war world and would give absolute control to those who possessed its secret." President F. Roosevelt and Prime Minister W. Churchill pledged not to transfer information about the Manhattan Project to a third party "without mutual consent". The same agreement stipulated that the decision to use atomic weapons should also be made by mutual agreement.

After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the scientists who created the atomic bomb at Los Alamos realized that they "did the work for the devil." Albert Einstein said after the war: "If I had known that the Germans would not be able to build a bomb, I would not have lifted a finger." Perhaps this prompted the great physicist to burn his latest scientific works before his death, since the knowledge contained in them could, in his opinion, harm humanity.

After the end of the Second World War, the tasks of the USSR foreign intelligence in the atomic area were greatly expanded. Along with the continued acquisition of technological information about atomic weapons in the USA and England, it became necessary to obtain information about the increase and improvement of the American nuclear arsenal, and most importantly, about the plans of the US atomic war against the Soviet Union. In essence, this was already a new, and moreover, the dominant direction of foreign intelligence activity, the emergence of which was caused by radical changes in the political and military strategy of the United States. The main idea of these changes, set out in the secret directive of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff No. 1496/2, developed in September 1945, was that the USSR was no longer considered as an ally, but as an enemy number one, the war with which should be carried out with the help of atomic weapons.

Since that time, in pursuance of the aforementioned directive, intensive development of plans for the use of atomic weapons began in the United States.

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zhia against the USSR. The scale of these plans expanded with the accumulation of nuclear weapons and their carriers. So, by the beginning of 1950, the number of heavy bombers increased by 4 times (from 60 to 250, and by the end of 1953 there were already over 1000). If at the beginning of 1946 the United States had 30-35 atomic bombs, then in January 1953, according to the conclusion of the government commission on atomic energy, the United States entered the era of "atomic abundance". The rapid accumulation of nuclear weapons allowed the US military and political leadership to conclude that it was necessary to deliberately force the outbreak of war with the USSR in the near future, before the Russians created their own atomic weapons.

Plans for an atomic war against the USSR, developed by the US Joint Chiefs in the period 1945-1959, were drawn up and updated almost every year. It is not possible to present all these plans, most of which were timely disclosed by Soviet intelligence, within the framework of one essay. Therefore, we will consider some of them, the most indicative in terms of their goals and scope.

The first such plan, codenamed Totality, was ready at the end of 1945. It was drawn up taking into account the atomic strikes on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It took into account the strategic vulnerability of the territory of the USSR and the possible consequences of a first atomic strike using 20 atomic bombs. The plan provided for the bombing of 17 cities of the USSR, including Moscow, Gorky, Kuibyshev, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Saratov... atomic weapons. In other words, they staked on impunity for the United States, provided by the "atomic monopoly", which was used by the Truman administration to put pressure on the USSR. For the first time such pressure was undertaken by US Secretary of State Byrnes, who, at the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four great powers, held in September 1945 in London, declared

with ominous humor to the representative of the USSR: "If you do not give up your position, I will snatch an atomic bomb from my pocket and bring it down on you." R. Oppenheimer, who became aware of this rude trick of Byrnes, called it disgusting. More rude and open pressure took place from the US side in solving the "Iranian problem".

And this was just four months after the Potsdam Conference, where all its participants - the heads of state of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, made a solemn promise to establish lasting peace throughout the world. Instead, "nuclear deterrence" appeared, a new term that has since become the basis of political and military

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US strategy, and was later adopted by other nuclear powers. But the priority here belongs to the United States of America.

The development of the next (second) American plan for an atomic war against the USSR, which received the code name "Pincher" ("Pincers"), was completed in July 1946. The plan provided for atomic strikes on 20 largest cities of the USSR (primarily on Moscow, the Baku region, the Ural industrial region), as well as on the main groupings of the Soviet armed forces. It was planned the invasion of American troops into the territory of the Soviet Union through Poland, the Balkans and the Middle East, followed by the occupation of the country. It was assumed that US military operations against the USSR, including atomic strikes using 50 bombs, could take place from mid-1946 to mid-1947.

of the year.

In subsequent American plans, the number of planned atomic strikes increased. Thus, the plan "Sizzle" ("Sizzling Strike"), developed by the end of 1948, provided for the use of 133 atomic bombs in 70 cities of the USSR, including Moscow (8 bombs) and Leningrad (7 bombs). In general, it should be emphasized that the direction and principles of American nuclear planning during this period retained the idea of "atomic monopoly" and "atomic abundance" at their core.

At the end of August 1949, however, an event occurred that caused real confusion in the minds of the US military and political leadership, gave rise to confusion and then significant adjustments in nuclear planning. This event was the testing of an atomic bomb in the USSR 5-7 years earlier than the most daring American forecasts. When President Truman was told the verified evidence that "the Soviet Union has its own atomic bomb," he responded to the report by asking, "What do we do now?" And the first thing he did was to fire the director of the CIA, Admiral Henry Hillenkoiter, who claimed that the atomic bomb would appear in Russia most likely in 1953. Meanwhile, the "political general staff" of the American president demanded that urgent measures be taken. Now there was talk of a "total war" against the USSR, with attacks primarily on its nuclear facilities.

By the beginning of 1950, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a new large-scale plan for conducting an atomic war against the USSR, which was given the code name "Dropshot" ("Instant Strike"). The main strategic goal of the Dropshot plan was to eliminate the Soviet Union as a state (!). The plan included four stages.

The first is the bombardment of 200 Soviet cities with 300 atomic bombs and conventional warfare, with the overall aim of destroying

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of at least 85% of the economic potential, the main groupings of the armed forces, supply bases and the main administrative centers of the Soviet Union. The duration of the first stage was to be six months.

The second stage provided for the deployment of US troops and their allies (over 160 divisions) for offensive operations against the countries of Eastern Europe and the USSR.

The third stage is the conduct of hostilities on the territory of the USSR in order to defeat its armed forces and deprive it of the possibility of active resistance.

The fourth stage is the end of hostilities, the liquidation of the socio-political system existing in the USSR and the occupation of its territory.

Thus, the "Dropshot" plan in terms of its goals, scope and combat weapons (atomic bombs) far exceeded the well-known German plan "Barbarossa". The dropshot, despite its detailed elaboration, was constantly refined and corrected, and the number of planned atomic strikes even decreased. So, in the next revised version, which was actually the new "Shakedown" ("Shakedown") plan, prepared in the middle of 1950, it was envisaged to deliver atomic strikes on 104 cities of the USSR using "only" 220 atomic bombs. The question was only in determining the optimal timing for the implementation of this new plan. In this regard, the Pentagon calculated that by the mid-1950s the USSR would already have a sufficient number of atomic bombs to inflict a "small, but still quite tangible retaliatory strike on the United States." Based on this, American nuclear war planners determined the so-called "Day A" - the last favorable opportunity for the United States to deliver atomic strikes on the Soviet Union with impunity (i.e., without fear of retaliation). According to their calculations, "Day A" was in 1954. With this in mind, National Security Council directive SNB-68 stated: "Military advantages in striking first require us to be in constant readiness to unleash our full power on the enemy, if possible before the strike from the Soviet Union becomes an accomplished fact. In the initial phase of an atomic war, the advantage of initiative and surprise will be extremely great.

It is known that drawing up scenarios according to which military operations can develop is a fairly common practice for the military. But here there were not scenarios, but plans for a surprise attack on the USSR, moreover, with specific dates for the start of the war.

Of course, the Dropshot plan posed a serious threat to the USSR, but this was not a surprise for the leadership of the Soviet

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of the Soviet Union: Soviet foreign intelligence managed to get a copy of the Dropshot in a timely manner, as well as to obtain reliable information about the American "Day A" calculations, which allowed the country's leadership to take appropriate measures to neutralize the atomic threat.

So, the Dropshot plan and its subsequent variants were the end of the first period of planning by the United States of an atomic war against the USSR. The characteristic features of this period were such factors as the "atomic monopoly" and "atomic abundance" of the United States, which ensured that they could carry out atomic strikes against the Soviet Union with impunity. When studying this period, a natural question arises: why, in the second half of the 1940s ~ early 1950s, the United States, in the presence of the factors mentioned, did not decide on a preventive atomic attack against the USSR?

In the political and strategic aspects, such restraint of the US leadership can be explained by the influence of those sensible American analysts who realistically assessed the strategic situation that developed at that time in Europe. An analysis of this situation on the basis of intelligence data available during the mentioned period shows that the main restraining arguments of American analysts were the following:

- after the end of the war, the grouping of Soviet troops in Europe had no equal in terms of numbers, equipment, combat experience and management efficiency. In the event of the resumption of hostilities, this grouping, which was three times superior in combat strength

grouping of troops of the Western allies, could in a matter of weeks break the resistance of the Anglo-American troops, reach the English Channel in the Mediterranean, close the access of the USA and its allies to the oil resources of the Near and Middle East. American analysts had no doubts about such operational capabilities of the Soviet troops. They well remembered the plight of the allied forces, who were unable to repel the German counterattack in the Ardennes in December 1944. And only the rapid offensive of the Soviet fronts, launched at the desperate request of the allies, made it possible to stabilize the situation on the western front (in this regard, it should be noted that General D. Eisenhower and Field Marshal B. Montgomery at their secret meeting held in September 1945, came to the conclusion that if the Red Army launched an offensive in Europe, the Western allies would not be able to resist it);

- the use of atomic weapons against the advancing Soviet troops would be fraught with many "European Hiroshima" and inevitable heavy losses of American troops (even from

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atomic bombs), which would undoubtedly cause an uproar in the United States with unpredictable consequences;

— the conclusion in February 1950 of the Soviet-Chinese military-political alliance meant that in the event of a war against the USSR, the United States would have to fight with China as well.

However, closer to the mid-1950s, the restraining influence of realistic American analysts noticeably weakened. The top military leadership of the United States once again intensified its efforts to prepare for a preventive atomic war against the USSR. Disturbing reports came in from the Soviet foreign intelligence stations, which provided secret information in the field of nuclear planning and production of nuclear weapons in the United States. Thus, intelligence became aware of the contents of the top secret report of the Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, General Twining, "The Approaching National Crisis," in which, in particular, it was emphasized that in the event of further delay, "a preventive war against the USSR will turn out to be a small but effective war for the United States." retaliatory strike on American soil." The "Basic War Plan", developed in 1954 by the Strategic Air Command (SAC) of the US Air Force, did not remain a secret for our intelligence. According to this plan, the main goal of the war was to "destroy the nation", i.e. the Soviet Union. The plan provided for preemptive air strikes against more than 2,100 of the most important industrial and military facilities of the USSR using 600-750 atomic bombs. The commander of the SAC, General K. Limay, believed that this would be the beginning of a third world war, the duration of which would be no more than 30 days, after which only "smoking radioactive ruins" would remain from Russia.

During the period under review, the US military-industrial complex continuously supplied the country's armed forces with new types of weapons and military equipment. Therefore, Soviet foreign intelligence during this period made active efforts to obtain information about the production of the latest types of weapons, especially nuclear weapons and their carriers. In particular, reliable data were obtained on equipping the US Air Force with B-52 strategic bombers capable of carrying four atomic bombs (previous types of bombers could carry only one atomic bomb). In the 1950s, according to intelligence data, there were more than 1,850 B-52 and B-47 bombers in the US strategic aviation, based at 65 air bases, including 25 located on the territory of countries bordering the USSR. In 1955 The United States successfully tested the first American ballistic missile with a range of 3,200 kilometers; in 1958-1962, 45 Jupiter missile launchers were deployed in Turkey and Italy,

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and in England, 60 Thor missile launchers. Thus, the western part of the territory of the USSR was within the reach of American medium-range missiles. And finally, as reported in reconnaissance reports, in the mid-1950s, the United States launched the construction of a fundamentally new type of strategic nuclear weapons - nuclear submarines equipped with ballistic missiles.

At the end of 1949, the foreign intelligence station in London obtained valuable documentary materials on the creation in the United States of a new, much more powerful type of atomic weapon - thermonuclear. In particular, a schematic diagram of a hydrogen bomb, its theoretical calculations, and the main design parameters were obtained. Later, in 1952-1954, detailed information was received from the London residency about the results of American hydrogen bomb tests in the Marshall Islands, where the United States carried out 67 thermonuclear explosions with a total yield of 108 megatons (equivalent to about 7,200 "Hiroshima bombs").

But in 1957, "extraordinary events" again occurred, causing another panic among the military-political leadership of the United States: in August, an intercontinental (!) Ballistic missile was successfully tested in the Soviet Union, and on October 4, a launch was carried out orbit of an artificial satellite of the Earth. The US military again began to call on the president to start a preventive nuclear war against the USSR, "as long as the US has the upper hand." However, President D. Eisenhower responded to these calls in the following way: "We will not go to this kind of war. We don't have enough bulldozers to clear the streets of corpses." Once again, the idea of a preventive atomic war against the USSR ended up in the archives of nuclear planning. But, alas, not for long...

At the beginning of 1960, foreign intelligence became aware of the development in the United States of nuclear munitions of small and ultra-low yield (up to 1 kiloton) with operational-tactical and sabotage purposes. In particular, the tactical and technical data of the so-called "knapsack atomic bombs" with a capacity of 0.1-0.2 kilotons were obtained, intended for the destruction of important strategic objects behind enemy lines, where these landmines were supposed to be delivered created for this purpose. sabotage units. As for the operational-tactical use of low-yield nuclear munitions, it can be noted that the explosion of one such device with a yield of 1 kiloton exceeds the damaging effectiveness of a simultaneous salvo of all the standard fire weapons of a division.

In 1959, Soviet foreign intelligence obtained a top secret list of several thousand targets in the United States, subject to

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"immediate destruction" by nuclear weapons "in the first hours of the outbreak of armed conflict". An analysis of this document showed that it is part of a new general plan for a nuclear war against the USSR and China. The appearance of such a plan (which our intelligence also managed to obtain some time later) was caused by fundamental changes in the strategic planning of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The essence of these changes was as follows. By the end of the 1950s, the qualitative development and quantitative build-up of nuclear weapons in the United States led to a transition to centralized nuclear planning, for which the Joint Staff for Strategic Objectives Planning was created and subordinated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The main functions of the Joint Staff were: determination of objects to be destroyed by nuclear weapons ("nuclear targets"), development of separate plans for nuclear operations and nuclear war in

in general.

In December 1960, the first general plan for a nuclear war was drawn up, called the Unified Comprehensive ", the strategy of "massive retaliation" was maintained. This strategy provided for the conduct of a general nuclear war against the USSR, other countries of the Warsaw Pact and China, which would begin with

unrestricted use of the entire arsenal of American nuclear weapons to ensure "assured destruction" of the enemy's economic and military potentials. Thus, the SIOP-1 plan called for nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union and China using 3,500 nuclear weapons with a total capacity of 780 megatons. According to American experts, as a result of these strikes in the USSR and China, up to 280 million people could have been killed. Changes and refinements were made to subsequent SIOP plans, reflecting mainly new US strategic concepts and an increase in the number of "nuclear targets". So, in SIOP-2 (1961) there were 6 thousand such targets, in SIOP-Z (1967) - 10 thousand, in SIOP-4 (1971) - 16 thousand, in SIOP-5 - 25 thousand. Of particular note is SIOP-3, which, taking into account the Caribbean crisis, provided that the first ("disarming") nuclear strike should destroy the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR, 25-30% of its population and 60% of its industrial potential. This, according to the plan, was considered to cause "unacceptable damage" to the enemy, and most importantly, it would deprive him of the opportunity to deliver nuclear retaliatory strikes.

Thus, the SIOP plans were a fundamentally new stage in nuclear planning in the United States. The main characteristics of this

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was: centralized planning of nuclear operations and nuclear war; the emergence of new types of nuclear weapons and their carriers, which subsequently formed the well-known "triad of strategic nuclear forces" of the United States; a hypothetical test of the concept of nuclear war through strategic command post exercises. This new stage of nuclear planning in the United States naturally forced the Soviet leadership to set new tasks for the Soviet foreign intelligence.

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On the border of two eras

(1945-1950)

At the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, the territory of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe became a zone of active hostilities. Soviet foreign intelligence carried out intensive intelligence and operational activities in these regions, necessary to bring closer the defeat of Nazi Germany, its allies and accomplices.

After the Victory, Soviet intelligence officers had to solve no less responsible tasks in connection with the complex and contradictory socio-political processes in the Eastern European countries, liberated from the rule of Nazi Germany and the regimes that were on its side.

Our intelligence was instructed to counteract the specific actions of the recent allies of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition, who sought to create a favorable situation in Eastern Europe and the Balkans that did not meet the state interests of the Soviet Union. There is no lack of evidence in the archives of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service that the American and British secret services in every possible way prevented the coming to power in the states of the mentioned regions of those socio-political forces that were oriented towards cooperation with the USSR. They spared neither effort nor means to undermine the sympathy of the peoples of these countries for their eastern neighbor. The intelligence agencies of the United States and Britain actively contributed to influencing influential representatives of the government, political and public circles of the countries of Eastern Europe to make a decision to join the "Marshall Plan" and to break with the Soviet Union. At the same time, the thesis was introduced that "the United States under no circumstances will go to provide economic assistance to the Soviet Union, since their strategic goal is to bring the Soviets to economic collapse and thereby prove the failure

communism and the inability to independently solve economic problems". Considering that the main internal political struggle was waged at that time precisely over the choice of a strategic path for further state development, it is clear that the efforts of the intelligence services of the former allies deliberately contributed to the split of the post-war world.

A fundamentally new direction in the work of Soviet intelligence officers was the provision of assistance to the nascent organs of state security in the countries of people's democracy. In particular, they were given politically and operationally important materials prepared on the basis of official documentation of the German Imperial Security Main Office. It was primarily about the activities of the German special services and their agents on the territory of the Eastern European countries. Soviet intelligence officers also shared with their new colleagues information about the work of American, British and French intelligence services. These contacts helped the friends to establish effective work on problems that affected their interests.

When the formation of people's power in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was basically completed, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of Ministers of the USSR considered it possible and desirable to stop intelligence activities there. The corresponding directive from the leadership of foreign intelligence was sent on July 30, 1949 to foreign apparatuses in Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia. It emphasized the need to thank the unspoken helpers for the services rendered and to explain in a benevolent manner that from now on relations between the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy will be built on the basis of trust and cooperation, which exclude the conduct of intelligence activities against each other.

It must be admitted that this decision was perceived by many of our unspoken assistants ambiguously. With the majority of agents and trusting relationships, relations were relatively painlessly transferred to open comradesly and even friendly ones. This part of the citizens of the countries of people's democracy, now on an official basis, to the best of their strength, capabilities and official position, continued to contribute to the expansion and strengthening of relations and friendship with the Soviet Union. But there were also many who believed that the Soviet side's termination of work with them on a conspiratorial basis was premature, largely dictated by an emotional political approach to problems of a strategic nature. At the same time, they pointed to those "undercurrents and reefs, which may soon come across the business of building

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evidence of socialism in the people's democracies". This point of view was quite widespread among people who collaborated with our intelligence on a strictly ideological basis in Hungary, Yugoslavia and Poland. They convinced operational workers that "in our countries there is still a lot of work for Soviet intelligence."

When this delicate farewell to the agents was basically completed, the leadership of the USSR put an end to this issue through diplomatic channels. In accordance with the instructions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of April 13, 1950, the Soviet ambassadors in Budapest, Bucharest, Warsaw, Prague, Sofia and Tirana officially informed the first persons of the respective countries that the activities of Soviet foreign intelligence in Central and Eastern Europe is completely discontinued. At the same time, it was emphasized that "such a decision was made on the basis of the unity of political goals and objectives, as well as mutual trust between the USSR and the countries of people's democracy." At the same time, the Soviet side spoke in favor of establishing cooperation between foreign intelligence services on bilateral and multilateral basics.

The attentive reader will, of course, notice that the above list of countries does not include [the German Democratic Republic and Yugoslavia. The specifics of relations with them in this delicate area will be discussed separately in our essays. Now let's talk about individual

episodes of the work of Soviet foreign intelligence in some countries of people's democracy in the post-war, critical period for them.

Bulgaria

During the successful offensive of the Red Army in the Balkans at the end of 1944, German troops and accomplices of the German fascists were thrown out of Bulgaria. On September 9, 1944, a democratic revolution took place there, and a multi-party government of the Fatherland Front came to power. The country has entered a period of serious internal political changes and transformations. In this regard, the residency of the Soviet intelligence faced new tasks. Now she was required to provide a comprehensive, objective and deep intelligence coverage of the radically changed internal situation, the complex and contradictory social processes that began after the September Revolution in Bulgarian society. This sharply raised the question of creating a new intelligence apparatus, since many of the former unspoken assistants who provided invaluable services during the war had largely lost their former capabilities in peacetime conditions. For example, the agent "Rebel" during the war years obtained important information about the complicity of a number of local church hierarchs with the German invaders, and

also do

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took on the risky duties of a liaison with the Bulgarian partisans. When the people's avengers approached Sophia, "Rebel" openly joined them. With a cross in one hand and a Mauser in the other, he was often seen in the front ranks of the attackers: with an inspired word and personal example, he raised his compatriots to a sacred battle with the enemies of the Motherland.

Another agent, "Melnik", supplied the residency with valuable information about the pro-German intrigues of the tsarist government. During the September Revolution, he created and led a group of anti-fascists and came out in support of the Fatherland Front, which, naturally, cut off his access to his monarchist and pro-German entourage.

Many of our assistants from the bourgeois-landlord milieu and conservative officers ended up in exile, and contact with them was lost.

Despite the objective difficulties, the new intelligence apparatus was created in a short time, and by the middle of 1945, the residency did not experience serious difficulties in covering the most important and urgent problems. Our intelligence officers paid special attention to collecting information about the subversive activities of the special services and political structures of Western countries, primarily the United States, whose influence was traced in the actions and speeches of the opponents of the Fatherland Front.

With the assistance of the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party, which played an important role in the Fatherland Front, the residency established contact with the Department of State Security (UGB) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Bulgaria. An exchange of information was established. Joint operational activities were carried out, the object of which was mainly the main adversary, that is, American intelligence, which interacted with the intelligence services of other Western countries. We can at least briefly describe some of these operations.

Elections to the National Assembly of Bulgaria were scheduled for August 26, 1945. With the moral, political and financial support of Western countries and their intelligence agencies, the opposition part of the functionaries of the Bulgarian Agricultural People's Union (BZNS), headed by Nikola Petkov, and the Bulgarian Social Democrats of Kosta Lulchev, during the election campaign, sought to change the alignment of political parties in their favor. forces and coming to power of pro-Western figures. Soviet intelligence made great efforts to help the Fatherland Front frustrate the provocations of the reactionary groups, whose actions were orchestrated by the Anglo-Americans. When their efforts were in vain, they tried to disrupt the holding of the elections, but succeeded only in postponing them to 18 November. And still it's not for them

helped: 88.18% of voters voted for the Fatherland Front. Then formed by the Front

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On September 8, 1946, the government prepared and held a nationwide referendum on the abolition of the monarchy and the declaration of Bulgaria as a democratic republic. 92.7% of the population was in favor of changing the state system. This convincing victory, together with the vast majority of the Bulgarians, was also celebrated by Soviet intelligence officers, who, due to their operational capabilities, managed to effectively outplay the main pro in the tense "war of wits"

tivnik.

The Sofia residency made a significant contribution to exposing the plans of the United States and England to tear away a number of regions from Bulgaria and transfer them to Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. On the basis of intelligence information, the USSR delegation at the Paris Peace Conference on February 10, 1947, took a firm position and achieved the preservation of its territorial integrity within the borders of January 1, 1941 when signing a peace treaty with Bulgaria.

In 1946, Soviet intelligence officers, together with employees of the State Security Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Bulgaria, thwarted the creation in Sofia of the Balkan Joint Intelligence Center of Western Special Services. This responsible mission was entrusted by the Western Allies to the British Colonel Bailey, who acted under cover of an officer of the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria. When he completed the preparatory work, which was carried out under the vigilant supervision of our intelligence and Bulgarian friends, and was awaiting the arrival of American and British intelligence officers allocated under his command, a series of operational measures began, aimed, according to G.M. Dimitrov, to "the ruin of this snake's nest." They were led from the Bulgarian side by the head of the UGB of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Bulgaria Khristozov, from the Soviet side - by resident G.P. Shnyukov.

Every Sunday, Bailey went "for recreation" to Mount Vitosha, at the foot of which Sophia is located. He went skiing there, dined at a restaurant, walked, met with his acquaintances, among whom he hid some of his operationally significant connections. On another visit, Bailey found his favorite ski run busy with a group of young Bulgarian skiers. These same noisy young men occupied all the seats in the restaurant. The Englishman arrogantly demanded that the owner clear his favorite table. When the local athletes did not yield, Bailey could not restrain himself and used "strong expressions that hurt the national pride of the Bulgarians." The quarrel that broke out turned into a fight. The colonel and his adjutant had their sides pretty rumpled. In addition to the bruises, they also took away their personal weapons.

A few days later, Bulgarian motorists created a situation on one of the roads that Bailey used to drive, in which the Englishman had to "grossly violate the rules
move

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for which he was severely punished by a representative of the local traffic police. Among the members of the Union Club, of which Bailey was a regular, a rumor spread that "this seemingly noble English officer" did not pay gambling debts and during the game very much resembled an experienced cheater. Soon, one of the waitresses of the Sofia restaurant filed a lawsuit against Bailey, accusing him of attempted rape. In this case, there were witnesses who confirmed the sexual harassment of the Englishman (by the way, Bailey's behavior gave rise to qualify the testimony of the "victim" in this way).

Bailey was forced to leave Sofia, and the Allied Joint Intelligence Center had to be deployed in Greece.

We mentioned above the opposition BZNS group headed by N. Petkov. The residency information left no doubt that this politician was an agent

American intelligence and its secret activities causes considerable damage to the development of Bulgarian-Soviet relations. At the same time, he was very cautious, choosy in communications and did not allow little-studied persons into his inner circle, selectively and meteredly shared information and plans with approximate ones. N. Petkov at the same time enjoyed considerable influence among the rural bourgeoisie and in commercial and industrial circles as the son of one of the founders of the BZNS, who was a close friend of the national hero A. Stamboliysky.

In order to penetrate N. Petkov's entourage, the Center provided important assistance to the residency by sending to Bulgaria a reliable agent, Devushka, a correspondent for one of the respectable Western newspapers. The choice fell on her because she was previously well acquainted with N. Petkov. The study of the top of the opposition BZNS showed that there is no unity there, and Petkov himself makes a lot of mistakes in relations with his associates. Thus, thanks to the information of the "Girl", the ins and outs of the "dangerous opponent of the Bulgarian-Soviet friendship" were revealed. A series of special events made it possible to free many prominent functionaries of the BZNS from the influence of N. Petkov, significantly undermine his authority among the party masses and collect material that exposed him as an American hireling. It is noteworthy that one of N. Petkov's confidants, recruited by the residency (let's call him "Grach"), indignantly admitted: "When I began to take a closer look at what was happening in Petkov's house and listen to his telephone conversations When I read his correspondence, I quickly became convinced that he was not a national hero, whom he claimed to be, but the most ordinary American spy, following the instructions of his overseas patrons. "Grach" even asked us for permission to physically liquidate this identified traitor, in which he

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denied. Later, a well-deserved punishment befell N. Petkov by the verdict of a legal court.

Hungary

At the final stage of the Great Patriotic War and until 1950, Soviet foreign intelligence and military counterintelligence carried out independent intelligence and operational work on the territory of Hungary. By the end of 1945, at the request of the leadership of the Hungarian Party of Labor, a special group of employees of the USSR state security agencies was sent to Budapest to assist in the formation of new Hungarian special services. (Intelligence and counterintelligence of the Horthy regime took a clearly hostile position towards the people's power and were therefore disbanded.) At first, the young leaders of the Hungarian intelligence service often made mistakes, and to correct them they resorted to the services of their Soviet colleagues. It must also be admitted that friction in relations with partners sometimes arose due to inconsistency in actions between the residency of the Committee of Information (CI) of the USSR and the advisory apparatus of the USSR Ministry of State Security. In particular, there were cases when, at the request of the CI residency, local authorities carried out operational activities, and the results of this work were transferred to representatives of the USSR Ministry of State Security and vice versa. At the same time, the Hungarian friends justified themselves by the fact that it was difficult for them to find or determine the difference between these two Soviet departments. Nevertheless, cooperation developed quite successfully. It was expressed mainly in the intensive exchange of information on a wide range of issues and the holding on the territory of Hungary, and then abroad, of joint operational activities. For example, in 1950, the list of information issues approved by both sides included such problems as the subversive activities of American intelligence in Hungary, the recruitment of the French in the countries of people's democracy, the internal political situation in Austria and Turkey, and cooperation between the counterintelligence services of the United States, England, and Switzerland. and Holland, the policy of the Vatican in Hungary, the situation in the Hungarian emigration abroad, etc.

With regard to operational activities, we can note the joint active identification among foreigners of professional intelligence officers of countries unfriendly to the USSR and Hungary and their agents. Also noteworthy are the joint undercover activities against the intelligence agencies of the United States and Britain in a number of Asian countries and even in the New World.

Despite the difficulties, difficulties and problems of an objective and subjective nature, by the middle of 1953, within the framework of the Hungarian State Security Administration, with our help,

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its own Hungarian intelligence service was created, its regulatory and legal framework was developed, the main divisions of the central apparatus were formed, and intelligence and operational work was established in a number of foreign countries.

Romania

The residency of the Soviet foreign intelligence was established in Bucharest immediately after the withdrawal of Romania from the war. At first, she acted as part of the staff of the USSR representative in the Allied Control Commission, and from August 1945 she was given shelter under her roof by the Soviet embassy, which began to function after the restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Romania. Conducting active intelligence work at that time was due solely to the need to prevent infringement of the state interests of our country.

Therefore, after the Victory, Soviet intelligence officers all over the world, including in Romania, could not rest on their laurels. The Cold War was not our choice. And its first signs came to light in Romania six months after the defeat of Germany. So, on November 8, 1945, on the birthday of King Mihai, monarchists and activists of the so-called historical parties staged rallies and demonstrations in Bucharest and a number of other cities, which turned into pogroms of people's democratic organizations and government institutions with human casualties. According to our intelligence, these events were manipulated behind the scenes by Western intelligence agencies. Their goal was to achieve the overthrow of the government of P. Groza, inflame anti-Soviet sentiments and "stop the further development of the trend of Romania's strategic orientation towards the Soviet Union." The opening and disruption of these plans had a beneficial effect on changes in the alignment of political forces. In May 1946, the Bloc of Democratic Parties was formed, which in November of the same year won a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections. On December 30, 1947, King Mihai abdicated and Romania was proclaimed a People's Republic.

Radical political changes in Romania and the further aggravation of the Cold War required a clarification and partial revision of both the goals of our intelligence work and the ways to achieve them. The main task came to the fore as the main task of countering the attempts of intelligence agencies of Western countries, primarily the United States and England, to restore the regime of anti-Soviet orientation in Romania. In a short time, a practically new agent apparatus was created, which made it possible to organize coverage of the main problems and objects of priority attention. Many anti-fascist Romanian citizens considered their patriotic

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duty to provide gratuitous assistance to Soviet intelligence. Among her unspoken assistants were also former functionaries of bourgeois parties and members of the legionnaire movement, who, in cooperation with Soviet intelligence, tried to make amends for their past complicity with the Nazis. It was from these persons that at the beginning of 1948 information was received that a group of fighters of the "Iron Guard", released from arrest on parole and a promise to stop the anti-government struggle, violated their obligation and, under the leadership of the Americans, was preparing a number of serious - jerky shares. At the direction of the Center, this information was transferred to the Romanian government, and already on its order, the Romanian Ministry of Internal Affairs carried out an operation to eliminate the dangerous underground.

The station regularly received information, including secret documents from the US and British missions, which made it possible to get a clear picture of those coming from Washington and

London directions. By the middle of 1949, our Romanian friends had received complete data from our intelligence on 84 American intelligence agents and 164 agents of other Western intelligence agencies operating in Romania. Our scouts actually showed their Romanian colleagues their usefulness and sincerity in cooperation. So far, these relations were not quite official. Nevertheless, the leaders of the state security agencies of Romania considered Soviet intelligence officers as experienced and authoritative specialists in their field, meetings with which were used not only to exchange information, but also to seek help in resolving operational issues. But on this account there was a prohibition of the Center - not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Romanian special services. In particular, once the residency, at the request of Romanian friends, asked for Moscow's sanctions to assist in the reorganization of the intelligence and counterintelligence agencies of Romania. These proposals have been carefully studied, and clear answers have been given to the questions posed. And at the same time, it was strictly stated that "our opinion must not be imposed on the Romanians in any case and in any form."

On February 4, 1948, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed between Romania and the Soviet Union. It not only qualitatively changed relations between the two countries, but also served as the basis for the transition to other forms and methods of Soviet intelligence activities in this country.

Czechoslovakia

In May 1944, within the framework of the Smersh department under the Czechoslovak Corps, an independent operational group of foreign political intelligence was created, which was entrusted with the liberation of Czechoslovakia from the German invaders:

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— establishment of communication and continuation of work with agents of the Soviet intelligence, abandoned on the territory of this country during the WAR;

- restoration of contact with agents, with whom we were forced to stop working with the beginning of the occupation of Czechoslovakia by German troops;

- acquisition of new sources of intelligence information.

By the spring of 1945, the above-mentioned group had basically completed the assigned tasks. The Center began to regularly receive valuable information about the political and military-political situation in Czechoslovakia and about the behind-the-scenes work of American and British intelligence, which was aimed at undermining the positions and authority of the Soviet Union in Czechoslovak social and political circles and turning this important Eastern European country into a springboard for deployment - Wings of the Cold War. In particular, our intelligence officers were well aware of the activities of several residents of British intelligence on the territory of Slovakia, especially in those areas that later became part of Soviet Ukraine.

On May 25, 1945, the residency of the Soviet foreign intelligence was recreated in Prague. It was headed by an experienced intelligence officer Ivan Andreevich Chichaev. In addition, in 1946, a special operational group began to function to ensure the security of the Yakhimovsky uranium mine and a sub-residency in Bratislava to cover and suppress the subversive actions of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which led the underground on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

Soviet intelligence officers had to work in a difficult political and operational environment. The situation in Czechoslovakia reached its peak by the beginning of 1948. There was a continuous stream of information about the preparation of a coup by right-wing parties, code-named "Truth will win." The conspirators obtained from President E. Benes a decision to open the western border of Czechoslovakia, through which a stream of rebels prepared for the hour of X, large consignments of weapons, ammunition and other equipment poured. The Americans and the British did not stint and generously supplied Czechoslovak accomplices for "a decisive battle with the communists for the restoration of democracy in Czechoslovakia."

The information obtained by Soviet foreign intelligence on these acute issues was transferred to the leadership of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Internal Affairs, but Minister Nosek did not always respond adequately to them. A number of his subordinates also indulged in complacent moods and, instead of taking decisive measures, sometimes limited themselves to conversations and exhortations to the identified putschists. Here is how, for example, G.P., a resident of Soviet intelligence in Bulgaria, recalls this. Shnyukov, who visited Czechoslovakia in January-February 1948 as part of

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special task force D.G. Fedichkin to provide urgent assistance to the Czechoslovak state security agencies:

"To our reliable information that the leaders of the counter-revolutionary parties and groups fly freely to the American zone of occupation of Germany to meet with representatives of the US military and intelligence agencies, Nosek nonchalantly replied:

- Well, let them fly. They may not return at all.

When we expressed bewilderment to the minister that some of his subordinates, instead of strict isolation of putschists caught red-handed, subjected them to only administrative deportation to the provinces for up to two months, he brushed aside:

"When we worked underground and got caught, the police sent us to the village and interned there for two or three months."

We must pay tribute to the Czechoslovak communists, primarily K. Gottwald and General L. Svoboda, who took our information seriously and immediately took action. It was mainly thanks to them that the planned coup was exposed and thwarted. The scope of the covert operation prepared under the auspices of American intelligence is evidenced by the fact that during the liquidation of only one of its armed links, the Czechoslovak state security agencies caught red-handed and neutralized about 400 militants.

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia was perhaps the only European country in which, after the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the fighting of the partisan detachments that had arisen against the German occupiers began already in July. As a result of the popular uprising and the subsequent hostilities, which were led by the communists led by I.B. Tito, by the autumn of 1941, Yugoslav partisans controlled vast territories in Bosnia and southern Serbia.

The first Soviet foreign intelligence station was established in Yugoslavia in March 1944. Its employees were officially introduced to the Yugoslavs. They carried out independent intelligence activities, and also acted as advisers to local security agencies - the Department for the Protection of the People (OZNA). Our reconnaissance groups were based in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana. At the same time, an adviser to the NKGB of the USSR was part of the Soviet military mission at the headquarters of the Resistance Movement.

The joint struggle against the Nazis, historical Russian-Yugoslav ties contributed to the fact that between Soviet intelligence officers and workers of the Yugoslav security agencies

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maintained friendly and trusting relationships. Between our residency and OZNA there was a lively exchange of information on a wide range of issues. For example, the Yugoslavs passed on to their Soviet colleagues data on the Gestapo and other war criminals who fled from Yugoslavia and took refuge in Hungary and Austria; documentaries about

German and Hungarian foreign agents; about senior Hungarian officers who offered their services to American and British intelligence services during the war. Together with OZNA, operational measures were taken to defeat the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which acted against the USSR in the territory of Yugoslavia.

From the second half of 1945, our residency completely switched to intelligence coverage of the actions, plans and plans of the USA, Britain and other Western countries and their intelligence services in the Balkans. In this regard, our intelligence officers were allowed to recruit agents from among Yugoslav citizens only to use their capabilities in working on the Americans and Westerners. The strictest ban on the involvement of employees of the Yugoslav party and state apparatus, the armed forces and OZNA in tacit cooperation remained in force.

In the post-war years, the work of Soviet intelligence on the special services of the United States and Britain gave tangible results. For example, Moscow was authentically and documentedly aware of most of the intelligence activities of the headquarters of the Anglo-American allied forces in the Mediterranean, closely followed the anti-Soviet actions of American intelligence in the Balkans. Many of its employees were known by sight. The end product of exploration obtained in Yugoslavia was highly valued by the Center and was actively used in the development and implementation of practical foreign policy measures of the Soviet Union.

There was one delicate feature in the work of the Belgrade residency - coverage from the intelligence positions of the attitude of part of the Yugoslav leadership towards the Soviet Union. Strange as it may seem, but this direction of application of efforts was identified, and then spun off from the general work to identify and suppress the anti-Soviet actions of the Americans. Information about the unfriendly plans and actions of such Yugoslav leaders as Tito, Ranković, Djilas, and Kardelj were first obtained from the unit of the joint Anglo-American military mission at Tito's headquarters, headed by Brigadier General McLean. . From these sources, it became known that Tito and his associates developed contacts with the Americans and the British behind the back of the USSR, in particular, they agreed with their proposal to prevent the Red Army from entering the territory of Yugoslavia. At first, the Soviet leadership, including I.V. Stalin, restrainedly and on

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received such information with caution. For example, on August 13, 1945, the Center demanded from the Belgrade residency to exercise increased caution when evaluating the activities of the Yugoslav leadership, "allowing the possibility of the British and Americans carrying out an action aimed at creating an atmosphere of distrust, as well as attempts to remove by our hands the most loyal and devoted communists.

However, the deteriorating Soviet-Yugoslav relations (by no means always through the fault of the Soviet side) more and more often confirmed intelligence information and proved that it was not only the intrigues of the main enemy, but also the special views and aspirations of Tito and his entourage. The political line of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia and the not always adequate reaction of the leadership of the USSR and the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks by June 1948 led, as is known, to a break in relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. Our intelligence activities in that country were terminated, including contacts with the Yugoslav security authorities. Some of our unspoken assistants, whom the Yugoslav counterintelligence officers managed to identify, were severely repressed. These tragic events left a sad mark on the history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Deep scars from seemingly healed wounds made themselves felt more than once in the late 50s and later, when relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were generally normalized along state and party lines, as well as in the field of interaction between foreign intelligence services .

So, since 1950, the activity of the foreign intelligence of the USSR in Central and Eastern Europe was terminated. Its relations with the state security organs of the people's democracies have entered a qualitatively new phase, the hallmark of which has become more and more obvious joint work against the common main enemy.

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This is how NATO was created

At present, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has absorbed most of the countries of Western Europe and is ready to accept into its ranks the Eastern European states, as well as a number of countries outside the European region.

That is why the appeal to the initial period of the creation of NATO has not only historical meaning, but also seems to be relevant for the modern world. At the same time, questions arise: why did the United States, together with Great Britain, soon after the defeat of fascism, made great efforts to cobble together this grouping? What goals were set?

A detailed answer to this can be given by the documents obtained by Soviet foreign intelligence at that time, at the moment when the silhouette of the largest military-political bloc in the world appeared on the horizon. What logic urged to force actions on its cohesion? After all, after the war, the United Nations was created to ensure peace and international security. A special place was given to the UN Security Council, which was entrusted with the functions of a regulator of peacekeeping activities.

In their argument for the creation of NATO, the US and its allies referred to the article of the UN Charter on the right to collective defence. But at the same time, the role of the Security Council was bypassed. Subsequently, the tendency to circumvent the UN and its Charter strengthened, and attempts to revise the provisions of international law, in particular on non-interference in the internal affairs of the state, adopted on the basis of consensus of the states that are members of the United Nations, intensified.

The publication of documents that are still top secret in the West and reflect the inner logic of the creation of NATO sheds light on the driving forces and secret considerations

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behind the concrete steps of the former allies of the USSR in the fight against fascist aggression.

Undoubtedly, for the US (and the UK) these actions were dominated by geopolitical considerations. They sought to secure for themselves influence and control over the politics of a number of European countries, especially where the anti-fascist struggle had aroused a broad movement of the masses, headed by left-wing parties. This concerned primarily France, Italy, Greece. The documents show that the US was ready for acts of direct intervention to prevent the left from coming to power, even through parliamentary elections. Hence the arguments about the emergence of "indirect aggression" applied to southern Europe. Hence the exaggeration of the "Soviet threat", under the flag of which the creation of NATO was motivated.

It is clear from the documents that the concept of "collective defense" was primarily based on the specific interests of the Anglo-Saxon allies, led by the United States. At the same time, one can also see the rivalry of the participants, their jealous attitude towards each other.

"Our defense policy should be built in case of the possibility of war with Russia ... We consider it necessary to make every possible effort to organize an alliance of Western European powers, which at least could delay the enemy's advance through Europe. It is very important for us to receive active and timely, possibly earlier, support from the United States of America ... They, at least

at least for a few years, will be the only source from which we can draw stocks of atomic bombs.

This policy provision was formulated in the report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the General Staff of Great Britain dated May 7, 1947, which was received in Moscow from the London residency. The central apparatus of Soviet intelligence attached great importance to this document. The most important residences in Western Europe and the United States were instructed to closely monitor developments and take steps to obtain reliable information about the steps of the West to create a military bloc directed against the Soviet Union. By this time, the residencies in Washington, London, Paris, Brussels and Rome had sources of information, primarily documentary, which allowed intelligence to keep the Soviet leadership constantly informed about the negotiations on the creation of the Western Union, and then the North Atlantic Pact (NATO). The greatest contribution to this work was made by two employees of the British Foreign Office from the famous "Cambridge Five", who supplied the residency with documentary materials on the progress and vicissitudes of the negotiations on the creation of these two military blocs.

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Numerous materials received from the residencies on this problem in 1947-1949 make it possible to recreate in detail the history of the creation of the Western (or, as it was then called after the place of signing, the Brussels) Union and NATO. From the very beginning it was clear, and this was emphasized in the secret negotiations between the representatives of the Western countries, that the military alliances being created were directed primarily and only against the Soviet Union. It is no coincidence that the participants in the negotiations tried to keep them secret and tried to cover up their anti-Soviet character.

At the beginning of 1948, one of the residencies managed to obtain a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, Jebb, which spoke of the need to conclude such an agreement, which "outwardly will not be directly directed against the USSR (although in reality it is directed precisely against it)". In this regard, Jebb proposed to cover this goal with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which provides for the right to "collective self-defence".

In informal negotiations, however, the participants did not hide their goals. Thus, according to information about the secret talks between representatives of the US and British Chiefs of Staff Committees at the end of April 1948 in Washington, the issue of developing plans in case of war against the Soviet Union, which "could happen at any time," was discussed there. As early as March 1948, a memorandum from a senior staff officer at the British Ministry of Defense considered three possible options for starting a war with the Soviet Union: before 1950, between 1950 and 1956, and after 1956.

In April 1948, to V.M. Molotov, foreign intelligence sent the text of a letter from the French ambassador to the United States, Bonneve, to the French Foreign Ministry, which stated: "In the circles of American experts, they do not hide the fact that in the event of a conflict, American forces will try to invade directly into the Soviet Union ... Air Minister Symington reported on 25 March of the Senate Armed Forces Commission that there is not a single point on Soviet territory that could not be reached by American bombers based in Alaska and Labrador.

In April 1949, intelligence obtained a document from the Institute of National Defense and War Economy of France "Strategic problem. Phase of the war '49", which considered the option of starting a war against the Soviet Union in 1949. As one of the reasons for the conflict, the document named a "diplomatic incident". A few months later, the Paris residency received information about anxious moods in the circles of the French General Staff, which did not exclude that the United States decided to provoke a war with the USSR as soon as possible, no later than two years later.

One of the main goals of the United States and Britain in creating anti-Soviet blocs was to involve them as much as possible

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number of European countries. As follows from the secret correspondence between England and the United States, which turned out to be at the disposal of Soviet intelligence, this was not an easy task. In a number of cases, the Americans and the British had to literally "pull by the ears" some small countries of Western Europe, resorting to overt pressure and even threats, so that they would join the anti-Soviet military community. US Secretary of State Marshall and British Foreign Secretary Bevin were especially zealous in this. They were actively supported by the Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak.

The first difficulties in relations between the Western states arose during the negotiations on the creation of the Western European Military Union. The Netherlands, fearing that in the event of hostilities, as a small country, it would suffer in the first place, showed great restraint at the initial stage of negotiations. When the Dutch representatives were invited to London for negotiations, Spaak and especially the representative of Luxembourg literally pushed the Dutch to negotiate. According to one of the participants in the negotiations, Holland stopped resistance only after the events in Czechoslovakia in February 1948.

From a number of documents obtained by intelligence, it was clear that France also showed a certain restraint. Thus, in a conversation with Bevin in April 1948 in Paris, where a meeting of foreign ministers of the countries participating in the Brussels Treaty was held, French President Vincent Auriol said that he "cannot help but worry about the possibility of war .. which would have been an even greater disaster than the war with Germany. Therefore, it seems extremely important that nothing be done that the Soviet Union could use as a pretext for aggravating the crisis. In response, Bevin made the curious admission that he himself "strove for three years for a patient and prudent policy towards Russia, until the United States found that he had gone too far."

A serious problem for the USA and England turned out to be the involvement of the Scandinavian countries, including neutral Sweden, in the Western European Pact. In March 1948, intelligence received documentary evidence that the British Foreign Office had informed its ambassador in Washington about the unwillingness of the Scandinavian countries to join the Brussels Treaty. In response, the ambassador reported to London that the Americans were confident that "it is possible to force Norway and Denmark into the Brussels system if appropriate pressure is exerted."

The residence in London received a number of documents stating that Norway and Denmark, fearing the reaction of the Soviet Union, did not want to bind themselves to the Brussels, and subsequently to the North Atlantic treaties. Instead, they tried to create their own

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bloc of the Scandinavian countries and involve neutral Sweden in it. As follows from the correspondence of the British Foreign Office with its ambassadors in Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen, British diplomatic representatives in these countries developed great activity in the second half of 1948 in order to prevent the formation of a Scandinavian defensive alliance independent of England and the USA and to draw these countries into a common western block. At the same time, they referred to the "threat from the USSR" and by this they argued the need to plan military assistance in advance. In order to put pressure on the Scandinavian countries, the US government refused to consider orders for the supply of military materials.

As the British ambassador in Washington reported to his Foreign Office on March 13, 1948, the US State Department instructed the ambassador in Oslo to warn the official authorities of the country that they could receive assistance from the United States only by taking a firm stand against Soviet initiatives, and

that America's desire to help Norway will be in direct proportion to the resolve shown by the Norwegian government.

The next day, a telegram was sent to Washington from London to the British ambassador with instructions to inform the US State Department that England was satisfied with the American position and sent a similar instruction to her ambassador in Oslo. The psychological attack was continued by Bevin at a meeting on March 15 in Paris with Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange. Intimidating his interlocutor with the strengthening of communist influence and the possible pressure of the Soviet Union on Norway, Bevin suggested that Lange start secret negotiations on joining the Brussels Treaty.

A few days later the British ambassador in Oslo also had a conversation with the Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange. It followed from it that England, having not achieved the simultaneous accession of the Scandinavian countries to the Western bloc, was striving to split the cooperation of these countries and obtain Norway's consent to conduct secret military negotiations with the USA and England, bearing in mind that subsequently to such negotiations could be joined by Denmark and Sweden.

Under such massive pressure, Norway made concessions, and in October 1948, the official proposal of England and the United States to begin negotiations on the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty finally agreed. However, Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange turned to the British Foreign Office with a request to convince the US government of the need for a cautious approach to Norwegian public opinion in connection with negotiations on his country's participation in the North Atlantic bloc.

After lengthy hesitation, Denmark also agreed to the talks, although it asked that its participation be kept secret. In December 1948, intelligence received a curious document - a message from the French

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French Ambassador in Copenhagen to French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman on November 30, 1948. It noted that in recent years there has been a marked deviation in the policy of Denmark from the previously adopted line towards joining the North Atlantic Pact. In support of this, the ambassador quoted the opinion of Foreign Minister Rasmussen: "We cannot agree to join the undertakings of the Western Powers, which would have the effect of subjecting our country to attack, seizure and destruction in the first place." The ambassador expressed confidence that this position of the Danish government is influenced by "the conviction of the Danes that there is no real threat of war at present".

Numerous secret data testified that Sweden turned out to be the toughest nut to crack, since from the very first attempts by the United States and Britain to draw it into military alliances, it took a firm position not to deviate from traditional neutrality. British Foreign Minister Bevin on 16 March 1948 (the day before the signing of the Brussels Treaty) in a conversation with Swedish Foreign Minister Unden continued to put pressure on the Swedish government to involve Sweden in this treaty. But no matter how Bevin Undena insisted that "force is the only means that the Russians really understand," the minister replied: "Sweden will adhere to a policy of neutrality."

As follows from the correspondence of the British Foreign Office with the ambassadors in Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen, attempts to convince Sweden did not stop later, until the end of 1948. The US ambassador in Stockholm, Matthews, recommended direct pressure on the Swedes, telling them that the US would only supply war materials to recognized friends, and "neutrals" would have to be at the very back of the line. The US government welcomed this proposal. Information obtained by Soviet intelligence indicated that in December 1948 Matthews made a representation to the Swedish government in which he threatened to stop all assistance from the United States if Sweden took part in any military agreement between the Scandinavian

countries based on a policy of neutrality. However, Sweden rejected such attempts. pressure.

The efforts of the United States and England to use the Norwegian government to put pressure on the Swedish government did not help either. The Anglo-Americans were forced to admit defeat. On February 1, 1949, the New York station reported to the Center that, despite enormous pressure, the United States had not been able to achieve Sweden's accession to the North Atlantic Pact.

Documents on the negotiations on the creation of the Western Union and the North Atlantic Pact, obtained by the Soviet intelligence residencies, indicate that the creators of these anti-Soviet blocs

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they themselves did not believe in the aggression of the Soviet Union, but tried to justify their actions precisely by a "threat" on its part. In this regard, the conclusions of the so-called memorandum of the head of the Russian section of the British Embassy in Moscow, Barker, prepared in March 1948, are of interest. "The unleashing by the Soviet Union itself, in pursuit of its expansionist goals, of a major war, that is, a war in which America could be involved, seems to be ruled out both for general political and military reasons. Soviet policy will rather be to continue the political war and the war of nerves in the hope of achieving its goals without armed conflict, through diplomatic pressure and subversion. If a major war nevertheless breaks out, it will in all likelihood be a war in which the United States begins military action against the USSR and not vice versa.

Approximately the same was expressed by the Americans in an analytical note prepared by the US Embassy in Moscow. "Although there are some differences in the density of colors, the American analysis of the situation is generally similar to the English assessment." And then the conclusion followed: "The Soviet Union will strive to achieve its goals by all means, with the exception of war."

During the negotiations on the creation of NATO in July 1948 in Washington, a document was approved, the first paragraph of which read: "The situation in Europe and the intentions of the USSR", the participants in the negotiations came to a common conclusion: "The intentions of the USSR may not enter to start a war." Bevin expressed this thought even more clearly in a conversation with Spaak in September 1948: "Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wants war, and I do not foresee one." Spaak said that he was not particularly concerned about the current situation, since he did not think that the Soviet Union consciously wanted war.

On October 5, 1948, the British Foreign Office prepared for the British delegation at the conference of Prime Ministers of the countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations a memorandum "The International Situation and Relations with the Soviet Union", in which, in particular, the British intended to somehow explain to the leaders of the dominion governments the conclusion of the Brussels pact and negotiations on the creation of NATO. After scaring the conference participants with the "communist danger" and "threats" from the Soviet Union, the authors of the memorandum admitted that "at present there are no signs that the Soviet Union or its satellites are preparing for an aggressive war."

The opinion of such a supporter of the firm and implacable US policy towards the USSR, as the then chairman of the Policy Planning Council at the Kennan State Department, who did not consider war inevitable and repeatedly expressed the opinion that the Soviet Union does not seek to start a war.

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One way or another, in April 1949, the NATO bloc was created and began its international activity. To the 12 original members - USA, UK, France, Italy,

Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Norway, Denmark, Iceland - Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, and Germany in 1955. The NATO bloc continues to expand.

The icy reflections of the Cold War spread over wide areas of the world and determined the course of world events for a long time: the arms race, attempts to use the West's monopoly on atomic weapons that had taken place at the beginning, crises both in the West and in the East, aimed at "rolling back" the Soviet Union. Union, and then People's China, their allies. It took a long time before, in the face of these crises escalating into a global conflict, the opposing sides began to take steps towards the search for peaceful coexistence and disarmament.

Note that the organization of the Warsaw Pact countries led by the Soviet Union was created only in May 1955, six years after the creation of NATO.

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Philby's Secret War

London. On May 28, 1951, in the office of the Deputy Chief of British Intelligence (SIS), who was in charge of cooperation with the American intelligence services, Jack Easton, the phone rang. Director of Intelligence, General Stuart Menzies, suggested that Easton urgently contact the head of British counterintelligence, Dick White, on a very important matter.

Easton decided that this could be related to the planned operation to detain the head of the American Department of the British Foreign Office, Donald McLean, who was suspected of having links with Soviet intelligence. Apparently, White had an urgent need to discuss a plan for further joint action.

Easton, however, knew Dick White well enough to think that White would hasten to share with him the results of McLean's first interrogation, if there was one. Easton recalled White's reaction at a recent meeting when he introduced him to an analysis of the results of work carried out jointly with the FBI to find the source of the leak in 1944-1945 of classified information on foreign policy, received from Washington from the representative of British intelligence at the CIA, Kim Philby. questions and the atomic problem from the British Embassy in Washington.

Philby's note then threw White into disarray. Philby recommended paying attention to some former employees of the British embassy in Washington, and among them to look for the source of the information leak.

Subsequent work by MI5 on Philby's proposal allowed counterintelligence to reassess the information it had and conclude that Donald McLean could have been the Soviet spy. Dick White, however, delivered the stunning news to Easton: McLean had disappeared! This proved Philby right.

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But the chiefs of the British secret services did not yet know the most important circumstance: Philby himself was in fact a Soviet intelligence agent. His memorandum was the result of a sober assessment of the most acute situation that has developed around his colleague in the "Cambridge Five" Donald McLean. It was clear that MacLean's failure was inevitable.

Therefore, before giving advice on finding the source of the leak, Kim Philby took vigorous action to warn McLean of the threat of arrest. To save him, he connected to this case, with the consent of the Center, another of his adherents - Guy Burgess. All three were part of the "Cambridge Five", which collaborated with Soviet intelligence. In helping to thwart McLean's arrest, Philby understood the risk to his personal safety. But he was ready to give the necessary explanations to the investigation and was able, as chess players say, to calculate his actions several steps ahead.

Having taken steps to save McLean, Kim Philby sent his considerations to the SIS at "slow speed" - diplomatic mail. In the event of suspicions about his own involvement in the MacLean case, he thus provided himself with retreat positions in order to gain time to solve the remaining tasks facing Soviet intelligence.

... As soon as Easton crossed the threshold of White's office, a hail of questions fell upon him: who was privy to the case of finding the source of the leak of information from the British embassy in the United States, who was aware of the authorization to interrogate McLean?

White was furious, asking questions abruptly and bluntly, as if he were interrogating Easton.

Stunned by such a reception, Easton did not have time, as they say, to open his mouth, when he heard from White what struck him the most. Donald MacLean, it turns out, did not disappear alone, but together with Guy Burgess, who had recently returned to London from Washington, where he worked as the first secretary of the British embassy.

Over the course of two days, White and Easton analyzed the circumstances of the case and all the signals in detail, step by step. As a result, they decided to call Kim Philby himself from Washington to London. They took into account that he maintained friendly relations with Guy Burgess, who, upon his arrival in 1950 to work in Washington, lived for a while in Philby's apartment.

General Menzies, after listening to Easton, suggested, however, that Philby not be rushed. With his usual sarcasm, he did not fail to remark: how could Philby, who was hundreds of miles from London, know about the dates of MacLean's arrest and interrogation? "If anyone is suspected of being involved in the escape of McLean and Burgess, then first of all those who were directly involved in the development of Ma

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wedge," concluded Menzies. In addition, he reminded Easton that if it were not for Philby's detailed report on the case of information leaks from the British Embassy in Washington in 1944-1945, then counterintelligence officers would continue to wander in the fog and check technical personnel. Menzies instructed Easton not to follow the lead of counterintelligence and to refrain from jumping to conclusions, especially when they concerned senior SIS officials like Philby.

Three days later, the British station in Washington received a detailed telegram from London about the flight of MacLean and Burgess. Philby and his colleagues were to inform the FBI about her.

The meeting with the FBI representative Ladd, responsible for contacts with the British, went smoothly. After reading a copy of the telegram, Ladd summed up what had happened very succinctly: "Well, you guys did it!" The subsequent conversation was reminiscent of the conversation of colleagues in misfortune. The operation to find the source of the leak was carried out jointly, and therefore, with the disappearance of Burgess, Ladd himself found himself in a delicate position. He repeatedly met Birdess in an informal setting at Kim's, invited him home, and had a certain sympathy for him.

Upon returning to the embassy, Kim said that he would go home to have a drink and rest after an unpleasant mission. The news of Burgess's disappearance, meanwhile, hit him like a lightning bolt.

Philby knew that while the FBI and CIA had not yet analyzed what had happened in London, he needed to get rid of the physical evidence he had. At home, he packed his photographic equipment and several films prepared for transfer to the Center with photographs of documents, went out of town and buried it all in a place that he had looked after in advance.

Returning home, Kim intensely analyzed the course of events preceding the disappearance of McLean and Burgess and the timeliness of the measures taken by him and the Center to save McLean. The fact is that he himself provided for a plan to save MacLean with the participation of Burgess, but ruled out his departure from the country. The Center, in turn, informed Kim Philby of a plan personally developed for him to illegally leave the United States in the event of an unfavorable development of the situation. Thanking the Center in his heart for the care, Kim unequivocally decided for himself that he would fight to the end. He, however, understood that Burgess's unexpected escape had changed his situation dramatically. British counterintelligence, together with the FBI, will now carefully study his biography. And each time they will encounter the name of Burgess. They will not pass by studying together at Cambridge when they had pro-communist views, with Burgess in particular about Kim's entry to work in the English

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intelligence, Burgess's 1948 trip to Istanbul, where Kim was then a resident of the SIS, and, finally, the fact that Burgess lived in Washington in Philby's apartment. Kim Philby, after working out and agreeing with the Center a plan to save MacLean, together with Guy Burgess, warned him in a rather harsh form before Guy's departure for London: "Look and don't run away yourself."

Offering the Center the option of saving MacLean with the help of Burgess, Philby proceeded from the fact that MacLean had serious behavioral breakdowns during his last business trip to Cairo, and upon his return to London he was in a state of deep depression, on the verge of a mental breakdown. . Years of nervous hard work took their toll. A short rest and appointment to the post of head of the American department in the British Foreign Office did not help MacLean to restore his former self-confidence and peace of mind. Philby and Burgess, the London station and the Center came to the conclusion that McLean would not be able to escape on his own and that he needed an escort who would ensure a secret exit from England. By that time, McLean was already under the operational and technical control of counterintelligence and would hardly have been able to solve all the issues of leaving the country on his own. According to Philby, there was no more suitable candidate for the role of escort than Burgess. Proposing a plan to save MacLean with the direct participation of Burgess, Philby did not for a moment doubt Guy's devotion to their common cause and his ability to act boldly in an extreme situation. Kim did not take into account one thing - that Burgess himself was on the verge of a nervous breakdown. True, Guy skillfully staged a drinking and flagrant traffic scandal to give rise to his early secondment from Washington. His departure for London was generally in keeping with MacLean's plan to get out of the threat of arrest and minimize possible damage. But he was really addicted to alcohol. Burgess's breakdown put his previous work in jeopardy. (Kim subsequently repeatedly asked himself the question: why did Burgess break his word and run away? Until the last days of his life, he could not find an unambiguous answer for himself.)

In the meantime, life in Washington went on as usual. Philby continued to serve as SIS representative to the CIA, maintaining business relationships with senior CIA and FBI officials and discussing operational and political issues with them. Kim did not notice any wariness or restraint on the part of the Americans. True, as he moved among the staff of the British embassy and their wives, he sometimes caught unfriendly glances directed at him, but he did not attribute them to his own account, but saw in this a belated reaction to his friendship with Burgess,

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who managed to make many enemies with his extravagant behavior and sharp tongue in a short time in Washington. Philby understood that the British and American intelligence services, continuing to work on systematizing, analyzing and evaluating the materials they had, would eventually include people and himself among the suspects in this case. Putting himself in the place of counterintelligence officers, Philby tried to find vulnerabilities or weaknesses in

his biography and official activities, especially from the point of view of the implementation of the information received from him by the Soviet intelligence.

British counterintelligence, in particular, could pay attention to the fact that, having taken the post of head of the counterintelligence department of the SIS in 1945, Philby repeatedly traveled to a number of European countries to get acquainted on the spot with the work of residencies and set tasks to counter the activities of Soviet intelligence and combat with the communist movement. This helped him to inform Moscow in more detail about the composition of the residencies and the agents they had, about the restructuring in the central intelligence apparatus, about the priority tasks set by the government. The implementation in the USSR of the information received from Philby in those years, the arrests of agents did not cause any particular concern at the headquarters of the SIS. Individual failures could be explained by the lack of sufficient experience in working against Soviet intelligence.

But there were also extreme situations. So, on September 20, 1945, K. Philby reported to Moscow that Volkov, an employee of the Istanbul residency of the MGB, intended to transfer to the British, for a large reward and granting political asylum, documentary information that Soviet intelligence had two agents in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Great Britain, and the third is even the head of the counterintelligence service in London. At the insistent request of Volkov, the staff of the British Consulate General in Istanbul sent his information to London not by telegraph, but by diplomatic mail and warned against the undesirability of further telegraphic correspondence on this matter.

Upon receipt of this information, General Menzies decided to send Philby to Istanbul to deal with this story on the spot. When Kim finally got to Istanbul, Volkov was no longer there. Soviet intelligence worked quickly and accurately. After confirming Volkov's departure for Moscow, the British compared his behavior, incoherent speech during a visit to their consulate and came to the conclusion that Volkov most likely had a nervous breakdown, and therefore the Russians sent him to Moscow.

At that time, Kim also had to deal with the information coming from the Canadian special services, received from Guzenko, the GRU cryptographer, who had embarked on the path of betrayal. Gouzenko betrayed several agents of the Soviet military intelligence. Due to a number of independent

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Philby failed to get out of the blow of all the agents issued by the traitor, but this subsequently turned even in Philby's favor. Bearing in mind that Kim Philby occupies a very important post in the SIS, where he enjoys authority, that he was awarded the Order of the British Empire for the successful fight against the subversive activities of German agents against Great Britain, the leadership of the NKGB and Soviet intelligence limited the circle of those admitted to Kim of information and very carefully approached its implementation in order to exclude the slightest possibility of deciphering the source.

This primarily applied to information received from Philby about the deployment of British agents to the territory of the USSR: to the Baltic republics, to Ukraine and to Belarus. In each specific case, options were developed for neutralizing spies by capturing, re-recruiting, radio games, and staging successful work up to a certain time (under the control of security agencies).

Summing up the analysis, Kim Philby came to the conclusion that his entire career testified to the complete confidence in him on the part of the leadership of the SIS and MI5, that they had no evidence at their disposal to give reason to doubt his trustworthiness.

It will not be difficult for even a person not experienced in intelligence matters to guess what paramount value for the USSR security agencies was the information received from Philby, thanks to which it was possible to frustrate many plans of the US and British intelligence services, to neutralize the abandoned agents and saboteurs. Philby's friend, a former SIS employee, later a well-known writer Graham Greene, very accurately said this: "When

Philby had reached the pinnacle of his career, any Western intelligence initiative was doomed in advance.

At the same time, Philby's position in the SIS required from him a truly filigree accuracy of actions, careful proportionality of each decision made.

Philby and the leadership of Soviet intelligence were constantly faced with a dilemma:

- if all the operations carried out by him through the British special services ended in failure, then he would be fired at best;
- if they were too successful, they would be detrimental to the Soviet Union.

Under these conditions, Philby had to plan and conduct each of the operations directed against the interests of the USSR in such a way that they either failed "naturally" or had limited success and were under the control of the USSR state security agencies. For Kim Philby, these were years of tremendous nervous tension.

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The joint flight of McLean and Burgess further inflamed the situation. The protracted silence of London, which kept Philby in suspense, was interrupted by a telegram received by him, in which he was asked to comment on the fact of Burgess' flight with MacLean and to explain the motives for such an act. In a telegram in response, Philby said that he had been friends with Burgess for many years, but never allowed the idea that Burgess could lead a double life and, therefore, did not find an explanation for his act.

The nature of the request convinced Kim that London was thoroughly investigating not only the McLean-Burgess case, but also came to grips with checking his possible involvement in organizing their escape. This was confirmed by Easton's personal letter to Philby soon received, sent with an SIS officer who flew to Washington on a short business trip, specializing in disinformation actions. In a handwritten letter, Easton informed Kim that he would soon receive a telegram summoning him to London and advised him not to delay his departure. After re-reading this letter, Philby came to the conclusion that MI5 and SIS, having no concrete evidence against him, were trying to induce him to take active steps and thereby impersonate himself. They did the same to McLean when they deprived him of access to classified information and set up surveillance.

Linking these facts, Philby decided that in London they suspected him not only of being involved in the escape of McLean and Burgess, but also of belonging to Soviet intelligence. According to the calculation of counterintelligence officers, a sense of danger should have prompted him to urgently contact representatives of Soviet intelligence in the United States in order to illegally leave Washington. If events developed according to this scenario, the FBI and MI5 would not only prevent a possible escape, but would also receive evidence of Philby's work for Soviet intelligence. The subsequent course of events confirmed his fears. Philby soon received a telegram signed by Menzies about the need to come to London. Before leaving, Kim paid protocol visits to FBI Director Hoover and CIA Deputy Director Dulles, CIA Chief of Foreign Counterintelligence Angleton, whom he had known through work since 1943, and FBI Chief Counterintelligence Officer Ladd. The meetings were short and informal. There are no alarming moments for Kim.

noted.

In London, while boarding a bus, Kim noticed Bremner, a high-ranking SIS administrative officer, darting about and looking for someone. In all likelihood, this could be a danger sign given to Kim Easton. When signing the telegram summoning Kim, Menzies instructed Easton to "insure" Philby's arrival in London so that the "zealous guys" from MI5 would not intercept Kim and do something stupid.

Upon arriving home from the airport, Philby promptly called Easton. Easton asked who was calling. After Kim's answer, there was a sigh of relief. Easton asked Philby to come to SIS immediately. Upon meeting Kim, Easton said that MI5 Director Dick White wanted to talk to him right now about the Burgess and McLean case.

The first conversation with White took place in the presence of Easton and lasted an hour and a half. It was mainly about Burgess and his relationship with MacLean, and how Philby, who, according to White, knew Burgess well, could explain everything that had happened. White's second and third conversations with Philby had already taken place in private. White, fortunately, was not a professional investigator, and by asking Kim questions directly, he unwittingly revealed what Philby was suspected of. Thus, White said bluntly that Kim did not bring anything new to the McLean-Burgess case, and suggested that he tell in detail, and then write everything about himself: about his studies at Cambridge, participation in a Marxist circle, a trip to Spain and his own intelligence career, including his role in the Volkov case. Philby's preconceived answers clearly did not suit White, and he could hardly contain his irritation and negative emotions.

Asking that everything be written down in detail and handed over to Easton, White this time took a cold farewell to Philby without shaking his hand. Kim was not embarrassed by this behavior of White. He understood: he survived the first round of the duel with counterintelligence and got the opportunity to prepare for further struggle.

At the same time, General Menzies received a rather harsh letter from the Director of the CIA, in which, in addition to Philby's close relationship with Burgess, he cited the long-standing testimony of the traitor Walter Krivitsky that the OGPU sent its agent, a talented journalist, to Francoist Spain. The director of the CIA also recalled Volkov's information that the head of the counterintelligence service in London was a Soviet intelligence agent, and also pointed out some unsuccessful, in his opinion, joint Anglo-American intelligence operations during Philby's stay in Washington. At the end of the letter, Bedell Smith categorically raised the question of the impossibility of returning Philby to the United States as a representative of the SIS.

After informing Philby of the letter he had received, Menzies asked Kim to resign. Shortly after the resignation, Menzies again invited Philby to his place and said that a formal legal investigation into the circumstances of the escape of McLean and Burgess had been launched, which was entrusted to head the royal adviser Milmo, who worked during the war as an investigator in counterintelligence. In the post-war years, Milmo was involved in MI5 only on very important occasions. Milmo led the first interview with Kim Philby aggressively, asking questions without

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appeal form. With the naked eye, an accusatory bias and an attempt to convict him of working for Soviet intelligence were visible. Philby assessed the situation, answered extremely succinctly so as not to allow the investigator to confuse him with possible contradictions. Having achieved nothing, Milmo ordered further interrogations to be continued by an experienced MI-5 investigator, Skardon. However, all his attempts to "talk" Philby were unsuccessful. In the end, Kim Philby was left alone with a small severance pay.

Meanwhile, the Center and the London residency used every opportunity to find out the fate of Philby and provide him with the necessary assistance. As a result of a complex of operational measures, it was possible to establish that Kim withstood the onslaught of counterintelligence, but continues to be under close surveillance. The residency was still able to secretly transfer the money to Kim through a liaison, as the severance pay had run out and he was out of a job.

Firmly denying involvement in the McLean-Burgess case, and even more so in Soviet intelligence, skillfully building a defense, Kim Philby waited for his opponents to miscalculate or make a mistake in order to move from defense to offensive.

Failing to get a confession from Philby, MI5 inspired not only tabloid harassment, but MP Lipton's request to the prime minister about Philby's role in the McLean-Burgess affair. Philby decided to take this opportunity to go from defensive to offensive, and managed to ensure that in 1955 British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan, during a debate in Parliament, was forced to publicly drop all charges against Philby. It was hard for the British authorities to believe that the talented intelligence officer Philby, who was awarded the Order of the British Empire for special services, was a spy.

Having obtained the dismissal of the charges, Kim Philby soon, with the help of his old friends, and above all Nicholas Elliott and George Young, who continued to work in the SIS and were interested in the full rehabilitation of Kim, as well as their entire service, left for Lebanon as a freelance intelligence officer. Under the guise of a correspondent for the English newspaper The Observer and the magazine The Economist in the Middle East. Despite the fact that counterintelligence continued to suspect Kim Philby, he, showing his fighting qualities, again actively joined in the fight against the intrigues of the American and British special services against the USSR from the territory of the states of this region. From him, the Center began to receive important political and operational information about the CIA and SIS officers who worked in this region, and their recruiting aspirations. The impression was that Kim was trying to make up for lost time. But the Soviet

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intelligence, aware of MI5's suspicions, took special measures to ensure Philby's personal safety.

On a January evening in 1963, Philby's secretary of residency in Beirut called Philby's apartment in Beirut and asked him to come to the embassy. Kim was ill at that time: his bronchitis worsened, and therefore it was agreed that as soon as he recovered, he would call her himself. A few days later, Kim called his secretary and said that he was ready to come to the embassy. In response, he received an invitation to visit her at the apartment.

The next day, Kim came to her apartment and, to his surprise, found Nicholas Elliott there, who offered to talk face to face. Warning at once that the conversation would be unpleasant, Elliott declared: "I have to tell you that your past has caught up with you." He further explained that counterintelligence knew for certain from the defector Golitsyn and Kim's old acquaintance Flora Solomon that Kim was working for Soviet intelligence. However, the leaders of the SISI MI-5 authorized him to offer Philby an exemption from legal liability in exchange for an admission of his guilt and the issuance of all the information they were interested in about Soviet intelligence officers and agents known to Kim. Philby did his best to convince Elliott that this was just another slander and that he had nothing to add to what he had told investigators in 1951. The next day, Elliott invited Philby and his wife to dinner, which, in addition to him, was the secretary of the residency. The dinner passed in a friendly atmosphere. Saying goodbye to Kim, Elliott told him that he was returning to London the next day and asked him to rethink their previous conversation. Kim must inform the SIS resident in Beirut, Peter Lahn, of the decision. Soon Lan called Kim and asked if Kim would like to meet him on a known matter. Kim replied that he had nothing new for Peter yet. If he thinks of something, he will call himself. This answer to Lan was dictated by the need to gain time. In the evening, Kim had a meeting with an employee of the Soviet residency, at which he told him about the proposal made to him by Elliott and the need in this regard to urgently leave for the USSR. The Center immediately agreed to send Kim according to the option proposed by the residency.

An interesting coincidence in this story. During Kim's departure days, Peter Lahn took a four-day vacation and skied in the mountains. On the day Lan returned to Beirut, Philby managed to leave Lebanon for the USSR. Analyzing later the circumstances that allowed him to leave for the USSR, Kim Philby was looking for an answer to the question of how to explain the demonstrative "carelessness" of SIS resident Lan after such a sharp conversation between Elliott and Philby. It was obvious to Philby that American intelligence services also had this information about him, since Golitsyn fled from Helsinki to the USA. And if in this

Since the Americans had good reason to arrest Philby, the SIS and the Conservative government of Great Britain, which at that time was headed by Harold Macmillan, were not interested in such a development of events.

In 1961-1962, England was swept by a whole series of spy scandals, and the arrest of Philby could have led to the resignation of the government. Knowing Kim Philby well, the leadership of the SIS understood that for the sake of the promised immunity, he would not betray the interests of Soviet intelligence. When sending Nicholas Elliott to Beirut, the leadership of the SIS proceeded from the fact that Philby would correctly interpret Elliott's frank conversation with him and make the only right decision - to disappear from Beirut. After six months later, Moscow officially announced that Philby was in the USSR, Elliott and several other SIS employees who supported Kim were dismissed without any publicity. Unlike in 1951-1955, Philby's disappearance was not followed by a noisy campaign in the press. SIS resident Peter Lahn upon his return from a business trip was awarded a high award - the Order of Saints Michael and George.

So, Kim Philby arrived in the USSR, which became his second Motherland. After a short rest, the talented scout continued his work, which was the content of his life for him.

Speaking to a team of scouts at a meeting dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the birth of F.E. Dzerzhinsky, Kim Philby said:

"Most of my life is behind me. Looking back at the past years, I think that I lived them not in vain. I would like to repeat on my own behalf the words of Felix Dzerzhinsky, a knight of the revolution, a great humanist: "If I had to start life anew, I would start the way I started..."

Naturally, little was written about the last third of Philby's life - from 1963 to 1988, except for some scattered facts published by Western journalists. But Philby lived during this period in the USSR a normal, full-blooded life, married, worked, traveled, and rested. Working hard on memoirs. During numerous trips around the country, he met with teams of employees of the territorial bodies of the KGB. He was a consultant to the First Main Directorate of the KGB.

He also had a favorite thing, to which he treated with special diligence and love. He led training sessions with young intelligence officers. The Philby Seminar, as these classes were called, made a significant contribution to the intelligence training and education of young intelligence officers.

Here is how one of the listeners describes the first lesson in the seminar: "December evening. In an intelligence-owned safe house in Moscow, young people anxiously await appearance

legendary scout. (As Kim admitted later, he was also worried.)

A few introductory words that instantly relieved tension, and now Kim is enthusiastically talking about who he was going to become when he entered Cambridge. Answering a question about his hobbies, the guest, in particular, said: "<...I reread the classics of English literature with pleasure. I love hockey (as a spectator, of course). And another hobby: cooking. If in doubt, come visit.

The Philby Seminar operated intermittently almost until his death. Going to the pupils for classes, Kim carefully prepared. He re-read a lot of literature, prepared notes. Two or three hours of classes flew by unnoticed. Philby proposed various operational situations, analyzed them, exchanged views on various

aspects of the international situation, gave assignments for solving operational and reconnaissance tasks.

In 1980, his book *My Secret War* was published in Russian. The book reveals the motives of his struggle against fascism and the confrontational post-war politics of the West.

Shortly before his death, Kim Philby gave an interview in Moscow in January 1988 to the English writer and publicist Philip Knightley, in which, summing up their conversation, he said: "As for returning to my homeland, the current England is a foreign country for me. . The life here is my life, and I am not going to move anywhere. This is my country, which I have served for over 50 years. I want to be buried here. I want my remains to rest where I worked."

The state highly appreciated the outstanding services of Kim Philby, awarding him the Orders of Lenin, the Red Banner, the Order of the Patriotic War [degree, the Friendship of Peoples.

Kim Philby died on May 11, 1988, and was buried in Moscow at the Novokuntsevo cemetery.

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Donald McLean on the front line

The year 1941 was coming to an end. Bloody battles continued near Moscow.

It was a tough time in London too. German aircraft bombed British cities. The threat of a fascist invasion of the British Isles was not removed from the agenda.

London's "legal" foreign intelligence residency operated in wartime. The workers, and there were only four of them, held meetings with sources, brought a lot of very important materials that needed to be processed, and the most valuable information urgently encrypted and transmitted by radio to Moscow. Employees often spent the night in their offices.

On one of these days, resident Anatoly Gorsky, returning from a meeting, invited a residency officer to his place and said: "These are materials of particular importance - the correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt. Figure it out, take photocopies and prepare a telegram."

The content of the correspondence was transferred to Moscow. The information received served as a serious impetus for Soviet initiatives to strengthen allied relations with the United States and Britain, which played a large role in the defeat of fascist Germany.

These documents were transmitted by one of the most valuable and reliable sources of the residency - Donald McLean, who belonged to the well-known "Cambridge Five". At that time he held the position of Second Secretary at the British Foreign Office. Prior to that, McLean graduated from the privileged Trinity College of the University of Cambridge, worked at the Foreign Office, then, in 1938-1940, as third secretary at the British Embassy in Paris.

The illegal spy Deutsch, who worked with McLean during the first period of his cooperation with Soviet intelligence, characterized this man as follows: "He came to us from honest motives,

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the intellectual emptiness and aimlessness of the life of the bourgeois class to which he belonged repelled him. He read a lot, is smart, modest ... He is a brave man and is ready for anything to make us".

At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he was considered a capable and promising official, who was entrusted with important tasks, including the preparation of secret documents for the Cabinet of Ministers.

As a scout, he acted prudently, accurately and boldly. He obtained significant documentary information, was well versed in the emerging military and political situation in the world, which influenced the adoption of various government decisions, and constantly informed his curator about this. Thus, he regularly received information on a very important German problem (Gorsky had his first meeting with him on his return from Paris in December 1940). In 1940 and early 1941, he handed over a number of materials prepared by British intelligence for a report to his government. Among them is such a document as the mobilization plan of Germany. In addition, he also handed over the mobilization plan of Italy, information about the state of the German military industry, and the production capacities of large German military factories.

In the first half of 1941, McLean informed Moscow about Hitler's preparations for an attack on the USSR. Among the documents of this period, it is necessary to note the report received from the source of the Ministry of Economic War of England, prepared for the report to the War Cabinet, on the imminent attack of the Germans on the USSR. defeat of the Red Army.

Of great interest was the data on the work of the English deciphering service in deciphering Soviet ciphers. The source delivered copies of telegrams deciphered by the British, which were sent from Moscow by the Comintern. At the same time, he stressed that the British decryption service was actively working to decipher Soviet diplomatic telegrams, but had not yet been able to achieve positive results.

The data received from McLean on the work on the decryption of Soviet telegrams played an important role in taking the necessary measures to increase the strength of ciphers and create conditions for the safe use of cipher correspondence on domestic and foreign communication lines.

Since the beginning of the war, McLean regularly began to receive secret documents about the military plans of England, negotiations on various issues with the United States, supplying the army, mobilization work, weapons, management of the military industry, design and research organizations, intelligence reports on the fascist army .

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In addition, McLean had the opportunity to get acquainted with the documents coming from the headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the correspondence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with its foreign missions abroad, and other important materials. Of great interest, as mentioned above, was the correspondence between the British government and Washington. By the nature of his work, McLean had direct access to these documents. He selected the most interesting materials and handed them over to the station officer for photographing.

The Center gave a high appraisal of the information obtained by the source, set before it specific tasks on the most burning issues. One of these was Anglo-French relations. The British had their own position towards post-war France, which was not shared by the French representatives abroad. England was in no hurry to recognize the French Committee of National Liberation, formed in Algeria and headed by General de Gaulle.

The information provided by McLean, along with information from other sources, made it possible for the Soviet government to understand this issue in detail and determine its strategy towards France. The USSR was the first to recognize de Gaulle's National Liberation Committee and established direct contact with it. Subsequently, this circumstance played a significant role in the development of Soviet-French relations.

Donald had to work hard. Understanding the importance for the Soviet leadership of the information he obtained, especially information relating to the German army and its plans on the eastern front, he often took risks in order to obtain the data of interest to the Center. Physical overload was also heavy.

He experienced moral and domestic difficulties. He sent his wife and child to the States to her parents, as the child required treatment, and it was not safe to stay in England under German bombs.

McLean acted productively and enthusiastically. He managed to obtain many documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were of interest to the Center. However, sometimes it took a lot of time to do so. Characteristic in this regard are the efforts to obtain a particularly secret document called the Jebb Report.

In January 1943, McLean announced the preparation by the leadership of the Foreign Office of a top-secret document on the strategy of British foreign policy. The author of the document was the head of one of the departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jebb.

This message aroused great interest in Moscow. An urgent telegram was sent from the Center to London. "The document is of exceptional interest to us," the cipher emphasized.

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he and was offered to get it at all costs, or at least to get acquainted with its contents.

The Resident informed McLean of the task. Despite the fact that McLean had quite ample opportunity to get acquainted with secret materials, he did not have access to this document. According to careful inquiries, it turned out that there were only two copies of the document, one of which was kept in the safe of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the other - with the author.

McLean began to look for approaches to officials who might know the contents of the document. One of these people was Lord Hood, with whom MacLean had a friendly relationship. He told MacLean that Jebb's report on the future foreign policy of the British Government had been submitted in abridged form to the War Cabinet. The prime minister rejected this report. As a result, the cabinet instructed Jebb to redraft it, incorporating the comments that had been made during the discussion. The revised 29-point Jebb Report was submitted to the War Cabinet for consideration.

Hood also said that the Foreign Office's Central Europe section had issued a top secret memorandum as an addendum to the "Jebb Report" on the future of Germany. The general meaning of this memorandum was that it was necessary to encourage "federalism" and "separatism" in the future Germany, and the existence of a German central government was completely rejected.

McLean's painstaking search work unexpectedly ran into a serious obstacle. Counterintelligence arrested a certain Ayres, who worked as Jebb's personal secretary. Meik, a diplomatic correspondent for the People newspaper, was arrested with her.

Ayres worked for a long time in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was admitted to the most secret materials. The investigation established that she systematically took out ciphers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, minutes of the meeting of the military cabinet, etc., and handed them over to Meik, with whom she was in intimate relations. Allegedly, no corpus delicti was found in their actions, but nevertheless, each of them received two years in prison for violating the act on the protection of state secrets.

This event prompted the adoption of strict measures to improve security at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and tighten the rules for handling documents, which seriously complicated McLean's intelligence work.

The "hunt" for the "Jebb report" lasted almost four months. By this time, the report had been corrected several times, and was finally approved by the cabinet. After that, several copies were printed, which were distributed to senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the heads of the main departments. One copy was also sent to the head of the department where McLean worked. However, ordinary employees

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no one was familiar with this document. At times, the document was with the deputy department head.

McLean made more than one attempt to familiarize himself with the document, but to no avail. But one day, an opportunity presented itself. He was working on a problem, and for this he was given a "Jebb report" for a short time. So McLean, after a long search, was able to read this important document. A few days later, its contents were transmitted by telegraph to Moscow.

In March 1944, McLean received a new appointment - the first secretary of the British embassy in Washington. The leadership of foreign intelligence greeted the news of McLean's transfer to the United States positively. The military and political center of the Western allies moved to the USA. The Americans now set the tone in all directions: military, political, economic, as well as in the field of creating new types of weapons. Under these conditions, having one's own person in such an important institution as the British Embassy, through which contacts were made between the leadership of the United States and England, was exclusively important.

The post of first secretary of the embassy brought McLean to a level that allowed him to have access to many secrets of the embassy.

Upon McLean's arrival in the United States, a "legal" residency established contact with him. After several meetings, the leadership of the residency immediately realized that an extraordinary assistant had arrived. He not only had brilliant capabilities and was able to obtain very important information, but he was also well prepared operationally. In his report on his meetings with McLean, the operative wrote: "‘Homer’ (McLean's pseudonym — Auth.) gives the impression of a very enterprising person who does not need to be pushed into his work. It is also evident that he is well versed in the international situation and understands which questions are of greatest interest to us. There is no desire on his part to avoid working with us. On the contrary, he believes that too infrequent meetings do not give him the opportunity to transmit intelligence information in a timely manner.

In response to the report received from the residency on the work with the source, the Center sent a telegram stating that a specially assigned worker was leaving for the United States to work with McLean. It turned out to be Anatoly Gorsky, who worked for a long time with a source in England and was able to establish very good relations with him. Given this, as well as McLean's new position, the Center decided not to change the curator. So in October 1944, Gorsky continued to work with McLean, which he was immensely happy about.

After Anatoly Borisovich's arrival in the USA, work with the source became much more lively, and the return on information increased many times over. For the first half of 1945, only by telegraph in

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The Center was given the contents of 191 secret documents and 26 secret messages. Of these materials, 146 were sent to Stalin and other top leaders of the country.

Materials handed over by McLean included:

- telegrams of German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to his ambassador in Dublin, intercepted by the British and Americans, regarding attempts to make peace with England and the USA;
- a document on the progress and results of negotiations between the British and American ambassadors and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov on the settlement of the Polish question;
- a telegram from British Prime Minister Churchill to US President Roosevelt on the position of the British government on the Polish and Romanian issues;
- a document on the planned negotiations of the Allies with the German General Kesselring regarding the surrender of his troops in Northern Italy;
- Churchill's telegram to US President Truman, in which Churchill proposes to seize Trieste without prior notice to the Soviet government;
- Churchill's telegram to the British ambassador to the United States Halifax, in which he instructed to obtain the consent of the Americans to the occupation of Prague before the Red Army did it;
- a series of telegrams on the position of the allies on the Austrian question;
- Churchill's telegram to Truman, containing a list of issues that he intended to put for discussion at the "Big Three" conference in Berlin, etc.

In the US, Gorsky worked with McLean for only one year. In November 1945, at the direction of the Center, he left for Moscow. This was due to the betrayal of the residency agent, who knew Gorsky as a Soviet intelligence officer. Another employee began working with McLean, whose affiliation with intelligence was not known to the American intelligence services.

During his time in the United States, McLean was entrusted with several important sections through his embassy. One of them was of exceptional importance for Soviet intelligence. He was appointed secretary of the Anglo-American Atomic Energy Committee, which made it possible to follow the progress of work on the atomic bomb and new aspects in the development of the atomic industry and scientific research.

The British ambassador to the United States at that time was Lord Halifax. Since Donald was an excellent specialist and stood out noticeably among other diplomats, he was constantly called upon to prepare materials of particular importance and urgency. He participated in the finalization of the plan for the landing of the allies in France, was a member of the Anglo-American commission for the preparation of a peace treaty with Ita.

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Leah and did other responsible work. To agree on the controversial issues that arose between the British and Americans, he often flew to London.

The most interesting direction of his activity was participation in the work on the coordination of the American Manhattan Project, that is, work on the creation of atomic weapons. He mined some materials on scientific and technical issues. But mainly its capabilities concerned the assessment of certain developments, the political aspects of a particular problem, the contradictions that arose between the British and Americans. His information on these issues was rated extremely highly at the Center.

Contradictions between the USA and England had intensified by that time. The British called their scientists home to work on their own project. McLean continued at the embassy to be responsible for maintaining liaison with the American Atomic Energy Commission. This gave him the opportunity to visit some atomic objects and institutions and, along with clarifying

questions needed by British atomic scientists, to collect information needed by the Soviet Union.

In February 1947, Donald McLean was promoted to co-director of the secretariat for coordinating the Anglo-American-Canadian policy in the field of nuclear energy, and thus received even more opportunities to get acquainted with the secret documentation on the atomic problem.

At a meeting in October 1947, McLean told an operative that there were several representatives of British counterintelligence in the United States, who were in close contact with the FBI. In connection with the failure of Soviet intelligence, the working hours of the British embassy became more complicated. One of the employees of the British counterintelligence told McLean that the American special services had arrested two Americans who confessed to working for the USSR. The FBI has data on several other individuals, but cannot yet arrest them, because the evidence not enough.

As the situation became more complicated, McLean offered to temporarily cut off contact with him. The Center carefully considered this request and recommended to the residency not to stop work, but to strengthen the secrecy and hold meetings no more than once a month.

The refusal to take a break from working with McLean was due to the special nature of the information that was coming from him at that time, in particular on atomic problems. In addition, it was also important to obtain data on the preparations of the United States and Britain for the conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was to be held in London some time later. Such materials were available in the British embassy.

In the summer of 1948, McLean received a promotion. He was appointed advisor to the British embassy in Egypt. He was at that time

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35 years. He was the youngest diplomat in the British Foreign Service to hold such a high post. He was talked about as an exceptionally capable and brilliant worker and was predicted for high positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

After a short stay in England, he left for Egypt with his family. The foreign intelligence station in Cairo was properly oriented towards the organization of work with the source. However, fruitful work with McLean did not work out. The great nervous overload that he had experienced over the past few years had seriously affected his health. He began to fall into stressful conditions, began to abuse alcohol. In one of his letters to Moscow, he expressed his desire to move to live in the USSR

In 1950 McLean returned to England. After a while he received a new appointment. He became head of the American section of the Foreign Office. The Center has developed a plan to re-establish contact with the source and continue to work with him in England.

However, in May 1951, the situation around McLean began to deteriorate. The Americans, who were engaged in the radio interception of our radiograms, were simultaneously working on deciphering them. Not one year has gone by. For a long time they failed to crack the Soviet ciphers. The British did the same. They even resorted to such tricks as inspiring statements in parliament on some sensitive issues, believing that Soviet intelligence and the embassy would give the text of the statement in their cipher telegrams. They believed that, having found the text of the statement, they would reveal the key to the cipher and reveal the cipher itself. However, this did not bring success.

The Americans were luckier. According to reports in the Western press, they were able to read several excerpts from telegrams sent by our residency from the United States. In June 1950, they succeeded in restoring individual fragments of a cipher telegram sent to Moscow in 1945 by the US foreign intelligence station. The telegram reported on secret English

American negotiations. The Americans reported this to the British. British counterintelligence determined that the content of this information was known to only eight persons. Using the method of exclusion, the British established that Soviet intelligence could only obtain information about these negotiations from two persons, one of whom was MacLean. The British counterintelligence organized a covert investigation of this case and established surveillance for McLean.

Simultaneously with British counterintelligence, Kim Philby, a Soviet intelligence officer who worked in British intelligence, closely followed the development of events. At that time he was in the United States, being the representative of the SIS in the CIA. He promptly received from the management

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CIA information and decided to act without delay. Guy Burgess was in the US at the time, another foreign intelligence source who was connected to him. Philby informed him of the impending danger and offered to urgently leave for England, to raise the question of the immediate withdrawal of MacLean to the USSR before the Soviet comrades. Philby also insisted that Burgess accompany Donald to a designated point on the Continent and then return to England. Burgess arrived in England and set about rescuing MacLean.

The leadership of foreign intelligence was not slow in responding. The resident was instructed to take all necessary measures to send McLean to the USSR and agreed with the proposal that Burgess accompany him on the way.

However, leaving England was not easy. McLean was already under close surveillance. Contact with the residency was maintained through Burgess, and he, as an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, went into MacLean's office, started a conversation on neutral topics, meanwhile wrote on paper what he should do. This precaution was taken because McLean's office was probably already bugged by counterintelligence.

On the evening of Friday, May 25, 1951, Burgess drove to McLean's house, they announced to the family that they would come to the club for an hour. Donald went upstairs, kissed the children, his wife, and they drove out of the house.

The trip to the club was only a pretext; in fact, Burgess already had two tickets in his pocket for a steamboat leaving in half an hour for France. They managed to board the ship at the last moment, and a few hours later they were in Paris.

The departure went smoothly, there was no outside surveillance, the days off began, and counterintelligence, apparently, limited itself to technical control. And the behavior of the ward did not cause concern. By outward signs, one could conclude that he was not going to leave anywhere. As it became known later, counterintelligence planned to interrogate McLean the following Monday. But this was not destined to come true. From France, the path of the scouts lay in Switzerland and Czechoslovakia. And on Sunday they were in Moscow. (Burgess decided to follow McLean.)

A new period began in the fate of McLean. He lived in the USSR for almost 30 years. First, for security reasons, he was settled in Kuibyshev, where he lived until 1955. Then he asked to be transferred to Moscow or Leningrad. His wife and children came to him, the family received Soviet citizenship.

After moving to Moscow, McLean was first a contributor to the journal *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, and then moved to the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, where he worked until the end of his life. At the same time, he was a consultant in foreign intelligence.

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As a senior research fellow, McLean prepared several scientific papers, defended a Ph.D., then a doctoral dissertation on the topic "Foreign policy of England after Suez".

It was highly appreciated and was published in the USSR, England and the USA.

McLean enjoyed great prestige in the scientific world of our country. He spoke at conferences, symposiums, scientists and authoritative experts in the field of international relations turned to him for advice.

A talented researcher of British and world politics, a subtle analyst, he closely followed the development of the situation inside the USSR. McLean sent appeals to the Central Committee of the CPSU, the KGB, in which he stated his views on a number of aspects of the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet state.

In particular, he considered the deployment of SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe a big mistake of the Soviet government. McLean was sure that NATO would react to this action by installing American missiles in Western Europe, and the arms race would continue in conditions less favorable for the USSR.

In the political and economic fields, McLean was a supporter of reforms aimed at decentralizing the leadership of the country, involving fresh forces in decision-making, and democratizing society as a whole. Back in 1981, he spoke about the inevitability of reforms that should bring Soviet society to a new level of development.

So, he wrote: "... it seems to me most likely that in the next five years, as a result of favorable changes in the top leadership, we will witness an improvement in the political, cultural and moral climate in the Soviet Union and the deployment of a whole range of reforms that will affect the most important spheres of the life of the Soviet people!

Scout, scientist believed that the reforms should liberate the country's productive forces and give a strong impetus to the development of the economy, culture, improve the social conditions of the people's life and generally strengthen the Soviet state.

As for McLean's life in the USSR, it developed in an interesting and prosperous way. Creative work fascinated him. He was constantly busy researching the problems that interested him, preparing scientific reports and articles, and participated in conferences and round tables. He once told his close friend George Blake, "Instead of becoming an alcoholic, I became a workaholic."

People were constantly drawn to him. Donald had many friends and acquaintances among the employees of his institute and other scientific

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institutions. McLean was attentive to his colleagues, and if anyone turned to him for help, he never received a refusal. His gentle nature and kind smile evoked a favorable response. He mastered the Russian language, spoke and wrote without errors.

McLean brought up a whole galaxy of specialists in the field of British internal and external politicians.

Unlike Donald, his wife and children could not adapt to life in the USSR, and McLean suffered from tearing them out of their familiar environment.

In the late 70s, his sons, who already had their own families, decided to return to their homeland. Donald went out of his way to help with the paperwork required for their return to the UK.

Unfortunately, Donald fell ill with cancer. He knew this, but, being a courageous man, he tried to do everything for his family members so that they would not have complications after his death. One

after another, all the members of his family left the Union. He was left alone. He especially missed his little granddaughter, to whom he was strongly attached.

McLean spent the last two years alone. His household was run by a housekeeper, a kind and sympathetic person. Friends did not leave him either.

Donald had a summer cottage. He took great pleasure in relaxing in the shade of the garden, among the flowers, growing berries and vegetables. In winter, he was passionately fond of skiing and spent whole days disappearing on ski track in the Moscow region forests and fields.

Donald endured the disease courageously. Until the last day, he worked on a collective work, which he edited.

Shortly before Donald's death, his younger brother Alan and eldest son Fergus came to visit him. But the disease progressed, and due to a sharp aggravation, he was placed in one of the best clinics in Moscow. Medicine was powerless, and on March 9, 1983, he died.

The civil memorial service, which took place in the assembly hall of the institute, turned into a touching farewell to a person who was respected and loved. Many people came to say goodbye to Donald. Speakers were academicians, researchers, representatives of foreign intelligence and people who knew their comrade well.

McLean's body was cremated. The urn with the ashes was taken to England by his son Fergus, in order, according to his father's will, to be buried in the family crypt in his homeland.

Portraits of famous scientists hang in the institute's library. Among them is a portrait of Donald McLean.

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George Blake in his book "No Other Choice" wrote that the respect for this man among the staff of the institute and his friends was so great that for a long time after his death, fresh flowers always stood near the portrait of Donald, which were brought by his friends and fans.

His military and labor merits before our state are marked with the Orders of the Red Banner and the Red Banner of Labor.

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World economy and international relations. - 1990. - No. 11.

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Man with a suitcase of documents

The August twilight was gradually thickening. But the visitors were not yet in a hurry to leave the London squares. Two men were walking in one of them. They were talking animatedly, no different from the rest of the audience, except for the fact that one of the interlocutors was carrying a small suitcase.

At the intersection of the square with a small street, two policemen approached them and began to ask who they were and what they were doing there. The situation for the two friends, despite all its outward harmlessness, turned out to be critical. One of them was an employee of the USSR foreign intelligence station, and the other was the most important agent of the station, Guy Burgess. Burgess' suitcase was filled to overflowing with secret documents from the British Foreign Office, which he brought to hand over to the Soviet intelligence officer.

Burgess looked calmly at the "bobby" and nodded his head at the suitcase.

- Are you interested in this?

"That's right," one of the policemen replied.

Burgess calmly placed the suitcase on his knee and opened it. It contained a pile of papers. The policeman winced, casually turning over a couple of sheets, said that everything was in order and that the gentlemen could GO.

Guy behaved as if nothing had happened, and at that time the scout's heart broke. Due to an absurd accident, a failure could occur, which would lead to the arrest of the source and an international scandal. But everything worked out.

As it turned out later, the police in the area were hunting for thieves from among the employees of nearby enterprises, who carried tools and scarce parts from work in bags and suitcases. This case became a lesson for the future, and the way documents were transmitted had to be changed.

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The incident made no noticeable impression on Guy Burgess. He continued to remain calm and confident. The flow of information from him not only did not decrease, but even increased. At that time, he worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had access to important documents and, in addition, could receive interesting verbal information, maintained contacts with high-ranking persons and officials who held high positions in the state apparatus of England.

Before joining the Foreign Office, Burgess worked for the BBC radio corporation, and in 1940 he was hired by the intelligence service - MI6. He was sent to the department that was engaged in sabotage work. There he initiated the creation of a sabotage school and was one of its leaders. The school prepared saboteurs from Belgians, Norwegians, French and people of other nationalities.

Not without the help of Burgess, Kim Philby was enrolled in the school as an instructor. Later, he moved to more responsible work in the SIS and made a brilliant career there. Burgess soon completed his service in intelligence. The main reason was Guy's personal qualities, which did not correspond to the intelligence service. He did not observe subordination, violated discipline.

After being fired from MI6, Burgess, through his connections, managed to get a freelance job in counterintelligence - MI5. His task was to provide operational services to the personnel of European governments in exile, who were in London. Burgess recruited agents among them and through them he identified pro-fascist individuals, German spies, and received information about the activities of these governments. With some of his agents he maintained operational contact until the end of the war.

The work of Burgess was very important for Soviet intelligence. Although he was not a full-time employee of counterintelligence, he had the opportunity to obtain information about the activities of this special service by communicating with its employees, among whom were senior officials.

But it was not easy for the residency to work with him. On the one hand, he was a literate, intelligent and enterprising person, on the other hand, he was very lax, led a lifestyle typical of the English "golden youth".

Arnold Deutsch, an illegal intelligence agent who worked with him at the initial stage, characterized him as follows: "He came to the Communist Party on the basis of a theoretical study of Marxism. Very educated and well-read, but superficial. His tongue is well suspended, and he speaks willingly and a lot... It is very important that our workers, who will be connected with him, know that they must be an example for him in every respect. He needs unconditional rigor, authority and integrity. It is necessary to teach him the rules of conspiracy all the time.

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The staff of the residency, and above all, Resident Gorsky, tried with all their might to instill in him the necessary accuracy, to improve discipline. Even such a moment as clothes, which used to be distinguished by a certain negligence, now looked quite strict on him, which played an important role for a civil servant.

Scouts taught Burgess the rules and techniques of intelligence work, observance of conspiracy norms, and he became a full-fledged source of important political and military information.

In 1941, Burgess returned to work at the BBC and was accepted into the editorial board, which was responsible for conducting discussions. He did a lot to organize the debate, involving in them well-known experts in the field of politics, economics and culture. He managed to interview people that many experienced journalists could not approach. He even managed to get through to Churchill and have a conversation with him. The Prime Minister praised Burgess for his intelligence and resourcefulness and expressed his wish to have more such talented young people in politics.

After the German attack on the Soviet Union, Burgess was scathingly critical of the editorial board, which carried out anti-Soviet propaganda. "Friendly propaganda should be carried out against the country that is an ally in the fight against fascism," he persistently argued. And this circumstance played an important role in changing the nature of radio broadcasts about the USSR.

As a correspondent for the BBC, he had access to many government offices in England. Guy acquired many connections among the carriers of secret information and easily obtained information that constituted a state secret.

One of his unspoken sources was Denis Proctor, private secretary to former Prime Minister Baldwin. He confidentially informed Burgess about the negotiations between the United States and England, in which he took part. Proctor recounted in detail the Roosevelt-Churchill conference held in January 1943 at Casablanca, at which it was decided to land in Sicily that year and postpone the opening of the front in France until 1944.

For Soviet intelligence, this information was of exceptional importance.

In August 1943, Burgess received information from Proctor about a secret meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill in Quebec, Canada. At this meeting, the two Western leaders agreed to delimit the war with Germany into two phases. The first phase would be centered around the Mediterranean, where the Allies planned to land in Sicily and then directly on the Italian mainland. Only after the completion of this operation will preparations begin for the landing in France. Approximately, it will be carried out at the beginning of 1944. This will be the second stage of the war.

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Thus, long before the allies officially notified the Soviet government about the timing of the opening of the second front, it was already informed by the intelligence leadership about this and timely adjusted its military plans.

After McLean went to work in the United States in 1944, the residency had no reliable sources in the Foreign Office. In this regard, it was decided to try to promote Burgess there. The matter was discussed with him, and the agent set to work with his characteristic energy.

A few months later he already worked in the press bureau and was a staff member of the Foreign Ministry. At the first stage, no valuable information was received from him. But then he began to extract important documentary information on political and military issues.

At a meeting on August 10, 1944, Burgess handed over a very curious document to the Resident. It was the original letter from the representative of the British government to the French National Liberation Committee in Algiers, Cooper. In this letter, Cooper communicated to Foreign Minister Eden his point of view on the question of the post-war foreign policy of Great Britain. Cooper emphasized that England should organize a Western bloc of states in opposition to the Slavic bloc, and also make every effort to create a strong Poland headed by a pro-Western government.

The Red Army was still fighting for the liberation of the Soviet territory from the German invaders, and in England the discussion of the issue of the post-war structure of Europe was in full swing, with the main emphasis being placed on confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Information continued to flow from Burgess in large quantities, covering important military and political issues. The residency report emphasized that at the meeting on September 1, 1944, eight photographic films of documents were received from him, and on September 13, eleven. Of great interest was information on Poland, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and other countries of Eastern Europe. The documents received eloquently testified to the plans of Great Britain and the United States aimed at preventing the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of these countries and at maintaining regimes hostile to the Soviet Union there.

At the end of October 1944, the Center decides on new tasks in intelligence work in England. The operational letter sent on this issue, in particular, noted: "In connection with the approaching end of the war in Europe, we are already facing tasks that will have to be solved in the new conditions.

After the war, the first task of the residency will be to work on obtaining information regarding domestic and foreign policy.

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England and the USA, and first of all the policies of these countries towards the USSR".

The letter gives recommendations on how to use the capabilities of the sources of the "Cambridge Five" in the new conditions. Concerning Burgess, the letter said: "Over the last period of time, Hicks (Burgess' pseudonym. - Auth.) has become the most productive source ... it provides the most valuable documentary materials. You should guard it in every possible way and direct it to obtain such documents that would characterize the cardinal line of the British in various questions of foreign policy, both of England itself and of other major countries.

The residency took the necessary measures to ensure that the members of the "five" could successfully solve the new tasks set by the Center in the post-war period. Being at the center of British domestic and foreign policy, they saw well where the rulers of England and the United States were leading their peoples. On the horizon, the signs of the Cold War were becoming ever more pronounced. A strategy of a direct military attack on the Soviet country began to be developed.

For Burgess and his friends, the question of which side to be on after the war did not arise, because life gradually led them to a decision - to remain to the end in defense of the ideals of peace and social justice.

As for Burgess himself, by the end of the war his activity increased significantly. Quite a lot of materials came from him on the domestic and foreign policy of England. So, he obtained a document of exceptional importance - Wilson's memorandum, acting. Secretary of the British Delegation at the forthcoming conference in Yalta of the three powers, on the position of the British delegation at this conference.

The note was drawn up on Eden's instructions in consultation with all interested departments of the Foreign Ministry. It contained four sets of questions:

A. Issues on which decisions need to be made

and which should be raised by Churchill:

1. Questions about the future of Germany.
2. Polish-German border.
3. The Polish problem.
4. Participation of France in the forthcoming meetings of foreign ministers
strange affairs and the heads of the three powers.
5. Iran.

B. Issues on which decisions need to be made

and which should be raised by other conference participants

rents:

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1. Communication between the allied armies.
2. Sixteen Soviet republics.
3. Procedure for voting in the Security Council.

B. Non-urgent matters that, under certain circumstances, it is useful to resolve:

1. Italo-Yugoslav border.
2. Deliveries for Europe.
3. Displaced persons.
4. European Economic Committee.

D. Questions that may be raised by other conference participants, but which we prefer to avoid discussing:

1. Straits.
2. Behavior of Russians in Eastern Europe and about control

missions.

3. Preliminary peace treaty with Italy.

Other questions that may arise in the course of the discussion: about Greece, Turkey, Macedonia, prisoners of war, the Kiel Canal and the areas adjacent to it, the participation of Russians in various international organizations, etc.

This document was reported to Stalin and played a positive role in the preparation and work of the Yalta Conference.

Work in the press bureau was for Burgess only a stepping stone on the way to the information of interest to the Center. He was well aware of this and carefully looked at which direction to take.

next step. Soon a unique case presented itself. He got a position that the residency never dreamed of. In 1946 he took over as private secretary to Hector McNeil, who was Minister of State in the Foreign Office. With this appointment, the agent gained access to virtually all classified information of the ministry.

Given the ability of his personal secretary, the Minister of State entrusted him with the preparation of all the most important documents. In this way, Burgess was able to transfer documentary materials to the residency before they reached the desk of the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister.

In April 1946, a conference of foreign ministers of the four powers was held in Paris. The main question concerned the fate of Germany's former allies. The question of Trieste, the Ruhr industrial region, and some others were also discussed. On the eve of the conference, all documents from the British Foreign Office relating to the meeting were in McNeill's office, that is, in the hands of Burgess. They set out the positions of the allies on the issues that should be discussed, the points of view of Western governments on individual problems. All these materials in a timely manner

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were transferred to residency. Thus, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov, even before the start of the conference, knew about the position of the allies and objectively assessed the possible results that could be achieved under those conditions.

In March 1947, the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers was held. And in this case, Burgess tried to supply the Center with the necessary documents. Once again, Molotov was aware of the behind-the-scenes agreements, which were initiated mainly by the Americans and the British to the detriment of the USSR.

The flow of information from Burgess did not diminish. During these years, many international meetings were held on the post-war order in Europe, and the Soviet Union was not invited to some of them. One of the most important conferences at which decisions were made bypassing the USSR was the meeting of representatives of the USA, England, France and the Benelux states in November 1947. The Soviet leadership was extremely interested in obtaining reliable information about what issues were discussed at the conference and what decisions were made.

At the conference, in addition to the Marshall Plan, issues directly related to Germany, and in particular to the status of Berlin, were discussed. Discussing these issues without Soviet representatives was a direct violation of the Potsdam agreements. And in this regard, the Soviet leadership was seriously concerned about the question of how the Western powers imagine the post-war structure of Germany.

Burgess was instructed to obtain as complete information as possible on this problem. As a result, some secret documents on the position of the USA and Britain were received already during the conference. The rest of the materials were sent to Moscow immediately after its completion.

Burgess, as a highly qualified specialist, had a good idea of which documents were needed first and which ones were needed second. At a meeting with a station worker, he often warned about what exactly needed to be sent to Moscow without delay by telegraph, and what could wait. He supplemented some materials with oral considerations so that no ambiguities would arise during their study.

In one of his personal letters to the resident, Burgess gives an assessment of the foreign policy of England, which began to take shape with the coming to power of the Labor government. Prime Minister Attlee and Foreign Secretary Bevin, Burgess noted, firmly adhere to a position of opposition to the Soviet Union in any region of the world: in Germany, in Southeast Europe, in the Middle East, and so on. However, the form of confrontation must be such as not to cause

military conflict. At the same time, the position of the Americans differed significantly from that of the British. They are increasingly insistent on

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discuss the idea of a preventive war against the USSR. British politicians constantly lived in fear and anxiety, lest the Americans lose their self-control and cause a military crisis for which Britain is not ready and does not want.

The intelligence leadership highly valued Burgess and his work. In 1945, a decision was made to give him a lifetime pension of £1,200 a year, a significant sum in those days. Thanking for the attention, he refused the money.

Much attention in Moscow was paid to the closed conference of the Allies, which was held in London from April 20 to June 7, 1948. It was attended by the United States, England, France and the Benelux states. An important task of the residency was to obtain information about what happened at the conference, what issues were discussed and what decisions were made.

Once again, Guy Burgess was at his best. He presented the necessary documentary data, from which it was clear that the Western powers decided to split Germany. It was planned to tear off the three western occupation zones from the rest of Germany, creating a federal state out of them. This was a new violation of the Potsdam agreements. Burgess believed that the policy of the Western states leads to an aggravation of relations with the Soviet Union and is fraught with the danger of a new military conflict. He saw that the United States was the initiator of the anti-Soviet actions. The "Marshall Plan" is used by them as a means of pressure on their allies. Burgess had previously spoken disapprovingly of the Americans. Now he began to treat them with ill-concealed hostility.

In the fall of 1948, after nearly two years as Assistant Secretary of State, Burgess was asked to move to a political department for further service. This is a common practice that is associated with further promotion. Despite the fact that Burgess's work fully satisfied McNeil, the minister, nevertheless, in a friendly manner advised his assistant to move to the political department, with a future perspective in mind.

Burgess himself, in his note to the residency, assessed his position as follows: "As you know, I got into the Foreign Ministry from the back door. This means that I did not pass the regular exams, but went to work in the press department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a temporary civil servant ... After a year or so, the opportunity arose to appear before the selection department and receive the status of a permanent employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, fortunately, I was one of the 20 percent of employees who successfully passed through this management ... I could have stayed with McNeil as long as he stayed

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at the Foreign Ministry. But no one knows how long this will continue. And he advised me to go anywhere while he was still there and able to help me."

At this time, a difficult situation arose in the Far East. Large-scale events unfolded in China. The Far East Department has become one of the most important subdivisions of the ministry. Burgess was offered to go there. He joined a group of collaborators who dealt directly with China and Japan.

In his report to the residency, he noted that he now had fewer opportunities to get acquainted with the documents than he had before. Nevertheless, he regularly reviews intelligence information on China and Japan, and also gets acquainted with Foreign Ministry documents on these and other Asian countries.

The Center needed information primarily on China, where very important events were unfolding, as well as information on India, Indonesia, Indochina and other countries of this region. Asian problems were international in nature.

From the documents that Burgess obtained, it was clear that the British were holding back the overtly aggressive approaches of US President Truman towards China. In London, it was believed that, having come to power, the Chinese Communists would not go for radical changes in life in the country and that China would remain in the sphere of Western influence. Moreover, they expected a chill in China's relations with the Soviet Union.

While working in the Asian Department, Burgess found a way to get acquainted with the analytical documents of the Committee for the Coordination of Intelligence Activities and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and gained access to classified materials coming from the Ministry of Defense. All these documents contained data related not only to Asian affairs, but also to European and international issues. Guy selected from them the necessary ones and brought them for photographing.

In 1950, two months before the start of the war in Korea, Burgess submitted a written report on British intelligence estimates of the Soviet Union's military aid to China for transmission to Moscow. This was important information, since the degree of British awareness of these issues played a significant role in the adoption of subsequent state decisions by the Soviet leadership.

Guy Burgess worked actively, conspiratorially and boldly. However, there was growing concern among the station staff about his behavior. He became more and more addicted to alcohol. On this basis, incidents often arose, which became the property of the leadership of the ministry. Any other employee would not have been kept for a day in such an authoritative institution as the Foreign Ministry, but Burgess, who had numerous friends, managed to get out of difficult situations without much loss.

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This weakness of Guy was well known at the Center and the resident in London was constantly reminded of the need to influence him. The resident and staff member with whom Burgess was in contact spoke with him on numerous occasions. However, these measures did not give great results. Burgess needed a new environment that would make him give up alcohol, but work in the ministry did not contribute to this.

He has already begun to think about moving to work in the press. But at this time he was made an offer to go as the first secretary to the British embassy in Washington. Burgess accepted this offer.

Before leaving, Guy wrote a letter to Philby, who was in the United States at the time, and asked him to let him stay for a while in his apartment until he found a place for himself. Kim did not immediately agree to this. Burgess was recruited to cooperate with Soviet intelligence through Philby, and it was completely unwise to advertise their close relationship. But at the same time, Philby and Burgess once worked in the same organization, maintained friendly relations, and this was widely known.

Philby decided that in this situation there was no point in playing conspiracy, and wrote Guy about his agreement to accept him. So for several days Burgess lived with Philby until he found an apartment for himself.

Burgess' stay in the United States coincided with a discovery made by American intelligence agencies. They came to the firm conclusion that there was a Soviet agent in the British Foreign Office, or "the mole", as they called him in professional language. The British secret services were also informed about this.

Philby knew from the documents he looked at that the ring around the "mole" was narrowing and that it would soon be revealed. He also knew something that neither the American nor the British counterintelligence officers knew yet. The person they are looking for so hard is McLean.

Burgess had been in Washington for about a year. After analyzing the situation, Philby informed Burgess of the danger looming over McLean. It was necessary to start an operation to rescue Donald. To do this, Guy had to go to London. The pretext for this was created immediately.

Within one day in the state of Virginia, Burgess violated traffic rules three times - he exceeded the speed limit, for which he was detained by the police. As expected, the governor of the state reacted to this rather painfully. He filed a protest with the State Department about the flagrant abuse of diplomatic privileges.

A few days later, the Ambassador regretfully informed the new First Secretary that he would have to return to London. The leadership of the embassy used the case with violation of the rules of the street

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movement as an excuse to get rid of an employee who systematically violated the rules of the internal regulations, was careless about work, and abused alcohol.

Burgess's departure seemed entirely natural. His return to London surprised no one in the British Foreign Office. What happened was in keeping with Burgess's usual "arts".

Before leaving, Philby instructed Burgess on the need to contact the Soviet comrades and on how to inform MacLean of the danger. It was agreed that Guy would leave England with Donald as an escort and then return immediately to England. The fact is that the departure of Burgess would inevitably complicate the position of Philby.

However, events developed in such a way that Burgess decided not to return to England and, together with Donald McLean, remained in the USSR.

The possibility of a trip to the USSR for a long time was repeatedly discussed with Burgess. It was considered as an option in case of unforeseen circumstances. And Guy always told the station officer that, despite his love for the Soviet Union, he would hardly be able to fit into our life, and indeed into the life of any other country except England.

At first, he, like McLean, lived in Kuibyshev for security reasons. Then he moved to Moscow. The leadership of foreign intelligence involved him in consultations on certain operational and foreign policy issues. The disease that Burgess suffered from continued to affect his life and in the USSR Measures were taken to cure him of alcoholism, but to no avail.

Guy Burgess died at the age of 51 on August 19, 1963. The body was cremated, the urn with the ashes was sent to England to relatives at their request.

Guy Burgess left a bright mark on foreign intelligence. His legacy amounted to many volumes of classified information. He had many friends in the USSR and England.

For selfless work in intelligence, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

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Confrontation of special services in post-war Germany

At the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army continued to inflict more and more crushing blows on the troops of the German Reich. The Germans still offered fierce resistance, but it was clear that the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition was not far off. Therefore, the statesmen of the allied powers were seriously and specifically concerned about the plans for the post-war order of the world.

The participants of the anti-Hitler coalition saw the solution of these post-war problems in different ways. The data of the Soviet foreign intelligence testified that the USA and Great Britain were heading for the "rejection of communism" and "the ousting of Soviet influence from Europe". A tough ideological, political and diplomatic confrontation did not rule out a military clash with the USSR. For its part, the leadership of the USSR defended the geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union and could not put up with it. It was not going to give up the positions it had won, at least in Eastern Europe, let alone leave to the mercy of fate that part of the socio-political circles of the countries of the region, which was guided by the help and support of its victorious neighbor. Germany and Berlin played a central role in this regard.

The Berlin "legal" residency, headed by Colonel Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov, began to function as a special unit of the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front, and from August 1945 its employees were covered by positions in the apparatus of a political adviser to the Supreme Soviet military administration in Germany. As the documents testify, they were given the following main tasks:

- collection of information on the political and economic situation in the western occupation zones of Germany;

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- revealing the plans and intentions of the USA, England and France in the German question;

- assistance to the apparatus of the authorized NKGB of the USSR in ensuring security and conducting counterintelligence activities in the Soviet zone of occupation.

The residency was aware that the German elite, even before the complete collapse of Germany, did everything to hide the traces of their crimes, to destroy or hide incriminating documents, to conceal and preserve, if possible, the most experienced cadres of the Nazi Party in order to create in future underground organizations to disrupt the post-war transformations on German soil. Scouts and counterintelligence at first paid much attention to the search for the German state and party archives. Their labors were crowned with success. Particularly valuable arrays of documents were found in the caches of the Gestapo and the Propaganda Ministry. In particular, the report of the Gestapo resident from Switzerland described in detail the course of secret negotiations, which were conducted on behalf of their top leaders by the chief of American intelligence officers Allen Dulles and one of the influential employees of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security (RSHA)! SS Obergruppenführer Wolf. Thus, the data of Soviet foreign intelligence, obtained shortly after the completion of these contacts, were confirmed.

A lot of effort had to be expended on the search for and neutralization of the Nazis, who were authoritative in the recent past, in order to exclude the possibility of them creating an organized underground and putting together illegal terrorist groups. Preference was given to identifying leaders and functionaries of the Nazi Party, employees of the RSHA, Gestapo, SS, participants in punitive operations in the temporarily occupied territory of the Soviet Union and other European countries. Until the end of 1945, about ten thousand war criminals and their active accomplices were arrested and brought to justice.

When searching for full-time employees of the Nazi special services and their agents, a wide arsenal of forces and means was used. For example, information received from a reliable source served as

the starting point for the implementation of the operational measure, which ended with the location of the lieutenant colonel of the German military intelligence hiding in the underground N. After careful study, he was attracted to cooperation.

At that time, many people who served the Nazi regime needed qualified legal advice in order to determine the new situation for themselves that had developed in defeated Germany. Since N. was a lawyer by training, he was recommended to open a private law office, which, of course, was under the control of the residency. Soon among

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Former officers of the Abwehr began to appear in his clientele, who personally knew him and trusted his old colleague. The circle of connections of this kind expanded rapidly, and it was relatively easy for Soviet intelligence officers to identify dangerous elements in this specific contingent. N.'s residency attracted some of N.'s clients to tacit cooperation.

A significant amount of information on the Abwehr came from a former employee of the personal secretariat of one of the leaders of German military intelligence. This brave woman, who painfully survived the collapse of the fascist regime and drew appropriate conclusions from the collapse of her past ideals, is known in the archives of the SVR under the pseudonym "Femina".

Working with N. and "Femina" made it possible to identify several hundred former Abwehr employees over the course of three years and take operational, political, legal and administrative measures against them, adequate to the degree of their involvement in the practical activities of Hitler's special services and in the crimes of Nazism.

It turned out to be much more difficult to get close to the employees of the former 6th Directorate (intelligence) of the RSHA. But in the end, it was possible to acquire reliable sources, with the help of which information was obtained about the personnel of this intelligence agency, and part of its archives was also found.

Whole volumes could be written about the effectiveness of the work of the Berlin "legal" residency in rooting out the roots of the Gestapo. Here we confine ourselves to a brief description of only one, but typical operation. In the American sector of Berlin, a former resident of the Gestapo, who lived in deep underground, was installed, who had the most valuable agents from among the ministers and major officials of the governments of a number of Western European countries. This Nazi (let's call him "Octopus") hid from the Americans because he pretty much "annoyed" them and their Western allies with his past activities and was not at all sure that now they would treat him "with understanding". During the operation, it turned out that Sprut was reestablishing contact with its agents and former colleagues, inducing them to participate in subversive work in the Soviet occupation zone. Step by step, the residency neutralized his agent network, and also carried out a number of actions to discredit some of his accomplices. In the meantime, information was received that American intelligence began to hunt for the Octopus. She could not attack his trail, although he lived in an outbuilding of the house, which housed one of the institutions of the US occupation authorities. Under these conditions, the Center approved the proposal of the residency to secretly withdraw the Sprut to the Soviet occupation zone for an investigation, followed by its transfer to justice. All this was done carefully and in an original way: the seasoned enemy did not guess until the last moment that he had been detained

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Russians, not Americans. Enlightenment in his head came only when he was convinced that he was in the eastern regions of Germany.

Contradictions in the interests of the victorious countries, in particular, on the German question predetermined fundamental differences in the practical activities of the military administrations of the western and eastern zones of occupation. This was especially evident in

the nature and pace of the process of denazification and demilitarization of Germany. Acute clashes of a political and diplomatic nature also took place in connection with the course pursued by the United States and Britain, calculated on the actual dismemberment of Germany and the revision of the results of the Second World War. Things got to the point that the United States and its allies defiantly ignored Soviet proposals to restore German state unity and, in violation of the Potsdam agreements, went to the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on September 7, 1949 within the boundaries of the united American-Anglo-French occupation zone. In response to this, on October 7, 1949, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was proclaimed on the territory of the Soviet occupation zone. The leadership of the FRG immediately announced its non-recognition of the post-war German borders, put forward territorial claims against the GDR and declared the FRG the only legal German state. The fact that the West German authorities acted on the prompting and with the blessing of the United States is evidenced by statements that were not intended for publication by the then US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. According to him, the FRG was supposed to become "a major trump card in the hands of the West. By incorporating East Germany into the sphere of Western dominance, it can assume a strategic position in Central Europe and systematically undermine Soviet military and political influence in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other adjacent countries.

In the conditions that developed after the end of the Second World War, the German land could not help but turn into a "theater of military operations" of the special services of various states that took opposite positions on the Cold War front. Already by the beginning of 1947, it was impossible to point to such an intelligence or counterintelligence agency of the United States and other Western countries that would not conduct active intelligence and sabotage work against the USSR. The West energetically connected West German political, public, propagandistic and émigré organizations, which were specially created and arose "spontaneously", to it. On the territory of the FRG and in West Berlin, scouts and militants were trained, who were thrown from high-speed boats into the Baltic states and by planes into Transcarpathia. West Germans recruited East Germans to participate in operations against the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

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(GSVG) and various institutions of the USSR. It often turned out that behind the backs of the West Germans were American, British and French intelligence officers. West Berlin became a real "nest of spies", which, despite its special status, was considered by the West German authorities as part of the territory of the FRG.

In the current situation, the Berlin residency was forced to shift its main attention directly to counteracting Western intelligence services. First of all, efforts were directed to attracting employees of the allied military administration, including, of course, the Americans, the British and the French, to tacit cooperation. Quite quickly, such an agent apparatus was created. It should be noted that foreigners collaborated with Soviet intelligence, as a rule, because they were by no means enthusiastic about the unleashed Cold War. The information output of our assistants as a whole made it possible to have a relatively complete picture of the entire complex of German problems.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, undercover penetration into Western intelligence services was also carried out. This complex and sometimes very risky work was carried out in close cooperation with the Berlin office of the commissioner of the USSR Ministry of State Security and counterintelligence agencies of the GDR. A constant "headache" for us and our German friends at that time was the 7880th US Military Intelligence Unit (MID). American intelligence officers acted aggressively and boldly on the territory of the GDR and managed to create an agent network aimed at working against many objects of the GSVG and the People's Army of the GDR. To maintain communication and transmit information, they used the latest technical means for that time. By the mid-50s, about a hundred MD agents were exposed and detained, including red-handed. However, despite the losses, this intelligence agency continued to function. Finally, the Soviet and East German leadership authorized a strike directly on the MD headquarters in

Würzburg. On the instructions of Soviet intelligence, our agent infiltrated the apparatus of the 7880th division. He, with two specially assigned assistants, was instructed to seize the operational documentation of this "office". On the evening of May 1955, the agent and his comrades entered the office, removed all the papers from the safes and desks of employees, and took out two safes from the chief's office that could not be opened, and slowly loaded them into a specially prepared car. Having traveled with such luggage through the territory of West Germany, the group safely crossed the demarcation line and arrived at the designated point in the GDR. As a result, valuable materials came into the possession of Soviet intelligence and our colleagues from the GDR,

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tamper with US military intelligence and expose 113 of its agents. Among the materials obtained was a card file with data on five thousand agents and activists of the emigrant Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, which was maintained by the Americans. After such a failure, the aforementioned MD apparatus was disbanded.

Similar operations were also carried out against other Western intelligence agencies. Both the highly experienced English and the wary French had their fair share of serious trouble. On the basis of reliable data obtained by the joint efforts of the Soviet state security agencies and German partners, agents of Western intelligence centers who occupied responsible positions in the administrative apparatus of the GDR were identified and neutralized.

The Western intelligence services were a serious adversary also because they widely used the operational and political potential of their West German partners to their advantage. Among the latter, we must first of all recall the Gehlen Organization. It was transformed in 1956 into the Federal Intelligence Service of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND). Overseas scouts chose General Gehlen not by chance. During the war years, he headed the eastern department of military intelligence under the main command of the German ground forces. After the collapse of the Nazi regime, he managed to save the agent's card file and the archives of his unit. In addition, Gehlen kept in touch with many of his colleagues. He made all this available to American intelligence. With the blessing of the CIA representatives, with their organizational assistance, material support and financial injections, the former Hitlerite general personally selected the staff, creating from them a deeply conspiratorial, corporately close-knit, disciplined detachment of professionals. The Americans were also pleased that Gehlen aimed his apparatus at conducting reconnaissance in the Soviet occupation zone in favor of the United States.

In 1949-1951, Soviet intelligence established strong operational positions in the Gehlen Organization. This helped, in particular, to minimize the political and economic damage caused by it to the USSR and the GDR, as well as to prevent the failures of Soviet agents and illegal intelligence agents operating in the West.

We had to systematically cross weapons with the West German counterintelligence, also created and generously fed with financial assistance from the American special services. We are talking here about the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für verfassungsschutz, BfV). Most of the operations of this uncompromising and sharp struggle still remain "a mystery with seven seals." However, some things can be made public. Let's give two examples.

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In the spring of 1953, Soviet intelligence officers managed to establish tacit business relations with the BfV staff member Hoer. With its help, a group of agents of the BfV and Western intelligence agencies was gradually identified on the territory of the GDR. Then he moved to East Germany and took an active part in exposing actions with detailed coverage in the media of the deeds of the "champions of freedom and democracy".

Even more effective was a series of operational combinations with the participation of the head of the BFF, Otto Ion, who was involved in cooperation. This high-ranking counterintelligence officer soon realized that the ruling circles of the FRG were hindering the efforts of the agency he headed to denazify the FRG. Ion was also outraged by the almost complete disregard by the government of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of warnings when appointing former major Nazis to leading positions in the state apparatus of the FRG. In the course of meetings and conversations with our intelligence officers, the head of the BFF became convinced that many of his life goals were close to the interests of the GDR and the USSR and did not coincide with the course pursued by Adenauer and his American bosses.

The crowning point of this reconnaissance epic was the transition of Ion in the GDR in June 1954. At a press conference in East Berlin, he issued a statement condemning the Adenauer regime and dependence on the United States. It was especially emphasized that the ruling circles of the FRG, in order to please the Western masters, encroached on the holy of holies for any normal German - on the restoration of the unity of Germany. In particular, he said:

"When I took over my department in December 1950, I had the illusion that I would work to build a new Germany, cleansed of National Socialism, which would provide all Germans with the opportunity for a peaceful life and development. Instead, we see today a dismembered Germany, which is fraught with its transformation into the arena of a new war because of the contradictions between East and West. And this can bring us new unimaginable suffering. Moreover, it will create a threat of destruction of the German nation itself.

... The Federal Republic of Germany has become an instrument of American policy in Europe. The Americans need German soldiers in the war with the East. At the same time, they are guided by those who have not learned the lessons from the catastrophe of 1945 and are only waiting for an hour to again rush into the eastern campaign. That is why notorious Nazis and militarists are again admitted to the court in Bonn."

It was mentioned above that the accomplices of the American and other Western intelligence services were not only the intelligence and counterintelligence agencies of the FRG, but also numerous West German political and public organizations. For example, the eastern bureaus of a number of political parties in the FRG, the Group for the Struggle Against

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skill", "Investigative Committee of Free Lawyers", information bureau "West".

It would be useful for the reader to know that here, too, the "initiators" of the struggle against the "communist threat to universal values" were, as a rule, yesterday's Gestapo men. Let us get acquainted with, in particular, how the most odious "Group against inhumanity" was put an end to. It was created in 1949 in West Berlin by American intelligence. In addition to espionage, this organization was engaged in sabotage and terrorist attacks in the GDR, the production and sending of propaganda materials designed to create tension among the population and disrupt the work of the people's authorities. By 1951, Soviet intelligence officers carried out undercover penetration into the headquarters of the "Group". Not only the centers for the training of saboteurs and propagandists, but also the routes of their infiltration into the territory of the GDR, fell under covert control. When the arrays of such information reached what is called a critical mass, the counterintelligence agencies of the GDR, with the assistance of the Soviet side, struck at the agents of the Group. In a short period of time, 163 agents were arrested, of which 34 were leaders of underground groups. In most cases, their neutralization had the character of red-handed arrest. The Americans had no choice but to stop funding and covert management of the "Group", which led to its self-liquidation.

The losses incurred by undercover agents and significant moral and political costs forced the West German and Anglo-American special services to make efforts to improve their subversive work against the GDR and the USSR. funds with the use of electronic computers, massive equipment was carried out with the latest equipment for operational purposes.

In order to impede the activities of intelligence agencies of the USSR and the GDR in official institutions and private enterprises, the personnel were systematically checked by the West German counterintelligence agencies for reliability. In government departments, research institutes and enterprises involved in the production of classified products, in firms maintaining business relations with socialist countries, a special regime of behavior for employees was introduced, compliance with which was monitored through an extensive agent network.

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As part of the "psychological defense" program, activities were carried out in the territory of the FRG and in West Berlin to strengthen "moral unity and vigilance". Anti-Soviet propaganda was combined with spy mania campaigns.

All this had to be answered with countermeasures. The most significant and large-scale of them were, in particular, complex operations, known under the code names "Ring", "Arrow" and "Spring".

In 1953, through the joint efforts of the Soviet and East German sides, operational data were summarized and systematized on persons identified in the GDR who were engaged in activities that did not correspond to their official status. On this basis, a comprehensive plan was developed for a one-time strike against established reconnaissance and sabotage centers. It received the code name "Ring". On the day and hour of X, about three hundred people were detained, who kept various espionage equipment, subversive propaganda literature and documentation not intended for the "uninitiated" in specially equipped hiding places. Unexpectedly, agents and residents of the American, British, French intelligence, Gehlen's intelligence and functionaries of a number of "public" organizations of the FRG got into the networks.

Operation Ring in July-August 1954 and March-April 1955 was followed by two others - Arrow and Spring. As a result, 12 foreign intelligence stations were liquidated (American - 4, British - 5, West German - 3). 598 people were arrested. Of these, 221 were agents of the American intelligence services, 105 persons who worked for the British, 41 Gehlen intelligence informants, and 29 of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. A large group of neutralized militants, agitators and informers belonged to the Investigative Committee of Free Lawyers, the eastern bureau of the leading political parties of the FRG. During the operation, 13 undercover radio stations, secret writing equipment, special photographic equipment, weapons, etc. were confiscated. Under plausible pretexts, American intelligence residents Bodo Hoffmann, Günther Zimmermann, Berthold Navitsky, and major Gelenites Van Akkern and Fricke were "invited" to East Berlin and caught red-handed. 134 of those arrested without denial testified about their belonging to foreign agents and about their illegal work. Part of the materials obtained during the investigation was made public at a press conference organized in East Berlin in May 1955 with the participation of more than 140 media representatives. The press and press agencies of the countries of the "free world" were represented by 50 correspondents, reporters and observers. The exhibition of physical evidence aroused increased interest.

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As noted, in September 1949, the Western powers split Germany, which led to the formation of the FRG and the GDR. Under these conditions, the leadership of East Germany was forced not only to establish a normal economic and social life on its territory, but also to take care of protecting state interests. For these purposes, the issue of creating special services was also decided. Already in January 1950, the People's Chamber of the GDR considered a bill on the formation of a corresponding ministry. On February 8, 1950, a law was adopted, according to which the Main Directorate for the Protection of the National Economy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was transformed into the Ministry of State Security (MGB) of the GDR. He was entrusted with "the fight against acts of sabotage and sabotage, as well as the suppression of the activities of enemy intelligence and their agents on the territory of the republic." With this in mind, the leadership of the Soviet Union decided to establish official cooperation between the state security agencies of the two countries and to transfer to the MGB of the GDR a significant part of the functions performed since April 1945 in Germany by the relevant Soviet departments and structures reporting to them. The tasks and forms of work of our reconnaissance units have also changed significantly.

With the consent of the top party and state leadership of the GDR and with the assistance of the Ministry of State Security of the GDR, Soviet foreign intelligence continued independent operational work from the territory of East Germany, reorienting it to the fight against Western intelligence services. The Berlin "legal" residency became part of the office of the representative of the MGB (since 1954 - the KGB) of the USSR under the MGB of the GDR. This was the fundamental difference between our cooperation with German friends and relations with the special services of other countries of Eastern Europe. There, our missions did not conduct independent intelligence activities, performing only the tasks of communication and coordination of efforts on a bilateral basis.

The Foreign Policy Intelligence (VPR) of the MGB of the GDR was created in the summer of 1951. The practical work on the formation of this body was headed by the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR, Anton Ackermann. In September of the same year, an organizational and instructor department was formed under the Soviet Control Commission, which was entrusted, in particular, with assisting German friends in the creation of the aforementioned service. Colonel Andrei Grigorievich Graur (1905-1953), who arrived from Moscow, was appointed its head.

Andrey Grigorievich quickly won the sympathy of his German fellow students, among whom was then 28-year-old Markus Wolf, who later became the legendary leader of foreign affairs.

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Vedka of the MGB of the GDR and headed it from 1953 to 1988. In a book published in Germany in 1997, The Chief of Spying in a Secret War, he recalls: "Graur was personally authorized by Stalin to take us under his wing. He had a lot of experience, and we, with our mouths open, listened to his stories about the adventurous everyday life of intelligence. But the main thing, of course, was serious and persistent study and joint work. Soviet instructors were directly involved in the development of the regulatory framework and structure of the VPR, the selection and professional training of personnel, the creation of foreign residencies and their intelligence apparatus. They generously shared their experience and assisted in the implementation of operational activities. Soviet intelligence shared information with German colleagues, receiving in return every year an increasingly solid end product of the VPR efforts.

As East German intelligence matured, our interaction with it gradually shifted from providing instructor and advisory services to equal and fruitful cooperation. By the end of the 1950s, VPR, as an integral part of the Ministry of State Security of the GDR, possessed brilliant professional personnel distinguished by devotion to their homeland and the ability to independently carry out complex complex operations.

! The Main Directorate of Imperial Security (yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy Nairbapi, RSHA) is a state institution of fascist Germany that ensured the conduct of intelligence

and counterintelligence activities and solving the key security problems of the Nazi regime. Liquidated in 1945.

? A.G. Graur was born in the family of a laborer in the Kherson region. In 1920-1922 he served in the food detachment, in 1923-1925 he headed the committee of the poor and the village council in his native Arnautovka. In 1925-1931 he studied at the workers' faculty, and then at the Moscow Higher Technical School and Moscow State University. In 1931-1936 he worked as an engineer at the Moscow Automobile Plant and served in the Red Army. After demobilization, he entered the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, but two years later he was sent to foreign intelligence according to the party recruitment. He performed important tasks in the USA (1938-1939), Sweden (1940-1941), England (1941-1943). Then, in 1943-1951, he held senior positions in the central office. In 1943-1945, he headed the department for interaction with British and American intelligence services in the joint struggle against Nazi Germany. In 1951-1953 he was a representative of the USSR foreign intelligence service at the VPR of the Ministry of State Security of the GDR. Died at this post.

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Berlin crisis and intelligence

In the early morning of August 24, 1961, an urgent telephone message was received at the Center from the Office of the authorized KGB in the GDR: "On the afternoon of August 23, units of American, British and French troops were advanced to the sectoral border in West Berlin, respectively, by sectors. There are tanks, armored personnel carriers and vehicles with recoilless rifles near the border."

In response, units of Soviet troops advanced to the sectoral border from East Berlin. For the first time since World War II, Allied forces confronted each other in the center of Europe. This was the climax of the Berlin crisis of 1958-1961.

One of the most complex post-war international problems, the Berlin one, was generated even before the end of the war. In September 1944, in London, the governments of the USSR, the USA and England signed the Protocol on the zones of occupation of Germany, which, in particular, provided for the allocation of a "special area of Berlin, occupied jointly by the three powers". This was later confirmed in 1945 at the Yalta Conference of the Leaders of the Three Allied Powers. It was also decided to invite France to take over one of the zones of occupation of Germany, as well as to participate in the management of one of the sectors of Berlin. Berlin was divided between the USSR, the USA, Britain and France into four sectors, three of which at the beginning of July 1945 included the military garrisons of the Western powers.

As might be expected, the three Western powers began to establish their own rules in the western zones of occupation [Germany and sectors of Berlin, and the Soviet Union — in the eastern zone and sector — their own. This confrontation took on a distinct shape after the start of the Cold War, which turned West Berlin into a permanent hotbed of crisis.

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The first aggravation of the crisis occurred in 1948, when the Western powers, by their actions, violated the economic and administrative-political unity of Berlin. In response to the extension to West Berlin of the separate monetary reform carried out by the Western powers in their zones of occupation, the Soviet Union imposed transport restrictions on access to the western sectors of Berlin in order to prevent the disorganization of money circulation. The Western powers responded by blocking trade with the Soviet zone of occupation and created an "air bridge" to supply food and other commodities to the western sectors of Berlin. The first serious crisis between East and West arose after the Second World War. It lasted 343 days: on May 4, 1949, the governments of the four powers signed a communiqué on their readiness, after the lifting of the blockade of Berlin, to remove all restrictions in the field of trade, transport and communications with regard to Berlin.

If the Berlin crisis of 1948 was the first serious escalation in the Cold War between East and West that began in the post-war years, then the crisis of 1958, along with the Cuban crisis, can be considered a turning point in the history of the Cold War. It led to lengthy negotiations between the USSR and the three Western powers. They ended on 3 September 1971 with the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin.

What role did the foreign intelligence of the USSR play in the Berlin Crisis? She closely followed the situation in West Berlin and the actions of the Western powers and the authorities of the FRG against the USSR and the GDR. Further, the intelligence efforts were aimed at providing the Soviet leadership with the information necessary to conduct complex and often deadlocked negotiations with the Western powers on the Berlin question. More than once it seemed that the former allies were leading the matter towards open confrontation. It was necessary to know exactly about the plans and intentions of the other side in order not to take measures and steps that could bring the confrontation to a critical point.

The residencies of the Soviet foreign intelligence were involved in almost all Western countries. Throughout the entire period of the Berlin crisis, foreign intelligence managed to systematically provide the leadership of the Soviet Union with information, including documentary information, regarding the position and plans of the Western powers regarding Berlin. In this essay it would be premature to highlight many of the nuances of this work, the most interesting combinations. We will limit ourselves to key points.

On December 3, 1958, an informal meeting of the members of the NATO Council took place, at which a position was developed regarding the Soviet proposals for the transformation of West Berlin
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a political entity such as a neutral free city. Even before the start of this meeting, Soviet intelligence obtained a memorandum from the government of the FRG to the NATO Council entitled "The legal and political concept of the government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the status of Berlin." In this document, the German government tried to impress the members of the NATO Council with the idea that the preservation of the quadripartite status that was in force at that time was better than any concessions. Realizing that negotiations on the Berlin question were apparently inevitable, the government of the FRG advised the Western powers to go over to the political offensive and come up with a number of serious demands on the Soviet Union.

Bonn's persistence was justified, because at that time there were reports that, unlike the government of the FRG, the three Western powers did not take such a categorically negative position regarding negotiations with the USSR.

Taking into account the sentiments reported by intelligence, on January 10, 1959, the USSR government sent a new note to the USA, England, France, the GDR, the FRG and the countries that took part with their armed forces in the war against Nazi Germany. Attached to the note was a draft peace treaty with Germany, which included proposals for West Berlin. Despite the position of the Federal Republic of Germany, the interested powers began to agree on the practical issues of organizing negotiations with the USSR, and in March 1959 an agreement was reached on holding a conference of foreign ministers in Geneva.

On the eve of the conference, intelligence intensified efforts to obtain information about the positions with which the Western powers were going to this conference. The most important result of this work was the receipt of information indicating a marked divergence of opinion among the three Western powers regarding the position they should take in Geneva. The government of the Federal Republic of Germany continued to take an irreconcilable position with regard to the Soviet proposals. The meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the four powers with the participation of representatives of the GDR and the FRG, held in May-June 1959 in Geneva, did not give any concrete results in the decision

the Berlin question. Further discussion of this issue was planned for May 1960, this time at the highest level.

Due to the particular importance of the Berlin problem, in 1960 a special group was created in the Office of the KGB Commissioner in Berlin with the task of further studying the Berlin problem and acquiring relevant sources of information. The hard work began. This markedly intensified information return. The office of the commissioner at that time was headed by an experienced intelligence officer, a specialist in Germany, Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov. A number of important ma

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materials on the position of the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, Britain and France, including the minutes of the meetings of the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, at which the Berlin question was discussed, a note by the West German intelligence service on the supposed position of the Soviet Union at the summit conference, a number of documentary materials Chancellor about Adenauer's negotiations with the Western powers regarding the implementation of measures against the GDR. Of great practical interest in this regard were the instructions of the French Foreign Ministry, sent in January 1960 to the French representative in the working group of the USA, Britain, France and the FRG, created to coordinate the positions of these countries at the upcoming summit meeting.

As a result of the work of this group, the positions of the three Western powers and the FRG drew noticeably closer, and coordinated proposals were developed for discussion with the Soviet Union. However, the Western powers did not count on success. Thus, according to available information, the ambassador of one of the Western European countries in England reported on March 31 that, according to the British Foreign Ministry, the USSR would undoubtedly reject this proposal, which ultimately had only tactical and propagandistic significance. The Western Powers, the ambassador said in the message, realize that they cannot prevent the USSR from concluding a peace treaty with the GDR. However, they intend to ensure that such an agreement, concluded without their participation, does not affect their rights in relation to Berlin.

In March of the same year, two documents were received through intelligence capabilities: a report on the work of the four-power group on German and Berlin issues and a document on the foundations of modus vivendi for Berlin, submitted by the United States for discussion by the working group. As follows from these documents, the Western powers intended to preserve their rights in West Berlin at all costs. At the same time, Soviet intelligence received documentary data on preparations for the commissioning of an "air bridge" between the FRG and West Berlin in the event of an aggravation of the situation around Berlin.

The preparations of the Western powers were connected with the upcoming summit meeting in early May 1960. However, the invasion on May 1, 1960 into the airspace of the USSR by an American Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, shot down by Soviet missiles, led to the disruption of the meeting.

Soviet intelligence received information that after this, fears intensified in the ruling circles of the three Western powers that, under the prevailing conditions, the line of dragging out negotiations on the Berlin question could ultimately lead to the conclusion of a peace treaty by the Soviet Union with the GDR. This was of particular concern to the German government. At the same time, from different sources

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nikov received information indicating a more restrained attitude of the United States. It turned out that at a meeting of the government of the FRG at the end of September 1960, Foreign Minister von Brentano said that, in the opinion of the Americans, there was now no reason to take sharp retaliatory actions against Soviet measures.

Information obtained in November 1960 indicated that, at the direction of the State Department, the US mission in West Berlin proposed to the West Berlin Senate not to take measures that

could aggravate the situation. In particular, the Americans pointed out to the Senate the inadmissibility of provocative speeches by the West Berlin press, which give the East the opportunity to say that the West is exacerbating the situation in Berlin.

According to information received by intelligence, the FRG Ambassador in Moscow, Kroll, had a conversation in early May 1961 with the ambassadors of the United States, Britain and France, in which he expressed his conviction that taking a completely negative position regarding the negotiations proposed in the memorandum of the Soviet government dated February 17, will lead to a very serious crisis. According to Kroll, he repeatedly drew the attention of his government to this circumstance. Referring to conversations with N.S. Khrushchev, Kroll expressed the opinion that if negotiations were not started between the USSR and the Western powers on the German and Berlin issues, then the Soviet government would conclude a peace treaty with the GDR at the end of 1961 and try to solve the problem of West Berlin this time. .

Information was received that at the session of the NATO Council in Oslo in May 1961, it was considered necessary to warn the USSR by all possible means that if, as a result of the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR, free access to West Berlin was closed to the Western powers, then they may pose a "real threat" to the security of the Soviet Union. In order to demonstrate this "threat", the military authorities of the United States, Britain and France proposed, in particular, to carry out the re-equipment of the armed forces of the three Western powers to the level of wartime, to inform the USSR through unofficial channels about the development of military plans by these powers in case of restriction of their access to West Berlin, as well as to take measures to disinform the Soviet government about the alleged plans to transfer atomic weapons to the armed forces of the FRG.

At the summit meeting in Vienna, where the German settlement and West Berlin occupied one of the central places in the exchange of views between N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy failed to reach a consensus. This outcome encouraged opponents of negotiations with the Soviet Union in the FRG, as well as in the USA.

By this time, information had been received that the talks in Washington between Kennedy and Adenauer had reached

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that agreement on the need for the Western powers to carry out preparations in the event of a "complication" of the situation in Berlin. In July 1961, intelligence reported to the government materials on the preparation of the Western powers for the organization of an "air bridge" to West Berlin. It was pointed out that the military headquarters bodies of the three Western powers were developing plans of a military nature. In May-June, the NATO Military Committee prepared a "four-phase plan for determining the limits of the enemy's resistance". The first phase is psychological: the announcement of a combat alert in the armed forces of all NATO member countries. Phase two: the creation of "breakthrough forces" consisting of military units of the United States, Britain and France, which should be deployed on the intra-German border in the area of the Helmstedt border checkpoint. Phase Three: The "breakthrough force" is to seize checkpoints on the motorway leading to West Berlin, as well as penetrate to a shallow depth at a number of points in the territory of the GDR. Phase Four: Suspension of all military operations "pending the reaction of the enemy."

Somewhat later, intelligence obtained the texts of two important documents: the operational plan of the US Air Force in Europe No. 129-60 on maintaining communication with West Berlin via an "air bridge" in the event that the USSR or the GDR restricted ground access to West Berlin for military personnel United States, Britain and France, as well as US Air Force Europe Operational Plan No. 156-60 on support, if necessary, by air forces of the US, British and French ground forces in operations to provide ground access to West Berlin along the Helmstedt motorway - Berlin.

In the memorandum of N.S. On July 20, 1961, intelligence reported to Khrushchev that, despite such a thorough development of measures of a military nature in the event of the Berlin crisis, the final plan for their implementation had not yet been adopted. This, the note said, "is explained by the fears of the United States, Britain and France that the use of force by them could provoke retaliatory actions by the Soviet Union, and this will put the Western powers before a choice: either retreat and thereby demonstrate their weakness, or unleash a war against against the USSR. In connection with the fear of a military conflict with the USSR, the ruling circles of the Western powers consider it expedient to enter into negotiations with the USSR in the near future."

The office of the authorized KGB officer in Berlin received information confirming that differences on the Berlin issue had become more acute among NATO partners. France and especially England did not want to follow the lead of the United States and bring the solution of the Berlin issue to a military one.
collisions.

In July-August 1961, the ruling circles of the FRG launched an active effort to prevent negotiations between the West and the USSR.

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The press of the FRG launched a campaign with threats against the GDR and calls for the preparation of a counter-revolutionary putsch in the GDR. German Defense Minister Strauss met with the commander of the NATO armed forces, General Norstad, trying to convince him that the time had come to liquidate the GDR through joint efforts. Enlisting the sympathy of Norstad, Strauss went to the United States in July 1961, where, in conversations with Kennedy and his inner circle, he tried to convince them that an "uprising" in the GDR was overdue.

Specially trained terrorists and saboteurs were urgently delivered from the FRG to West Berlin, from which strike groups were created to be transferred to the GDR and create unrest there. The situation escalated, at any moment a conflict could break out with unpredictable consequences.

All this required energetic countermeasures from the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies. And such measures were taken. On August 13, with the approval of the Warsaw Pact countries, the GDR authorities closed the border with West Berlin by building a concrete wall.

According to West German historian Christoph Klesmann, the erection of the wall "was not a surprise to the US government." As early as July 30, Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Congress, said in an interview on television: "I don't understand why the authorities of the GDR do not close their border, because, in my opinion, they have every right to close it." "It is paradoxical," Klesmann writes, "but the building of the wall for the future turned out to be a step "on the way from the Cold War to international detente"!

Immediately after the border was closed, the Office of the Commissioner of the KGB in Berlin informed the Center about the reaction of the Western powers. He reported that on 13 and 14 August meetings were held at the German representation in West Berlin on the question of countermeasures by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in response to the GDR event in Berlin. Discussed:

- disruption of intra-German trade and the application of broad economic sanctions by the Western powers;

- taking control of the section of the railway in West Berlin by the West Berlin Senate.

The US, British and French commandants present at the meeting did not show much interest in the countermeasures discussed and did not specifically express their point of view on the latest events in Berlin.

On August 14, information was sent from Berlin to the Center: the police and other administrative bodies of West Berlin have a strict order from the Western powers not to allow large gatherings of people on the sectoral border, fearing riots. Large police forces and equipment have been deployed to the Brandenburg Gate area in order to prevent demonstrations that could lead to even more complications.

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It also became known that on August 14, Brandt, the ruling mayor of West Berlin, was invited to the Allied commandant's office. From the conversation that took place, Brandt realized that the Western powers intended to protect only their own interests and rights in West Berlin. They rejected responsibility for possible complications and conflicts, if any, due to the fault of the West Berlin authorities, and demanded that Brandt not allow provocative actions.

A similar warning was given to German Chancellor Adenauer before his visit to West Berlin in connection with the construction of the wall by US Vice President Johnson. He stated, in particular, that the United States was convinced of the need to negotiate with the USSR without linking them to the demand to cancel the latest GDR events. He also recommended that the West Berlin Senate exercise restraint and not carry out provocative actions on the sectoral border until it became clear that negotiations with Khrushchev would fail.

In connection with the alleged negotiations, in November 1961, Soviet intelligence sent a message to the USSR Foreign Ministry stating that the Americans had a realistic and sober assessment of the international situation and the situation in Germany. The US stands for free, guaranteed access to West Berlin, but is willing to compromise on other issues. They seek a long-term agreement on West Berlin, seek a reasonable way out of the impasse in the interests of their own military security, and therefore agree to eliminate some of the "unpleasant moments" in West Berlin and take note of the reality of the existence of the GDR.

In December 1961, intelligence obtained information about the meetings of the NATO Council in November, at which it was considered expedient for the three Western powers to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union. However, during the negotiations it was supposed to touch only on the Berlin question, to insist on keeping the troops of the three Western powers in West Berlin and providing a guarantee for their security, as well as on maintaining the freedom and viability of West Berlin and freedom of access to it. The intelligence report detailed tactical steps in the negotiations with the USSR, developed at meetings of the NATO Council.

The Soviet-American contacts that began at the end of 1961 were interrupted due to the Caribbean crisis that broke out in 1962. He revived the efforts of opponents of the search for an agreement with the Soviet Union on the Berlin question. In an orientation-task sent to the residency in January 1963, the Center pointed out that most of the NATO member countries considered it possible to continue to adhere to a tougher position and not to initiate negotiations with the USSR on the Berlin issue. However

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if the initiative comes from the Soviet Union, then probing negotiations with the USSR should be continued. The position of the German government on the Berlin question became even more irreconcilable after the events around Cuba. The government believed that the Caribbean crisis proved the correctness of the hard line on the Berlin issue. Therefore, the West should not show any initiative to negotiate with the USSR. And the primary task is the accelerated development of countermeasures by NATO countries in case the Berlin crisis escalates.

The events of August 13, 1961 and subsequent events, meanwhile, had a serious impact on the leadership of the SPD and personally on Willy Brandt, the ruling mayor of West Berlin, who understood the futility of a show of force and switched to a more flexible policy. In subsequent years, the "new thinking" of the Social Democrat Brandt was not always consistent and constantly

encountered opposition from the Christian Democratic government of Germany. Nevertheless, it nevertheless led to certain positive developments in the Berlin issue. (And Brandt himself began to lean toward recognizing post-war realities in Europe, which later found expression in the Helsinki agreements on cooperation and security in Europe.)

Information received by intelligence from Berlin at the beginning of 1965 showed that the past year 1964 was characterized by a softening of the situation in Berlin, the desire of the military authorities of the Western powers and the West Berlin Senate to avoid open actions that could lead to an aggravation of the situation in the city, as well as attempts by the Senate to establish contacts with representatives of the GDR in order to solve a number of problems of intracity importance. The USA and England supported the compromise position of the Senate.

The political information obtained over the years by Soviet foreign intelligence about the position, plans and actions of the three Western powers and their allies in the Berlin issue played an important role in the peaceful resolution of the Berlin crisis, helped the leadership of the USSR to consistently pursue its line and ultimately achieve in 1971 a reasonable resolution of the Berlin crisis, taking into account the interests of the USSR and its allies. Peace in Europe, which had been on the brink of war several times, was preserved.

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Head of the abstract at the Gehlen Organization

On the night of February 14, 1969, in the snow and ice, at the checkpoint Herleshausen, which was located on the state border between the GDR and the FRG, a significant event occurred: as a result of the exchange, Heinz Felfe received the long-awaited freedom.

Soviet intelligence, during lengthy negotiations involving the political circles of four states (the USSR, the GDR, on the one hand, the FRG, the USA, on the other), managed to achieve the consent of the West German side to exchange a prominent agent of Soviet intelligence, Heinz Felfe, for a whole bus of agents Germany USA. Among the 21 Western intelligence agents, 18 were agents of the German special services and were serving sentences in the prisons of the GDR, 3 West Germans were caught red-handed and convicted in the USSR for spying for the United States and were brought from Moscow.

Heinz Felfe was sentenced in 1963 to 15 years in prison, the most severe punishment that any agent received in the FRG, and spent almost 8 years in prisons in West Germany.

On the border between the two worlds, he was met by representatives of Soviet intelligence. For Felfe, this was not only liberation, it was the beginning of a new life, life in a new world.

The life of Heinz Felfe is complex and controversial. He was born in 1918 in Dresden in the family of a police officer. Home and school education instilled in him tolerance for other people's views, the desire for independence and knowledge, the ability to get along with people. After Hitler came to power, Felfe, like many other young Germans, was convinced that the new regime would give the German people a clear purpose, prosperity, strict order and discipline. This was the influence of his father. Without completing high school, Heinz enters an optical instrument factory as an apprentice, but soon comes to the conclusion that this does not correspond to his vocation. He put

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My goal is to get a law degree. A conscription for serving the so-called labor service helped him to obtain a certificate of complete secondary education, where he, as

especially gifted, was given the opportunity to prepare for the exams.

In 1939, after the attack on Poland, Felfe was drafted into the Wehrmacht. In September, after 10 days of participation in hostilities, he ended up in a hospital with pneumonia and did not return to duty due to health reasons.

In March 1941, in Dresden, Felfe received a certificate of secondary education and, after a selection exam, was enrolled as an employee of the security police in the system of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) with a simultaneous secondment to study at the Faculty of Law of the University of Berlin. In parallel with his studies, Felfe attended courses for the preparation of commissioners of the criminal police. After their graduation, without completing the university course, he was sent to work in the criminal police of Dresden, and then Gleiwitz. In August 1943, an important event took place: in connection with the order he received, he went to Berlin, where he was hired by the 6th (intelligence) department of the RSHA, to the report on Switzerland, which he later headed.

At the end of 1944, he was sent to work in the Netherlands with the task of sending sabotage groups to the rear of the Anglo-American troops. As Felfe recalls, during this period he no longer showed great activity: the war was coming to an end, everyone was thinking how to survive. In May 1945, he surrendered to Canadian troops, went through interviews and interrogations, and was released from captivity in October 1946. After his release, he went to the town of Bad Honnef, near Bonn, where his wife's sister lived. It was necessary to start a new life, to undergo denazification. Felfe did not think about Dresden: there were Russians there and the city was completely destroyed. Two weeks later, a wife and son arrived in Bad Honnef.

A few months later, Felfe was able to start his studies at the University of Bonn at the Faculty of State and Law as a free student, took up journalism, and began to expand his connections. Frequent trips as a freelance journalist and correspondent for the Berlin Radio in Germany, including to the Soviet zone of occupation, gave him the opportunity to establish numerous contacts.

During this period, under the influence of developments in West Germany and in the world as a whole, there was a reassessment of Felfe's views both on the history of the Third Reich and on the situation in West Germany. It took, of course, not months, but years. By 1949, Felfe had become quite critical of the policies of the United States and the ruling circles of West Germany. He came to the conclusion that those forces of the West that led to World War II could not be

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guarantors of progress. Felfe became more and more interested in the processes taking place in East Germany, the policy of the Soviet Union.

He had to meet with Soviet journalists, officers from the Soviet military mission in the British zone of occupation. In the course of communication, political discussions arose. As a journalist, he interviewed and talked with political and public figures in East Germany. Step by step, according to the way of thinking, Felfe went to what is called "ideological closeness."

The Soviet Chekists, who were in Dresden, managed to find the wife of a former SD officer (later an intelligence officer of the RSHA in Berlin) Hans Clemens, who remained with her children in this city. They were able to establish a trusting relationship with her.

In 1946, Clemens' wife, returning from West Germany, where she was sent to meet with her husband, said that Clemens, in a conversation with her, expressed a desire to meet with Soviet intelligence officers and, in principle, was ready for cooperation. Clemens was invited to come to East Berlin for a conversation with representatives of Soviet intelligence. At a meeting that soon took place, Clemens said that he was trying to get a job in the so-called "Gehlen Organization", spoke about his life, about his connections in the West. Among

of his contacts in Dresden and West Germany, he named Heinz Felfe, who was working as a freelance journalist at that time. About Felfe, he said that he met him while working on a report on Switzerland in the intelligence service of the RSHA, that they had become close friends, like former Dresdeners. After his release from prison (Clemens was convicted by the Americans as a war criminal), Felfe helped him find an apartment and find a job. The fact that Clemens had connections among former SD employees and had opportunities for a job in the Gehlen Organization aroused interest in him. It was decided to involve him in cooperation with our intelligence as an agent, a gunner and, possibly, a recruiter.

At the end of 1951, Clemens had a probing conversation with Felfe, and then invited him to cooperate with Soviet intelligence.

In August 1951, in East Berlin, Felfe met with representatives of Soviet intelligence. The conversation concerned Felfe's work in a law office and in the Ministry for All-German Affairs, his connections among intelligence and counterintelligence officials. Felfe was advised to take steps to get a job in the intelligence service of Gehlen.

The vigorous activity of the Gehlen Organization against the Soviet occupation troops in Germany and Austria, as well as subversive work against the GDR, forced the Soviet secret services to undertake serious counter-forces.

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By the beginning of the 1950s, Soviet intelligence already had solid agent positions in the Gehlen Organization, systematically received information about Gehlen's agents that worked against the Soviet troops and government agencies of the GDR. At that time, Gehlen planted agents in the location of military camps, on railways, near airfields, in the ministries and departments of the GDR. The leadership of the republic decided to carry out arrests of Gehlen's agents. As a result of the first operation, more than 400 agents were arrested at once, the results of the second were not lower. The territory was cleared of a significant number of enemy agents.

Fulfilling the assignment received in East Berlin, Felfe began to sort out old contacts in Dresden, for work in the intelligence department of the RSHA. In the autumn of 1950, the so-called "Blank Office", the future Ministry of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, was created. Somewhat later, contrary to the Potsdam Agreement, the foreign ministers of the three Western powers approved the decision to remilitarize Germany. The secret services were also strengthened. Frames were needed.

It was at this time that former Wehrmacht colonel Kriechbaum re-established contact with Felfe. He was well aware of Felfe's work in the Ministry of All-German Affairs and offered him a job in the general representation <[.]> of the Gehlen Organization, located in Karlsruhe. November 15, 1951 Felfe was enrolled in this mission. It operated under the guise of a trading company, the boss was a former employee of the Abwehr, Benzinger. The work began with the study of old personal files and the search for candidates for recruitment. And here Felfe was faced with the fact that Gehlen's intelligence worked not only against the East. As he reported to East Berlin, in 1951-1952 the General Representation worked intensively to acquire agents in the key political and economic spheres of the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin: in the federal and state ministries, political parties, trade unions, etc. At the same time, files on leading politicians from both the ruling and opposition parties.

The beginning of Felfe's work in the Gehlen Organization made it necessary to pay more attention to his security and the organization of a reliable conspiratorial connection. Along with personal meetings, which began to be held two or three times a year, Felfe suggested using Clemens as a contact, who regularly appeared in West Berlin once every two months. Until 1953, the transition from West to East Berlin did not pose any particular problems. This is used

elk for the delivery of undercover materials from Felfe. As Felfe's position strengthened, their number increased: as a rule, Felfe or Clemens brought 10-12

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film from a Minox camera and a pair of tape reels. A year later, with the consent of the Center, they periodically began to use their colleague from Dresden and the SD, Erwin Tiesel, as a liaison. According to them, Tiesel was used by them "in the dark", not knowing what was lucky and to whom. Thus, a group of agents gradually took shape, where the leader was Heinz Felfe, an intellectual and organizer.

Working in the general representation in Karlsruhe and in one of the branches, Felfe and Clemens supplied Soviet intelligence with information about operations in the territory of the FRG and the GDR, espionage against the French missions in the FRG (which was done in agreement with the Americans). During this period, important political information periodically came from Felfe. Felfe was able to send to East Berlin the so-called "Orientation 6600", which dealt with Gehlen's intelligence activities in preparation for the putsch on June 17, 1953, as well as a number of other documents on special events.

The information received from Felfe made it possible to react in a timely manner to the putsch in Berlin inspired by the West in 1953.

In accordance with the assignment of the Felfe Center, in 1952-1953 he was looking for ways and opportunities to transfer to work in the central apparatus of the Gehlen intelligence in Pullach near Munich. The solution of this problem was facilitated by the transfer of one of the agent's friends to a leading job in Pullach from Karlsruhe.

On October 1, 1953, Felfe left for Pullach to take up new duties in the counter-espionage unit of the central apparatus of the Gehlen intelligence, whose task was to infiltrate the intelligence and counterintelligence services of the USSR and some other socialist countries. This division was leading and coordinating. Information from all general representations and branches flocked here, including information about joint operations with the intelligence services of the United States, Britain and France.

By the time of Felfe's transfer to Pullach, the Gehlen Organization was a complete spy apparatus, in keeping with the style and methods of the CIA. And no wonder: during the work of the Gehlen Organization for the Americans, they invested about 200 million dollars in it.

In July 1955, the Adenauer cabinet decided to turn the Gehlen Organization into a federal intelligence service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND), and from April 1, 1956, the organization began to function as a federal service headed by a president who reported directly to the federal chancellor. Felfe was transferred to the position of a federal official, received the rank of government adviser and was

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was appointed head of the report "counter-espionage against the USSR and Soviet missions in the FRG". Using his position in connection with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the FRG after Adenauer Felfe's visit to Moscow, he managed to achieve the creation in the town of Bad Honnef, where the Soviet trade mission was originally located, of the BND group, whose task was to observe and develop living and working in Bad Honnef Soviet citizens. Felfe's friend and colleague Hans Clemens was appointed head of this group under Felfe's patronage.

Felfe's undercover capabilities in connection with his appointment as the head of the report were significantly expanded. A mass of important documents passed across his desk, such as the weekly political reviews prepared by intelligence for the Federal Chancellor, government

memorandums, including those related to the plans of the government for the rearmament of the FRG, the position of the government of the FRG in connection with Adenauer's visit to Moscow, etc. During the most difficult period of the Cold War, when it was about the integration of West Germany into the newly created alliances and blocs in Western Europe, about the creation of the Bundeswehr, the demands for access for West Germany to nuclear weapons, Felfe skillfully obtained documents and information from foreign and domestic political issues. All this activity, as Felfe later stated bluntly in his book *Memoirs of an Intelligence Officer*, was "subordinate to the interests of the Soviet Union making the right decisions."

Due to the position of the agents, the significance of the information received from them, almost every meeting was attended by representatives of the MGB-KGB in the GDR, in particular, Generals E.P. Pitovranov, A.M. Korotkov, I.A. Fadeikin. Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov made the greatest impression on Felfe. In the book *Memoirs of a Scout*, Felfe, recalling Korotkov, writes: "His excellent German language, colored with the Viennese dialect, his elegant appearance and manners immediately aroused my sympathy. He was well versed in the various political currents in the Federal Republic. More than once we argued heatedly with him."

As a rule, when Felfe or Clemens came to Berlin in the evening, they went out to the eastern sector and, together with the operative, went to one of the safe houses in Karlshorst, where everything was already ready for a long night's work. In the morning, with the first stream of workers and employees, they returned to the west.

A significant problem was the implementation of the information received, especially of an operational nature. One of the conditions that Felfe set, already working in Gelen's intelligence, was the following: not a single agent or object of development that becomes known from him should be arrested (it should be noted that this

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the condition has been strictly observed for ten years of cooperation).

The work of Felfe and Clemens for Soviet intelligence, due to their official position, especially after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the FRG and the exchange of embassies and other representative offices, increasingly acquired the character of balancing on a knife edge. Coordinating the work of intelligence of the FRG against the Soviet special services and Soviet missions on the territory of the FRG, Felfe simultaneously maintained contacts and coordinated actions against the missions with the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (the main counterintelligence body of the FRG), with military intelligence, with the special services of the USA, England and France. Thus, he often became aware of the operations that were carried out by these services against Soviet missions and their employees.

Systematically receiving operational information, which dealt with the development and impending arrest or expulsion from the country of one or another Soviet representative, neither Berlin nor the Center could not but react (and rather sharply) to it, taking all measures to save the Soviet intelligence officers. There were quite a few such cases a year and a half or two before Felfe's arrest. Under carefully thought-out pretexts, Soviet intelligence managed to get everyone who was in danger out of harm's way.

The enemy could not but analyze the reasons for the failure of his operations. And these were arrest operations prepared by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, and the BND, and military intelligence. The departments were different, and there were no results in the work on the Soviet representations in the FRG. Naturally, the enemy's special services should have thought about leaking information. And if such a thought arose, you need to look for the source of the leak.

In the winter-spring of 1961, the Center received several information messages from Berlin, the analysis of which suggested that Clemens and Tibel, in all likelihood, were in the field of view of the enemy's special services.

The Center proposed temporary mothballing of the reconnaissance group, but the leadership of the Office of the Commissioner of the KGB in Berlin insisted on continuing active work with Felfe and his colleagues.

Felfe handed over materials on a number of major operational games that the BND started with the Soviet special services, including the use of Friedrich Panzinger, who at one time led the special commission of the Gestapo on the case of the "Red Chapel"; retired Colonel von Bonin, senior officer of the Blank department (future German Ministry of Defense); about the actions of the BND and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and in connection with the departure of the head of this department, Otto Jon, to the GDR.

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The last acute task that Felfe managed to complete before his arrest in November was an instruction to find out where the traitor Bogdan Stashinsky, who had fled to Germany at the end of the summer of 1961, was located, and what he was telling the enemy. Felfe, although this problem was in no way related to his official activities, was able to establish and report to the Center that Stashinsky was with the Americans and was giving them detailed testimony about his activities.

On November 6, 1961, Felfe was instructed by telephone to appear at 11:00 a.m. to General Langkau, the special envoy of Gehlen, to report on one of the important operations. The general waited for the end of the report, and then, through the secretary, invited the officials of the criminal police into his office, who announced to Felfe that he had been arrested. The preliminary investigation lasted more than a year and a half. In addition to the usual investigating judge in a criminal process, BND and American intelligence officers took part in the interrogations.

Even while Felfe, Clemens and Tibel were in the remand prison in Karlsruhe, Soviet intelligence managed to establish contact with Felfe and support him morally and financially. Already during this period, it was established that during the investigation, Felfe was steadfast, recognizing only indisputable evidence. During the investigation, Felfe expected another blow: his wife filed for divorce. Clemens, on the other hand, took the path of cooperation with the investigation and spoke frankly about everything.

The trial in the case of the Felfe agent group began on July 8, 1963 and lasted two weeks.

Felfe was sentenced to fourteen years in prison, not counting the one and a half years spent in the remand prison. More than fifteen years in total. Clemens, who admitted his guilt and helped the investigation, was sentenced to eight years in prison. Tibel received three years. Felfe was sent to serve his sentence in the Straubing prison in Bavaria - where he was to stay for almost six years. He staunchly fought for his rights: he sought permission to work in prison, to receive the press, to contact relatives.

BND and in prison did not leave him alone. Shortly before the exchange, in January 1968, Felfe was invited to a conversation with a gentleman who offered him freedom, the opportunity to write his memoirs (the amount of the fee was even named - half a million German marks), which would allow for old age. But all this on the condition that Felfe, after his release, will live in one of the neutral countries of the West and forever refuse to travel to the countries of the Eastern bloc.

Felfe refused these proposals, rightly believing that the BND was behind it. Indeed, this was the last attempt by West German intelligence to disrupt the exchange of Felfe and his departure to the GDR.

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For a great contribution to strengthening the security of the Soviet Union, for many years of fruitful cooperation with Soviet intelligence by Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Heinz

Felfe was awarded the Orders of the Red Banner and the Red Star, and the leadership of the KGB of the USSR - the badge "Honorary State Security Officer".

On his return to the GDR, Felfe settled in Berlin and taught criminology at the law faculty of the Humboldt University, where he began his studies as a student in 1941. Soon Felfe received the title of associate professor, defended his doctoral dissertation. He was awarded the degree of Doctor of Laws and the title of professor. He repeatedly visited the USSR on vacation and at invitations, including from the Faculty of Law of Moscow State University. In Berlin, Heinz Felfe also found a new life partner.

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Apennines

The resumption of activity in Italy of the "legal" residency of the Soviet foreign intelligence in the post-war period took place in a difficult situation. By March 1944, the front line between the Anglo-American troops, liberating Italy from the German divisions occupying it, passed approximately 50-60 kilometers north of Naples. The allied Advisory Committee on Italy, consisting of representatives of the USA, England and the USSR, was relocated from Algeria to this city. Two foreign intelligence officers were part of the Soviet mission.

They were faced with the task of organizing work to obtain information on the situation in Italy and in the Mediterranean region. Of particular interest was information about the plans of the United States and England regarding the post-war reorganization of European countries, specifically Italy.

This aspect of intelligence work was of great importance, since the allies of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition pursued a policy aimed at minimizing or completely limiting the possibility of any influence of the Soviet Union on the formation of the socio-political system in the liberated from the German occupation of the countries of Europe.

The position taken by the allies on this issue was openly manifested at the moment the Soviet government established official relations with the Italian royal government based at that time in the city of Salerno, near Naples. When an official announcement was made over the radio that diplomatic relations had been established on March 14, 1944, and the readiness of the governments of both countries to immediately exchange representatives was expressed, the Anglo-Americans reacted sharply negatively to this. On the radio and in the newspapers, they began to present this step as the implementation of the Kremlin's intentions to interfere in the internal affairs of Italy.

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An official reply followed from Moscow: "Of the three Allied Powers, only the Soviet Union has so far not had direct relations with the Italian government, having only a small number of representatives in Italy connected only with the Consultative Council for Italy. Thus, the Soviet Union was in an unequal position compared to Great Britain and the United States of America. Now this inequality is being eliminated to a certain extent, since the Soviet Union is given the possibility of direct relations with the Italian government, which have long been in existence.

our allies."

The behind-the-scenes activities carried out by the Anglo-American allies in itself raised the question of the need for foreign intelligence to obtain information about their true plans and practical steps to create a political and economic system beneficial to the West in Italy.

To solve this problem, sources were needed in the headquarters of the command of the Anglo-American troops, in the Italian royal government, as well as in the Italian political parties coming out of the underground. The work of establishing contacts and connections among people who had access to these institutions and organizations made it possible to reach people who had the necessary information. In some cases, this was accompanied by luck. One of the Italians, with whom a Soviet intelligence officer had developed a confidential relationship, had the opportunity to obtain the necessary information from an American staff officer. The fact is that the officer fell in love with the daughter of this Italian and almost every evening came to visit. In conversations, he told his probable father-in-law about the plans that were being developed by the Anglo-American side regarding the formation of the Italian state administration apparatus. The information obtained in this way from the American was then transferred to a Soviet intelligence officer at secret meetings.

Immediately after the establishment of official relations with Italy, it became necessary to find premises for the diplomatic representation of the USSR under the Italian government, which was at that time in Salerno. The selection of the appropriate building was entrusted to a foreign intelligence officer, who was officially listed as the first secretary of the Soviet diplomatic mission.

During a trip to the districts of the city to inspect the premises offered by the Italian side, an Italian became attached to this employee, who persistently offered to buy from him nothing more nor less than a heavy American Sherman tank. It was difficult to get rid of this "seller". He desperately insisted that the Soviet signor was a diplomat - and he determined this by the flag on

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a car - he could buy the necessary thing for nothing, if not for himself personally, then for his country. "Your country has been devastated by the war more than any other, and this machine can be used both for military purposes and for civilian purposes, for example, as a tractor," he urged. Even the threat to hand him over to the American military police for trying to sell the property of the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, and, quite possibly, stolen goods, did not cool the ardor of the Italian. He assured that an American officer had instructed him to sell the tank, providing him with a corresponding written document. In support of his words, he even showed a sealed envelope and told the story that a small American military unit was quartered in the area of his house, and the officer in charge of it was assigned to stay directly to his house. A few days later, huge trailers brought 13 tanks to this unit from the port. The next day, a motorcyclist with a package rushed to the officer. Apparently, he brought an order to send this unit to the front line in the direction of Rome. The crews took places in the tanks, but there were 12 crews and 13 tanks. One turned out to be superfluous, and the commander was forced to leave him, instructing, according to the Italian, to find a buyer and sell this extra tank.

In the end, our diplomat had to agree to take a look at this tank. Indeed, in the courtyard of one of the houses, next to the city stadium, there was a new American tank covered with tarpaulin and plywood shields.

After examining the "goods", our employee, referring to the fact that this thing did not suit him, since it was too big, took the address from the Italian in case someone was interested in the offer. Later he told the representative of the Soviet military attache about this. It is clear that he did not "buy" the tank either, but bought an optical sight installed on the tank.

In general, at that time in Naples, which became an important strategic port for the allied troops, there were many curious cases. In the ports of the Gulf of Naples, many ships with troops, equipment, military equipment and food were constantly unloading. For this reason, German aircraft often raided the city and ports,

especially on those days when there was a congestion of ships. As a rule, during air raids, the city and ports were closed with a dense smoke screen. Each time after the air raid ended and the smoke screen dissipated, the loss of various cargoes from the berths, primarily food, was detected.

As it turned out later, many air raid alerts were false. They were arranged by Italian-American criminal groups in collusion with army quartermasters in order to

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to steal unloaded goods and food from the berths as a cover of a smokescreen. And once in another major port of the Gulf of Naples — Castellammare di Stabia — during one of the false air alerts with the corresponding setting of a smoke screen, a ship of the Liberty type with all its equipment and cargo disappeared!

At the end of May 1944, the front line moved to Rome, and on June 4, German troops, considering it useless to defend themselves near the walls of the Italian capital and fearing that the partisan detachments of the Lazio region could cut off their retreat, left the city. Allied troops entered the capital of Italy without a fight.

A few days later, the staff of the Soviet embassy and the Advisory Council for Italy moved from Salerno and Naples to Rome.

With the resumption of the functioning of the embassy in Rome, work began on the organization of stable operational activities of the "legal" residency of the Soviet foreign intelligence. The main thing is that uninterrupted encrypted communication with Moscow was established. The number of the Soviet colony began to increase. More and more employees of domestic institutions arrived, among whom were several intelligence officers.

The residency concentrated its efforts in acquiring assistants in two directions: restoring communications interrupted by the war with agents acquired in pre-war times, and searching for new contacts in those objects that were of interest to intelligence.

It should be noted that the search for agents who collaborated with Soviet intelligence before the start of the war was an extremely painstaking task and rarely led to the desired results. The war scattered people far from their former places of residence and work, and brought death to many.

The way of searching and making new contacts was more fruitful. As participants and eyewitnesses of those events noted, the period of the end of the war and the first post-war years were a golden time for foreign intelligence, despite the difficulties inherent in that time. This was determined by the major victories of the Red Army on the battlefields with the Nazi troops and their satellites, the scope of the anti-fascist movement in European countries, in particular in Italy, the huge growth of interest of various segments of the population of European countries in the Soviet Union, the desire of many people to express personal gratitude to the representatives of the country bearing liberation from fascism.

The flow of visitors to the embassy was so great that its employees were physically unable to receive everyone. From conversations with numerous Italians and foreign

visitor

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Our operational officers of the residency received a lot of interesting and important information about the military-political situation in Italy, in the Mediterranean region, about the behind-the-scenes actions of the Anglo-American allies in relation to the Soviet Union.

A number of people who visited the embassy were of great interest to intelligence. Subsequently, contacts with these people were continued outside the diplomatic mission. Further meetings were held in urban conditions with the observance of the necessary secrecy measures. This allowed the Roman residency to expand agent positions and ensure the fulfillment of the tasks of the Center.

After the complete liberation in April 1945 of the country's territory from German troops who left Italy under the blows of partisan Garibaldian detachments and Anglo-American allied formations, the development of political events in the Apennines was stormy. The situation was characterized by fierce rivalry between the Italian political parties that emerged from the armed anti-fascist movement: on the one hand, the communist and socialist, on the other, the Christian-democratic, republican, liberal and party of action. The political struggle was very acute and affected almost all aspects of the socio-economic life of the country: holding a referendum on the state system of Italy (monarchy or republic), elections to the Constituent Assembly, drafting and adoption of the constitution, land reform, the question of nationality. industrial enterprises.

Despite the contradictions between these political groupings regarding the ways, forms and methods of political, economic and social development of the Italian Republic, representatives of the communists and socialists in the first post-war years became part of the government cabinet. True, the ministerial posts they occupied, as a rule, were far from being the main ones. With the announcement in 1947 by the United States of the "Marshall Plan" for Western European countries, the participation of Italian communists and socialists in government was put to an end. The Americans put forward strict demands to Italy that assistance under the "Marshall Plan" be provided only on the condition that the Communists and Socialists were removed from the government.

In the same 1947, a peace treaty with Italy was signed in Paris. When discussing it with the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition at the Paris Peace Conference, the representatives of the USSR advocated the inclusion in the peace treaty of starvation guaranteeing the national independence of Italy, its development along a democratic path, a ban on the activities of fascist organizations in the country and the exact determination of the timing of the withdrawal from Italy. Italy Anglo-American troops. At the same time, the USSR also achieved the inclusion of a provision

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on compensation for damage caused by Italy during the war to the Soviet Union and other countries.

It should be noted that this legitimate demand was immediately used by the Italian ruling circles in order to inflate anti-Soviet propaganda in the conditions of the Cold War, which was gaining momentum at that time.

Naturally, the United States and Britain, using the presence of their troops on the Apennine Peninsula until the end of 1947, did everything possible to prevent the transfer of power in Italy to the communists and socialists.

Further developments, in particular the outbreak of the Cold War, the introduction of the "Marshall Plan", and then the entry of Italy into the NATO bloc made it possible, despite the presence in it of the largest Communist Party in terms of numbers of all Western countries, to consolidate it in the system of the so-called Western countries. democracy. Confirmation of the work done by the United States and Britain in those years with respect to Italy is the statement of Steward Hughes, who held a responsible post in the US State Department in the post-war years, who noted in his book "The USA and Italy" published in 1953 that "even before the signing in Paris After the peace treaty, Italy became, if not theoretically, then in fact, an ally of the Western powers in the Cold War against the Soviet Union.

These events, which affected the national interests of the Soviet Union, were in the field of view of its leadership. In order to develop possible response measures, Soviet intelligence officers in Rome needed information that would reveal the activities of the main organizers and actual leaders of the military-political bloc opposing the USSR.

The Center set itself the task of obtaining intelligence information about the strategic plans of the USA, Britain and the alliances headed by them for confrontation with the USSR and the countries of the socialist camp. Moscow paid special attention to the issues of obtaining documentary materials on the development and implementation of new types of weapons, primarily nuclear and missile, as well as electronic equipment for military use.

The expansion of the range of intelligence tasks that the Center set for the employees of the Roman residency took place against the backdrop of the complication of their working conditions in Italy. With the gradual strengthening in the post-war period of the structures of the government apparatus in the country, the strengthening of special services also took place. In the context of the unwinding of the Cold War and the growth of anti-Sovietism, control over the activities of Soviet representative offices, institutions and organizations was tightened. Not to mention such specific aspects as wiretapping of telephone conversations, the installation of eavesdroppers in Soviet institutions and apartments of Soviet workers.

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devices, the use of special radio interception techniques, etc., this control was most clearly manifested in the strengthening of ordinary surveillance, the so-called outdoor surveillance. Surveillance was carried out by the military and political counterintelligence services using the police forces, carabinieri troops (gendarmarie), criminal police, financial guards, traffic and municipal police.

Increased surveillance made it difficult for the intelligence officers, especially in maintaining contact with agents. It required great efforts, vigilance and caution, began to take a lot of time to prepare and conduct each reconnaissance operation.

Despite the difficulties, the Roman residency increased its efforts to fulfill the tasks of the Center. Along with political and economic topics, it began to pay attention to scientific and technical problems. So, at the beginning of 1947, an orientation was received from Moscow with an assignment to obtain a novelty of British military equipment - an anti-aircraft artillery projectile with a high degree of destruction of moving targets. British weapons scientists began to develop such a projectile even at the time when the Germans began to regularly bombard England with high-powered V-2 rockets. As you know, these ground-to-ground missiles posed a great danger. They caused tangible damage, destroyed industrial and residential buildings in large cities of Great Britain. The intensive work of British specialists made it possible to achieve success - an electronic anti-aircraft projectile was created with an unusually high coefficient of hitting a flying target for that time.

The residency was tasked with obtaining technical information about this projectile, which received the code name "Boy", and, if possible, samples of it.

At first glance, the task of searching for novelties in Italy, developed and put into practice in the defense of the territory of England, seemed almost hopeless. However, upon careful consideration, the residency came to the conclusion that in Italy it also made sense to work out all the possibilities for fulfilling the tasks of the Center.

Firstly, since the "Boy" was already in service with the British army, it could not be ruled out that the shells were in the artillery depots of the British military units that recently fought in Italy and are still deployed on its territory. If there are no such warehouses, then it was necessary to find out where they were transferred.

Secondly, as noted, after the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition signed a peace treaty with Italy in Paris, the governments of England and the United States pursued a policy of forced drawing this country into their orbit. Therefore, it could not be ruled out

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It can be said that the Allies could provide the Italian armed forces not only with old military equipment, but also with new models of weapons.

Thirdly, the trade in weapons and military property in Western countries was carried out not only through the state line, but was also carried out by individual dealers through private channels. There was also the case mentioned, when an American officer instructed an Italian to sell a tank that turned out to be superfluous to him.

Before proceeding with the development of these options, it was necessary to resolve the issue of those intelligence forces that could be used to carry out such a complex task. It was decided to involve an experienced agent "Rey" in the operational business, who, through his connections in British and American trading and intermediary private firms, managed to find out that the corresponding anti-aircraft shells could be stored in northern Italy in art warehouses created by the Allies after the end of the fighting. action against the Germans.

Ray also learned from them that the British military department had sold several thousand special shells to the Italian artillery department, in which, in addition to explosives, there was also an electronic "filling". Thus, the agent managed to obtain information that British anti-aircraft shells with an electronic fuse are in Italy and, moreover, are in service with the Italian army.

The residency already knew that the main artillery depot of the Italian anti-aircraft artillery was located in one of the towns not far from Rome. It could be assumed with a high degree of certainty that it was on it that the electronic "Battles" purchased from the British were located.

The agent made business connections in this town. He had to let some of the engineers, technicians and administrative staff of the art warehouse earn extra money with the help of various kinds of orders, which made it possible to identify those with whom he could "deal with". In the end, it was possible to buy from persons who turned out to be suitable for this, both samples of "Boev", as well as drawings and related technical documentation.

In September 1947, the residency reported on the completion of the task and sent the obtained samples and materials to the Center.

Outwardly, the "Boy" had the form of an ordinary artillery projectile in size (without a cartridge case) a little more than a beer bottle. The electronic devices built into it detonated the projectile at the optimal distance for hitting the target.

The Roman residency did not stand aside from the work on the problem of the use of nuclear materials in military and civilian affairs, which became extremely important in the postwar and subsequent years.

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Zhdansk regions. As is known, the Italian scientists Fermi, Pontecorvo, Amaldi, and others made a great contribution to nuclear physics. In the USA and Canada, physicists of Italian origin were widely involved in important secret work on projects such as Manhattan.

Some of them, due to their pacifist convictions, along with scientists from other European countries, even before the tragedy in Hiroshima, were fundamentally opposed to the use of the discoveries of nuclear physics in the creation of weapons of mass destruction, up to the boycott of the Manhattan Project. This was the position held by one of the young

Italian physicists, who was a friend of an experienced, proven agent of the Roman residency "Cerna". And when he received an offer from an institution in one of the Western countries to take part in a project on the practical use of the theory of nuclear physics in the energy sector, the agent had to work hard with him to convince this scientist to accept the proposed job. CERN managed to prove to his young friend that the boycott of nuclear projects is quixotic. In those years, such boycotts would not have changed anything in the development and production of a new type of weapon by the United States, and boycotting scientists would have remained deprived of information about new technologies being developed, would have come to the attention of the FBI, and possibly would have been persecuted. And the main thing that the agent convinced his friend was that new nuclear technologies should not remain a monopoly of the United States, which would keep the rest of the world under the threat of a new war using atomic weapons.

Ultimately, an agreement was reached with the young scientist (later he was given the pseudonym "Medis") that he would accept the offer he received to participate in a project being implemented in one of the Western countries and would transfer secret information on the project to "CERN to use it "in the interests of progressive forces." Then, practical operations were worked out with "Medis" to transfer to them through the caches for the Soviet foreign intelligence those secret materials on which he worked. And he participated in a secret project to develop technology for creating nuclear devices.

For meetings with Medis, it was necessary to select a specialist with professional knowledge in the field of nuclear physics. Medis liked the new operative from the very first meeting, and friendly relations developed between them, which contributed to a significant increase in the efficiency of work with the scientist.

The problem of selecting meeting places remained unresolved. From the point of view of conspiracy and security, they were not suitable for this

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no restaurants, no cafes, no hotels. In this regard, it was decided to rent a suitable apartment for the required period. It was in it that many hours, and sometimes taking whole days and nights, conversations of an operational officer seconded from the Center with Medis were organized.

It should be noted that the productivity of the meetings held at the apartments of the operational officer who came from the Center especially for conversations with Medis was exceptionally high. All questions of interest to Moscow related to the subject of his work in the project and in the field of research as a nuclear scientist were discussed in a calm atmosphere.

Thus, the work with Medis, although it required, due to its versatility and the participation of a somewhat expanded circle of people at all stages, proceeded without disruption and, according to the Center, produced exceptional results. As it became known later, the technical information received through intelligence from a nuclear scientist was of great importance and was a significant contribution to strengthening the economic and defense potential of the USSR.

Naturally, the activities of the scouts of the Roman residency were not limited to the described episodes. As already noted, the behind-the-scenes actions of the former allies of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition in Italy in the post-war period forced them to shift the focus of the intelligence priorities of the Roman residency from collecting information about the situation in the Mediterranean zone to obtaining information about the activities of the countries that led the opposition to the Soviet Union - USA and England. With the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance in 1949, the work of our intelligence officers on the territory of Italy was reoriented to information coverage of the activities of the NATO military political bloc openly hostile to the Soviet Union. The Cold War exacerbated the confrontation and hostility between

former allies. The development of events in this direction has led to the concentration of efforts of foreign intelligence residencies in European countries in the so-called NATO direction.

Here it is necessary to highlight the work of a foreign intelligence officer, Colonel Nikolai Mikhailovich Gorshkov (1912-1995).

After the liberation of Italy from the Nazis in 1944, he was sent to that country as a resident and worked there until 1950. Nikolai Mikhailovich was not only a good organizer, but also served as a wonderful example for his subordinates. He personally acquired a number of sources from which important political, scientific and technical information was received, which had significant defense and national economic significance. With his direct participation, a set of blueprints for the American B-29 bomber was obtained. In 1947, he developed and successfully carried out the mentioned

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in this essay the operation "Fight". Assessing the materials received as a result of this operation, the chief designer of the leading defense facility concluded that "this greatly contributed to the reduction of the development time for a similar model and production costs."

The activities of Colonel N.M. Gorshkova in foreign intelligence was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, two Orders of the Red Star, the badge "Honorary State Security Officer" and many medals.

Largely thanks to the operational work done in the first post-war years by the Roman residency, it was subsequently able to adequately solve the tasks set by the leadership of the Soviet Union for foreign intelligence.

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In the name of truth

In December 1993, there were reports that in Paris, at the age of 80, a high-ranking French official, Georges Pak, who was considered by many to be the largest KGB agent in France during the entire Cold War years, died in Paris. One of the French journalists figuratively called Georges Pak "a man passing through the walls, who secretly made his way into ministerial offices at night, broke into protected rooms, took pictures of everything he wanted, and then, unnoticed by anyone, again disappeared into the Parisian night. You can only see that in a movie."

But in reality, there was nothing like this in the life of Georges Pak: no nightly penetrations into the offices of ministers, no breaking into secure offices, nothing that is often found in spy films. And why did Georges Pak have to do this? He was, if not a leader, then a leading employee of many ministerial offices, and all the secret documents of these offices were in his hands... Everything was more everyday, but at the same time more serious and much more complicated, especially psychologically.

The story of Georges Pak's secret collaboration with Soviet intelligence began back in 1943 in Algeria. In order to understand why Pak embarked on the path of secret cooperation with a foreign power, it is useful to recall the situation in which his homeland, France dear to his heart, was then...

On June 22, 1940, the French government, headed by Marshal Petain, signed the act of surrender. Hitler divided France into two zones. Two-thirds of the country's territory - all of Northern France, including Paris, the English Channel and the Atlantic - were occupied by the German army. In the unoccupied, southern zone, the jurisdiction of the Petain government remained,

living in the resort town of Vichy, which pursued a policy of collaborationism with Nazi Germany.

But far from all the French resigned themselves to defeat and recognized the "Vichy regime" as their government. A few days before the signing of the act of surrender, the Deputy Minister of National Defense of the former French government, General de Gaulle, spoke on London radio with an appeal to all the French and French women, urging them to launch a fight against Nazi Germany. "Whatever happens," he stressed in his address, "the flame of French resistance must not be extinguished and will not be extinguished!" This marked the beginning of the Free French movement, which took organizational shape in September 1941, when the National Committee of Free France (NCSF) was created, headed by General de Gaulle.

On September 26, 1941, that is, immediately after the creation of the NKSF, the Soviet government, proceeding from the interests of uniting all forces for the struggle against Nazi Germany, recognized de Gaulle as the leader of "all free Frenchmen, wherever they are"? At the same time, the Soviet government declared its determination to contribute to the "complete restoration of the independence and greatness of France"³. In 1943, a prominent Soviet diplomat Alexander Efremovich Bogomolov was appointed Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR to the French Committee of National Liberation (FKNO - this was the name of the NKSF from June 3, 1943), whose headquarters settled in Algeria.

In sharp contrast to this consistent and clear foreign policy of the Soviet Union towards France, the vague and even ambiguous policy of Great Britain and especially the United States looked like. Both the United States and England, believing that France had already ceased to be a great power, and hoping to profit from the French colonial possessions, in every possible way hampered the recognition of de Gaulle as head of the provisional government of France. The United States maintained formal diplomatic relations with the Vichy government until November 1942. Only in August 1943, out of fear that the USSR would deepen its relations with de Gaulle, did the USA and Britain recognize the French Committee of National Liberation, with a number of reservations accompanying the recognition.

Georges Pak, who was thrown into Algeria by the war, worked at that time at the French radio station Radio France, where, under the name of René Versailles, he chronicled events under the heading "Voice of Fighting France". And he was able to see for himself the duality of the policy of the USA and England, whose troops landed in North Africa in November 1942. In his partly autobiographical confession, Georges Pak wrote that at first he was enthusiastic about you.

the landing of the Americans in North Africa, but then quickly realized his mistake: "They fought their own war, not ours ... - writes Pak. "Their people despised us because we were defeated and poor; their leaders were already dreaming of how to oust us from this Africa, which I loved ... "It was in Algiers," he says later, "that I first saw the Americans in action. Even then, in 1943, they were working in North Africa to the detriment of France, raising the tribes against us, negotiating behind our backs with the Sultan of Morocco. And I hated them even more after I heard American generals say cynically: "After the Germans, it will be necessary to deal with the Russians."

Georges Pak unwittingly compared the actions of the Russians and the Americans: some immediately recognized the "Fighting France", others pursued an ambiguous policy, recognized the governing body of the "Fighting France", in fact, its provisional government, only with various reservations. Georges Pak involuntarily began to sympathize with the Russians and believed that he was in the same ranks with the Russians. "It was at this time that the Soviet offensive began," Pak writes in his novel. "Finally, 'our camp' stopped retreating"?

Georges Jean-Louis Pak was born on January 29, 1914 in the small provincial town of Châlons-on-Saône in the department of Saône. In 1924 he went to study at a college in his native Chalon.

In 1931, to continue his studies, he entered the Lyceum Park in Lyon, from which he successfully graduated in 1934. In 1935 he became a student of the Faculty of Literature "Ecole Normal" (Higher Normal School)b.

The years of Pak's studies at the Ecole Normale (1935-1939) coincided with the years of increased political division of French society and the growing threat of a new world war.

The deep and extensive knowledge acquired by Georges Pak during his studies at the Ecole Normal allowed him to receive the Sorbonne diplomas of higher education in the field of Italian philology, as well as in practical Italian language and Italian literature. And the years of study ended with the successful passing of the competitive exam at the Sorbonne for the degree of "agreje in Italian civilization" (agreje is a person who has passed the competition to fill the position of a university teacher). At the same time, Georges Pak took first place and received an award from the Ministry of the Colonies of France - a ticket to the Antilles.

In the autumn of 1939, Georges was drafted into the army. The military campaign of 1939/40 turned out to be a lost one for France.

After demobilization from November 1940, he worked as a teacher in Nice for a year. But most of his friends, both left and right, who were hostile to the "Vichy regime", left France, many of them headed for North Africa. Georges and his wife also decided to leave France, and in

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In September 1941, they left for Morocco, where Pak was given a job as a teacher of literature in one of the lyceums in Rabat. At the same time, Georges maintains a literary page in the weekly Youth published by J. Faure.

The events of late 1942 changed the calm course of the life of the young Pak family dramatically.

On November 8, 1942, Anglo-American troops landed in Morocco and Algeria under the command of General Eisenhower. After a short fight, the Vichy troops, who were formally allied with Germany, laid down their arms. The Vichy colonial administration in North as well as West Africa went over to the side of the Allies.

"At the end of Christmas 1942," recalls Georges Pak, "my friend from the Ecole Normal, Pierre Boutan, visited us ... He suggested that I urgently leave for Algeria and take the post of head of the cabinet with Jean Rigaud, who had just been appointed secretary of state for information, with which Bhutan had a rather close relationship".

So on January 20, 1943, on the recommendation of a friend, Georges ended up in Algiers on the staff of the information commissariat. Jean Rigaud instructs Pak and another employee to quickly organize the work of the Radio France radio station, and its regular broadcasts begin in February. "It was my lot," Park writes in his autobiography, "to be the first to utter words on the North African air about freedom and to support the call of General de Gaulle..."

During this period, Pak, through one of his friends, met the head of the Soviet intelligence station in Algeria. Gradually, they began a personal friendship, which turned into a strong cooperation of like-minded people, which lasted almost 20 years.

In September 1944, Georges Pak warned his Soviet friend that in the near future he, together with his colleagues in the interim government, would move to the liberated

Germans Paris. The residency worked out the conditions of communication with Pak in Paris, and in October 1944 operational contact was restored with him in France.

Pak worked at this time in the office of Secretary of the Navy Jacquinot as director of the cabinet. Due to the complexity of the operational situation in the city, meetings with him are held strictly on a secret basis. The pack is advised to take precautions when performing residency assignments and when going to meetings. He is sympathetic to these recommendations, since the country is still living under the laws of war.

The victory of the anti-fascist coalition radically changed the balance of power in France. Left anti-fascist, democratic groups came to the fore. But the main influence on the life of France is provided by de Gaulle and his supporters.

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However, their efforts to put into practice the idea of creating a strong state and "strong power" ran into opposition from the majority of the Constituent Assembly, and on January 20, 1946, de Gaulle resigned. After that, the inter-party struggle for power intensified, and the situation in the highest echelons of power became more and more unstable. This instability was also characteristic of the period after the adoption in December 1946 of a new constitution, which marked the beginning of [At the Republic. Governments sometimes changed several times a year, one prime minister was replaced by another...

Accordingly, the position of Georges Pak was also unstable. In a short period of time, he changed several cabinets: in March 1946 he took the post of assistant chief of the cabinet of the head of government Felix Gouene, in February 1947 he again worked in the office of the Minister of the Navy Jacquinot, in July 1948 he became assistant chief of the office of René Coty, who was then Minister of Urban Construction and Reconstruction, and at the end of 1949 got a job in the secretariat of Prime Minister Georges Bidault.

Knowing about the high intellectual potential of Georges Pak and his extraordinary abilities, Moscow recommended to the residency in Paris to advise Pak to get a job at one of the objects of political and strategic importance, working in which he could supply intelligence with valuable information revealing the plans and intentions of the Western powers. in relation to the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Such facilities at that time could be the prime minister's office, the ministry of foreign affairs, or the ministry of national defense (NATO did not yet exist).

In order to approach the solution of this problem, Georges Pak, in agreement with Russian friends, in 1948-1949 took a course at the Higher School under the Ministry of National Defense, where he specialized in the conduct of "psychological warfare".

In early 1951, Georges Pak shared his thoughts with the operative about his possible participation in the upcoming elections to the National Assembly of France, which, in his opinion, would allow him to take a stronger position in the political circles of the country. The intelligence leadership reacted positively to this idea.

Georges Pak announced his candidacy in the small town of Macon in his native department of Saone-et-Loire.

Pak was a fellow countryman of the Makonians, who were impressed that the son of a hairdresser from the town of Chalon-na-Son had reached such heights: he is an assistant professor at the university, a government official who performs important missions and lives among the powers that be.

True, Pak was not elected as a deputy, his rival turned out to be more successful. But the goal was achieved: this election campaign

strengthened the position of Park in the French ruling circles as a respectable Christian and patriot of his country.

Between 1953 and 1957, Georges Pak, thanks to his connections in government institutions, was the head of the office in the Ministry of the Merchant Marine, an adviser in the State Secretariat for Finance and Economics, then - in the State Secretariat for Energy. Being naturally ambitious in the best sense of the word, Pak works hard and enjoys the full confidence of his superiors. In recognition of his public service, Georges Pak was awarded the Legion of Honor in 1956.

But wherever Pak worked, he remained an important source of valuable political and operational information for Soviet intelligence. He drew information not only at his place of service, but also received sometimes more important and more valuable information from his friends at the Ecole Normal and the Sorbonne, who held senior positions in ministries and other state institutions or became prominent writers, journalists who have friendly relations with ministers, deputies and other political and state figures, up to prime ministers and presidents.

During these years of Pak's cooperation with Soviet intelligence, such well-known intelligence officers as Ivan Ivanovich Agayants, Arkady Ivanovich Kulikov and others worked with him. They did a lot to ensure the solution of intelligence tasks using the capabilities of Pak. All of them saw in Pak, first of all, a political fighter, with whom they were united by a unity of views and a common concern for the fate of the world. Pak's communication with these people left an indelible mark on his life: he could open his soul to them, talk about the difficulties he experienced, share his joys and sorrows, and frankly express his doubts. And he always received from his Soviet like-minded friends moral support and a new charge of vivacity and

vital forces.

And of course, there were difficulties in Pak's life. At one of the meetings with Arkady Ivanovich Kulikov, Georges told him: "You can't ... imagine what it means for me to be in the environment all the time in which I have to be, and how hard it is for me sometimes to endure all the severity of loneliness and stress, which is determined both by my position and the need to lead an exceptionally cautious, hidden lifestyle ... On these issues, I cannot even share my thoughts with my wife. And this, I must confess to you, sometimes

almost unbearable."

The late 50s - early 60s in the life of France were especially tense. The country has entered a period of protracted political instability due to profound changes in social

but the economic situation and the beginning of an extremely painful process of the collapse of the French colonial empire.

Where will France go? This question was of interest to politicians, diplomats and intelligence officers in many countries of the post-war world. Finding an answer to this question was the task set by Moscow for Soviet diplomacy and Soviet intelligence. And it must be admitted that the predictions of Soviet diplomats and intelligence officers who worked in Paris at that time were largely confirmed by the subsequent course of events. And a significant place in this was occupied by information coming from Georges Pak.

One well-known American publicist, a former professional intelligence officer himself, rightly noted that the intelligence services had and still have a much greater influence on the course of history than some people think. "Behind any major event," he wrote, "behind the back of every statesman involved in these events, stood

scouts, but the authors of scientific chronicles - either because of arrogance, or out of a sense of disgust - ignore their contribution and rarely give their names...". These words can be fully applied to many Soviet intelligence officers of the Cold War period and their faithful assistants, in whose Parisian "constellation" Georges Pak was a "star" of the first magnitude.

Much attention during these years was paid by the Soviet intelligence residency in Paris to identifying the prospects for the development of cooperation between the Western powers within the framework of NATO, created in 1949, especially taking into account the special position of France, which claims an equal role with the United States and England in this organization. NATO headquarters was then in Paris, and many French people worked in the staff of the NATO secretariat. Among them were acquaintances of Georges Pak.

Acting in accordance with the recommendations of Soviet intelligence, Georges Pak in April 1958 gets a job at the Permanent State Secretariat of National Defense under the Council of Ministers of France, transformed with the coming to power of de Gaulle into the General Staff of National Defense (decision of the Council of Ministers of June 11, 1958 G.). As part of the General Staff, under the General Information Service, a Committee for the Coordination of Psychological Actions was created. And Pak, as a specialist in the conduct of psychological warfare (this is when the knowledge he had gained in his time on the problems of psychological warfare, was useful) was assigned to head the secretariat of this committee.

Georges Pak's years of work in the system of the French Ministry of Defense, and then in the NATO secretariat, were the most fruitful years of his cooperation with Soviet intelligence.

Work in the Committee for the Coordination of Psychological Actions opened wide opportunities for Pak. opportunities to get acquainted with

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materials of a military-strategic nature of the French Ministry of National Defense and other ministries involved in the problems of psychological warfare, as well as to reach NATO headquarters staff. Park's capabilities were further enhanced when, in November 1958, the General Staff of the French National Defense appointed him as its representative to the working group of the NATO Permanent Council for Coordinating Psychological Action. This, in turn, contributed to the establishment of friendly relations by Georges Pak with many senior officials of the General Staff of France. The broad information capabilities of Pak allowed Soviet intelligence to obtain documentary intelligence information on many political and military-strategic problems of both individual Western powers and NATO as a whole during this period.

These were the years when, as one of the French journalists put it, Georges Pak became "an important cog in the Soviet machine", and secret documents "flowed like a river into the Soviet Union". There were documents of both the General Staff of the National Defense of France and the governing bodies of NATO. Of considerable interest to the top political and military leadership of the Soviet Union was the draft plan for waging psychological warfare by the armed forces of NATO.

The year 1961 was a year of sharp aggravation of the international situation, when at any moment the cold war could turn into a "hot" one and develop into a global nuclear catastrophe. This was the year the Berlin crisis was brewing. It seemed that the world was on the verge of a nuclear catastrophe... and, however, the catastrophe did not happen, prudence prevailed, and the world was preserved.

A considerable merit in preventing a military catastrophe belongs to Georges Pak. From the beginning of 1961, he constantly received important intelligence information, including documentary information, revealing the true plans and intentions of the Western powers, which enabled the Soviet leadership to work out realistic decisions about the future of Germany and West Berlin.

The fact that among the documents obtained by Pak there were almost no materials on the military-strategic issues of France, apparently, is not an accident. Georges Pak became

the path of cooperation with Soviet intelligence, feeling a deep dislike for the Americans, but, continuing to remain a patriot of his homeland, he could not agree to the transfer of secret documents affecting the interests of France directly.

By handing over to Soviet intelligence materials revealing the military-strategic potentials of the United States and NATO, Georges Pak wanted to maintain the balance of power between the two opposing blocs and prevent the emergence of a global catastrophe that would

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would inevitably swallow up France. In doing so, Georges Pak, by his own admission, was guided by humane feelings and thoughts: he acted in the interests of France, he wanted to protect his homeland from an atomic war. This was the main driving force in his cooperation with the USSR.

Using the reorganization in the system of the Ministry of National Defense of France, Georges Pak, in agreement with the residency, is taking steps to move to a permanent job in NATO. This fully coincided with the interests of Soviet intelligence, as well as with the personal interests of Pak himself. Georges Pak's connections in French government circles and in NATO itself ensured the successful implementation of this vision.

Georges Pak was appointed Deputy Head of the Press Service of the NATO Secretariat. This post opened up enormous opportunities for obtaining valuable intelligence information on the Atlantic block. Having gained access to almost all secret documents, including documents of particular importance, Pak became a kind of "filter" in NATO, a censor that determines what materials and to what extent can be introduced to foreign journalists accredited at the headquarters NATO. Perhaps the only materials to which he did not have access were documents marked "SAVAI" - documents of a scientific and technical nature about the development of the latest types of military equipment.

In connection with the admission of Georges Pak to work in NATO and his inevitable check by the special services to establish his trustworthiness, the residency, in agreement with the Center, stopped personal meetings with Pak and took the necessary additional measures to strengthen the security of working with him. Personal meetings were resumed only at the end of January 1963, and secret documents from various NATO working bodies on a wide range of political and military-strategic problems again began to arrive from Pak.

At the end of December 1961, the Center informed the residency about the betrayal of Anatoly Golitsyn (a former employee of the First Main Directorate who had fled to the West during his work in the KGB residency abroad). Instructions were given to strengthen secrecy in work with all agents. As for working with Pak, it was suggested that all materials compromising him should be confiscated and personal meetings with him should be interrupted for two or three months. The resident of the tour followed the instructions of the Center, leaving Pak the opportunity to call an operative worker for an emergency meeting. And such urgent instant meetings with Georges Pak to receive secret documents of special importance from him took place with the permission of the Center on February 28, March 10 and 12, 1962, but after that work with him in the usual mode was mothballed for another two months - until the middle of May.

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After a short resumption of work with Pak in the summer of 1962, communication with him, taking into account his membership in NATO, was again interrupted until January 1963.

However, as it became known later, already at that time, Georges Pak was under suspicion of the French counterintelligence - the Territorial Surveillance Office (DST) of the French Interior Ministry. The development of Pak and a whole group of other high-ranking French officials suspected of collaborating with Soviet intelligence began in mid-1962.

The primary source for the verification and development of these French officials was the information received by the Western intelligence services from the traitor Golitsyn.

His information about the presence of Soviet agents in the highest echelons of power in France prompted President Kennedy to send a personal message on this issue to General de Gaulle.

General de Gaulle at first did not really believe his American colleague, believing that the Americans, being dissatisfied with the independent course of France's foreign policy, were trying to quarrel him with the Russians, with whom relations were successfully developing during this period (visit of N.S. Khrushchev, held in the spring of 1960, already gave its positive results). Nevertheless, in order to obtain more complete information than that contained in the message of J. Kennedy, de Gaulle sent General de Rougemont, Chief of the 2nd Bureau of the General Staff, to Washington as his personal representative. General de Rougemont, returning from a trip to the United States, confirmed to de Gaulle the presence of materials testifying to the leakage of top secret information from the highest structures of the French state apparatus.

Following this, already in May 1962, de Gaulle sent to Washington for a detailed acquaintance with the available materials and for qualified conversations with the defector, a group of experts from the French special services, headed by the head of counterintelligence (DST) Daniel Doustin and the head of French foreign intelligence (CDECE) by General Jacquier. The materials received from the Americans and in conversations with Golitsyn (whom the French gave the pseudonym "Martel") allowed the French counterintelligence to start with a circle of suspects numbering up to 15 people, and then, as a result of painstaking analytical work, reduce it to 5 people.

Among these five suspects was Georges Pak. The identification of the "mole", as it is customary in the West to call the enemy's agents, embedded in the organs of the state apparatus, now became a matter of technique and time. Counterintelligence took these five suspects into active development using all search and operational-technical means. It was already December 1962. And yet, for many months, the DST failed to identify the "mole". The "hunt" for him continued until August 1963 ...

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On August 10, 1963, on Saturday, another meeting with Georges Pak was to take place. The meeting was scheduled in the suburbs of Paris - in the town of Feshers, to discuss with him a new task and the conditions for its implementation. However, this meeting did not take place. The residency detected the activity of the surveillance service in the area of the meeting place and removed their employee from the route.

Based on the materials received from the Americans, the leadership of the DST decided to have a conversation with Georges Pak and immediately charge him with a criminal connection with Soviet intelligence in the expectation that Georges Pak would not withstand the "psychological attack". In order to achieve success, the French secret services prepared a surprise trap for Pak in advance, which, in their opinion, could turn out to be decisive in the planned duel.

The arrest of Georges Pak took place on Monday, August 12, at 18:30, when he was leaving the NATO headquarters building, located on Boulevard Lannes near the Porte Dauphine metro station. Throughout the day, Pak was tormented by bad forebodings. Automatically performing his daily duties, he constantly returned to the thought of the failed meeting. At the end of the working day, having closed the cupboards in his office out of habit, Georges Pak went out into the street... Three police inspectors were waiting for him on the sidewalk - they were employees of the DST. One of them, presenting his document, politely invited Pak to go with them to Sausse Street (the building of the DST was located there) in order to have a talk.

The conversation began in a very friendly tone. The commissioner who conducted the interrogation explained in a quiet, insinuating voice that the DST would not like what happened in the life of Pak, such a respected person, to be made public and result in a big scandal, and suggested to Pak

frankly confess everything that inevitably torments him. Georges Pak, despite the nervous tension and the feeling of imminent misfortune that gripped him, decided, nevertheless, to strictly follow his pre-worked-out legend in a conversation with DST employees. When asked why he went to Fescherols on Saturday, Georges Pak outwardly calmly and unperturbed answered: "I wanted to visit a historical monument. There is a beautiful Romanesque church in Fescherols..." To all other questions, including about his meetings with foreigners, Georges Pak, noting that maintaining contacts with foreign journalists is part of his duties as deputy chief NATO press service also gave quite convincing answers.

Having failed to achieve a frank conversation and thus not having obtained the desired result, the commissar, who did not escape the feeling of anxiety carefully concealed by his interlocutor, decided to go on the offensive and deliver a decisive blow to the enemy. As if with regret he declared that Mr. Pak was trying in vain

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hide from the DST their contacts with representatives of the ... Soviet embassy, which they know for sure about his long-term cooperation with Soviet intelligence. And as proof of this, the commissioner revealed to Pak one of the secret documents that Georges Pak had once passed on to Soviet intelligence for familiarization. It was a draft plan for the conduct of psychological warfare in the southern zone of Europe, prepared by the permanent group of the NATO Military Committee in Washington, which was sent for consideration and approval by the Chief of the General Staff of the National Defense, General Ely. To prepare a response, this document was then handed over to Georges Pak as a specialist in the conduct of psychological operations, as evidenced by the resolution of General Ely on the cover letter. A photocopy of this very document with the resolution of General Ely, which determines the executor, was presented to Pak by the commissioner of the DST. As soon as Georges Pak saw a photocopy of this material, he immediately recognized it as a document that he handed over for photographing in 1961 to an employee of the Soviet embassy. This had an overwhelming and disarming effect on Pak. The thought immediately flashed that someone in the Soviet intelligence service had betrayed him...

Unable to withstand such psychological pressure, Georges Pak asked the Commissioner of the DST to invite him to a curate (priest) to confess and take communion. And after the ceremony of church confession, Georges Pak began to tell in detail the entire history of his cooperation with Soviet intelligence, from the moment this cooperation was born in Algiers to the failed meeting in Fescherols.

In July 1964, a trial took place that sentenced Georges Pak to life imprisonment. After that, he wrote a petition for clemency, and his wife Viviana and friends began a campaign to have the court's decision reviewed. As a result of the efforts made, the sentence of Georges Pak was reduced to 20 years by a decree of President de Gaulle in March 1968. In 1969, in connection with the resignation of de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou, who, like Pak, was a graduate of the Ecole Normal, was elected to the post of President of France, and on April 30, 1970, he signed a decree granting Georges Pak a conditional release.

The further fate of Georges Pak was not subjected to great trials. With the help of friends, he got a job in one of the private publishing houses as an editor, and in 1971 he was even accepted into the public service - the Ministry of Finance.

Georges Pak completed work on the novel "Unpredictable as Judgment Day", begun in prison, which was published in Paris in 1971. He also continued to work on his doctoral dissertation, which, unfortunately, remained unfinished.

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Perhaps the main guiding star in the life of Georges Pak

was his constant striving for the truth, which led him first to a protest against the imperfection of the world, to communism, which he understood as the embodiment of justice on Earth, and, ultimately, to the moral origins of the eternal values of life - to religion and God.

All his adult life, Georges Pak was looking for the truth. Search

truth led him to cooperate with Soviet intelligence. "I only sought to ensure the survival of France," said Georges Pak. This was his truth, this was the meaning of his life.

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Goll Sh. de - Military memoirs. - T. 1. - M., 1957. - S. 332.

Cit. Quoted from: Diplomatic Dictionary. - T. Sh. - M., 1986. - S. 19.

There.

Radiese Seogres. <... Sotte un veer, "but Shaga. - R, 1971. - R. 236-237. (In our press, the title of this novel is translated literally: "...Like a thief." This does not reflect the essence of this confessional novel. In our opinion, a more correct translation of the title of the novel is "Unpredictable, like Judgment Day").

There. - S. 238.

The prestige of this educational institution is evidenced at least by the fact that in different years the Higher Normal School was graduated by French President Georges Pompidou, Prime Minister Pierre Mendes France, ministers Louis Jox, Peyrefit and many others.

Farago L. Game of foxes. - M., 1979. - S. 22.

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On the southern flank of the North Atlantic bloc

The hot summer of 1960. The employees of the Soviet embassy in Ankara had already gone home, and work continued in the office of the resident of foreign intelligence. Two hours ago he received important information. Its content required an immediate report to the Center.

The prepared telegram lay on the table. A cipher clerk was called to the office, who was supposed to send her to Moscow. The resident re-read the text. I did not like the first phrase: "According to the data received from Mustafa's source, the installation of American Jupiter nuclear missiles has begun in the Izmir region." He glanced at the cryptographer, as if seeking advice, and put "supposedly" before the word "installation". I read it again and crossed out the "supposedly". Then he wrote "according to unverified data" and thought again. The source never failed, but here - "according to unverified." Crossed out. Walked through the office. Then he sat down at the table and at the end of the telegram wrote: "We are rechecking the information received." He handed the telegram to the cipher clerk and leaned back in his chair. Only now he felt tired. The information about the missiles shocked him unpleasantly. He knew that the decision to install them was made at the NATO session back in December 1957, but deep down he hoped that the rulers of Turkey would not rush to deploy missiles on their territory. But the Americans, apparently, are pressing with all their might, and now the turn has come to the implementation of a dangerous plan.

In the evening, after a meeting with the staff of the residency, it was decided to check the information on the spot. I had to go to Izmir. There was a suitable occasion for a trip there: the receivers of the Soviet trade mission were to visit the city at the invitation of a local company. An experienced residency officer went with them. The route of the trip made it possible to follow near the American base and see what was happening there.

The trip turned out to be extremely successful. It was possible not only to observe the work being carried out at the base through binoculars, but also to take several pictures. The received materials were urgently sent to Moscow to confirm the previously sent message received from "Mustafa".

Back in 1947, US President Truman substantiated the doctrine of providing military assistance to Turkey by its "exceptionally convenient location" near the borders of the USSR. Based on geopolitical considerations, the US government, the Pentagon and the CIA in the post-war period created a system of bases in Turkey, turning it into a springboard for striking in the event of a war against Soviet facilities. The US leaders also took into account the dominating positions of Turkey in the Black Sea straits: hundreds of Soviet merchant ships and over 200 warships passed here every year.

The armed forces of Turkey were the largest in the Middle East, the second (after the United States) in NATO and numbered 600,000 people. In the event of war, Turkey was able to mobilize and put under arms up to 4 million people. The Turkish army was considered in NATO as a counterweight to 24 Soviet divisions deployed in the southern military districts of the USSR, as well as the 115,000-strong Bulgarian army, separate Romanian and Hungarian combat units. The Turks transferred two-thirds of the ground forces, all the Air Force and the Navy, together with their bases, to the operational subordination of NATO. The training, arming and equipping of these forces was carried out in accordance with NATO plans. In addition, on the basis of bilateral agreements between the United States and Turkey, the Americans received the right to use military and intelligence bases on Turkish territory.

The Turkish military industry was developed with the assistance of the United States in accordance with the concept of increasing the degree of internal self-sufficiency. It produced light small arms, machine guns, artillery pieces, and ammunition for them. In the post-war years, the production of diesel submarines and missile gunboats was launched, tanks and aircraft were repaired, and military trucks and tractors were assembled.

Tactical nuclear weapons, atomic bombs, warheads for Jupiter, Honest John, Nike Hercules and Hawk missiles were deployed in Turkey. The greatest danger to the USSR was the Jupiter medium-range missiles deployed in the Izmir region. They could hit objects in the European part of the USSR, including Moscow, as well as targets in the Urals and Central Asia.

Foreign intelligence also received data on the construction in Turkey of warehouses for storing aviation nuclear ammunition at the air force bases in Incirlik, Eskisehir, Balıkesir,

Myrte and Erzurum and nuclear weapons depots for the ground forces in Çakmaklı, Çorlu, Artık, Erzurum and Kesköy. The largest was the US Air Force base in Incirlik, near Adana. It was constantly occupied by combat aircraft of the US Air Force, including nuclear weapons carriers and reconnaissance aircraft. The airspace of Turkey was mastered by B-52 strategic bombers.

Until 1965, the Americans made regular reconnaissance flights over Turkish territory and the Black Sea. The incident with an American reconnaissance aircraft that crashed near Novorossiysk in December 1965 and the USSR's note of protest to the governments of the United States and Turkey forced the Turkish government to impose control over reconnaissance flights of US Air Force aircraft, but significant subordination of Turkey to American interests remained.

Thus, the United States Military Assistance Mission to Turkey (JUSMMAT) implemented and supervised the implementation of the US military assistance programs by the Turks, supervised

activities of advisory groups in the Turkish armed forces. There were NATO liaison teams and officers in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Turkish army, as well as in the US military mission. JUSMMAT had its telephone network in Ankara and was connected by radio relay channels not only with the most important points within the country, but also with the main American headquarters in the USA, Europe, and the Near and Middle East.

The available data indicated that the US activities in Turkey against the USSR were carried out in close contact with the Turkish intelligence service. Back in February 1944, an "Anglo-Turkish-American intelligence bureau" was created in Turkey. Through this bureau, the Americans influenced the Turkish special services and directed their activities against the USSR, Turkish intelligence opened its archives, records and agents to the American special services. The "Anglo-Turkish-American Bureau" developed joint intelligence measures against the Soviet Union and the Balkan countries.

In November 1960, CIA chief Allen Dulles secretly visited Turkey. During the visit, an agreement was signed to intensify the intelligence work of the United States and Turkey against the USSR and other socialist countries.

Through reliable sources, the residency received information about the main activities of the American and Turkish intelligence services against the USSR: weakening the influence of the USSR in the Near and Middle East; struggle against the national liberation movement in the area; obtaining secret information about the internal political situation and foreign policy, economic potential and military power of the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact.

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In early 1962, the residency received information that the Americans recommended that the Turkish government rebuild the security agencies based on the experience of the CIA and the FBI. In 1965, in accordance with these recommendations, the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) was created, and American methods were implemented in various areas of its activity. Through advisers in the MIT, the security agencies and the police, the Americans got the opportunity to keep abreast of the political life of Turkey, to find out the plans and intentions of the opposition parties and groups.

In accordance with bilateral agreements, US technical intelligence agencies and bases operated in Turkey, with the help of which the Americans obtained information about the launches and properties of Soviet strategic missiles, the deployment of missile units and launch sites, and the air defense system. With the help of radio-electronic equipment, the Americans intercepted closed radio communication channels in the USSR and other countries, received information about the activities of government agencies, industrial and research enterprises, the location of units of the USSR armed forces, primarily in border areas, about the activity of the USSR Navy in the Black and Mediterranean Seas, revealed the operating frequencies of missile guidance stations located in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Electronic installations were also used for space reconnaissance, satellite flight tracking and control. Radiographic equipment helped to collect information about nuclear explosions in the USSR. Foreign intelligence, with the help of agents, had detailed information about American bases in Turkey.

The CIA paid great attention to the internal problems of Turkey. The CIA residency attached particular importance to acquiring agents of influence among state and party leaders, members of parliament, religious authorities, leaders of the army, police, intelligence services, intellectuals, and media workers. Representatives of US intelligence were not only "included" in the ruling circles of Turkey, they "cultivated" and put in power in Turkey the figures they needed, who defended the strategic interests of the US military-industrial complex. A striking example of such a figure is former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, who was overthrown by the military in 1960 and subsequently executed. coming to power in

The Turkish military was negatively perceived by the Americans, and they did everything to neutralize the active figures of the new Turkish administration. It must be said that this side of US activity in Turkey was also monitored by Soviet intelligence.

The Turkish residencies of our intelligence carried out a great deal of work to cover the activities of the Baghdad Pact, which was

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created in February 1955. This military-political organization was born on the initiative of the United States and Great Britain on the basis of an agreement between Turkey, Iran, Great Britain, Pakistan and Iraq. After the withdrawal of the last of this pact in 1959, the organization became known as CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). The United States, which had observer status in the Baghdad Pact, actually played a leading role in it. The parties to the pact regularly carried out naval, air and land maneuvers, which could not but disturb the USSR.

A major success of foreign intelligence was the operation in 1959 to obtain undercover secret plans of the Military Committee and the Joint Military Planning Organization of the Baghdad Pact in 1959. Of greatest interest were the US plans and maps with targets for delivering nuclear strikes against Iran and Pakistan "in the event of an offensive by the Soviet troops."

In order to keep abreast of developments, the foreign intelligence residencies in Turkey paid great attention to acquiring sources of information in the military, government and business circles, American and other foreign organizations. One of the main sources of American residency was "Alex". He helped our intelligence, based on ideological convictions, was a consistent supporter of rapprochement between Turkey and the Soviet Union. "Alex" was painfully aware of Turkey's subjugation to the American dictatorship. Over the years of cooperation, "Alex" gave the residency a large amount of important information on military-political issues, about American military bases on Turkish territory, about the plans and intentions of the US ruling circles in relation to the Soviet Union. She played a certain role in the development of the foreign policy of the USSR and in the assessment of US policy in the Middle East.

Another important source transmitted information about the internal political situation and foreign policy of Turkey, the activities of the countries participating in the Baghdad Pact, about the activities of American and British intelligence officers in Turkey and other countries of the Near and Middle East.

In 1957, information was received from this source about the development of plans to establish an economic blockade of Syria and its political isolation. These measures were aimed at overthrowing the government of Sabri Asali in Syria and bringing pro-Western politicians to power. According to information received from the agent, Lloyd Henderson, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, discussed with the governments of Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq a plan to establish a "cordon sanitaire" around Syria, which, in his opinion, should inevitably lead to the fall of the Asali government. . For his support of this plan, he promised

additional supplies during

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weapons to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. Information about the conspiracy against Syria was also confirmed by our reliable source Kim Philby.

On the basis of intelligence information, the Soviet government took the necessary diplomatic and other steps to prevent undesirable developments around Syria. Some military formations were concentrated in the southwestern direction. Marshal Rokossovsky was appointed commander of the Transcaucasian Military District. These measures had a sobering effect on Turkey, and she refused to participate in the implementation of plans to overthrow the Syrian government.

Often, Turkish citizens proactively approached us with an offer to provide assistance. They did not want their country to turn into an American military base and pose a threat to neighboring countries. Of course, among these "well-wishers" there were counterintelligence set-ups, and the residency knew about it. But there were also people who had sincere intentions. One of them was Chok. He established contact with our workers on his own initiative in Ankara at a restaurant that Soviet diplomats sometimes went to.

Once, in this restaurant, our scouts, who were working under diplomatic cover, were approached by a handsome, slender Turk. He looked to be forty years old. He was in a civilian suit, but one could feel the military bearing. After making sure that the employees of the Soviet embassy were in front of him, he gave his last name and said that he had recently been dismissed from a high position in one of the Turkish government institutions, because he made anti-American statements and spoke negatively about the policies of the Turkish government. "Chok" asked to make an appointment with him, wrote down his home phone number and address on a piece of paper, indicated his last position and quickly left the restaurant.

A difficult question arose before the residency: what to do? On the one hand, the possibility of a provocation by the Turkish counterintelligence was not ruled out, on the other hand, the Turk's initiative could be quite sincere. After carefully analyzing the situation, we decided to take a certain risk.

First of all, we installed the "Chok" at the place of residence, checked it through other possibilities. After making sure that "Chok" really lives at the address indicated by him, we came to the conclusion that a secret meeting could be organized at his apartment in order to find out the real reasons for his decision to cooperate with us. House location allowed it to be done imperceptibly.

A few days later, two operatives visited Chok at his apartment. In response to their questions, Chok reaffirmed that he had recently been fired from the army with a meager pension for being
vysk

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criticized the United States, spoke positively about the support of the USSR provided to Turkey in the 1920s, during the national liberation war. He added that he was ready to provide us with valuable services and asked for help in obtaining a taxi to create a cover, as well as monthly material support.

The motives that prompted "Chok" to decide on cooperation, outwardly looked convincing, however, they still did not give grounds to fully trust him. Therefore, the residency developed the conditions for communication with Chok, which excluded the possibility of a provocation.

Subsequently, "Choq" handed over several materials and a list of contacts prepared by him, which included employees of a number of ministries, the General Staff of the Turkish Army, the secretariat of the Supreme Council of National Defense, and the Main Security Directorate. Some of the persons indicated by him were of intelligence interest. Among the materials handed over were top secret and secret instructions, mobilization manuals, military manuals and combat training manuals.

However, it did not take long to work with Chok. He violated the rules of secrecy and found himself in the field of view of the Turkish counterintelligence, was arrested and executed by a court verdict. During the investigation and trial, he behaved courageously and did not give confessions.

The results of the work of foreign intelligence and its assistants in Turkey in the post-war period, undoubtedly, greatly contributed to the reduction of international tension in this strategically important region of the globe, helping to search for ways of peaceful coexistence. And the most important thing was that in the 60s, under pressure from the international community with

Turkish territory, as well as from Italian territory, were withdrawn American rockets "Jupiter" with a nuclear filling.

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The case of Rudolf Abel

On October 14, 1957, in the United States, in the building of the federal court of the Eastern District of New York, the trial in the case No. 45094 "The United States of America v. Rudolf Ivanovich Abel" began, which was covered in the press. In the dock was an illegal Soviet intelligence officer, Colonel William Genrikhovich Fisher, who, after his arrest, did not recognize his belonging to the Soviet foreign intelligence and did not give his real name. He spoke under the guise of a displaced person from the post-war Soviet Union named Abel. In fact, Abel is the surname of his comrade, with whom he worked in the central intelligence apparatus and lived in the same apartment during the Great Patriotic War. By this, the scout made it clear to the intelligence leadership that he had not revealed himself and would act according to the legend he had worked out. Thus, as a result of this lawsuit, William Genrikhovich Fisher became widely known as Rudolf Abel.

The failure and then the arrest of the intelligence officer occurred as a result of the betrayal of Fischer Heihanen's assistant, who, due to drunkenness, was unable to conduct intelligence work and was ordered (under a specious pretext) to return to Moscow. Hoping that he would earn a lot of money from betrayal and secure a comfortable life for himself, Heihanen appeared before the US authorities and told what he knew about his leader. He said that his boss had the rank of colonel, gave a description of his appearance, the nature of his cover and the approximate area of his residence. He didn't know anything else.

Based on this information, the FBI identified and arrested Fisher. Since the FBI had no other data, he appeared at the trial as "Colonel Abel" - a member of Soviet intelligence.

The American and foreign press paid great attention to the process. Under the conditions of the Cold War, the arrest of the Soviet times

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for the leading circles of the United States was a truly great find. The conduct of the scout himself at the trial was of great importance. They chose the best course of action. In accordance with American law, he refused to testify, authorized the court to provide him with a lawyer, and turned the whole process into a dialogue between the court and the defense. This made it impossible for the prosecution to demand testimony, explanations, evidence from the intelligence officer and to play spectacular scenes of a political show.

During the process, Fischer sat behind his defenders and outwardly calmly observed what was happening, from time to time making notes and sketches. "Reporters and everyone else," his lawyer Donovan later wrote, "who sat in the room day after day, watched Abel take notes, draw something, and talk naturally with his lawyer during breaks, were sure that he is a cold person, an impassive observer, not interested in the outcome of the process. They could not have made a big mistake. Only iron self-discipline allowed him to sit silently and calmly, without showing a single sign that he was experiencing physical and emotional torture. Neither of us knew that physically he was not a very healthy person. He had a serious stomach disease (ulcer. - Auth.), which he never complained about".

Leading the defense of Fisher on duty, Donovan was so imbued with respect for his intellect and courage that he took up literary work, devoting a very objectively written book to the scout.

The court failed to prove that Fischer-Abel was engaged in espionage. There was not a single fact that would confirm the receipt by the defendant of secret data and their transfer to a foreign state. However, the prosecutor demanded that the accused be found guilty on all counts, on the basis, as he said, that "it is not at all necessary for the accused to be found guilty that the offender has already committed his act"?

On November 15, 1957, the court issued its decision. He sentenced Rudolf Ivanovich Abel to 30 years in prison.

Neither during the preliminary investigation, where the FBI used both pressure and various promises, nor during the trial and imprisonment did William Genrikhovich give away the secrets of Soviet intelligence and other data related to his mission in the United States.

Fischer's courageous, calm behavior, testimonies about his moral character and lifestyle during his stay in the United States aroused the sympathy of the public and journalists. This fact is typical. Letters from his wife and daughter, which were confiscated during his arrest, were read at the trial. He kept them as the most expensive thing he had in the USA on a personal level, they helped to endure difficult

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illegal situation and gave hope for the future. The cordial letters characterized the accused as a devoted husband and father. This caused a wave of respect for the personality of the Soviet intelligence officer, who subordinated his personal interests to the cause of serving the Motherland.

As for Hayhanen, the American public looked at him as a traitor and a morally corrupt person. One of the documents relating to the trial notes: "Heihanen left the witness's seat (and he was present at the trial as a witness. – Auth.), answering 220 questions. He left as if beaten, with his head bowed low, red and sweaty. Having done his vile deed, in the future he turned out to be of no use to anyone. Four years later, he died in a car accident on the Pennsylvania Highway under unexplained circumstances.

Donovan writes about the traitor: "Like many of his predecessors, Hayhanen was aware that the life of most "defectors" does not cease to be hell. As soon as he crossed the line, his old fears were replaced by new ones. He lost his family, his homeland, his past... During World War II, I knew many defectors. Accidents, drunkenness, so-called nervous breakdowns and suicides were frequent occurrences among them.

Fischer arrived in the United States in 1948, and for nine years until the day of his arrest, he conducted intelligence work here. The organization of an illegal link in a country like the United States is not an easy task. And the creation of such links is always associated with circumstances of an emergency nature.

The United States and Britain have embarked on a sharp confrontation with the USSR, which is fraught with a serious complication of the situation in the world. Secret US documents released to date show that since 1945, the United States has been developing specific plans for an atomic attack on the USSR. consideration of President G. Truman, recommended that "all preparations be made in order to, if necessary, strike the first blow" with the use of atomic weapons. Later, in 1949, the Dropshot plan was developed, which planned to drop 300 atomic and 250 thousand tons of conventional bombs on the Soviet Union.

In 1946, American and British intelligence launched a program of total espionage against the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. Specially trained agents are thrown into the Soviet Union through the "green" border from Turkey and Iran, from airplanes on parachutes from West Germany and Japan, by sea using various watercraft from England, West Germany, Sweden.

In such conditions, foreign intelligence was faced with the task of "not overlooking the preparations by the United States and England for a surprise attack

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attack on the Soviet Union", and illegal links were considered as the most viable intelligence structures capable of functioning not only in normal conditions, but also in crisis situations.

Thus, an illegal intelligence unit was created in the United States, headed by career intelligence officer William Genrikhovich Fisher. He was given the task of settling in the United States under the guise of a local citizen, creating a solid cover, working out reliable channels of communication with the Center, getting in touch with some agents, organizing work to acquire new sources and using them to extract information, related to ensuring the security of our state.

The illegal work that the Soviet intelligence officer went to is not done by order. It is carried out at the call of the heart. People go here voluntarily, because by their nature such activities are associated with a risk to life and severe trials.

Being well acquainted with the situation in the world and realizing that a new military danger looms over the Motherland, William Genrikhovich expressed a desire to go abroad for illegal work. At that time he was in his 44th year.

The most difficult thing was to part with the family for a long time, to go to separation from loved ones - wife and daughter - a family where an atmosphere of warmth and tenderness reigned. But William was a man of duty. He shared his intentions with his wife, Elena Stepanovna, explained to her the reasons that prompted him to make such a decision. After a long discussion, she agreed with her husband's arguments and blessed him for this hard work.

The next day, William Genrikhovich submitted a report to the management, which stated:

"I, Fisher William Genrikhovich, fully aware of the importance for my homeland - the USSR - of illegal work and clearly realizing all the difficulties and dangers of this work, I voluntarily agree to join the ranks of illegal workers of the USSR Ministry of State Security.

I understand that the work of an illegal Soviet intelligence officer is the most honorable and responsible for the Chekists.

I undertake, having become an illegal intelligence officer, to subordinate my entire future life, all my aspirations and behavior to the interests of my Motherland.

I undertake to strictly, accurately and unquestioningly comply with all instructions of my supervisors on illegal work.

I undertake to strictly observe secrecy, under no circumstances will I reveal to the enemies the secrets entrusted to me and I would rather accept death than betray the interests of my Motherland.

W. Fisher.

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The report was written in April 1946, and in October 1948, after two years of preparation, Fischer went abroad, in November of the same year he was already in New York.

Fisher was not new to intelligence. Before World War II, he was twice on business trips abroad in illegal conditions in European countries. Mastering perfectly

English, being well acquainted with the manners and customs of Europeans, he successfully completed the tasks assigned to him.

William spent his childhood and youth abroad and therefore had a good language training and a complete understanding of the life of Europeans. He did not need much effort to transform into a foreigner.

William Genrikhovich was born on July 11, 1903 in England. His parents, Genrikh Matveevich and Lyubov Vasilievna Fisher, were political emigrants from Russia. They were expelled from the country in 1901 for revolutionary activities and settled in England.

William's father, Heinrich Matveevich, was born in 1871 in the Mologa district of the Yaroslavl province in a large family of German origin. After graduating from school, Genrikh Matveyevich moved to St. Petersburg, worked as a turner in factories, and joined revolutionary activities. Then - moving to Saratov, marrying eighteen-year-old Lyubov Vasilievna, close to him in worldview, Russian by nationality, and deportation abroad.

William, together with his older brother, Heinrich, grew up in an English environment, studied at an English school, and spent their free time with their peers from English families. My father worked at a factory, which made it possible to support the family more or less tolerably. At the school of the future intelligence officer, mathematics, physics, astronomy, mechanics, and history were most fascinated.

At the age of 15, Willy started working, he was accepted as an apprentice draftsman in the design bureau of the shipyard. At the same time, he continued to study at the secondary school program and at the age of 16 he passed the exam at the University of London.

After the October Revolution, the parents began to prepare for their return to their homeland, and in 1921 they arrived in Moscow. William and his brother Heinrich also aspired to Russia. In the family, education was carried out in the Russian spirit. A great merit in instilling in children love for their historical homeland belongs to the mother, Lyubov Vasilievna. The language of communication in the family was Russian, outside the home the children spoke English. Thus, they were equally fluent in both Russian and English.

Willy first worked as an interpreter in the Executive Committee of the Comintern and entered the Institute of Oriental Studies. But I managed to study at the institute for only a year. In 1925 he was drafted into the army. He served in the radiotelegraph regiment, here at

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acquired the specialty of a radio operator, which played an important role in his future fate.

Life in the army team gave a good hardening, where he made friends with many comrades who later became noble people of the country. Since those years, Willy's personal friend has been a famous polar explorer, [Hero of the Soviet Union, radio operator of Papanin's expedition to the North Pole Ernst Krenkel.

After demobilization, William entered the Research and Testing Institute of the Air Force of the Red Army as a radio engineer. But he did not work there for long. Already in 1927 he was sent to foreign intelligence. In the same year he married Elena Stepanovna Lebedeva, a student at the conservatory.

For about four years, Fisher worked in the central intelligence apparatus. In 1931, the leadership suggested that he go on a business trip abroad. The trip abroad was planned to be carried out in an unusual way. He had to travel on his own documents, but not as a citizen of the USSR, but as a subject of Great Britain. He had to apply to the English embassy in Moscow with a request to return to England.

From the legal point of view, this operation looked legal, and there was no doubt about its plausibility, since during this period the flow of emigrants from the USSR still continued.

In accordance with the assignment received, he had to go to one of the Scandinavian countries and create a point of contact there, which would provide radio communication between the residency and the Center. The residency in this country was working on neighboring states and was in dire need of maintaining regular communication with Moscow.

The troubles in the English embassy ended successfully. Soon William and Elena Fisher received English passports and left for their destination. In the host country, William paid a visit to the English consul, explained that he intended to stay here and earn some money, and only then leave for England. The consul made no objections to this.

In one of the suburban areas of the capital, Fisher rented a villa and set up a makeshift radio workshop in it. The creation of this cover made it possible to legend the existence of livelihoods. Elena Stepanovna taught ballet at a private school.

The point of contact created by William [Genrikhovich] functioned normally. Operational affairs and cover work were going well. However, difficulties arose in 1934. Local authorities reported that Fischer was denied the right to continue working and offered to leave the country after the end of his stay. As it turned out later, this was due to the intelligence officer's petition to allow him to enter the civil service.

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After an almost four-year stay abroad, William Genrikhovich, together with his wife and daughter, returned to Moscow.

After analyzing the work of the intelligence officer abroad, the leadership of foreign intelligence decided, after a rest and a short preparation, to send him to another country with a more difficult operational situation. The assignment provided for the organization of two-way radio communication between the illegal residency and the Center.

Then Fischer and his family went to Western Europe. It took two months to adapt the six-year-old daughter to foreign conditions. The stay in the USSR led to the fact that the girl gained various impressions of Moscow, which had to be eliminated, otherwise it could have a negative impact on security issues.

The Fishers settled in a modest hotel and began to look for an apartment. It soon succeeded. It was more difficult to cover. Posing as a radio engineer who had just arrived from a Scandinavian country, Fischer tried to do similar work here, but the services offered were not in demand. Therefore, while making legends about having some savings to support his family, he simultaneously became a freelance artist, creating a kind of fine arts studio at home.

The work progressed well. In February 1936, the assistant to the resident informed the Center that Fisher was ready to start two-way radio communication and even asked for ciphers and a radio program.

But life took its own course. For security reasons, he was recalled to Moscow.

William Genrikhovich was appointed to the position of senior operational commissioner and began working in the central apparatus of foreign intelligence. The life of the Fisher family returned to normal. Elena Stepanovna entered the children's theater as a harpist. Daughter Evelina went to school.

The new year of 1939 brought a lot of worries to the family. William Genrikhovich was dismissed from the service without explanation. It was a severe blow from which he could not recover for a long time. I had to take on some work to support my family. However, it was not easy to find an occupation that would suit William. Finally, he managed to get a job in the All-Union

chamber of commerce as a technician for the implementation of patents. Then he moved to the plant of the People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry. He worked at the plant until the start of World War II.

In September 1941, Fischer was offered to return to the service in the state security agencies. As William Genrikhovich recalled, no pressure was put on him, the conversation was correct and thorough. He was asked to think and then give an answer. Despite

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to the trauma that was inflicted by the dismissal, and therefore by distrust, for Fischer the answer was clear. There was a war, and he agreed.

Soon, by order of the NKVD of the USSR, William was enlisted as a senior operational commissioner of a newly created unit in connection with the martial law, which was engaged in organizing combat reconnaissance and sabotage groups and partisan detachments in the Soviet territory occupied by the enemy. He was engaged in the training of radio operators and performed other duties related to the deployment of our people behind enemy lines. The work was not easy, requiring not only precision and accuracy, but also great physical exertion. They worked for days. I had to go to the front-line zones to carry out the tasks of the leadership. One of these trips was connected with the operational game "Berezino". It was launched in August 1944 and ended in the days of the capitulation of the Nazi Reich. Its essence was to legend the presence of a large military unit of Germany on the territory of the USSR. The radio game, in which Fischer took part, helped to "catch" 22 German scouts sent to help the "surrounded", a large amount of weapons and radio equipment.

His family was evacuated to Kuibyshev, and he himself, when he was not traveling, lived in a communal apartment in Moscow in Troitsky Lane.

Victory Day William Genrikhovich met in Moscow with family and friends.

For the performance of tasks related to ensuring the state security of the Motherland during the Great Patriotic War, Fischer was awarded the Order of the Red Star and medals: "Partisan of the Patriotic War" 1st degree, "For the Victory over Germany", "For defense of Moscow.

The post-war service of William Genrikhovich again turned out to be connected with foreign intelligence. He was the deputy head of a section in a unit that was engaged in intelligence for the countries of the West.

As mentioned earlier, Fischer volunteered to go abroad as a

illegal

In the USA, Fischer settled in New York under the name of the American Goldfuss, a freelance artist. In 1950, he opened an atelier for the production of enlarged reproductions from color transparencies, and moved there to live. Later, William Genrikhovich found another premises, opened an art studio for the production of color photographs and for classes

painting.

The cover was successful. He quickly and confidently entered the local environment, the environment accepted him as a respectable American. The illegal immigrant led the life of a lonely elderly man, until

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quite erudite, possessing many talents. Friends treated him with respect.

At the same time, he was debugging communication channels with the Center and contacts with sources. In addition to the cover, which took a lot of time, it was necessary to hold meetings, receive and process information, send it to the Center, study and select places for meetings, work out test routes.

For successful work in August 1949, Fischer was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

At the end of 1952, Heihanen, a career KGB officer, disguised as a Finnish American, was sent to help the intelligence officer. The Center decided to offload Fisher from a number of time-consuming technical duties, focusing his attention on working with sources and obtaining intelligence information. Heihanen's task was mainly to provide two-way radio communication with the Center.

William Genrikhovich was pleased with Heihanen's arrival. Helped him in legalization, creating a cover, mastering the situation and getting him to work. As a personnel officer, the resident fully trusted him, but tried not to go beyond what was permitted. Heihanen knew that the resident, a colonel, lived in New York under the guise of an American painting and color photography. The new employee did not know any legalization data, real name or address.

Fischer held meetings with the radio operator in places remote from their areas of residence. Only once, when Heihanen was unable to complete the work entrusted to him due to lack of photographic materials, did the resident bring him closer to his house, ask him to wait, and leave for 15 minutes to bring him the necessary materials. "If Abel had not made this unforgivable mistake," writes Donovan, "in letting his subordinate Hayhanen find out where his studio is, then everything could have turned out differently. It was this mistake that led to Abel's arrest and then to the trial, during which his life was at stake.

Heihanen's downfall began with drinking. He began to lack money, and he began to spend operational funds for personal needs.

Drunkenness entailed moral licentiousness. Heihanen got married secretly from the Center and, having fallen under the influence of his new wife (he left behind a wife and child in his homeland), he retired from intelligence work. Quarrels and scandals took place between husband and wife on the basis of passion for alcohol, which forced the neighbors to turn to the police.

In connection with the situation that had arisen, the Center decided to recall Heihanen to Moscow. Departure was motivated by the need for retraining and rest. Indication of the Center, the radio operator took sick

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nno. He began to invent pretexts to force him to change this decision.

Anticipating an undesirable development of events, Moscow warned the resident about the need to take security measures, in particular, to stop contact with Heihanen, switch to other documents and change his place of residence.

Meanwhile, the Center continued to insist in radiograms to Heihanen that the radio operator leave the USA for Europe and then for Moscow. As a result, Heihanen went to France on the steamship Liberte. This was at the end of April 1957. Upon arrival in Europe, a meeting was held with him and the further route to Moscow was determined.

However, Heihanen did not appear at the appointed points at the appointed time. Efforts to find him were unsuccessful.

As it turned out, Heihanen, fearing responsibility for his misdeeds, decided to commit the most shameful thing - betrayal. He appeared at the US Embassy in Paris, told who he was

is, asked for political asylum and promised to cooperate with US intelligence agencies.

On May 11, 1957, the traitor was secretly brought to the United States on an American military plane.

FBI director Hoover allocated large forces and the best specialists to search for Fisher. Establishing the residence of a resident was not so easy. One thing helped. Heihanen remembered the place where Fischer had asked him to wait when he went somewhere to get photographic materials. This place, according to the traitor, was not far from the work or housing of the scout.

After checking all the premises in the environment and questioning the inhabitants, the FBI agents finally came to the house at number 252 Fulton Street in New York, where Emil R. Goldfuss's studio was on the fifth floor. But the studio was closed. The agents learned from the tenants that Goldfuss had disappeared at the end of April. House No. 252 was under constant surveillance. The search continued throughout America.

And at this time, following the instructions of the Center, Fisher was already in Florida in Dayton Beach, living in a hotel, posing as Martin Collins. From here, in case of danger, he had to leave the United States. He has been here for 18 days. It turned out to be impossible to receive radiograms on the radio receiver available there. He managed to receive only one radiogram, which spoke of a meeting with a radio operator in Paris, from where he should proceed further along the route. This calmed William Genrikhovich. He considered that the situation had returned to normal, decided to return to New York and, until further instructions from the Center, not to appear in his apartment, but to live in a hotel under the name of Collins.

Arriving in New York, having no connection with the Center, he decided to observe his house from the side, to see if everything was calm there.

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But. The apartment contained the radio receiver he needed, and it was necessary to destroy the materials that were in the cache, which could give counterintelligence a lead in order to get to other residency cases unknown to Heihanen.

The first observation showed that the situation around the house was calm. But the scout decided not to hurry. Another three weeks have passed. He informed the Center about his return to New York, but he could not receive an answer due to interference on the air, despite his best efforts.

After that, in the evening, he reappeared at his house and, seizing a convenient moment, quietly entered the entrance. Cautiously entered the apartment. After making sure that everything was in place, without turning on the light, he took his portable receiver and, observing the precautions, went out into the street.

On the way to the Latham Hotel, where he was staying, the scout checked: everything was calm.

The next day, he decided to check the cache, which was in the studio under a wooden staircase. The cache contained tapes with several letters from the family, postal addresses for contacting the Center, as well as encrypted records of the installation data of a number of sources, conditions for contacting them, and encryption notebooks.

He quietly entered the apartment again. The light didn't turn on. In the cache, everything was intact. Laying out the documents on the table, he remembered that the desk should contain a metric for Collins, according to which he lived at the Latham Hotel. William Genrikhovich began to rummage in the drawer and accidentally brushed off the table the container where the tapes with letters from the family were kept. Rummaging unsuccessfully in the darkness on the floor, he watched the street from the window and not noticing anything suspicious, turned on the light. He quickly found the container and turned off the light two minutes later.

Returning to the hotel, carefully checked. In one place I noticed a man who seemed suspicious to him. But further checks convinced him that there seemed to be no observation of him.

Returning to the hotel, he destroyed the records that could be used to contact the people who worked with him, saving only the conditions for a meeting in case of leaving the United States, a container with a film containing letters from the family, current encryption pads and a radio program. In the event of an arrest, there was enough evidence, but the most important thing he did was to destroy the traces by which the FBI could find people who worked with him.

In the evening there was another radio session. Although the radio had worked flawlessly before, this time the signals were not getting through due to strong interference. It was not possible to decipher the radiogram completely. Suffering from fatigue, at three o'clock in the morning he went to bed.

Around seven in the morning there was a knock on the door, FBI agents rushed into the room and announced to the intelligence officer that he had been arrested. At the same time,

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Zali: "Colonel, we know who you are and what you do. We invite you to cooperate with us, otherwise you will face jail."

From what Fischer heard, he knew immediately that Heihanen had betrayed him. Taking advantage of the fact that he was allowed to put on trousers and a shirt and was allowed to go to the toilet, he tore into small pieces and flushed into the toilet the cipher pads and paper with the recording of yesterday's radiogram, which were in the back pocket of his trousers. However, some evidence still fell into the hands of counterintelligence.

FBI members insistently demanded consent to cooperation. However, William Genrikhovich only shrugged his shoulders and repeated that there was some kind of mistake here.

Having achieved nothing, the FBI officers handed over the arrested person to the employees of the department of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. In the New York branch of this service, Fisher was photographed and fingerprinted. Four hours later, he was handcuffed to the airport and flown to McAllen, Texas.

Here he was placed in solitary confinement.

The next day the interrogation began. The investigator demanded to tell who he was, when he arrived in the USA, what documents he lived with, etc. At first, Fischer flatly refused to give any evidence. He stated that, under the United States Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused was not required to prove his innocence. However, the persistence of the FBI, their threats, and even an attempted beating convinced him that he needed to come up with some kind of acceptable cover story and stick to it strictly. The intelligence officer was afraid that American counterintelligence might start an operational game with the Center on his behalf. So far, the Center does not know about his arrest, and Heihanen's betrayal is also hardly known. He can go on the air and report that he is ill, therefore he returned to the USA and start sending radiograms on behalf of the resident.

William Genrikhovich understood that there was only one way to prevent a possible provocation by the FBI – to let the Center know about his arrest.

He was well aware that the testimony of the traitor and the evidence seized by the FBI would serve as sufficiently convincing arguments in any instance, including the judiciary, to testify that the arrested person was a Soviet intelligence officer. However, it is impossible to admit it, this decision was firm. But how to inform the Center? He is ripening the decision to recognize himself as a native of Russia, who, among the displaced persons, ended up in Germany, where he found a treasure of several thousand dollars in a destroyed house, bought himself a fake passport and arrived in the United States. He decided to speak under the name of Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, his old comrade and colleague.

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Such a legend, according to the intelligence officer, would allow him to seek protection from the Soviet embassy, since he could claim Soviet citizenship. And this, he believed, would be a signal for the Center.

After some time, Fisher told the investigators that he was ready to tell about himself, and prepared a written appeal to the Soviet embassy. The interrogations went on for a whole month. Investigators all the time tried to persuade the intelligence officer to cooperate with the FBI. After making sure that Fischer would not commit treachery, they informed him that the case was being referred to the courts, that after this move there would be no going back and that he would face a long term in prison, and possibly the death penalty. They agreed to send the paper to the embassy, but they said skeptically: "The KGB doesn't need you now, they will try to disown you."

In reality, with the appeal to the embassy, what happened was what the FBI agents frightened. The answer was as follows: "Rudolf Ivanovich Abel is unknown to the embassy, and among the Soviet citizens there are no listed."

At the same time, the fact that the arrested person applied to the Soviet embassy deprived the FBI of the opportunity to take any operational steps, believing that Soviet intelligence was already aware of the arrest of its employee.

..Conditions in prisons - New York District and Federal Correctional in Atlanta - were difficult. The composition of the prisoners was different, but criminals predominated. Quarrels and fights, the use of drugs, which were delivered to the prison premises in some unknown way, poisoned the situation, made it unbearable for many prisoners.

William Genrikhovich spent more than four years in such conditions, but never once complained about the poor content.

He had the ability to find something to do in any situation. His mind was always in constant search of ideas that carried him away. Now he was engaged in solving mathematical problems, then compiling crossword puzzles, inventing various devices.

In this regard, Donovan describes the situation that developed when Fisher was in a New York prison. One inveterate criminal was placed in a cell with an illegal immigrant, and the lawyer decided to inquire about the situation. Donovan gives the following dialogue that took place between him and his client:

"I heard you have a cellmate?

"Yes," Abel replied, "poor bandit."

- How do you get along with him?

"Very well," said the Colonel, lighting a cigarette, "I'm teaching him French." You see, Squillant (prisoner's surname. - Auth.) was very upset about being sent to prison again, and for the first few days he behaved like a caged animal. I didn't pay attention

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mania for his fuss, but in the end it began to interfere with my solving mathematical problems with which I was killing time. And so I had an idea.

I have noticed that in people like him and some others who are accustomed to acting with violent methods, physical fatigue helps to calm emotional excitement. It was difficult for me to come up with something in a small cell with the strictest regime. However, I noticed that the walls, ceiling, and floor of the cell were dirty, and asked him if he would like to scrub them to keep his physical form.

In the end, he announced that he would take care of this case. Since then, every day for several hours, he scrubbed the cell and kept it absolutely clean.

I thought about how to compensate for his efforts, and offered to teach him French, and he was delighted.

I'm being patient - and without any lyrics, we've made pretty good progress."

The scout was not left alone and the special services. On the one hand, they acted through the prison administration, on the other hand, through the lawyer himself. Donovan professionally and conscientiously performed the duties of a defense attorney, but never missed an opportunity in critical situations to remind him that the client was missing his chance by refusing to cooperate with American intelligence agencies. Sometimes these conversations took the form of pressure. But each time the illegal alien rejected these harassment, while acting with great dignity and tact.

Measures to rescue Fisher from an American prison began in October 1957. Employees of the central office tried to find the best option that would allow them to start negotiations with the Americans.

Elena Stepanovna was also included in the work process. The influential lawyer Wolfgang Vogel, a member of the Greater Berlin Bar Association, was invited as her lawyer. He was to act as an intermediary before the American authorities.

An important point was the selection of a suitable candidate or candidates for the exchange. During this period, it was not easy to find such people. The Americans were skeptical that there would be an equivalent candidate in the USSR.

The Italian magazine Tempo in February-March 1958 published an interview with its correspondent with US Deputy Attorney General Tompkins, who described the situation as follows: "He was an opponent of a large scale, a genius in his profession," he noted. - For ten years, he was able not only to live unnoticed and not draw attention to himself, not arouse suspicion, but even managed to gain sympathy

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and establish many friendships. This is undoubtedly the most important and most capable Soviet agent that has ever fallen into our hands since 1917. In his profession, he is an exceptional person in all respects... The arrest of Abel is a matter of great importance. It takes years and years to train an agent with such abilities, maybe ten years, maybe twenty. His willpower and tenacity are such that if I had to write a textbook on the behavior of a secret agent, I could not advise anything else but to imitate Abel. This is a man who sacrificed everything for the sake of fulfilling his mission, who completely reincarnated in his role. For Russians, he is undoubtedly irreplaceable. Therefore, I do not think that he would be exchanged for anyone, since by doing so we would present a huge gift to the Russians "?.

The ice broke unexpectedly. On May 1, 1960, an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft piloted by Francis Powers, a thirty-year-old American pilot, was shot down near Sverdlovsk. The plane belonged to the CIA and was literally crammed with a variety of equipment. The pilot's task is to photograph the missile bases near Sverdlovsk.

Powers parachuted out and was arrested. Subsequently, the Americans began to speak out in favor of exchanging Abel for Powers. However, the negotiations dragged on for a year and a half. And only on February 10, 1962, the exchange took place. It took place in Berlin on the Altglinike-brücke bridge.

Fisher himself describes the events that preceded the exchange as follows:

"It was the evening of February 6, we were already locked in the cell. The guard came up and said: "Abel, take your things. Go down." He waited until I finished packing. They didn't take long...

Downstairs, when we left the block of cells, I was taken to the room on duty. The head of the prison was there.

You need to go to New York.

...At about two o'clock in the morning I was already on the plane, and at five in the morning I was received by the prison officer in New York. A day later, on February 8, at 3 pm, I was dressed again and taken out of prison. On the street at the entrance to the prison, I was met by Wilkinson, who was the governor of the prison in Atlanta during my stay there.

We got into the car, there were a few more people, and accompanied by the second car, we headed south...

Having driven about a hundred kilometers from New York, we drove up to the airfield, by all indications of a military one. There was a slight hitch at the gate - Wilkinson called someone on the phone, and then our cars pulled up to a four-engine plane.

It was already getting dark, and when we took off into the air and lay down on the course, the stars appeared. I looked out the window, found Big and Small Med

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Vedic, the North Star and determined the course: we are flying about 17 degrees east of north - therefore, to Europe.

I knew that the big arc from New York to Northern Europe was in that direction, and when Wilkinson asked me if I had any idea about the purpose of the flight, I answered him just like that: "To Europe."

He was somewhat surprised, but when I showed him the stars, he understood where this came from.
known...

In Berlin, we landed at the Tempelhof airfield, where some people with cars were waiting for us. After driving quite a long time through the city, we drove up to the building of the US occupation troops. I was taken to the basement... It was quite clear that the matter was going to be exchanged."

The exchange took place on the morning of February 10, 1962. William Genrikhovich immediately fell into the arms of friends and colleagues who took part in this event. Then he was brought to a service villa in Karlshorst, where his wife Elena Stepanovna and daughter Evelina were waiting for him.

A friendly meeting took place. More than one toast was raised. At the end of the meeting, William Genrikhovich said: "I feel the feelings of a person who got "from the ship to the ball". And joyful, and exciting, and unusual, unusual to such an extent that even with a glass of light dry wine, the head is incredibly dizzy. Frankly, I'm like in a dream. There was such a striking contrast of the situation that it is even hard to believe what happened. The "ship" on which I had to stay for almost five years, as you know, has a very prosaic name - the hard labor prison of the Ministry of Justice in the city of Atlanta. There I tried to do everything possible so as not to drop the honor and dignity of the Soviet people, to fulfill my official duty to the end.

In Moscow, William Genrikhovich was received by the leaders of the Committee for State Security and Foreign Intelligence. The Chairman of the KGB announced the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on awarding the intelligence officer with the Order of the Red Banner and the orders of the KGB on awarding him the badge "Honorary State Security Officer" and appointing him to the post of head of the department.

After treatment and rest, Fischer set to work. In addition to operational work, William Genrikhovich had to speak a lot in the KGB teams of the central office and local authorities, as well as at enterprises, schools and even in rural areas. Interest in the personality of this man was very great. Almost ten years after his release from prison, Fischer remained in the intelligence service, sharing his knowledge and experience with young employees.

But trouble came. On November 15, 1971, William Genrikhovich passed away. He died in an oncology clinic after a short treatment of a serious illness, the symptoms of which have made themselves felt only very recently.

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He lived for 68 years. He was a man of great all-round ability. James Donovan described him as follows: "He is a unique person. He talked to me about atomic energy as if he were Einstein's best friend. Abel knew painting, photography, jewelry, electronics, chemistry,

To this it must be added that he was a good musician, a linguist, and knew law and literature very well.

Painting was his special passion. He gave her the lion's share of his free time. He painted hundreds of paintings, and reproductions of some of them became known to the general public.

The long and impeccable service of William Genrikhovich Fisher in the ranks of foreign intelligence officers, his courage and steadfastness, selfless devotion to the Motherland have become a worthy example. His name will remain in the memory of not only scouts, but also of all people who hold dear the interests of our Fatherland.

Donovan D. Strangers on the Bridge. - M., 1992. - S. 149. Ibid. - S. 224.

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Member of the Royal "Overseas League"

Colonel Konon Trofimovich Molodoy, known from publications in our country and abroad under the name of Gordon Lonsdale, from 1955 to 1961 headed the illegal residency in England. It was one of the most effective links of foreign intelligence, which successfully obtained secret political, scientific, technical and military-strategic information in the most important institutions of England and US military bases located on its territory.

During this period, relations between the West and the East continued to heat up, and the arms race intensified. The Soviet leadership and the command of the armed forces were keenly interested in issues related to the development of military equipment in NATO countries, including those intended for the naval forces.

At the same time, obtaining the necessary information using "legal" opportunities encountered great difficulties due to the activity of counterintelligence agencies against Soviet citizens and institutions in many NATO countries. England was not

exception. In this situation, it was decided to create an illegal residency in London and transfer to it a part of valuable sources for communication.

The residency of Molodoy began to be created in 1954. But its main components began to function only in 1955, after the resident himself settled in London and a point of contact organized by illegal intelligence officers Morris and Leontina Cohen began to operate.

It took a long time to create a solid cover, establish communication channels and deploy the residency in full force. At the initial stage, mainly political information came from the residency. Then, with the transfer to its composition of a source that had access to scientific and technical issues, according to

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there was an opportunity to send important information on developments in the field of modern technology and the latest technologies. In particular, the Center began to receive materials on the technology of production of rolled high-strength aluminum and other alloys, brazing of titanium and stainless steel using a new method, and other important industrial and scientific developments, which were highly appreciated by the departments concerned.

The "marine" line has become a new effective direction. The work intensified here after the Houghton ("Shah") source was included in it. The illegal residency received from him a large amount of secret materials: orders from the Admiralty, information about the organization of the British Navy, about naval equipment, the submarine fleet, weapons, methods of using the combat means of the fleet, the state of defense of British ports and naval installations.

Subsequently, with the help of Houghton, a new source was acquired - Bunty Gee ("Asia"), who, like Houghton, worked at the Portland Naval Research Center, which dealt with secret naval issues. She had access to almost all secret materials in this institution and transmitted through Houghton and directly to Molodoy documents and drawings on the most important developments.

During Houghton's collaboration with Soviet foreign intelligence, several thousand titles of top secret, secret and confidential documentary materials of the British Admiralty and its scientific centers were received from him, with a volume of over 17,000 sheets. The materials obtained gave a complete picture of the state of the British navy, its combat capabilities, and the prospects for the development of watercraft and weapons. As one British newspaper later wrote, citing a statement by a major military leader, there were no secrets left in the British Navy that were not known to Soviet intelligence.

A large number of documents were also received on the latest scientific and technical developments in the production of armaments and technical equipment for the army and navy. Among them are materials on the Dreadnought nuclear submarine, sonar stations and sonars, sonar anti-submarine defense systems, etc.

At the end of 1958, Molodoy was contacted by the source "K", who had access to valuable scientific and technical information. The illegal met him at various places in the city, sometimes on the train, and received documentary materials. The meetings most often lasted just a few seconds. The documents received after being photographed were returned in the same way.

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"K" handed over to the illegal immigrant a large amount of materials that were highly valued at the Center. The materials obtained made it possible to more rationally plan our military and military

maritime programs, saving large amounts of money, to carry out preventive measures against a possible threat to the security of the state.

The merit in creating unique intelligence capabilities in one of the key NATO countries should be attributed not only to the illegal intelligence officer Molodoy, but also to the London "legal" residency, which actively contributed to his work. At the same time, the role of an illegal immigrant in this matter is exceptionally great. If it weren't for the betrayal, Molodoy's residency could have been working for a long time and it would have been almost impossible for counterintelligence to detect it by conventional means.

impossible.

In addition to naval issues, work was carried out on facilities in the city of Porton, where the center of biological methods of warfare was located, on American air bases, on the study of British intelligence personnel who were trained at the University of London, and on other issues.

Konon Trofimovich Young was an outstanding person. He was fluent in English and was fluent in French, German and Chinese. By language and manners, knowledge of manners and customs, it was impossible to distinguish him from a real Canadian or American. A lively mind, benevolence, and a sense of humor helped win over people, make useful connections, and successfully resolve the sometimes difficult issues that fall to the lot of the illegal gala. He was a strong-willed, purposeful person, which allowed him not to be scattered over trifles and firmly follow the intended goal.

Konon Trofimovich was born on January 17, 1922 in Moscow. His father, Trofim Kononovich, studied physics at St. Petersburg and Moscow Universities. He later became a lecturer and editor of scientific journals. Konon's mother, Evdokia Konstantinovna Molodaya, was a doctor. In 1929, the father died, and the mother continued to raise children alone. A comprehensively developed, hardworking woman, professor of the Research Institute of Prosthetics, Evdokia Konstantinovna gained fame in the scientific world, including abroad, had scientific works. During the Great Patriotic War, Evdokia Konstantinovna worked as a military surgeon and saved the life of more than one Soviet soldier.

Konon grew up as an unusual child. He has been fond of foreign languages since childhood.

When Konon was ten years old, his mother's sister Anastasia Konstantinovna Naumova, who lived in the USA in Berkeley (California), invited him to her place. Another mother's sister lived in America - Pyankova, who became a ballerina, and she also wanted her nephew to live with them for some time.

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Evdokia Konstantinovna let her son go to her sisters. Conon stayed in the USA until 1938. Here he studied in high school, traveled a lot around California, visited other cities in the USA, and visited New York. During this time, he perfectly studied the English language, life and customs of the population of North America. Together with his relatives, he visited England, France and other countries.

In 1938, Konon turned 16 years old and had to choose a future path in life. His aunts recommended that he finish high school, enter one of the American universities and stay in the United States. However, Konon firmly decided to return to his homeland. He came to Moscow. In 1940 he graduated from the 36th Moscow secondary school.

In October of the same year, Molodoy was called up for military service. From the very first days of the Great Patriotic War until the Victory, Young was at the front as a military intelligence officer. He served in the 140th Artillery Brigade as Assistant Chief of Staff of the 627th Separate Reconnaissance Artillery Battalion.

In battles with the Nazis, such qualities of Konon the Young as courage, courage, military ingenuity and observation were manifested. For courage and bravery shown during the Great Patriotic War, Lieutenant K.T. Young was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War

Gi P degree, the Order of the Red Star and several medals. He traveled more than one thousand kilometers with troops across Europe, having visited the territory of Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary and Romania.

In 1946, Young was demobilized and entered the Institute of Foreign Trade to study. I successfully studied Chinese here.

In 1952, after graduating from the institute, Konon Trofimovich Molody was recruited into the intelligence service and began training for work in illegal conditions.

Konon Trofimovich, as is known, spoke English at the level of his native language. This made things easier. He also knew the way of life of the North Americans, the peculiarities of the behavior of the Europeans. Therefore, the main attention was paid to operational intelligence issues and professional training.

To improve his language skills, Molodoy used communication with Morris and Leontina Coen, who were preparing to work in an illegal residency in England, which he was supposed to head. Communication with these people made it possible not only to study their future employees, but also to take a lot for themselves from their extensive experience in intelligence work. As for language practice, it was impossible to think of a better school. Sometimes, from morning to evening, conversations were conducted only in English. After such training, the Coens concluded that in terms of language, behavior and manners, Conon could not be distinguished from a real American.

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In October 1954, the chairman of the State Security Committee approved a plan to organize an illegal residency in England and appoint Molodoy as its head, and also authorized his transfer to the country of destination.

In order for an illegal immigrant to settle in England, a country with a difficult operational situation, it was necessary to provide him with a reliable document that would allow him to freely enter England and stay there to live. The developed version provided for the residence of Konon Trofimovich abroad on the basis of a genuine international passport.

Along with resolving issues of documentation and legalization, he carried out work on the implementation of specific reconnaissance missions.

The preparatory work for moving to England was drawing to a close. It was necessary to transfer a certain amount of money from his account to England in one of the London banks, so that upon arrival there he could open an account. During this operation, the scout met a bank employee who was the secretary of the local organization "Overseas League". This acquaintance later played a large role in the arrangement of life in England, and it is worth telling a little more about this. The League was a public organization with more than 50,000 members whose program was to agitate for the strengthening of the British Empire.

A new acquaintance invited Konon Trofimovich to join this organization. When the illegal immigrant began to hesitate, he explained to him that in London, where he was going to go, he probably did not have any acquaintances, but many problems would arise, and there would be no one to help. And in the Overseas League they will accept him as their own person, help him find an apartment, introduce him to the right people, organize interesting and inexpensive trips around the country.

Molodoy, after consulting with the Center, made an entrance fee and was registered as a member of this organization. When, after receiving his membership card, he looked at the name of the patron of the league, he saw the name of Queen Elizabeth P. He knew that he had become a member of a really solid organization.

At the end of February, the preparations were completed, and Molody left for New York, from where he went on the liner America to England ...

Evening came. It was too late to go to the office of the Overseas League, as the secretary of the Vancouver branch advised him. He settled down for the night in a small hotel, and in the morning went to the board of the local league. It was located in the center of London, next to the park adjacent to Buckingham Palace. The illegal entered his name in the book of "foreign guests", as was customary. He was offered for the first time a place in the hotel of the league, where he could get a room.

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that for 12 shillings a day. To show that he was an economical person, Molodoy settled in a double room, where another person lived.

"Before I had time to properly position myself," the scout later wrote, "the telephone rang. A pleasant female voice said that the general secretary of the league branch would like to see me.

"I'll be ready in half an hour," I replied.

Quickly putting myself in order, exactly 30 minutes later I entered the secretary's office.

"My name is Philip Crawshaw," the owner of the office introduced himself to me, an elderly gray-haired Englishman. - I would like to introduce you to our leaders. Let's go to the bar.

At the bar, my arrival was greeted by raising glasses filled with traditional whiskey and soda, and we introduced ourselves. Seeing that I was in a hurry and about to say goodbye, Crawshaw, who turned out to be a MBE, took my arm and led me to a wide window.

"Look," he pointed to Buckingham, "the royal flag flutters over the palace.

"Yes, I see," I confirmed, not really understanding his intentions.

"Her Royal Highness is here." The tone of his statement was extremely solemn. I propose a toast to her health.

- With great pleasure. Queen's health - I ordered whiskey for everyone. As I finished my glass, I came to the conclusion that my patriotism had not yet manifested itself with sufficient enthusiasm and decided to correct this mistake in the future.

At the league hotel, Young made many acquaintances. With some he maintained relations throughout his stay in England, and this seriously contributed to the strengthening of the legalization polo.

zheniya.

Thanks to the league, Young was constantly aware of political events of great importance. During the Suez crisis in 1956, with the help of the league, he managed to get to a meeting of parliament, get acquainted with parliamentarians, and establish contacts among politicians and businessmen.

When it was necessary to leave the hotel of the league and rent an apartment in the city, then here too they had to resort to the assistance of the league. In the Regent's Park area, an illegal immigrant managed to rent an apartment in a good but inexpensive house. It was difficult for mere mortals to settle here, it was necessary to have five recommendations: from the previous place of residence, from the place of work, from the bank and from two respected large owners. Konon Trofimovich could not have presented such recommendations at that time. However, at the request of the league, the apartment was rented to him without presenting other recommendations.

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On this occasion, Molody noted: "Thanks to the league, I had not only a warm apartment in London, but also interesting acquaintances."

According to legend, the scout arrived in England to study at the University of London. He successfully passed the exams and was enrolled as a student at the eastern faculty of the university. Here, secretly, employees of the SIS, British intelligence, who were to work in the countries of the East, were trained. The young man got acquainted with them, carried out their study.

Only five months have passed since the illegal spy left Moscow. And he managed to do a lot in this short time. For successful work, Molodoy was thanked by the chairman of the KGB, he was promoted in position and rank.

The Center recommended not limiting yourself to studying at the university as a cover, but to look at other opportunities as well.

The young came to the conclusion that it was necessary to start a commercial business without interrupting his studies at the university. This, he believed, would strengthen his position and enable him to remain in England after graduation. He went through several options and decided to purchase several jukeboxes.

In January 1957, the intelligence officer wrote to the Center: "According to the agreement, during my stay at the Center I ordered two jukeboxes, paying a relatively small deposit. The rest is payable within two years. Such machines create good opportunities here. Having spent \$5,000, you can create a business within 6-12 months that does not require additional costs, and after the end of payments, you can receive income up to \$200 per month. Such a case will allow, firstly, to justify the stay in the country and, secondly, to travel, if necessary, to other countries for 1-2 months. And further: "During the year I am thinking of expanding the network of vending machines to 10 units. After paying off the debt, the machines will bring a very solid real income, and will also allow you to maintain a car, if necessary."

Subsequently, Molodyi entered as a partner in a firm that was engaged in the operation of automatic machines on a more solid basis. It had 300 chewing gum vending machines located throughout London. This made it possible practically at any time of the day to travel around different districts of the city, to solve various reconnaissance tasks, without attracting the attention of local authorities and the environment.

Things were going well for the owners of the Coens' point of contact. They also created a reliable cover, communication with the Center was established, promising candidates appeared for subsequent use as sources.

The residency created by Molodoy began to intensify its activities. Radio communication began to operate. Two kilometers from

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The Coens' country house, where the radio apartment was equipped, housed the headquarters of the US Air Force. The radio stations of the Nordholt airfield and headquarters worked around the clock on long and short waves, so it is almost impossible to detect an outside radio transmitter in such an area, despite the fact that a direction-finding station was operating very close.

The activity of the residency was developing very successfully, and it seemed that nothing foreshadowed trouble. But events began to develop in an extremely unfavorable direction. In the summer of 1960, a member of Poland's foreign intelligence went to the West, to whom Young Houghton's source was known as a person in whom his country's intelligence showed interest. He was then working at the British Naval Attaché in Warsaw. The British found Houghton without difficulty and, for the purpose of verification, placed him under surveillance.

Through Houghton, counterintelligence came to Molodoy, and through him to the Cohens. Bunty Gee also came into view.

The work of counterintelligence was structured in such a way as to exclude as much as possible the possibility of Molodoy becoming suspicious. For these purposes, she did not seek to constantly spy on him on all routes of his movement. She recorded him at his place of residence, place of work, in other places where he regularly visited, as well as during meetings with Houghton and Gee, keeping an eye on the latter.

Counterintelligence figured out that Lonsdale was a professional intelligence officer, but it was necessary to find out who he was working for. This took several months. It was also necessary to carefully study the organization of the work of the residency and make a red-handed arrest during the transfer of materials from hand to hand. This was necessary in order to present in court irrefutable evidence of espionage activities with the presence of incriminating materials.

Counterintelligence acted without haste. She gave Molodoy the opportunity to travel to the continent and spent almost four months after her return developing it.

The arrest took place on January 8, 1961. Subsequently, Molody described the incident as follows: "At 16.29 I turned around the corner I needed and went south. There were no passers-by. The street was visible for several hundred meters ahead, and I was surprised not to see Houghton. Continuing to move south, I suddenly noticed how he crossed the street to my side and also headed south a little ahead of me ... I did not notice anything suspicious and, having caught up with Houghton and Gee, who had joined us along the way, I told them that I was in a hurry and that I would call them by a predetermined signal by mail to the usual place in such cases.

I asked Gee if I could temporarily pick up her shopping bag, which contained the materials, and she replied: "Perhaps

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hundred." Before I had time to grab my bag, I heard the sound of brakes. Looking around, I saw three small dark cars of outdated models and people jumping out of them, ten or twelve people.

What happened next was like in a third-rate movie: they all rushed at us at a run (the sidewalk was four meters wide); Four people piled on me, two grabbed my hands and dragged me into the first car. None of them said a word. The driver of the car reported on the radio: "Everything is in order. We're going home across Westminster Bridge" and turned on the increased speed. The police inspector, who later turned out to be named Smith, who was holding my right hand, tried to count my pulse. But I turned my hand in such a way as to interfere with him, and asked: "Are you a doctor?" He replied: "No. You are going to Scotland Yard. By the way, my pulse was almost normal. It's hard to explain, but I didn't feel much excitement. Panics too.

Houghton and Gee were arrested. The day before, the Coens had been arrested. A significant part of the residency ended up behind bars.

The Center learned about the arrest of Molodoy and members of his residency on January 9, 1961. The resident of the "legal" residency reported that all the morning newspapers of January 9 published a report about the arrest of Ben (the pseudonym of Molodoy), "Dachnikov" (the pseudonym of the Coens), "Shah" and "Asia".

After the arrest and delivery to Scotland Yard, Molody said, the first interrogation took place, which was conducted by Superintendent Smith. He persistently pressed for the intelligence officer to make a voluntary statement and confess to espionage activities. "We know everything," he said, "what you did here during the six months that you were in England." To which I replied that it was very good, since in this case there was no need to make a statement, and added that, in fact, I had been in England for six years. This literally shocked him, and he left without saying a word.

Given the current situation and knowledge of the laws of England, according to which the police can hold someone under arrest for no more than a day, after which the arrested person must be presented to the court and justifications for his arrest are given, Molodoy decided to take a tough stance, firmly and to the end adhere to his main legends, to confess nothing, to demand the right to protection and not to allow the special services to drag him into a provocation.

"In making such a decision," the scout later wrote, "I proceeded from the following considerations: to do everything possible to show an example of correct behavior to my assistants; force counterintelligence to reveal their cards and thereby determine the cause of the failure; to show public opinion, and especially our foreign friends who are helping us, that

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Soviet intelligence officers are worthy sons of their homeland and you can rely on them. At the same time, the noble, courageous behavior at the trial in the United States in 1957 of intelligence officer Rudolf Ivanovich Abel was of great importance to me.

According to English law, charges cannot be brought at Scotland Yard, this is done at the police station. The arrested were brought there.

"Smith formally charged us with espionage," Molody wrote. "This is where I saw the Coens for the first time since their arrest. They have just been brought in and spent the night in one of the police jails in the Ruislip area." The young man had the opportunity to exchange a few words with the Coens. He told them not to admit anything and behave like Abel (a lot was written about the trial of Abel in the newspapers).

"We were offered to sign an inventory of the property taken from us during the arrest," the intelligence officer said further. "I declined because the list included a package taken from Gee's shopping bag with a description of its contents. As it turned out at the trial, the source brought orders for the fleet, a description of several sonar instruments and electronic equipment of the Dreadnought submarine, the second part of the Navy Ships directory (the last two documents were on film) and a number of other documents. I stated that the handbag was not mine and was opened without me.

The trial began on 13 March 1961 at the Central Criminal Court located in the City. It lasted eight days and was widely covered in the English press. First, the Prosecutor General spoke, then witnesses and experts, mainly counterintelligence officers. They tried to interpret every fact in favor of the prosecution. The matter came to curiosities. At the preliminary hearing, a question arose about a map of the naval base in Portland found in Houghton's apartment. The defender of the latter asked the witness Simond, a captain of the first rank, head of the Admiralty submarine warfare department, regarding the value of this map for a potential enemy. Symond said she was so secret and important that he couldn't answer questions about her in open court.

The defender continued to insist, and it was decided to hold a closed meeting. The public has been removed. The court continued its work. The defender asked Simon to confirm once again that this card would be very valuable to a potential opponent. Simon confirmed this. Then the defender asked the court to hand over the card to him. Having looked at it, the defender returned it through the secretary of the court to Simon and asked the latter to read the inscription in the lower right corner of the card. He looked up and literally blushed. At the insistence of the defender, he

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I did read: "Her Majesty's Stationery, 4s 6d." After this incident, there were no more closed sessions.

After the witnesses and experts, Houghton and Gee testified. They confessed to doing intelligence work. Young and the Cohens declined to testify.

The seventh day of the trial began with a speech by Molodoy, about which the London Daily Mail wrote on March 22: your prepared statement.

The statement stated that none of those arrested had any criminal connection with him and that if the court, on the basis of the evidence available to him, considers the charge proven, then he alone is guilty, no matter what consequences this may entail for him.

During the investigation and trial, Young, in agreement with Morris Cohen, made great efforts to acquit Lona Cohen. He presented the situation in such a way that she was not privy to his affairs. Molody insisted all the time that if she carried out any of his instructions, then their content was not revealed to her, but everything was disguised as everyday affairs.

However, when the Americans presented evidence to the court that the Cohens were American citizens and wanted by American counterintelligence, Lona's position was seriously complicated by NILOS.

The hearings were over, and the judge announced the sentences: Young - 25 years in prison, the Coens - 20 years, Houghton and Gee - 15 years.

The Observer newspaper, referring to Molodoy's behavior at the trial, wrote: "There was something so professional in him that there was only a feeling of admiration. And if at least one person was a patriot and lived for the sake of his duty, then this is he.

Another newspaper, the News of the World, added that Gordon Lonsdale behaved calmly throughout the entire process, his eyelid did not even flinch when he was sentenced to 25 years.

The intelligence officer also behaved courageously during his stay in prison, where he was kept under conditions of a particularly strict regime. As he learned, the UK Home Office considered him a person of "exceptional risk", capable of escaping from prison. At this time, George Blake escaped from an English prison - one of the employees of the Soviet foreign intelligence, sentenced in England to 42 years in prison. Apparently, this circumstance prompted the authorities to tighten the regime for keeping Molodoy.

At first, Konon Trofimovich was in London prisons, in Manchester, then he was transferred to Birmingham, where he was kept until his release.

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"I was in a special position in prison," said Konon Trofimovich, "because, as the judges believed, I did not admit who I really am. So they were afraid that I would run away. The usual prison uniform is a jacket and trousers, very similar in cut to the English military uniform. I was given the same uniform, but with three large "patches" - on the left side of the chest, on the right knee and under the left knee. They were kept in a single special cell equipped with a special steel grate, which allegedly cannot be taken by a hacksaw. All my clothes were taken away from me at night, and the light was on in my cell all night. Wherever I went, a specially appointed jailer followed me with my form book, in which he signed when transferring me to another jailer.

The food in the prison was monotonous. The guards and the administration treated the scout normally, and after some time even with respect. The same can be said about the prisoners, among whom Konon Trofimovich had unquestioned authority because of his ability to give proper advice or write a petition. However, in relation to a scout, often

prison rules and the laws of the country were violated. He, for example, was not always given books, while others enjoyed this right.

While in an English prison, Young believed that the leadership of foreign intelligence would take measures for his early release. This made it possible to remain calm and endure severe trials.

Having met Konon Trofimovich in prison, George Blake described him as follows: "Lonsdale endured his fate with remarkable fortitude and was invariably in a good mood ... I recall one of our conversations that took place a few days before he was suddenly transferred to another prison. "Well," he said in his optimistic manner, "I don't know what's going to happen, but I'm sure of one thing. We will be in Moscow at the big parade on the day of the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution." It sounded fantastic at a time when we were just starting to serve very long sentences, but it turned out that he was right."

Work to rescue the illegal from prison was started immediately after his trial. The rescue process itself is a painstaking and complex undertaking. The main thing is to find a suitable candidate for the exchange. This is not always possible to achieve in a short time.

In this case, the opportunity presented itself in November 1962. English businessman Greville Maynard Wynn was arrested in Budapest. He repeatedly visited the USSR. Before his next trip to Moscow, one of the employees of the British secret service asked him to carry out a number of reconnaissance assignments. This

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activity was recorded by the KTB authorities. After his arrest, he was taken to Moscow and a trial took place over him.

Wynn pleaded guilty to most of the charges and was sentenced to eight years in prison.

Wynn's conviction made it possible to obtain the exchange of Young for this man. For several months, cautious steps continued on both sides to reach an agreement on the exchange.

Despite the fact that the negotiations were conducted in secret, some information about the exchange was leaked to the press. The planned activities were subjected to sharp criticism. One of the newspapers wrote: "England, unlike America, never exchanged spies with Russia. If the Wynn case had set a precedent, the Russians would have won the secret Cold War. What a victory it would be if the Lonsdale shark were exchanged for Wynn's fry!"

Such circumstances seriously complicated the matter.

Nevertheless, an agreement was reached on April 7, 1964. A little more than two weeks later, the exchange was made, and Konon Trofimovich Molody again found himself in his homeland.

"On the morning of April 21," the illegal immigrant recalled, "I was in the bathhouse and had just undressed when one of the senior guards came running after me. This in itself was unusual. He told me to get dressed quickly, because I was "needed"... At about 10 am I was taken to the office of the head of the prison, in which, in addition to himself, there were the secretary of the Minister of the Interior and some senior rank of the local police. After greeting me, the head of the prison said seriously: "Mr. Lonsdale (having heard "sir", I understood that I was going home), I want to introduce you to the Secretary of the Secretary of State for the Home Office." Then I was asked to sit down and explained that the minister's secretary had a package that he should open in my presence and read the text of the document to me... Having finished reading the document, the head of the prison showed it to me. All three of those present came up to me and shook my hand.

The exchange itself took place in Berlin on April 22 at 5.30 am at the Staaken checkpoint, located on the outer bypass of West Berlin along road No. 5. At the agreed time, the car with Winn was advanced to the border line, the British did the same. After identification (on our part, this mission was carried out by the head of the department, N.A. Korznikov), an exchange procedure took place. The young one got into our car, and Wynn got into the English one. The cars quickly picked up speed and went on their routes.

The exchange took place without incident and without outside spectators, as the road was blocked. In an emergency, several cars, both on one side and on the other, were nearby and served as a cover.

Konon Trofimovich immediately hit

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into the arms of his friends who wholeheartedly congratulated him on his return to his homeland.

With special joy, his family met him at home - his wife Galina and children Liza and Trofim. Konon Trofimovich loved them very much and missed them. The children were glad to see their father return from another business trip. He could not tell them where he was, what he did. A long separation from him further strengthened their mutual love.

It was a warm meeting with friends and co-workers. He was congratulated on his return by the chairman of the KGB of the USSR and the head of foreign intelligence.

The young man was awarded the next rank of "colonel". He was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR stated: "For the courage and steadfastness shown in the performance of special tasks, to award an employee of the State Security Committee Young Konon Trofimovich with the Order of the Red Banner." He was also awarded the "Honorary State Security Officer" badge.

Deep knowledge and rich experience of intelligence work abroad predetermined the direction of his further use in the foreign intelligence system. He was entrusted with the work of training and educating young workers. He was frequently invited by local government teams to speak with memories of his work abroad. At this time, publications appeared abroad and in our country connected with the work of the Lonsdale residency. A movie was even filmed in England. Public interest in this event was great.

But the foreign media often distorted the facts. Therefore, the speeches of Konon Trofimovich, including in the press, gave an objective picture and contributed to the correct perception by the Soviet and foreign public of both the activities of the Soviet foreign intelligence service and the facts related to the work of the Molodoy residency, the arrest of its employees.

He devoted a lot of energy to work with youth and found great satisfaction in this. In his spare time he liked to travel with his family out of town. He enjoyed nature and spent a lot of time wandering through the fields, river banks and groves near Moscow. He liked to pick mushrooms.

The last day of his life was spent in nature. On Friday, October 9, 1970, Konon Trofimovich and his wife, together with a friend who was also with his wife, went to the Medyn region. Upon arrival at the place, they pitched a tent, began to make a fire. Konon Trofimovich, tired after a long journey, sat down on a folding chair. Here, unexpectedly, he had a stroke. He lost consciousness. The nearest hospital was in Medyn, 10 kilometers from the scene of the incident. Konon Trofimovich was taken there by car, however

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failed to save him. Apparently, the nervous stress that he experienced at work abroad, and three and a half years in prison, did their job. So at the age of 48, a beautiful soul passed away

man, front-line soldier, brave intelligence officer Colonel Konon Trofimovich Molody. His death was a heavy loss for the team of foreign intelligence officers.

Characteristically, a number of British newspapers published reports on the death of the Soviet intelligence officer, known as the hero of the "Portland affair". Large portraits of Konon Trofimovich appeared in the newspapers.

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They fought to the end

An elderly couple sits on a bench in Livadia Park in Crimea. He is short, gray-haired, with a good-natured smile on his face, she is a thin woman with a pale, preoccupied face and lively eyes. They are watching with interest the children from the kindergarten, who are located next door with the teachers. A man and a woman occasionally talk to each other, but all their attention is riveted to the children, who started a noisy fun game.

The woman sighed, turned her head towards her interlocutor and spoke softly in English:

- And we could have children ... but we were left alone.

"Well, why are you sad, Lona," the man said with a smile. - These are not only children of other people's parents, these are our children with you. And the guys that we saw in children's sanatoriums in Evpatoria, who came from the North and the Far East, are also our children. We have invested our share of labor in their well-being and peaceful sky above their heads.

He bent down, picked a flower and solemnly handed it to a fair-haired beauty of four or five years old who was running nearby. She smiled shyly, hesitated, and said softly:

— Thank you, but you can't pick flowers in the park.

She smiled awkwardly once more and slowly walked towards her peers. Foreigners knew little Russian, but they understood what the girl said. Lona laughed.

— Morris, this seems to be your first fiasco on the women's front.

Morris smiled too.

"Look, what a clever, wonderful child.

This little episode brought a cheerful animation to the atmosphere of the conversation of the elderly. Around them wandered through the park, admired the sea, people who came to the Crimea to rest were sitting on the benches.

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But Morris and Lona were no ordinary vacationers. Most recently, they were serving their sentences in English maximum security prisons. Sentenced to 20 years for intelligence activities in favor of the USSR, they spent 9 years there without seeing wildlife. Morris and Leontina Coen devoted their entire lives to working in Soviet intelligence. They did a lot to ensure the security and defense capability of the Soviet state. Both were awarded the title of Heroes of Russia.

A special place in their activities was occupied by work in the USA and England on nuclear and other scientific and technical issues, political and military-strategic issues.

In the USA, Morris and with his participation acquired several sources of important information related to work on the creation of atomic weapons and other types of weapons.

Lona Cohen provided the source liaison job. She had to travel to remote cities in the United States, receive secret materials there and deliver them to their destination. Repeatedly she found herself in very difficult situations, from which she managed to get out only thanks to endurance and resourcefulness.

Morris and Lona Cohen were US citizens, before joining the intelligence service, they were active in American trade unions and democratic left organizations.

The beginning of their political activity dates back to the second half of the 1930s, when the threat of the Second World War loomed over the world.

In 1937, when the war was going on in Spain, Morris decided that his place was in the ranks of the defenders of the republic, and went there. He fought in the ranks of the Lincoln International Brigade and was the unit's political commissar. In October 1937 he was wounded in the legs and spent four months in the hospital.

After recovery, he again went to the front. In December 1938, Morris returned to the United States, where he took part in the creation of the organization of American veterans of the Lincoln Brigade, and was a member of the executive committee of this organization in New York.

Lona also took an active part in anti-fascist activities. They met as like-minded people, fell in love and got married in June 1941. Since then, we have walked together along the same path of life, which was difficult and at the same time brought a lot of joy and satisfaction. On their way were the front, and the dangerous work of reconnaissance missions, and the happy days of the Victory, and success in work, and nine years in hard labor in England, and the long-awaited release.

Morris began working in Soviet foreign intelligence during the war in Spain. While studying at the courses of military commissars of the republican army, he met teachers from the Russian

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these and on their recommendation was sent to the intelligence school in Barcelona. Morris joined active intelligence activities upon his return to the United States. Lona began intelligence work in 1942.

Morris was born in 1910 in New York to a poor family. After graduating from high school, he worked at a metallurgical plant, in a printing house, restaurants and hotels. In 1931 he entered the University of Mississippi, where he studied history, literature, economics, and commerce. In 1935 he continued his studies at the University of Illinois.

Lona was born in 1913 in the USA, her parents were from Poland. She studied at school, and from the age of 13 she began working in a factory.

The intelligence activity of Morris Cohen in the USA started productively. He managed to acquire a source of valuable intelligence materials on scientific and technical issues (sonars, a system of radio-controlled projectiles), conducted a study of other persons of interest to Soviet intelligence. After some time, he already had a whole group in touch sources.

At the end of 1941, the United States entered the war, and in the spring of 1942, Cohen was drafted into the army. In this regard, it was decided to involve his wife in the work. Lona agreed and from that time, like her husband, she devoted herself entirely to intelligence activities.

Its main task was to provide communication with a number of valuable sources. For more than a year, she maintained contact with a source who held a major post in the OSS (Department

US strategic services). There was a lot of work: frequent trips to other cities, from where Lona returned with top secret documents, then handed them over to their destination.

I remember a trip in July-August 1945 to the area of the American atomic center in Los Alamos. She was to travel to Las Vegas, New Mexico, near the nuclear power plant, stop there, and visit the neighboring town of Albuquerque on Sundays, the meeting place where the man from the nuclear power plant was to arrive.

Lona arrived safely to the place. Every Sunday she went to the meeting, but to no avail. The person she was waiting for did not appear. Apparently, it was not easy to leave the carefully guarded zone of the nuclear center. |

Taking the necessary measures of conspiracy, she continued to go regularly to the appointed place. She knew from the locals that the top-secret center was heavily guarded and that every person in the surrounding towns was under police surveillance. Time passed, but the man did not appear. Lona began to worry. Fortunately, the next Sunday the meeting took place. Lona received a thick stack of sheets of paper covered with small handwriting, which had to be delivered to New York.

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She decided to take the train back. Before boarding the train, she unexpectedly discovered that passengers at the station were being controlled by the military police. As it turned out, such periodic checks were common here. How to be? You cannot cancel your trip. This will attract attention and delay the return. Lona's belongings included a small suitcase, a shopping bag, a handbag, and a box of Kleenex paper napkins used by American women with colds. But in this box there are only napkins on top, at the bottom there is a dense layer of documents received at the meeting.

There are few passengers. The control of local residents was carried out superficially. But everyone who came here from other areas was subjected to a more thorough check. They demanded documents, clarified the purpose and duration of their stay in Las Vegas, and inspected the luggage of many.

Lona was one of the last to go with her things to her carriage. Three military policemen stood by the car.

- Documentation!

She slowly took out documents from her purse, a certificate of doctors prescribing dry desert air for her treatment (under this legend she lived in Las Vegas). The police asked her a few questions and asked her to open her suitcase for a search.

The scout in the depths of her heart felt that in a minute or two a tragic denouement might come. Head worked feverishly, but outwardly Lona remained calm.

One of the policemen, bending down, sorted through things in a suitcase. At that moment, Lona decided to fake the "loss" of the train ticket, which was supposed to divert the attention of the inspectors. She hurriedly started rummaging through her bag, then tried to open the zipper on the side pocket of her shopping bag and, in her excitement, could not do it. A box of tissues under her arm prevented her from grasping the clasp. Annoyed, she got up and asked to hold the box and her purse, thrusting them into the hands of a younger policeman, and finally opened the zipper. There was no ticket, of course. Slightly pushing aside the policeman who was inspecting things, she began to look for a ticket in her suitcase, but he was nowhere to be found. Her face showed anxiety and confusion. The policemen clearly sympathized with this pretty young woman and were in a hurry to search things, since there was a little more than a minute before the train left. Having finished examining the suitcase, the policeman asked to open the shopping bag and immediately stumbled upon a detective novel, from which, like a bookmark, a train ticket stuck out. With a smile, he handed it to Lona, and she began to warmly thank

him for his help and berate yourself for forgetfulness. There was no more time. The policemen helped her to climb onto the platform of the car, quickly handed her things, a box of napkins, and with a smile

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invited her to visit Las Vegas again. Continuing to express gratitude, Lona hurried to enter the car. In the compartment, from the excitement experienced, she began to tremble. But still, when the train started moving, she had the strength to wave affably to the policemen who were standing at the car.

If only they knew what exactly one of them was holding in his hands while her things were being searched!

All the years of the war, Morris Cohen served in the American army. First there was a military school, then service in Alaska. The unit where he served was engaged in the preparation and provision of Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet Union of certain types of military equipment. In April 1944 he was relocated to England. A few weeks later - landing in Normandy, fighting in France, Belgium. Bloody battles in the Ardennes and the disorderly retreat of the allied forces under the blows of the German armies that went on the offensive. The end of the war found Morris in Germany, in Weimar, with the rank of corporal.

In November 1945, he was demobilized and returned to New York. Meeting with comrades, and immediately resuming intelligence work. On the recommendation of the Center, Morris enrolled at Columbia University, graduating from which he began teaching at a high school. At the same time, he restored contact with some members of his group, with whom contact had been lost. A new stage of its activity began: regular developments, acquisition of sources, obtaining political, scientific, technical and military information. Lona has her own area of work. She still provided a link to important sources in other US cities.

In December 1946, in connection with the revitalization of the FBI, it was decided to suspend the work of the Cohen group. But already in July 1947 it resumed again. The possibilities of the group were expanded due to the involvement of two atomic scientists who worked at closed facilities.

In order to increase security in 1949, Morris and Lona Cohen were transferred from "legal" to illegal residency. The direct supervision of their work was entrusted to the illegal intelligence officer Abel (Fisher).

Morris and Lona were pleased that their leader was an experienced, thoughtful and exceptionally charming comrade. He devoted a lot of time to teaching the intelligence officers new methods of work.

A little over a year they managed to work with Abel. In the summer of 1950, the Cohens' security was again threatened, and this time they had to leave the United States.

They had to fly from Switzerland to Czechoslovakia. But the circumstances prevented this, and they decided

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go by train. It was their mistake, which almost led to irreparable consequences.

On the way from Zurich to Prague, their train passed through the territory of Germany. No visas were required for travelers with American passports to Germany. But in order to leave the territory of West Germany for Czechoslovakia, the Americans had to have a special exit visa. They did not know this, and were detained on the border with Czechoslovakia by the border guards of the FRG. Neither links to urgent business in Prague, nor all kinds of letters of recommendation and business letters from American companies helped.

I had to leave the train at 3 am and go to the guardhouse of the German border guard. There was nothing left to do but play the role of arrogant, wealthy Americans. Lona was especially good at this role. She demanded to be immediately sent to her hotel, to connect by telephone with her friend, an American general in Munich, and so on. The border guards, referring to the instructions, tried to explain that on Monday (it was early Sunday morning) they would be able to get a visa to leave for Czechoslovakia at the nearest American consulate, and then there would be no problems. But it was precisely the appearance with fictitious documents at the American consulate that was the most dangerous for the Coens, since the documents did not stand up to scrutiny. These passports were issued to them by intelligence only for a trip to the USSR. According to their documents, it was generally impossible to travel, since the Cohens could be wanted and they would have been detained at the very first checkpoint. The scouts continued to insist on passing through the border. It ended up that the head of the border post called the border checkpoint of the Americans. An American sergeant appeared. At first glance, it was clear that between him and the head of the German border guard there was an open enmity. Lona described in the most colorful terms the "arbitrariness" of the German border guards who removed them from the train. The sergeant skimmed through their passports and references, cursed the German border guards, and took the couple back to his office. There he gave them coffee to drink, and then took them to a local hotel, promising to arrange everything. Around 10 am, he reappeared, said that he had difficulty getting through to his superiors and settled everything.

Apparently, the sergeant really tried. From his experience in the American army, Morris was well aware of the officers' Saturday sprees, he knew how much the army authorities disliked when they were disturbed by their subordinates on Sunday mornings. The calculation was that they would not deal with a hangover and would give everything to the discretion of the senior on duty.

The sergeant made marks in the passports and wished them a safe journey. The scouts boarded the next train and a few hours later were in Prague. From there they arrived by plane to Moscow.

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After discussing the report and their proposals for organizing work with the sources that remained in the US, they were given the opportunity to rest and receive medical treatment.

Until 1953, their work was associated with short-term trips abroad to perform one-time reconnaissance missions. Then it was decided to send Morris and Lona for a long-term work in England, where they were to act as part of the illegal residency of Konon Trofimovich Molodoy, who later became known as Lonsdale.

They underwent appropriate training and in December 1954 left for their place of work. They had passports in the names of Peter John Kroger and Helen Joyce Kroger, he acted as a businessman, she was a housewife.

Morris needed to master the profession of a second-hand bookseller and open his own business, that is, to create a reliable cover. The main task is to ensure communication between the illegal residency of Molodoy and the Center. The task is not an easy one, since the amount of information coming from the residency to the Center was considerable.

At first it was especially difficult. But gradually things got better. They managed to successfully rent a country house near London and equip a radio apartment. Slower than we would like, developed commercial success. But here, too, progress has been made: regular customers have appeared, and it has been possible to fit into the environment of booksellers. The business gradually improved, contacts were established with partners in France, Belgium, Holland and other countries, which made it possible to travel there on business. These trips were used to transfer the materials received from Molodoy to their destination.

More than six years have passed in intense fruitful work. During this time, Morris and Lona transferred to the Center a huge amount of classified material received from their

leader. The point of contact worked impeccably. The center and the resident were satisfied with the work of the scouts.

But in January 1961 there was a failure. As a result of the betrayal of a Polish security officer, the British counterintelligence managed to find one of the sources of Molodoy's residency, and then some of its other members.

On January 7, the Coens were arrested. The resident himself was also arrested. During the search, radio equipment, cryptographic devices and other operational equipment were confiscated from the Coens. But counterintelligence did not have direct evidence that they used it.

At the trial, Molodoy made a statement that he, taking advantage of the friendship and hospitality of the Krogers, kept his equipment in their house without their knowledge.

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But during the trial, the prosecution presented evidence that the Krogers were in fact American citizens who had long been wanted by the FBI on suspicion of "espionage." This sealed the verdict.

By the way, all the arrested members of Molodoy's residency were not accused of espionage. To do this, it is necessary, according to English law, to provide evidence of the transfer of secret information by members of the group to a foreign power. But there was no such evidence. Therefore, members of the residency were tried under the article on "conspiracy to commit acts of espionage," that is, they were accused of attempted espionage. And the most surprising thing is that they were sentenced to a punishment greater than, according to English law, is required for espionage. The chief of residency, Molodoy, was sentenced to 25 years in prison, and Morris and Lon Coen were sentenced to 20 years. everyone.

During the arrest, investigation and trial, as well as while serving a prison sentence, the Cohens behaved courageously, steadfastly and did not reveal any secrets of Soviet intelligence, refusing to testify at all. During the trial, the American intelligence services tried to prove their American origin, as well as the involvement in the cases of some persons convicted in the USA for "espionage". However, there was not enough evidence, and the court refused to extradite the defendants to the Americans, where they were threatened with an electric chair.

Difficult years of imprisonment began. The persons convicted in this case were kept in different prisons. The prison administration was particularly partial to them. Undisguised discrimination deprived them of even the limited opportunities that other prisoners enjoyed. And to top it all off, there were incessant "visits" by representatives of the secret services, who, either by "seductive" offers, or by threats and pressure, tried to force the Cohens to break their silence.

When the Cohens were allowed to correspond, they actively used this opportunity to maintain contact with each other. In the letters, first of all, they were interested in the state of health, mood, prison situation, tried with all their might to morally support each other. During their nine years in prison, they exchanged hundreds of letters, of which more than three hundred have survived. They amaze with the expression of feelings of warmth and love, firmness of spirit and faith in the triumph of justice.

Received permission to use the mail and Conon the Young. A lively correspondence began between him and the Coens. There is not a single reproach or resentment in the letters, they are all filled with a sense of gratitude, care, and they invariably contain words of spiritual support for each other.

In one of her letters, Lona Cohen wrote to Conon the Young: "All my life I have fought against injustice, my dear, and

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beat those who did the same. One day I will tell you about a suffragette from England who went through hell when she was young so that women could have more freedom. I will never forget her - her spirit lives in my heart. She taught me and several other girls about socialism when we were teenagers. During our process at the Old Bailey, her spirit lived in me... I often wonder if my students will remember me the way I remember her...

Peter and I love you very much, but what a pity we didn't know more about you before the lawsuit. Have your friends been as loyal to you as ours have been to us? Peter and I will always be your friends. You can always be sure of our friendship while we are alive.

In a reply letter, Konon writes to Lone: "Darling, in your letter you say that Peter and you will always be my friends. I never had any doubts about this. I hope you both also know... I traveled light all my life and collected nothing, achieved even less, but at least I had a few friends whom I would trust with my life?

In the letters, the thought ran like a red thread: by all means hold on, do not give up to the end. This can be seen from another letter from Lona to Konon: "When I saw you and Peter standing at the entrance with the guard," she wrote, "I wanted to rush to you and hug you tightly, but the guard held me back ... It's a pity that we there was no time to talk about the past. Wait, someday I'll tell you about our adventure just before we get to England. My God, how I was mistaken in my ideas about this country. I sincerely believed that the judges here do not show their class hatred so clearly...

Gordon, it dawned on me why they keep you in isolation for so long. Brainwashing is what it is. They want to break your resistance. Or maybe they are afraid that you will convert all the prisoners to your way of thinking."

Morris and Lona were kept in English prisons under extremely difficult conditions. In 1967 they were transferred to maximum security prisons, where the most dangerous criminals in Great Britain served their sentences. Thus, Morris was held together with the participants of the well-known mail car robbery in England at that time (the so-called robbery of the century), murderers and other dangerous criminals.

Establishing the possibility of their release from prison began immediately after the trial. The materials of the trial and all newspaper reports about their arrest and trial were carefully studied. Again and again their case was examined in order to find a lead that would overcome the main obstacle - the British authorities' assertion that the Coens were American citizens.

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The result was a tactic that made it possible to start correspondence with Morris and Lona on behalf of a distant relative living in Poland, to challenge the claim of their American citizenship before the British authorities and to insist on their Polish citizenship. (There were reasons for this. Lona is Polish, while Morris's mother was Polish.)

The most difficult task is how to inform the Coens of this legend so that they, on their part, act accordingly. But this problem was also solved.

The Coens were pleased with the legend. It made it possible to start actions to rescue from conclusions.

In 1965, an Englishman, Gerald Brooke, was arrested in the Soviet Union and sentenced to five years in prison for anti-Soviet activities.

Attempts were made to start negotiations with the British to exchange Brooke for the Coens. But the British did not agree to negotiate such an exchange.

It must be admitted that our positions on this issue were extremely weak. Trading two Coens for one Brook, even without considering who the Cohens were and who Brook was, seemed unequal. In addition, it was known that the position of the British was under strong pressure from the US intelligence services, which until the very last moment did not give up hope of getting the Coens into their own hands.

For four years there were fruitless attempts to induce the British to exchange Brook for the Coens. Brook himself helped the cause. While in the camp, he behaved so frivolously and irresponsibly that there were grounds for bringing new charges against him. At this point, the British became seriously worried and after some hesitation went into negotiations. As a result, an agreement was reached under which the Soviet side released Brook and two more British criminals who were serving sentences in the USSR for drug smuggling, and the British released the Cohens.

Morris had an exceptional ability to win over people. Even in the conditions of imprisonment, being among the inveterate scoundrels, he invariably enjoyed universal respect. To protect Morris from the rudeness and bullying of the guards, the prisoners established a kind of guardianship over him. This greatly facilitated the position of the scout.

In what a serious condition Morris was, can be seen from Lona's letter to Molodoy: "Peter is ill, he is in the prison hospital. He was put there after he wrote a letter to my cousin and described his condition. After the flu, Peter has severe furunculosis, his whole body is in boils. The poor thing is suffering so much, even her voice is very weak. What to do, Arnie? Petitions are useless, trust me. There is no news regarding his operation... For the first time in three years, Peter

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smiled when he met me. So you can understand, my dear, what condition he is in?

Once, when the prisoners of the strictest regime wing of the prison decided to launch a campaign of defiance in response to deteriorating nutrition (the prisoners refused to leave their cells and went on a hunger strike), they forbade Morris to join them and "officially" notified the prison administration that Peter Kroger will not participate in the upcoming riots. This was done in order to prevent the administration from subjecting Koen to another torture.

The following fact is also characteristic: when the prisoners of the strict regime wing of Parkhurst prison, where Morris was kept, learned about his impending release, they turned to the prison administration with an unprecedented request: to allow them to arrange a farewell dinner for Peter Kroger. Permission was given, and all 16 prisoners of the wing spent a month saving on their meager prison rations in order to collect some food.

On the day of the farewell dinner - it was one of the Sundays - the prisoners themselves set the tables, laid out on them what they managed to cook from the saved products, and solemnly led Morris into the dining room. He was seated at the head of the table, on a chair over which was hung a homemade red flag with a hammer and sickle. The "ceremonial part" began - speeches, toasts. After the solemn part, amateur performances began.

For a whole week after the party, the whole prison enthusiastically discussed this event. Even the London papers published lengthy accounts of the "grand dinner".

It was more difficult in the Lone prison. She was kept in the wing of the strictest regime, in one of the women's prisons in England, where the most degraded, the most dangerous criminals, murderers, prostitutes, lesbians, drug addicts served their sentences. These were women who had lost their human appearance, who, apart from their base interests and motives, did not recognize anything in the world. Many of them were mentally deranged. Constant fights took place between the prisoners, they were supplemented by rudeness and mockery.

overseers. The prisoners worked in workshops, where the work was hard and exhausting. All this contributed to a gloomy mood.

By placing Lona in such conditions, the British authorities set out to break her mentally and physically. They hoped that she, as a woman, would turn out to be weaker, would not withstand bullying, and, in the end, would give the evidence the authorities needed.

The last year, Lona was already barely holding on. She had a general exhaustion of the nervous system, which progressed. But she still resolutely refused any sedatives.

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drugs, strongly imposed by doctors, fearing that these drugs may contain drugs and weaken her will. She suffered from constant headaches and, to top it all, because of a liver disease, she was forced to sit on a half-starved diet.

Morris made desperate attempts to somehow support Lona. Here is one of his letters: "I have to tell you that you must pull yourself together. A nervous breakdown will not solve anything and will only bring pain and grief to you and me. I am not trying to diminish or misrepresent the conditions under which you are forced to live. I am aware of all the influencing factors: physical, psychological, emotional, and I do my best to alleviate the situation, bring a little lightness and joy to it. Every day, every hour, I feel your burden. And I would feel heavy remorse if I didn't turn to you now with an appeal to collect all your internal reserves in order to avoid any breakdown ...

In a previous letter you wrote to me, "All we can do is bite the bullet and keep going. I know it's hard, but we don't have a choice. We must protect our health and not give in to despair. When my brain is feverishly on fire and my mind is bewildered and confused ... I force myself to think of other unfortunates who also experience similar torments, and these thoughts give me the strength to face my own trial.

These words of strong spirit and character aroused my deep admiration.

Attempts to break her resistance continued until the last day, even after her impending release was officially announced. Apparently, the British secret services hoped that their efforts would bear fruit at the last moment and that Lona would violate the nine-year silence.

Early in the morning on October 24, 1969, Morris was put into a prison van and escorted by police cars and motorcyclists to the airport. From the side, the procession resembled the departure of the head of a foreign state. Cars of journalists followed the procession.

A similar procession was moving from the other side of the city. Lona was in the prison car. The two columns met on one of the bridges across the Thames, formed up into an even more imposing form, and rushed at a faster speed along the highways leading towards London International Airport.

Here the cortege was waiting for reporters and correspondents. But the police escort on the move slipped past them, went around the airport building and stopped at one of the service entrances. A security group in civilian clothes was waiting for them. Together with the passengers of the mysterious vehicles, they quickly disappeared into the terminal building.

Meanwhile, representatives of the press began to gather at the plane of the British airline BEA, which was preparing for departure. Many

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arrived here in advance and had already managed to place their film and television equipment in the most advantageous places. The crowds of reporters kept coming. A small group was waiting right at the gangway. They were going to fly on the same flight.

Finally boarding was announced. A stampede began among the journalists. It seemed that reporters from all over London were gathered here.

An elderly couple, Morris and Lona Cohen, came out of the terminal door, accompanied by security. Correspondents tried to get an interview. The Cohens, accompanied by officials, boarded the plane. The ladder was removed, the plane taxied to the runway and in a few minutes was in the air.

The departure procedure was watched by millions of television viewers in England. Lengthy descriptions of the flight were provided by correspondents who were on board the aircraft.

But strangely, in many reports there was a sense of confusion. Critical remarks have appeared.

"A foreigner who arrived in England on Friday ... would involuntarily think that the Krogers were national heroes and not spies who had harmed the interests and security of England," wrote the London Times.

"The dispatch of the Krogers had to be organized differently, and not in such a way that it resembled the dispatch of the royal couple," the Daily Telegraph lamented.

Many newspapers admitted that the buzz around the early release of the Krogers from prison, the British press created an excellent advertisement for the fact that Soviet intelligence does not leave loyal workers in trouble.

After their arrival in Moscow, Morris and Lona Coens were first of all treated, and then, after a rest, they met with friends. They were visited by Abel and Molody, with whom they worked abroad, comrades from the central intelligence apparatus, as well as other Moscow friends. After arriving in Moscow, they were visited by the chairman of the KGB Yu.V. Andropov and head of foreign intelligence.

Soon the Cohens were accepted into Soviet citizenship, for the results achieved in their work and courage they were awarded state awards - the Order of the Red Banner. They got a nice apartment in the center of Moscow. Given the age and state of health, the scouts wished to go on vacation. They were given personal pensions. However, they did not stop working in intelligence. But now it was a different field of activity: meetings, conversations, speeches to young intelligence officers, sharing the experience that they had accumulated over decades of their intelligence work abroad. They happily met with young people and invariably repeated that they had not lived their lives in vain and, despite the difficult

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the trials that fell to their lot consider themselves happy people, because they faithfully served the Motherland and the cause of peace on earth.

And these were not empty words. The Cohens always had warm feelings for the Soviet Union, and after Spain, when Morris came into close contact with the Soviet people, participating together in battles against the Nazis and where he made the final choice on which side to be on, the Soviet state became his native state. . The same thing happened to Lona after she replaced Morris, who was drafted into the American army in 1942. Throughout almost the entire Second World War, she, side by side with Soviet intelligence officers, carried out the dangerous work of obtaining and transporting intelligence information and, like Morris, of her own free will determined her fate and her attitude towards the Soviet Union.

As for their contribution to the preservation of peace, they have demonstrated this more than once. Take, for example, their work on nuclear issues in the United States. It is not known what would happen in the world if the US nuclear monopoly had not been abolished. Many now admit that the world did not slide into a third world war only because the USSR acquired nuclear weapons in a timely manner. And the Coens have made a significant contribution to this.

Leontine Cohen died in December 1992, Morris died in June 1995. They are buried at the Novokuntsevo cemetery in Moscow. Their death was a huge loss for the foreign intelligence team and for those who personally knew these remarkable people. The Scouts cherish the memory of Morris and Leontine Cohen. In the Cabinet of the History of Foreign Intelligence in Yasenevo, their photographs were placed on a stand next to other prominent intelligence officers. On their graves

lay fresh flowers.

Intelligence officers who worked with Morris and Lona in Moscow testify that the Coens did not change their views and attitudes towards their new homeland until the very last days, continuing to remain its patriots and staunch internationalists.

'
At that time, that was the name of American intelligence.

2 From a letter from Helen Kroger to Gordon Lonsdale dated 11/09/1961, Her Majesty's Prison Winson Green Road, Birmingham 18.

3 From a letter from Gordon Lonsdale to Helen Kroger dated 11/18/1961, Her Majesty's Prison, Manchester.

4 From a letter from Helen Kroger to Gordon Lonsdale dated 19.08.1961, Her Majesty's Prison, 18 Winson Green Road, Birmingham.

5 From a letter from Helen Kroger to Gordon Lonsdale, 24/01/1964, Her Majesty's Prison, Steal, Wilmslow, Cheshire.

6 From a letter from Peter Kroger to Helen Kroger dated 10/16/1967, Her Majesty's Prison, Parkhurst, Newport, Isle of Wight.

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Morris Cohen - Hero of Russia (from the memoirs of an intelligence veteran)

..For me, Morris is a close, dear person. Friendship with him began more than half a century ago. Common interests, mutual understanding and trust - all this contributed to the strengthening of our relations, the strength and inviolability of which have been tested over the years. We first met in 1947 in New York, where I was sent on a business trip. There was a lot of work ahead of me, and I began it by restoring the connection, interrupted for more than a year, with the valuable agent group headed by Morris. Morris' closest associate was his wife Lona. Morris and Lona were inseparable as loving spouses, as friends, and as comrades-in-arms in intelligence work. Almost always, when we talk about Morris, we actually mean both of them.

So, the connection was restored, work was resumed in different directions. Valuable sources of important information have come into being, including on the atomic problem. In this Morris was very tangibly helped by Lona.

In his work, Morris was distinguished by the highest reliability. In addition to brilliant analytical skills, he had a calm character and enviable endurance. I never saw him angry or irritated. He could remove any tension with his kind smile and convincing arguments.

For me, Morris was both like an older brother and a good adviser. I constantly felt both understanding and support from him in a new, unusual environment for me at first. IN

At the same time, Morris listened carefully to my advice and recommendations, realizing that they were dictated by business considerations and concern for his safety.

In the meantime, the situation in the United States was becoming increasingly unfavorable for our work. Especially after the rise of the wave of McCarthyism, the closure of our consulate general in New York in 1948 and

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deterioration of relations between the US and the USSR. All this forced the New York residency to significantly increase the level of communications security and tighten the requirements for their observance. The Center decided to prepare for the transfer of Morris and Lona to an illegal immigrant. Thus, at the end of 1949, they became connected with the famous Rudolf Ivanovich Abel (Fischer), with whom, by the way, at that time I maintained a personal, and more impersonal connection and whom I knew from the best side. As a result, opportunities to work in safer conditions have been created.

However, it was too early to calm down. Approximately six months later, after the arrests of several Soviet agents, there was a real threat to the safety of Morris and Lona. Therefore, the Center ordered them to be evacuated immediately. I was assigned to carry out this operation. Abel could no longer meet with them, and therefore, on a sunny July day in 1950, after a thorough check, I unexpectedly, without warning, "broke into" the house of our friends. The hosts, of course, were surprised by my visit. However, they realized that my appearance could only be due to an important reason.

We soon got down to business. The "conversation" between Morris and me was kept on paper for safety reasons, and Lona burned the written sheets in the bathroom. Morris took our decision rather calmly. But although he certainly understood the seriousness of the situation, he suggested that I think about the possibility of implementing an alternative option:

"It's a shame to stop working at such a time. And it's not in my rules to run away from difficulties. Maybe you can find another way out of the situation?"

"I'm afraid we don't have time for such a search," I replied.

"Well, if Lona and I go underground, change documents and place of residence," Morris continued, "then we will be in combat formation again!"

~ This proposal deserves attention and respect, but we do not have the opportunity to discuss it.

— Well, should I consider the management's decision as an order? my interlocutor asked.

- Most likely, it is.

"Then what is there to talk about?" We are under orders," Morris concluded.

After that, we agreed on the conditions of communication in the city, on the implementation of specific preparatory measures. For quite understandable reasons, we could not drag out the conversation, and on this we parted.

This was my first and only visit to Morris' apartment. I remember the simple, no-frills atmosphere, the modesty of life.

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And then - everything rushed by, like in a movie. More than two weeks – careful working out of each step of the upcoming operation, overcoming the difficulties caused by the complication of the operational

environment. Nevertheless, everything ended well, and at the end of the month I received a signal that our friends were leaving Yu Ye in the evening.

Several weeks passed when the New York station received a joyful message from the Center that Morris and Lona had arrived safely in Moscow. All this time we have been dominated by expectations. And how many anxious moments, unrest and concern for their safety, for the success of the operation to rescue them, I had to endure! Looking ahead, I recall that on July 2, 1985, on a photograph presented to me, in which he was captured on the day of his 75th birthday, Morris made the following inscription:

"Dear Yuri,

In memory of the deep emotion with which you followed us in your thoughts until we, having traveled almost half the world, safely reached Red Square 35 years ago.

With thanks. Morris and Lona July 2, 1985"

And below is a short postscript of Lona:

"I wholeheartedly agree with everything that Morris wrote.

Lona"

It is also difficult for me to forget that day at the end of July 1950, when I learned about the happy completion of this difficult and honorable operation for me.

Thus ended the unforgettable years of the beginning and flourishing of our friendship, years filled with great events, interesting and important deeds, successes, unfortunate failures and difficult trials.

Years, years - a ball of events. Golden and black THREADS AND colorless threads are intricately intertwined in it... This is life.

well well

Then, two years later, my business trip to the USA came to an end, and in the fall of 1952 my family and I returned to Moscow. I really wanted to meet Morris and Lona, but this desire was realized only a year later, since my friends were on special training, preparing to perform important tasks in the line of illegal intelligence.

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The meeting turned out to be rather short, as if on the move, in the car, but left very pleasant memories. Feelings of brotherhood, camaraderie and loyalty were felt. At that time, I did not yet know about their plans for the future. And now I think that this meeting for Morris also meant receiving a friendly parting word before he sets off on a new military campaign. Our firm handshakes were meaningful. We understood each other without words.

We haven't seen each other for 15 years. For Morris and Lona, it was six years of hard work under Ben (Young) in England, and then nine years in prison. Later we learned what they had to endure.

It was a difficult time for the Center, which did everything possible to alleviate the fate of Morris and Lona, to achieve their release. Ben was especially worried. I met with him several times after his return to Moscow, and he always said that the concern for the rescue of Morris and Lona was the purpose of his life.

About them - about all three - many books and newspaper articles have been written. Many details are known. And about perseverance, endurance, fidelity to one's ideals, about honesty and decency of Morris, about the hard trials that Lona, a truly courageous woman, had to endure, and about many other things.

Finally, there is good news: on October 24, 1969, Morris and Lona Coen were released from British prisons in exchange for Brooke, an English intelligence officer arrested and convicted in the USSR. The next day, October 25, they were already in Moscow.

It took time to recover and settle in the three-room apartment prepared for them by the Service. For Morris and Lona - modest people, not accustomed to excesses - this was a gift that brought them great joy.

Having barely settled into their home, Morris and Lona in November 1969 hosted a small reception - a dinner for a small circle of Soviet intelligence comrades with whom fate had connected them. Among the invitees were those who worked diligently for the release of the Cohens, and those who at various times kept in touch and worked with them abroad. The dinner passed in memories, accompanied by jokes and toasts. The mood was joyful and upbeat.

Two years earlier, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of October, I wrote and dedicated a poem to Lona and Morris:

I would like to break into their cell-cells,
To those who walked with us on a long road,
To those who considered work in
Soviet intelligence to be their revolutionary

LONG.

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I want to

shake your hands firmly. Vivacity to you!

And strength - in abundance! And with this friend's handshake
To let you know That YOU are not forgotten.

I had no intention of reciting poetry, especially my own. But a friend of the Cohens, the now well-known intelligence officer A. Yatskov, had a different opinion. He, having chosen the right moment, asked for the floor, and after a short introduction he read the verses in full. He arranged ahead of time for simultaneous translation with Ben, which he did brilliantly. Yatskov's performance made a big impression, at least on Morris.

It was a real holiday. Immediately, at the suggestion of Morris, October 25 was proclaimed "liberation day." Every year since then, on this day, friends have gathered in the house of Morris and Lona, recalled the past, heatedly discussed the events that took place and thought about the future. Alas, in recent years, the spouses were overcome by illnesses and meetings on the "day of liberation" were not regular.

After their release, Lona and Morris traveled extensively throughout our country. First of all, this was dictated by the desire of the intelligence leadership to do everything possible to restore and strengthen their shaky health. And this means - rest and treatment in different sanatoriums. On the other hand, it met their desire to get to know each other better, to see more and learn about the country for which they had done so much. The Coens spoke about these trips in detail. Rested, cheerful, they willingly shared their impressions about interesting meetings, about what they saw with their own eyes. They noted both the good and the bad (the latter Morris called "temporary difficulties") - honestly, sincerely, benevolently. They quickly got used to the new reality. Russia became their country, and in conversations on political, cultural and everyday topics, they always said: "in our country", "our artists", "came to us", etc.

During the first months we saw each other irregularly: Morris studied the Russian language persistently, both followed international events and carried out the assignments of the Service. Lona, who spoke Polish, quickly mastered Russian, helped Morris, and gradually, with noticeable progress, he began to speak quite confidently with friends and colleagues in Russian. He preferred to speak Russian more often, sometimes, however, mixed with English.

Morris was a sociable person who highly valued friendship. He was interested in the families of friends, knew everyone by name - and children, and even

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grandchildren. I met some of them at home. At the same time, Morris and Lona were welcome guests of their friends. Morris, it seems to me, not only valued friendship, but also needed friends. He needed active interlocutors in Moscow to express his thoughts, to test his understanding of the events taking place in the Soviet Union and in the world. To this we can also add an interest in the opinion of comrades, in new information, in discussions.

An important quality of our friend was inexhaustible optimism, a firm hope that our country would overcome difficulties and become powerful and prosperous. At the same time, he diligently convinced his interlocutor, cited examples from the history of England, France and other countries that experienced upheavals in their time. His words contained not just hope, but unshakable conviction and firm faith in a future prosperous Russia.

For us and for future generations, Morris will always remain an example of a combination of such important qualities for a scout as loyalty, friendship and brotherhood, fearlessness, a clear conscience and honor. The memory of Morris as an outstanding intelligence officer, a kind and wonderful friend will always be with us.

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Solution (A Jorge Blake)

A scout is not a profession, but a way of life, and not everyone can handle it.

J. Blake

Standing, with long friendly applause, the audience met a man of medium height with a surprisingly lively expressive face. A small beard gave him a special charm. Who does he look like? To the polar explorer? Climber? Priest?

The chairman introduced this man. "Today we have a guest," he said, "a prominent Soviet intelligence officer, George Blake." This exciting moment occurred during a meeting between John Blake and his fellow foreign intelligence officers in Moscow.

Much preceded this meeting. Childhood, family, studies, Blake's participation in the Dutch Resistance during the Second World War, service in the Royal Navy of England, and then in the holy of holies of the English secret services - the Secret Intelligence Service. This was followed by the Korean War and captivity, painful moral searches, the decision to cooperate with Soviet intelligence. Then - arrest as a result of betrayal, trial, prison and escape, an escape from the strictest London prison "Wormwood Scrubs", which shook with audacity and became an international sensation. Such is the kaleidoscopic change of events in the life of this unusual person.

On October 22, 1966, the BBC reported: "Dramatic events took place in London this evening. George Blake, a doppelgänger who was serving time for spying for the Russians, has escaped from Wormwood Scrubs Prison. Blake's case was heard by the Supreme Criminal Court in 1961. He was sentenced to 42 years, the longest prison term in the history of British jurisprudence. He was found guilty of passing information to the Russians while he was a member of British intelligence in Berlin. How

According to a spokesman for the Home Office, Blake was not in his cell during the evening inspection at seven o'clock, when prisoners are locked up for the night. The territory of the prison

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searched, but no trace of Blake was found. The political department of Scotland Yard led a large-scale raid: all airports, maritime stations, as well as embassies of the Eastern bloc countries were taken under close surveillance. News of the daring escape keeps coming. We will keep you updated on developments."

That October Saturday evening in London was overcast and rainy. There were few passers-by on the street where the Wormwood Scrubs prison was located, and only at the opposite hospital there was some activity. Visitors, as a rule, with small bouquets of flowers in their hands, left their cars and hurried to the entrance to the building. None of them paid attention to the car parked near the walls of the prison and the man standing near it with a bouquet of chrysanthemums.

It took a moment for the rope ladder to be thrown over the wall and the person who used it quickly descended to the ground. The car instantly disappeared into the darkness of the London evening, carrying away the escaped man and his assistant.

And only an hour later, an alarm sounded in all five buildings of the prison. In the special building "D", where prisoners who received long terms were kept, the guards missed one of THEM.

The next morning, without exception, all the English newspapers placed Blake's photographs on the front pages. Correspondents of newspapers, radio and television, as it were, entered into a competition, expressing the most incredible versions of the escape.

Meanwhile, J. Blake, together with Sean Burke, the man who helped carry out the escape, were holed up in a pre-selected London apartment, literally a block from the Wormwood Scrubs prison.

But let's not get ahead of ourselves and try to put everything in order.

George Blake was born in 1922 in the Dutch city of Rotterdam in the family of an English citizen. His father is from Constantinople. Grandfather was a rich merchant who sold carpets and had a large family. His numerous sons and daughters settled in different countries of Europe and the Middle East after the First World War. George's father studied at the Sorbonne, but the World War broke out and he joined the Foreign Legion, and later went to serve in the British army in the Middle East. For military merit he received British citizenship. The last place of his service was Rotterdam, where he participated in sending home English prisoners of war released from German camps at the end of the First World War.

Blake's mother came from an intelligent Dutch family that gave the country doctors, clergymen, officials and archivists.

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tectors. She played, perhaps, the main role in the upbringing and development of Blake as a person, and he, in turn, paid her great love. Here is what Blake writes in his book *No Other Choice*: "My mother and I always got along very well, we had a lot in common: the same attitude to life, almost the same tastes ... From her I got a balanced character, and we never quarreled!

In the late 1960s, Blake's mother left England and returned to Holland, where she regained Dutch citizenship. Blake maintained a cordial relationship with his mother until her last days.

life. Already after Blake's escape, they met annually in Moscow or on the territory of the countries of the former socialist community. For obvious reasons, Blake could not do this either in England or even in Holland. Blake's mother died in 1994 in Holland at the age of 98.

J. Blake received a good education. However, after the death of his father, the family began to experience financial difficulties. At the family council, it was decided to send Blake to Cairo, where his aunt, his father's sister, lived. My aunt was married to a rich banker.

In Cairo, Blake graduated first from a French school and then from an English college. So he lived for three years, spending the winter in the capital of Egypt, and the summer either in Alexandria, where his aunt had a dacha, or with his mother and sisters in Holland.

In 1939 World War II broke out. Blake stayed in Holland. In May 1940, the Germans occupied the country. Blake's mother and sisters managed to get to England, while Blake stayed with his grandmother and aunt in Rotterdam, and soon joined the Dutch resistance movement. From this moment begins the "secret" life of George Blake.

He acted as a messenger, transported secret messages and anti-fascist literature, exposing himself to the danger of being arrested by the occupiers. Blake's desire to participate more actively in the fight against the Nazis led to the decision to move to England. With the help of friends through Belgium, France and Spain, where he was detained by the Spanish police and spent several months in an internment camp for foreigners, Blake eventually ended up in Gibraltar and went to England.

J. Blake served in the English Navy, having graduated from officer school. In the last year of the war, he was assigned to British intelligence - Secret Intelligence Service, where he worked in the Dutch department and participated in the organization of intelligence activities in German-occupied Europe. As part of the cooperation between British and Dutch intelligence services, Blake was directly involved in the preparation and deployment of agents to the territory of Holland.

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After the end of hostilities in Europe, Blake went to Holland, where he worked as an employee of the new SIS station in The Hague, and after some time he was transferred to Germany, to Hamburg.

By this time, a new SIS structure had been developed in the highest echelons of British intelligence. It became clear that the main object of attention was the Soviet Union, the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. The Cold War years have arrived.

In 1947, Blake received an offer to work in the SIS already on a permanent basis, as a personnel officer. He agreed, putting aside thoughts of going to a theological college and pursuing a career as a priest. As a career British intelligence officer, he was later sent to study at the Russian language courses at Cambridge University.

Classes in Russian, reading Russian classics, communication with Russian people of the Slavic faculty of Cambridge changed Blake's attitude towards Russia and its people. Here is what Blake wrote about this in his book "No Other Choice": "Remembering the days spent in Cambridge, I now understand that they were turning points - new horizons opened up for me, I received the key to the amazing riches of Russian literature, began to understand the Russian people a little, became interested and fell in love with their customs and traditions"?

Then there was South Korea. The time spent there had a great, perhaps decisive, influence on Blake's political moods, his worldview.

In October 1948, J. Blake arrived in Seoul, where he headed the SIS station, which operated under the cover of the British Consulate General, its goal was to organize intelligence work against the Soviet Far East.

The outbreak of the Korean War crossed out all plans. As a result of the North Korean offensive, Seoul fell, and members of the British diplomatic mission, including Blake, were interned for three whole years.

As a person prone to analysis, Blake compared his position, understanding of the world and justice with what was happening. Cold War, confrontation: Blake's ideological foundations were shaken by West and East. Introduction to Marxism—Blake literally read through Marx's *Das Kapital*—conversations with the envoy who was in captivity with him, who was attracted to socialist ideas and who believed that communism was the next stage in the development of mankind, had a great influence on Blake. From a man with traditional views, he turned into a supporter of the movement with which he had previously fought. He grew convinced that the creation of a socialist society was feasible and desirable.

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Apparently, his conversations in his youth with his cousin Henri, who was interested in politics and adhered to left-wing views, also had an effect.

In an interview in the mid-1990s, Blake answered the question: "Why did you cooperate with our intelligence?" - answered simply: "Firstly, I was afraid that a third world war would be unleashed, and secondly, I believed in the victory of communism. For these reasons, by the way, many foreigners collaborated with Soviet intelligence.

Blake came to the conclusion that it was necessary to actively participate in the confrontation between the two camps, but already on the other side of the barricades. He decided to apply to the Soviet embassy in North Korea, offering his services. Thus, voluntarily and for ideological reasons, George Blake took the path of cooperation with Soviet intelligence, became a Soviet intelligence officer. Blake refused material reward and firmly adhered to this principle in the future.

Here I would like to mention a young officer of the KGB department for Primorsky Krai, Nikolai Andreyevich Loenko?, who, while on a business trip in North Korea, established contact with Blake. Here are his words:

"In fact, George, observing wars in all their forms and reflecting on the fate of the world, himself came to communist convictions. He immediately struck me with the globality and versatility of thinking, genuine interest in our country. Of course, in his erudition, the level of culture, George surpassed me, he was well versed in the theory of scientific communism. All I had to do was go along with him. In short, I could not influence him ideologically, so I put more pressure on common human interests."

In the spring of 1953, Blake's captivity ended, and together with other members of the British diplomatic mission who were in captivity, he returned to England.

After joyful meetings with relatives, interviews with representatives of military intelligence and the SIS, which were of a formal nature, Blake received additional leave, and in September 1953 he began working at the Intelligence Service. He was appointed to the post of deputy head of the "U" SIS department. This service was engaged in carrying out operations to introduce eavesdropping techniques and remove information in the representative offices of the USSR and allied states, as well as in private apartments of employees of these institutions. A number of operations were carried out jointly with the US CIA.

Soon, representatives of Soviet intelligence in England restored contact with Blake. Ten years of his active and fruitful intelligence work followed. A simple enumeration of what was done by George Blake would take a very

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a lot of space. He handed over a large number of secret documents to British intelligence, revealing its subversive aspirations against the Soviet Union.

A few words can be said about one sensational case in its time, in which Blake was a participant. This is an operation of the American and British special services, codenamed "Gold" (gold), known to the Russian reader as the "Berlin Tunnel".

On the night of April 22, 1956, Soviet signalmen, "carrying out urgent repairs" to a telephone cable between East Berlin and Moscow, stumbled upon a branch line. They found a tunnel leading to an American warehouse on the other side of the border separating the Soviet and American sectors of Berlin.

Our side did not agree to destroy the equipment for intercepting telephone conversations installed by the Americans and the British, and the next day organized a press conference at which they accused the Americans of an outrageous invasion of the territory of the Soviet sector of Berlin and declared a strong protest. The assembled journalists were invited on an "excursion" into the tunnel.

A few years earlier, on a December day in 1953, a secret meeting of representatives of the US Central Intelligence Agency and the British Secret Intelligence Service was held in London. As a result, it was decided to lay a tunnel to the communication lines of the Soviet troops and the communication lines of the German Democratic Republic. The enterprise was financed by the Americans: the British side undertook to supply the most sophisticated equipment. As Deputy Chief of Section U, George Blake was personally involved in this meeting of SIS and CIA intelligence specialists.

In the Berlin district of Altglienicke, where the border of the American sector of Berlin passed, the American military authorities built buildings of the eavesdropping station. From them, a five-hundred-meter tunnel was dug, equipped with the latest technology, to connect eavesdropping, amplifying and other spy equipment to telephone cables on the territory of the GDR.

After the scandalous revelation, when all the evidence was there and there was no need to play hide and seek, high-ranking figures from the CIA still tried to claim that, they say, this operation was the most effective in recent years. At that time, neither Washington nor London could even guess the main thing - their action turned out to be doomed even before the drawings of this "enterprise" were created.

The very "discovery" of the tunnel was skillfully carried out. The ensuing joint investigation by the Intelligence Service and the CIA into the circumstances of the failure of the operation concluded that it was purely technical reasons. There was no mention of information leakage. But only

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In 1961, after Blake's arrest, it became known to the SIS and the CIA that the Soviet authorities had been thoroughly familiarized with Operation Tunnel even before the first shovel sank into the ground. Blake was able to transfer information about this operation to the American and British intelligence services to the Soviet intelligence even at the stage of its initial development.

In connection with the betrayal of one of the leaders of Polish intelligence, M. Golenevsky, British counterintelligence, according to indirect data, contacted Blake, and in 1961 his arrest followed.

The first conversations, still at the stage of suspicion, did not give anything to the employees of the counterintelligence department of the Intelligence Service, who interrogated Blake. They did not have any specific data or physical evidence of his cooperation with Soviet intelligence. The interrogators themselves, apparently not expecting it, found a non-standard psychological move. As if wishing to alleviate Blake's confession and thereby his fate, they declared that he had gone

cooperation with the Soviets only because he was tortured in Korean captivity and forced to confess that he was a member of British intelligence. Blackmail followed, and Blake agreed to cooperate. Blake was outraged by this suggestion. He wanted to explain that he acted on the conviction that no one had tortured or blackmailed him, and he came to the Russians by his own decision and offered them his services. This internal reaction—perhaps, someone will consider it contrary to elementary common sense and the instinct of self-preservation—turned out to be a complete confession.

But this is the whole of George Blake - a noble man who does not allow doubts about the sincerity of his actions and decisions. He showed this character trait more than once, he did not compromise when it came to convictions and principles.

This is also confirmed by Blake's behavior during the trial. Lawyer Jeremy Hutchinson, acting as Blake's defense counsel, requested his permission to state in his appeal to the judge that the defendant was deeply sorry for what he had done. This could have reduced the sentence. Blake refused, because he considered it untrue, he does not regret anything and is confident in the correctness of his cooperation. And if not for the arrest, he would have continued contacts with the Russians.

The case was brought before the Old Bailey, the central criminal court in London, which sentenced Blake to 42 years in prison. It was an unprecedented punishment in the history of English jurisprudence for such a crime. Blake's mind refused to accept such a verdict. He experienced a sense of the unreality of what was happening, since his release was to occur only in 2003, that is, in the next millennium. If the court gave him 14 years, then this, according to Blake,

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would have made on him "a much more terrible impression, forty-two years were beyond comprehension." But the most interesting thing is that such a period prompted Blake to think about escaping.

Everything that happened later fit into Blake's philosophy, his position in life.

Blake entered the regime of prison life relatively quickly. He behaved approximately and after five years he received a "promotion": from the workshop where they sewed bags for diplomatic mail, he was assigned to a prison shop - there the prisoners bought simple supplies. His mother, wife and other relatives visited him. This, on the one hand, made it easier for him to stay in prison, but on the other hand, it was also a great moral test. He felt guilty before his relatives for what happened, especially before his wife, who was left alone with three sons in her arms.

Great moral support for Blake was his conversations during walks in the prison yard with the Soviet intelligence officer Gordon Lonsdale (Konon Trofimovich Molody), who was arrested by the British as a result of the betrayal of the same Pole Golenevsky and sentenced to 25 years in the same 1961 .

Blake admired the steadfastness and invariably good humor with which Young endured the trials that befell him. They often discussed their chances of getting out.

In one of the conversations, shortly before Molody was transferred to another prison, he expressed confidence that during the big parade on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution (1967) they would be together on Red Square. It sounded fantastic, but Young turned out to be absolutely right - both of them were present at this parade, and then they drank

champagne.

Over time, Blake seemed to "draw" into the routine of prison life and even began to find it tolerable. To keep himself in working condition, he resumed his Arabic studies, attended classes in English literature and a class of music lovers organized in

guardianship prison. In addition, the prison authorities allowed him to take correspondence courses at the University of London.

But Blake did not leave the thought of escaping. The verdict was such that it was simply impossible not to challenge him. He considered himself a political prisoner, while the British government denies the existence of such a category of imprisonment in England.

Realizing that without outside help, escape is impossible, Blake was looking for people who could help him.

Such an opportunity presented itself. He met two members of the 100% Committee, Michael Randle and Pat Pottle, who were sentenced to 18 months in prison for organizing a peaceful demonstration at a US Air Force base in England. Between them were established

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hard relationships. Before leaving prison, these people offered Blake help in case he decides to escape.

Another helper was Irish rebel Sean Burke, who went to jail for mailing a bomb to a police officer who falsely accused Sean of child molestation.

The three did the preparatory work and helped Blake make his escape. They also helped him to cross to Moscow. It happened in December 1966.

Thus ended the most difficult stage in the life of the Soviet intelligence officer George Blake.

It cannot be said that Blake easily entered a new life while in Moscow. His "pink" idea of socialism differed from reality. But this did not disappoint him, but made him take a deeper look at life. He had a lot of free time, he often wandered around Moscow, especially in its old part, in the Arbat area, getting acquainted with Muscovites and their way of life. His mother came to him, who helped him to improve his life.

Shortly after arriving in Moscow, Blake meets Kim Philby and Donald McLean, who have lived in Moscow for more than a decade. Communication with them helped him enter the rhythm of Moscow life. Particularly friendly relations developed with D. McLean, who helped Blake start working at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, where he became, according to his colleagues, one of the Institute's leading experts on the problems of the Near and Middle East.

In Moscow, Blake has a new family, a son was born, and now a grandson is growing up, to whom Blake pays a lot of attention.

Blake has become a real Muscovite, he has a dacha where he spends a significant part of his time with his family and friends, especially in summer. Gathers mushrooms, skis for a long time in winter.

Over time, Blake re-established ties with his sons from his first marriage. With great excitement and anxiety I expected to meet them in Moscow. They were sympathetic to the choice of their father, and now every year, together with their wives and children, they visit Blake in Moscow, they live with pleasure at his dacha in the Moscow region.

Naturally, George Blake, being a veteran of foreign intelligence, actively participates in the life of its team, is an honorary professor at the Academy of Foreign Intelligence. He often meets with colleagues, speaks to young scouts. In 1999 he visited the Far East and laid flowers on the grave of N.A. Loenko.

For his services, George Blake was awarded the Orders of Lenin, the Red Banner and the Patriotic War [degrees, "For Personal Courage", the badge "Honorary Fellow

state security", as well as the badge "For service in intelligence" No. 1.

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It is most appropriate to end this essay with the words of Blake himself: "Today I can say that my life has turned out well, perhaps even better than, according to many, I deserve."

! Blake J. There is no other choice. - M., 1991. - S. 280-281.

There. - S. 119.

Colonel N.A. Loenko died tragically in a car accident in September 1976 in Primorye.

Grigoriev K.A. Rolls of fate (behind the scenes). - M., 1994. - S. 160.

In 1964, the British authorities agreed to exchange a Soviet intelligence agent for British intelligence agent Greville Wynn, who was arrested in Moscow. English peace movement.

7 Blake J. Decree. op. - S. 303.

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Fighting on the edge of the nuclear abyss

In the time that has passed since January 1959, when jubilant rebels entered Havana in columns, the United States has repeatedly wondered about the reasons for the persistent anti-American sentiments of the vast majority of Cubans. Apparently, for the American layman it was incomprehensible why the population of a small island, which until recently received tens of thousands of tourists from the United States, did not feel gratitude to their yesterday's patrons. The Americans did not find an intelligible answer to the "inexplicable" behavior of the Cubans. Let us try to understand the essence of this question and at the same time specify the starting points in the development of close relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba. To do this, let us recall that after the victory of the Cuban revolution in the foreign policy of the USSR, which itself at that time was going through a turbulent period of de-Stalinization, the Latin American direction was clearly identified and soon loudly declared itself. New, every day more and more noticeable accents appeared in the work of the Soviet diplomatic, foreign trade, propaganda agencies, and last but not least, the State Security Committee. It has become obvious to many well-informed foreign policy experts that the growth of anti-Americanism in Cuban society as a response to the neo-colonialist course of the United States and the growing craving for the experience of the USSR are all serious and for a long time to come. This was especially clear to those who had the opportunity to look at events in the Caribbean through the prism of information received through intelligence channels.

The adoption by the Revolutionary Government of Cuba in 1959 of the laws on agrarian reform and on the control of minerals, which infringed on the interests of North American companies, caused immediate response from the US leadership. At the beginning of 1960, Soviet foreign intelligence received information about the preparation of a report by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee of the US Congress

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yes "The Influence of Politics on Economic Relations between the United States and the States of Latin America". This document contained recommendations to take urgent measures to strengthen the shaken positions of the United States in the Latin American region and to develop joint measures with the countries of Latin America in order to "prevent the emergence of a situation similar to that which has developed in Cuba" and "restore democracy in this country."

As predicted by Soviet intelligence analysts, the report formed the basis of many steps taken by the American leadership. At the end of January 1960, a special statement by President D. Eisenhower on Cuban-American relations was published, in which the Revolutionary Government was accused of "violating the rights of American citizens." It contained urgent calls to Cuba "to refrain from expanding ties with the Soviet Union", accompanied by threats.

Then in July, the president promised to provide Latin American countries with \$500 million in loans for the economic development of the region. Naturally, Cuba was excluded from the "aid" plan. It is interesting that the assessments of these steps, contained in the analytical reports of the Cuban Ministry of Internal Affairs and Soviet foreign intelligence, coincided with the conclusion of well-informed American experts. In particular, in the issue of the journal "Yu.S. The News and World Report" of July 25, 1960, noted that "the US government is developing plans to strengthen its Latin American neighbors in order to stop the further spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere."

There was a fairly widespread opinion among Soviet intelligence personnel at that time that Cuba's activities would most likely not have been so sharply anti-American if the United States had acted more realistically, diplomatically, and, if you like, smarter. But it was necessary to respond to frontal assaults and outright blackmail. Here is a list of some anti-Cuban actions of Americans for an incomplete year 1960.

In May, the American oil monopolies (Esso Standard Oil, Texaco Oil) and the British British Dutch Shell stopped importing oil to Cuba. In addition, in response to the readiness of the Soviet Union to meet Cuba's oil needs, the leaders of these companies instructed their refineries not to process oil coming from the USSR.

On July 6, the American administration announced a reduction in the quota for the import of Cuban sugar into the United States by 700,000 tons, which caused damage to the Cuban economy by almost \$100 million.

On July 9, Eisenhower's statement was published, in which anti-Cuban actions were essentially elevated to the rank of the main direction.

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leniia of the Latin American policy of the USA. It emphasized that "the United States will never allow the establishment in the Western Hemisphere of a regime under the rule of international communism."

In order to reduce the flow of convertible currency to Cuba, the State Department has decided to limit the tourist travel of US citizens to this country. For Cuba, which received significant foreign exchange funds from tourism, this turned into yet another
hard trials.

Since mid-1960, the American media have launched an unprecedented anti-Cuban campaign in the United States and Latin America.

Around the same time, the US Central Intelligence Agency, with the approval of Eisenhower, began to organize and finance an armed intervention of counter-revolutionary emigrants into Cuba. Back in the spring of 1960, Soviet intelligence received information that on March 17 the president had given a secret order to provide military assistance to Cuban emigrants in order to carry out sabotage actions on Cuban territory. In Florida (USA), Guatemala and Nicaragua, military training centers and bases were created to prepare Cuban emigrants for the invasion of the island.

In August 1960, Cuban security agencies learned from reliable intelligence sources that the United States had embarked on a secret long-term action to destroy Cuba's economic resources. So, as a result

Numerous air raids carried out from the territory of the United States set fire to plantations that yielded about 350,000 tons of sugar cane.

On September 3, the US government banned the export of motor vehicles and spare parts to Cuba. For a country where the vast majority of vehicles consisted of American-made cars, this was tantamount to large-scale economic sabotage.

On September 16, the State Department issued a circular note to US NATO allies urging them to reduce purchases of Cuban sugar and thus counteract "the infiltration of international communism into the Western Hemisphere."

It is unlikely that anyone can doubt that these and other similar actions of the United States were calculated only for the overthrow of the Revolutionary Government and the restoration of its economic and political dominance in this country. All this was done unprovoked, since the Cuban government did not seek to curtail relations with the United States. The only thing it sought was for them to be built on a mutually beneficial basis, which should be the relationship between sovereign states

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mi. Neither the leadership of Cuba nor the vast majority of the population wanted to become, in fact, a vassal of the United States. In response to the demand of the Cuban leadership to reduce the size of the US Embassy (at that time its staff exceeded 300 people, a significant part of which was engaged in intelligence activities), the Eisenhower administration severed diplomatic relations, ignoring the fact that back in November 1959, the Cuban leadership in a special The note informed Washington of the desire of the government and people of Cuba "to live in peace and friendship with the government and people of the United States and to expand their diplomatic and economic relations with the government of the United States on the basis of mutual respect and mutual benefit." The note proposed a number of measures aimed at improving relations. For example, the conclusion of a bilateral agreement on sugar, the revision of trade agreements and the discussion of controversial issues. However, the US government rejected the proposals of the Cuban side. Twice ~ January 27 and February 16, 1960 - Havana offered Washington to start negotiations to resolve disputed issues, but was refused.

An even tougher position on the issue of bilateral relations with Cuba was taken by the administration of John F. Kennedy. In an attempt to convince the new president that the internal situation in Cuba favors the organization of intervention in this country, the CIA, as it became known from the data obtained by Soviet intelligence, with the help of mercenaries, organized a number of acts of sabotage at industrial enterprises in January-February 1961. and burning sugar plantations in Cuba. "Unknown aircraft" made several flights over Cuban cities, dropping anti-government leaflets. Reports from our sources and through the newly formed partnership with the Cubans indicated that the CIA was misleading US President Kennedy and his entourage into influencing him into invading Cuba. Distorting the reports of its agents in Cuba, prejudicially interpreting the statements of individual representatives of the intelligentsia, sugar plantation workers, bar and restaurant owners (whose numbers declined sharply after the revolution), American intelligence inspired the leadership that the overwhelming majority of Cubans were opposed to the Revolutionary Right. governments, and many joined the "centers of resistance". The desire of the CIA to present Cuba, which had just liberated from American political diktat, as an outpost of Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere, also pursued another goal - to try to convince the Latin American public of the alienness of the ideals of the Cuban revolution for Latin America.

The anti-Cuban orientation of the plans and actions of the American intelligence services forced the Soviet and Cuban foreign intelligence

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ki to the establishment of joint work in the American direction and the strengthening of partnerships in general. The result of this approach was measures to reveal the role of the US State Department in organizing a series of demarches in the countries of Latin America aimed at discrediting the policy of the Cuban leadership. After the Americans planned a trip to Latin America for the special assistant to the President A. Schlesinger, Soviet and Cuban intelligence developed and implemented the first plan in the history of partnerships to counter US actions. The information obtained by both intelligence agencies about the secret actions of the CIA in relation to Cuba and plans to carry out armed aggression on the island was brought to the attention of Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek, Minister of Foreign Affairs of this country A. Arinos, Chilean Senator Salvador Allende, Chairman of the Confederation of Workers of Latin America Lombardo Toledano and other prominent figures of the continent, whose voice was heeded by Latin America.

As a result of the implementation of these and other measures in February-March 1961, many public organizations of Latin American countries sent appeals to the US Congress and international organizations, which cited facts about American participation in the preparation of intervention in Cuba in order to stifle the Cuban revolution. At the same time, the support of public and political organizations of Latin America for the right of Cuba to self-determination was emphasized and calls were made to condemn the intention of the United States to use force as a means of resolving international disputes. Particularly weighty was the statement of the industrial and agricultural associations of Latin America condemning the US attempts to eliminate free trade.

Information obtained by Cuban and Soviet intelligence indicated that the Americans continued to prepare for intervention. From the reports received in February 1961, it followed, for example, that an authoritative commission from Washington intended to visit the training bases in Guatemala in March to determine the readiness of the Pentagon and the CIA for an invasion, and already on March 11, a meeting was scheduled with the President of the United States at which the details of the plan for the invasion of Cuba were to be concretized before its final approval.

From the intelligence data it became clear that at the said meeting, President Kennedy spoke in favor of a forceful solution to the problem. The only thing he cared about was to take measures that would minimize the risk of exposing the role and extent of the United States in this operation. In particular, he suggested that the landing site be chosen as isolated as possible, the invasion should be carried out at night, so that

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to hide its scope and the involvement of the US Navy in it; The bombing of Cuban cities on the eve of the action should be presented in propaganda in such a way as to create the opinion that it was carried out by pilots who deserted from the Cuban Air Force. It should be noted that the Democratic President proved to be quite a skilled developer of covert operations. Thus, he demanded from the CIA to accelerate the creation of a new political organization by Cuban emigrants and to provide its leaders, especially those who directly prepared the invasion, with appropriate assistance and propaganda support. The State Department was instructed to prepare and publish as soon as possible a "White Paper" on the situation in Cuba and, along the way, to carry out actions of secret influence on the leadership of the Organization of American States, so that it would exert appropriate pressure on the Cuban leadership.

Our special services fulfilled their duty no less promptly in clarifying the plans of the CIA to organize the landing. Everyone who was involved in obtaining such information and its subsequent use in intelligence and operational activities was aware that the fate of the country depended on how reliable the information was, without loud words,

fought for its independence for a whole century. The information received by intelligence about the landing of mercenaries on Playa Giron (the corresponding plan was approved by Kennedy on March 15, 1961) made it possible to take the necessary measures in a timely manner. In addition, the Cuban intelligence service managed to obtain information that, with the active participation of the CIA, the formation of the "Cuban Revolutionary Council" began, which united the two largest groups of Cuban emigration - the Democratic Revolutionary Front and the People's Revolutionary Movement. It was understood that after the landing of the mercenaries and the capture of a piece of Cuban territory, the leaders of the "Council" should be brought there, who would form a provisional government and turn to the United States for recognition and help. In the book "STA. Te ipsiye sgogu" ("CIA. Behind-the-Scenes Story"), its author A. Giulli stated that the CIA was completely confident in the success of this action and considered the issue of a new government to be practically resolved?

On April 4, 1961, the US State Department published the White Paper. "By disregard for facts and the dictates of reason, it has no equal among the official foreign policy documents of the United States," this is how the Uruguayan international lawyer T. Martillo would later write about her. On the same day, at a meeting of the National Security Council, chaired by Kennedy, the final decision was made on the exact time of the armed invasion of Cuban territory. This information was immediately passed on by Soviet intelligence to Cuban partners.

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The USSR and Cuba knew the true value of President Kennedy's broadcast statement of April 12 to the American Association of Newspaper Publishers that the United States would under no circumstances take military action against Cuba. The intelligence data obtained, which the leaders of both countries took with all seriousness and full confidence, accurately indicated the scheduled dates for the bombing of Cuban airfields and the start of the invasion of the island.

In the early hours of April 15, 1961, American-made B-26s bombed Havana, Santiago de Cuba, and San Antonio de los Baños. The next day, speaking at the funeral of the victims of the bombing, F. Castro sharply condemned the attack and called on the working people to defend the gains of the revolution.

On April 17, the "liberation army", numbering about 1,500 mercenaries, landed on the Cuban coast in the Playa Giron area. The awareness of the Cuban leadership about the timing of the landing, the readiness of the Cubans to defend their homeland predetermined the outcome of the American adventure. It took the troops of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba only 72 hours to defeat the aggressors. Of the 1,500 mercenaries, about 1,200 were captured, the rest were killed or drowned in the bay, which, ironically, was called Bahia de los Cochinos - Bay of Pigs.

In vain did the American mass media try to instill in the consciousness of the public and political circles of foreign countries the version that President Kennedy was not involved in the preparation of aggression against Cuba. After the failure of the aggression and inflicting a tangible blow both on the prestige of the United States and on the authority of the American president, he will be forced to call it a "mistake" and express regret that he took the risk of its implementation. The condemnation of the American adventure in the world, the wave of protests against the US intervention in Cuba forced Kennedy to take full responsibility for the invasion and publicly declare it.

However, reliable intelligence materials from Cuban and Soviet residencies in foreign countries showed that the United States did not draw conclusions from the failed intervention and began to develop new plans for the destruction of revolutionary Cuba. Kennedy held a series of confidential meetings with influential US politicians, including Richard Nixon, to find a convenient "legal" rationale for the Americans to crush the Cuban revolution. On his instructions, the anti-Cuban direction of the CIA's activities soon

took one of the main places in the work of American residencies in Latin America. They were given the following tasks:

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- Assistance in the regrouping of the Cuban emigration forces in order to intensify subversive actions against Cuba in order to cause the maximum possible damage to its economy;
- exerting pressure on the official circles of the Latin American countries in order to force them to break off diplomatic and trade relations with Havana;
- organization of anti-Cuban actions in the countries of Latin America;
- preparation and implementation of measures aimed at undermining the stability of the Latin American countries, which could be presented as "subversive" actions of Cuba;
- the formation of conditions and public opinion in the world for a large-scale operation to undermine the prestige and influence of Cuba in the international arena.

Soon, Soviet and Cuban intelligence, each through its own channels, began to receive regular information about the development of plans for the physical elimination of the leaders of the revolution. Later, in 1975, testifying before a Senate panel, former CIA director Helms would speak of the necessity and political importance of such goals.' Already in the summer of 1961, the CIA began to create new recruiting centers in the United States to prepare for the next invasion. Particular preference was given to the secret recruitment of former officers in the army of the deposed dictator Batista. However, the main thing on which the attention of American intelligence was concentrated was to bleed Cuba as much as possible, to inflict as much material damage on it as possible. American specialists in covert operations hastily prepared all kinds of falsifications that were supposed to discredit the domestic and foreign policy of Cuba, discredit F. Castro and his associates. American researchers W. Hinckley and W. Turner will write about this in 20 years in the book "Red Fish. History of the secret war against Castro.

American intelligence placed great hopes on the organization of the international isolation of Cuba. In order not to be unfounded, let's open the well-known book by F. Agee "Behind the Scenes of the CIA", in which he describes how this agency was preparing to break off diplomatic relations between Peru and Cuba. "A commando group," he writes, "from among Cuban emigrants raided the Cuban embassy in the capital of Peru and during the raid seized some documents. Our residency in Lima included in the original documents several falsifications prepared in advance by the department of operational technology, including a document listing Peruvians who allegedly received up to 15 thousand dollars a month from the Cuban embassy"? According to Agee, the then conservative government of Peru used these documents as a pretext to break the dichotomy.

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diplomatic relations with Cuba. The goal set for the CIA by the American administration in this country was achieved.

This was followed by a provocation with the seizure of "subversive documents" at the Cuban embassy in Argentina and a series of speeches by statesmen and political figures of Latin American countries, which were aimed at distorting the goals of the foreign policy of the Cuban leadership.

Of course, both the Cuban and Soviet leadership received detailed information about the subversive actions of the CIA. As best they could, the intelligence services of both countries, despite some discrepancies and differences in the assessments of the events that took place, tried to counteract them. However, the methods used to organize a rebuff to the Americans were fundamentally different from those used by the CIA. So, Soviet foreign intelligence never resorted to such provo-

actions, which were organized, for example, by American agents in Ecuador - pogroms in the premises belonging to the Cuban diplomatic mission, harassment of the personnel of the Cuban embassy. In Venezuela, the unbridled anti-Cuban campaign was preceded by a provocation with the "discovery" of secret weapons caches on the coast, the laying of which was attributed to the Cubans, although this was the work of American intelligence.

In January 1962, the United States succeeded in getting Cuba expelled from the Organization of American States. Soon the White House announced a decision to impose a complete embargo on US trade with Cuba. In February-March of this year, American emissaries visited NATO member states and, as it became known from intelligence reports, put strong pressure on their governments to join the economic blockade of the island. However, as in previous years, Washington's calls were not particularly heeded. Most of the US NATO allies continued to develop trade relations with Cuba.

Based on the available operational capabilities, intelligence officers of the two countries contributed to reducing the effectiveness of US pressure on their allies on the Cuban issue, contributing, in particular, to making public in Latin American and European countries information about the CIA plan under the code name "Mongoose approved by President Kennedy. It included the transfer of sabotage groups to the island, the implementation of acts of terror and sabotage against the civilian population, industrial and military facilities, the more efficient use of the Guantanamo base for sabotage, the organization of arson of sugar cane plantations, the shelling by Cuban terrorist organizations (justified in the United States) merchant ships carrying goods for Cuba. Under these conditions, joining the blockade meant for the American allies the recognition of the legitimacy of such criminal actions. Practically all European countries did not agree to this.

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The Washington KGB station played a significant role in neutralizing the anti-Cuban actions. She managed to arrange the receipt of intelligence information, which allowed the country's leadership to have a complete picture of the US anti-Cuban plans. In the spring of 1962, the Cuban partners were given a map received by the residency with routes and places for the transfer of mercenaries to Cuba. At the same time, in order to stop the mass transfer of bandits and mercenaries to the island, the residency, through its own channels, brought to the attention of an influential US government department, which had strained relations with the CIA, information that Cuban counterintelligence controls the channels for bringing in saboteurs. The residency organized a "leak" of information that Cuban counterintelligence agents managed to recruit several mercenaries and were playing a "game" with the CIA. The event was a success: the CIA significantly reduced the transfer of its agents and weapons to Cuba.

In recent years, many publications by Russian and American authors have appeared in which they argued that the supply of Soviet weapons to Cuba in 1962 led to the emergence of the Caribbean crisis. The inconsistency of such assertions will become apparent if one examines the data that Soviet intelligence had at the end of 1961 and the beginning of 1962, and the conclusions that were drawn from the information received through undercover channels.

The first thing to mention is the development in the US of a program to overthrow the Cuban leadership. It had an extremely specific character and was approved by the President of the United States. The start of the program was another anti-Cuban campaign in the media, initiated by the CIA-controlled press organs in Latin America, Africa and Europe. Its integral component was a statement by the US Congress with direct threats against Cuba, which were reinforced by the administration's decision to mobilize 150,000 reservists. The final stage of the program was to be the largest in the history of American naval exercises in the Caribbean and use them as a "smoke screen" to concentrate on American military bases near Cuba, significant military contingents intended for subsequent

weed for landing in Cuba. Meanwhile, a powerful US naval armada was concentrating off the coast of Cuba under the pretext of preventing the supply of Soviet "offensive weapons" to the island.

On September 1, 1962, the intelligence department of the Cuban Interior Ministry reported to Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders that, according to confidential data from reliable sources, a new US aggression against Cuba could be committed in September-November 1962. The same information was transferred to the Soviet side. As agreed

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On September 12, on behalf of TASS, a statement was made about the preparation by the Americans of aggression against Cuba.

On September 18, the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the UN reported to Havana that UN Secretary-General U Thant had a conversation with the American delegation about the threat of aggression on a large scale against Cuba and received assurance from her that there would be no aggression. However, the intelligence agencies of the USSR and Cuba, using each of their capabilities, continued to receive information from which it was obvious that the Americans were deceiving U Thant and systematically preparing reprisals against the "Marxist regime of Fidel Castro." So, in January - May 1962, the CIA organized the training of 150 saboteurs, from which special forces were formed and thrown onto the island. One of them, led by Miguel Angel Orozco, carried out 25 operations in a short time. Here is how he himself told the court about his work for the CIA:

"I am 26 years old. He was an officer in Batista's army. Illegally left Cuba in May 1959. In January 1960, he was recruited by a CIA officer. He was trained in various CIA camps in the United States. Then, as part of many groups, he was thrown onto the island. Our task was to infiltrate Cuba, collect information about military and industrial facilities for the Americans, carry out sabotage on communications and industrial facilities, and create secret weapons depots. In total, he visited Cuba 24 times before his arrest. One of the CIA plans that I was involved in was to stage a Cuban military attack on Nicaragua. This "aggression" could be used as a pretext for the US invasion of Cuba. In accordance with another plan, an expedition of mercenaries was to be sent to the island in order to capture Cayo Romano, where it was planned to form a government of Cuba in exile, which the United States would immediately recognize.

And there were many like Orozco at the disposal of the Americans. According to the Cuban Ministry of the Interior, at the end of 1961 there were more than a dozen schools in Miami where CIA officers taught Cuban emigrants the methods of espionage and sabotage. In addition, similar training centers functioned in Cayo Largo, Key West and Florida. A network of sabotage schools was also created in Nicaragua.

How real were the fears of the Cuban authorities in 1962 regarding US subversion? The answer to this question is provided by documentary materials obtained by Soviet and Cuban intelligence, which testified that the CIA and other members of the American intelligence community sought to create conditions for organizing a "general armed uprising" in Cuba. This work was carried out in the following areas:

1. Collection of economic information to determine the directions of strikes against the most important objects of industrial areas.

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2. Disorganization of the production of food and essential goods, interference with the work of agricultural cooperatives, disabling sugar factories.

3. Penetration of special groups for military training of members of underground organizations and working out with them the procedure for obtaining weapons and equipment from secret warehouses created on

territory of the country.

4. The deployment of special forces to carry out sabotage operations: explosions of bridges, railways and highways, oil refineries, power plants, communication lines and structures of military strategic importance.

5. Organization of attempts on the leaders of the revolution, primarily on Fidel Castro. This was to serve as a signal for the start of an armed uprising.

6. Operational landing of combat groups trained in guerrilla warfare to key points in the country in order to raise a mutiny in various regions and tie down the actions of government troops with small skirmishes.

It is quite natural that Cuba could not remain inactive in the face of the impending threat, the reality of which was confirmed by ever new secret information from Soviet and Cuban intelligence. At stake, as before, was the fate of the country, its future as an independent state. Therefore, the leaders of the Soviet Union and Cuba agreed on measures to strengthen the defense capability of Cuba. They included the supply of medium-range missiles, Il-28 bombers and some other weapons to Cuba.

Meanwhile, the crisis was entering an acute phase. On October 16, 1962, President Kennedy chaired the first meeting of the hastily convened executive committee of the National Security Council (NSC). Representatives of the Pentagon and the CIA, Assistant to the President for National Security M. Bundy, Secretary of the Treasury D. Dillon spoke in favor of mass bombing of Cuba, the invasion of the island and the overthrow of the government of F. Castro.

By the end of October 17, it became known about the decision of the executive committee to establish a naval blockade of Cuba. The leadership of the US military department made no secret of the fact that the scenario of anti-Cuban actions would develop in the context of the measures discussed during the first meeting of the executive committee. It became obvious that the removal of Soviet weapons from the island was not the main goal pursued by the White House. All his efforts were still focused on the overthrow of the "objectionable" government of F. Castro.

The situation was further heated up by President Kennedy's address to the people, in which he announced that he had ordered the Pentagon to intensify military preparations. Large units of the ground forces and marines began to be transferred to the southeast of the United States

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and paratroopers. More than 100 warships were ordered to go "to their starting positions". On October 26, Kennedy instructed Secretary of State Dean Rusk to set up an interim government of Cuban exiles. The next day, a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was destroyed over Cuba, which was used by the "hawks" in the United States to exert powerful pressure on President Kennedy. The end of the conflict was approaching.

Negotiations and contacts to resolve the crisis went through many channels, both state and intelligence.

An active participant in the search for ways to resolve the conflict was the Soviet ambassador to Cuba, Alexander Ivanovich Alekseev, who had close contacts with Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders. So, thanks to the efforts of diplomats, intelligence officers and people who had influence in the highest echelons of power, Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy found a reasonable compromise. The proposal of the American president on the conditions for the dismantling of Soviet missiles and the response of the Soviet leader on the peaceful settlement of the Caribbean crisis (in connection with the withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey) were sent to UN Secretary General U Thant, who had to draw up a formal agreement jointly with the Soviet and American representatives.

The danger of a direct armed conflict that could escalate into a nuclear one was averted. The USSR agreed to remove missiles and bombers from Cuba, and Washington gave assurances that the United States would lift the naval blockade of the island and refrain from military actions in the future. It has been demonstrated to the whole world that the United States no longer has the right to use any means indiscriminately to achieve its goals. The Caribbean crisis was overcome and a new US intervention against the Cuban people was prevented. Mankind has escaped the threat of a nuclear missile war.

On November 1, 1962, speaking on television, Fidel Castro found it necessary to make, in particular, the following statement: into the friendly hands of the Soviet Union. For this we are grateful to him, and we must speak about this at the top of our voices! The Soviet people, the specialists we see here, who came here to work with us in various sectors, have done a lot for us." These words, of course, can be justifiably applied to the Soviet intelligence officers, who, in coordination with their Cuban partners, developed and successfully carried out on the basis of the obtained information on the eve and during the Cuban Missile Crisis a number of measures to disrupt and counter the subversive activities of the American intelligence services. In 1959-1962 the Cuban and Soviet

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intelligence agencies have accumulated a wealth of experience in working together, although both sides understood that it was still not without certain rough edges. For them, as for both of our countries, the events around Cuba of that period were a serious test, which they withstood with honor.

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At one of the US bases in Morocco

The end of the 50s. The scene is the North African country of Morocco. To solve a number of operational tasks, the Center sent an experienced agent-recruiter "Francois" here. A comprehensively developed person, he was distinguished by his sociability, ability to communicate with people, was exceptionally hardworking and rational in his actions. Over the years of cooperation with

Soviet intelligence gained experience in recruiting and working with agents. Devotion to our cause, reliability proved by practical results.

Settled "Francois" in the business center of the country - Casablanca. He rented an apartment, rented a car, established an autonomous connection with the Center. From Moscow he received encrypted messages by radio. He sent his information to the Center through international mail channels. In case of need, he had conditions for contacting the KGB residency in Rabat, the capital of Morocco.

The Francois business trip was calculated for three to four months. However, due to the coincidence of circumstances, which is narrated in this essay, he had to stay late and do a rather voluminous additional work.

Justifying the legend of a business man who came to Morocco to study the local market, he began to establish contacts in commercial circles. At an entrepreneurs' club, he met "Icarus," a third-country representative who worked as a civilian at a US air base near Casablanca. The highly experienced scout immediately identified the potential value of this man.

The first meeting was followed by other meetings, during which friendly and trusting relations began to develop between the interlocutors. Various vital problems were discussed: from issues of big politics to the likelihood of an increase in local prices for

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petrol. Icarus talked about his past, shared his worries and plans for the future.

As a result, the Center formed the following impression about Icarus: a man of uneasy fate; life pretty patted him, threw him in different countries. In his early thirties, he had done enough fighting. He also served in aviation units, where he received an aviation specialist diploma. After the divorce, he ended up in Morocco by the will of fate. He began to engage in commerce - it did not work out. I had to go to the service of the Americans.

He had no firmly established political views. In his youth, he sympathized with extremist movements. Ideas about the alignment of political forces in the world are very confused. Organically hates Americans. He suffers from the humiliation he suffers from their side. Anti-Americanism is carefully masked in order to keep a job.

Life aspirations - to achieve material well-being. This is necessary to maintain poor health ~ periodically undergoes treatment in a hospital, constantly bears the cost of doctors, medicines, etc.

Worked on the base for several years. Has extensive friendships. He uses them to obtain weapons and ammunition from the base and resell them to representatives of underground organizations in some African countries. Therefore, he has some skills of conspiratorial activity. The man is intelligent, well-read, well-spoken. Observant, restrained in external emotions. "Francois" was recommended to continue his study.

Time passed. Contact between them systematically deepened. Of course, "Francois" took an active interest in the affairs at the place of work of "Icarus". As a result, curious details of the orders at this American military facility became clear.

The latest military aviation was stationed at the base - bombers, fighters, tanker aircraft. There were hangars, warehouses for aviation weapons (missiles, warheads, etc.), workshops for the repair of various types of equipment, and fuel depots.

Hundreds of technical specialists of various nationalities were engaged in the maintenance of this large diversified farm on a contract basis: French, Spaniards, Germans, English... Even a teacher of one of the schools there was a Russian by birth. IN

In the economic sphere, many Moroccans were used: food supply, maintenance of catering units, supply of building materials, various equipment, repair of secondary facilities, etc. Jobs at the base were valued, they paid more there than for similar work in the country.

The base was guarded by American military personnel and had its own security service. The base was divided into

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regime zones. The American servicemen allowed in them, by no means all, but only those associated with specific areas of work, wore on their military uniform and on their work clothing special badges.

The existing order at the base was characterized by a decline in morality and elementary decency. The concept of duty and patriotism among many American military men was replaced by aspiration for profit. Some of them, even officers, were unrestrainedly engaged in speculation, selling everything they could get their hands on: weapons, ammunition, explosives, airfield equipment. Drunkenness flourished.

The attitude of the civilians working at the base towards the US servicemen cannot be called benevolent. In an atmosphere of almost universal hostility, the Americans were condemned for the wealth they had accumulated during the war years, in contrast to the Europeans, who were impoverished by the war. General dissatisfaction was caused by the arrogance, conceit, and arrogance of the overseas military. Local residents were indignant about their noisy parties, frequent car accidents.

The base had a large service library, where documents on various types of aviation military equipment and weapons, work and mobilization plans of the units stationed at the base, service manuals and instructions were kept. Materials labeled "secret" and "top secret" were under special control. Access to them was limited to sergeants and regular officers in their working specialty. The library funds were constantly replenished both in a planned manner and at the request of the base. In the latter case, the librarian, at the request of a specific official, filled out a standard form, handed it over for signature to the officer - head of the library. Then the application was sent by special mail to the appropriate collector of the US military department, from where the requested documents were received. Obsolete materials, superfluous copies were destroyed. This was done by the librarians themselves, about which they also made notes in the inventory books.

After analyzing all the accumulated information, "Francois" decided: it's time to act. At the next meeting, he confidentially informed "Icarus" that in reality he had arrived here not as a private person, but as a representative of a consortium of a number of large European banks. This banking group is interested in acquiring information of the widest profile, including military information, preferably confidential. He bluntly offered Ikar to participate in this profitable enterprise, given its capabilities on the American base. As expected by "Francois", consent was obtained. At the same time, the partner did not show hesitation, he did not ask "unnecessary" questions. The initiative to select the first batch of materials in favor of the "consortium" was given to "Ikar".

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Over the next few weeks, François obtained: a list of all US military bases in Morocco with an indication of their purpose, a telephone directory, a plan for the location of facilities, a manual on security and access control at the base, a US Department of Defense directory of radio equipment used by the military aviation, the plan for the redeployment of the 16th air army from Spain. All of these documents (and a number of others not named here) were stamped "for official use."

"Icarus" said that he acquired all this with the help of his friends at the base, and called some of them by name. Such opportunities, he said, remain for the future. Having received a very modest reward, Icarus proactively and somewhat unexpectedly offered to get the full documentation of the B-52 strategic bomber stationed at the base. He asked for \$120 for this service.

The received documents were sent to the Center and the actual recruitment of a source on the American base was reported. The answer to the request about the aircraft through the residency came: it is of no interest, since the materials on the named bomber were obtained earlier from other sources.

We do not know exactly in what sequence further events developed. Either the residency did not have time to orient Francois in time, or he, for some reason of his own, made an independent decision and did not "suspend" Icarus, but the fact was that the latter obtained documentation on V- 52. One fine day, or rather late in the evening, he showed up at the Francois apartment and handed over two voluminous cardboard boxes weighing about 20 kilograms with secret documents on the bomber. "Francois" had to keep this far from safe material at home for several days until the day when, according to the schedule, he was able to transfer them through the cache to the residency (by this time, impersonal communication through the caches had already been established).

As "Icarus" later told, the operation was carried out using the service library at the base where one of his "good friends" worked. The library in the United States sent a request for documentation on the B-52, which would include improvements made to the last time. The requested documents soon arrived in Casablanca. The "good friend" mentioned sealed the parcel in two cardboard boxes and conspiratorially handed them over to the customer. For the night, "Icarus" put the boxes in the supply room of his work friend and agreed to take them out of the base in his car.

The next day, at the time of the mass departure of employees after the end of the working day, a loaded car with his friend at the wheel headed for the exit. It was known that the American military police at the checkpoint, as a rule, did not inspect the departing

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vehicles, unless she received instructions from the security service. Usually it was enough for the driver and passengers to show personal passes. It happened this time as well. However, that was not all. The fact is that control over entry to and exit from the base was carried out according to the principle of crossing the state border. There were two checkpoints - American and Moroccan, located at a distance of 200-300 meters from each other. The only task of the local "border guards" was to prevent the export of goods for speculative sale from the base: alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, food, etc. (Although, as it was known for certain, it was possible to take almost any cargo.)

In this case, the Moroccans stopped the car and, as usual, offered to open the trunk. Then they opened and examined the contents of the boxes. When they saw "only books and all sorts of papers" there, they lost interest in the luggage, and the car safely left the barrier.

... After studying the received materials at the Center with a total volume of about 12,000 pages, it was found that they represent a complete technical description of the B-52 bomber in its four modifications - B, C, B and E with changes made to the design until June 1959, as well as manuals and operating instructions for individual units, assemblies and devices, published in 1955-1959.

According to the assessment of the state organizations where intelligence sent this documentation for use, it was of practical interest mainly in the part that outlined the improvements made by 1959 to the basic model of the bomber. Particularly valuable was the documentation on the electronic filling of the aircraft.

It was estimated that about a third of the documents from the total volume of material obtained in Casablanca turned out to be useful.

Let us return, however, to Morocco, where new materials continued to arrive from Francois. There was a mobilization plan for the base, a description of the characteristics of one radar installation and a radio-technical product that had recently arrived at the base, etc.

"Icarus", a person who certainly thinks, could not help but understand that someone else was behind the notorious "consortium". Indeed, why did businessmen from Europe need information about the security system of the base? And who could be interested in buying the documentation of an American military aircraft? There was an assumption: someone's intelligence is operating here. The largest Western European states were excluded; they had allied relations with the USA. The special services of the "communist bloc" remained. It was a lot to think about. "Icarus" patiently waited for further actions of his partner.

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"Francois", of course, understood the piquancy of the situation. Having weighed all his knowledge about "Icarus" and taking into account the experience of the work already carried out with him, he asked the Center for a recruitment permit, meaning to directly involve "Icarus" in cooperation with Soviet intelligence. He made a convincing case for just such a course of action and expressed confidence that he would cope with this task. The residency supported his proposal. The Center agreed without hesitation. After that, "Francois" had a corresponding conversation with "Icarus". The latter immediately accepted the conditions of secret cooperation offered to him, regarded the appeal to him as a high degree of trust, and firmly promised to conscientiously carry out our tasks.

For some time after the recruitment, "Francois" continued to manage the work of "Icarus": he explained to him the requirements of secrecy, taught him how to photograph documents (some materials were withdrawn from the base only for a while and were subject to return), prepared the conditions for the transfer of a new agent to a direct contact with the residency. On the agreed day, "Francois" and "Icarus" met with the head of our residency in Rabat. The forthcoming tasks of Icarus were clarified and concretized, the possibilities of acquiring new sources at the base were considered, methods of personal and impersonal communication between the parties were worked out, and financial issues were agreed upon. "Francois" later reported: "Icarus" was very pleased with the comradely, friendly manner of treating him of our resident.

Having thus completed work with Icarus and having completed the tasks that had previously been set, Francois left Morocco.

Following the recommendations received, "Icarus" began to select his assistants at the base. He had someone in mind. It was necessary to select the most promising ones and find a SUITABLE "KEY" for each of them.

The first candidate was an American sergeant "James". "Icarus" became close to him on a personal level, began to meet more often during non-working hours, sympathetically shared his moods, patronizingly supported his life aspirations.

The study made it possible to draw such a portrait of an American: bold, inventive, cunning; to achieve the goal "goes ahead"; impudent and rude in relations with people - both with subordinates and superiors. Realizing that a career largely depends on professional knowledge, he diligently expands it, studies the materials of the latest aviation technology stored in the service library. With a group of friends, he several times organized the theft of small arms, cartridges, explosives from the base to sell them to the underground anti-government movements of African countries. By political convictions, he is a rabid anti-communist.

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It was obvious to Icarus that the only way to recruit this American was to offer him money. "Icarus" had a business conversation with him on behalf of the "military service" of the underground movement of one African state and formulated the terms of cooperation: he gets new, preferably secret documents on aviation equipment and weapons, "Icarus" pays for his services "in reasonable limits." The agreement took place, and "James" energetically set to work.

Another source was also an American, Sergeant "Marten". Icarus reported about him: "A man without lofty ideals, lives according to the unseemly American model—today he is sold to one, tomorrow to another, if he pays more. Once he threw in his hearts: 'I'll sell anything, just to get a little extra money.'" Embittered by his superiors, who, in his opinion, unfairly delayed his promotion."

"Icarus" easily found approaches to "Marten", demonstrating its friendly disposition and understanding of its financial problems. Loaned small sums, showed sensitivity during the illness of his wife. Often they had lunch together at the base, and in the evenings they spent time in the city with a glass of beer. Their rapprochement was also facilitated by the fact that both of them, according to their parental roots, were of the same nationality. As a result, comradely friendly relations developed between them. "Marten" willingly talked about the events and current affairs at the base: about the arrival of new types of equipment, about the security system for especially important warehouses, and much more.

"Icarus" offered - the residency supported him, and the Center agreed to involve "Marten" in tacit cooperation on a regular basis, for money. Use approximately the same scheme as in the case of "James": work in favor of the African underground. An addition has been made to this legend: these Africans are allegedly supported by an influential financial organization of one of the major European countries. The recruiting conversation went smoothly. The American agreed without any worries and was sincerely delighted, having received assurances of worthy payment for his efforts to extract secret materials from the base.

There came a period when three of our people began to work at the base - "Icarus", "James" and "Marten". The main load was carried by the leader. Each of his wards received instruction on the course of action, warned of the need to exercise discretion. In principle, the Americans tried to follow these recommendations (they were well aware of what would happen to them if they failed), although they were not particularly disciplined. Sometimes, without significant reasons, previously scheduled meetings were disrupted. Or "James" could unexpectedly, closer to midnight, come to the apartment to "Icarus" and literally bring a pack of secret documents in his bosom.

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cops. Neither "James" nor "Marten" were inclined to tell "Icarus" about their friends at the base who assist them.

At first, being a specialist in American aviation technology, Icarus himself determined what exactly should be looked for at the base. At the same time, he proceeded from his own understanding of the value of certain materials. Subsequently, when the Center became convinced of its real intelligence capabilities, assignments began to arrive from Moscow for the acquisition of specific documents on certain types of equipment and weapons. Sometimes it succeeded.

When trying to perform some of the tasks of the Center, there were surprises. Once, through the library, they tried to get the documentation on the device, the name of which was reported from Moscow. As usual, the "good friend" "Icarus" drew up an application and handed it over to the boss for signature. However, the paper was soon returned with the following resolution: "This device is not used on the base, so its technical description is not required here." "Icarus" was worried: an investigation could begin and thus the initiator of the request would be found. The application was immediately destroyed. Several weeks passed, the situation around the protesters remained calm, and there were no negative consequences. To be fair, we decided that

in this case, just lucky. Information about this incident, apparently, did not reach the security service of the base.

One more example. The Center ordered to obtain documentation on one complex product, it was designated by a cipher understandable for specialists from a certain alphanumeric combination. "James", who was involved in this case, soon reported that this product is classified as top secret, its drawings are in a special vault, where it is very difficult to penetrate. Despite reminders, the promise of an additional fee, "James" was never able to complete the task. But the persistence shown on our part and the reproaches expressed to him, obviously, angered the American, and he, as if "in defiance" of the Icarus, with undisguised irony asked the following question: "What were you going to do with this thing? ". Thus, he made it clear that he did not really believe in the need for African underground workers to get themselves such a specific aviation product. What thoughts wandered in his head, what he actually began to think about the customer - we now no longer know this. In any case, nothing happened to Icarus, while James continued to cooperate.

In general, working with "James" was difficult. At any moment, some kind of trick could be expected from him. So, he persistently and for a long time offered to purchase 200 M-2 rifles "for the Africans" at \$50 each. He took upon himself all the hassle of removing weapons from the base and delivering them to the right place. It was worth the effort to get him away from this venture.

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Having begun to receive remuneration from us quite regularly, "James" suddenly announced that he was no longer satisfied with the "token" payment system, that is, money against documents. This, they say, offends his dignity, and the uncertainty of the size and timing of payments does not allow planning a budget, etc. He demanded that he be paid exactly the agreed amount every month. Difficult protracted negotiations followed. As a result, Icarus was forced to meet him halfway (after all, it was his most valuable source) and determined a stable salary for him - 100 US dollars per month. But in return, he took away from him a subscription on voluntary secret cooperation with the "military service" of the underground movement of the African state.

The rapacious claims of "James" knew no bounds. But the Icarus was not so simple to indulge all the mercantile demands of the American. Often a vulgar trade was started between them. This episode has been recorded. The Icarus learned about a secret handbook for mechanics on servicing a fighter jet, one of the latest modifications, that had recently arrived at the base. He himself did not have access to the library fund of the most secret zone of the base, so he suggested that "James" get an allowance for 60 dollars. He agreed, retired for a couple of hours to talk with his subsource, and then brought the requested book. However, he set a condition - with a return. "Icarus" presented a bleak prospect for itself for the next sleepless days: night photography of hundreds of pages of text. And I decided to take this step. He agreed, but immediately stated that in this case the fee would be reduced. Such a turn of affairs did not suit the seller. He again left for consultations with his friend, and when he returned, he handed over the allowance irrevocably. After that, I immediately received the agreed amount.

"Marten" worked diligently and almost weekly brought various documents. Some he gave away "for good", others he handed over on Friday evenings to receive back on Monday morning. Here are the titles of only some of the secret documents received from Marten that were of informational interest: the layout and operating instructions for the pipeline system at the base, the maintenance manual for air traffic control radar stations, a description of radio equipment and flight reports in areas of Alaska, Canada and the North Atlantic, documents on the technology of storage of concentrated nitric acid.

Payment was made strictly according to the agreement: today the material - today the money. It follows from the financial report of Icarus that, for example, within three arbitrary months, he paid "Marten" a total of 620 dollars.

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In addition to these two agents, Icarus had other confidants at the base who also periodically provided useful intelligence information.

Icarus spent a lot of time and physical effort on preparing materials for transfer to residency. He was engaged in photographic work at night, preparing ten or more standard photographic films at one time. Moreover, he did not immediately master the technique of documentary filming, he had to finish his studies on the spot.

The abundance of incoming information and, as a result, the overload of the Icarus could not but lead to certain costs. Some of the materials obtained by his agents never made it to Moscow. There was a case when "James" brought a set of technical documentation in the form of ten brochures, subject to mandatory return. But "Icarus" selected only seven of them (he spent 44 photographic films on them), the most interesting, in his opinion. Wasn't it possible that the other three, which he didn't get his hands on, also contained valuable information? Or a case of the opposite character. Twice in Moscow it was discovered that the same documents had been obtained repeatedly.

Of course, it is always important to know what value the information obtained by intelligence has provided for the user. The documents of the Ikara group were studied, evaluated and ultimately used by four research institutes (NIY), thirteen experimental design bureaus (OKB), three numbered aircraft factories that were part of the system of state committees for aircraft engineering and radio electronics, as well as other organizations.

Their assessments, officially sent to the KGB, were usually laconic, outwardly very modest. Most often they are: "The material was of informational interest". Sometimes, however, something was detailed. For example: "A short explanation of the design of the aircraft, its main units and systems, including those that have not been seen before" (for the B-58 bomber) has been received.

"The resulting information is of interest." This meant, in fact, an unconditionally positive feedback, namely: the information is useful and taken into consideration for use in scientific and industrial purposes. To the questions of the inquisitive operatives about the prospects for its further use, the answer invariably followed: "And these are already our professional secrets."

There is no possibility and no need to list even the most valuable documents obtained at the base. First, their number was quite large, and a simple list of them would take many pages. Secondly, for the most part they belonged to specific areas of technology that were accessible to understanding and evaluation only by narrow-profile professionals. For example, what can a document entitled "On Capacitive Discharge Ignition Systems" tell us?

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The most complete assessment of the results of the work of "Icarus" is given in the final generalized document of the KGB of the USSR, compiled after the completion of work in Morocco. It stated in particular:

"Icarus gave us about 25,000 pages of documentary information, mainly on aviation, rocket technology and electronics, which was highly appreciated by the State Committee for Defense Technology and other interested departments ... Some of this information represented a serious defense significance ... A significant number of secret orders, instructions and other documents have been received from the US military command, as well as orientation and characterization data on the personnel of the military base."

We add that a lot of materials were sent for use by colleagues to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army. Many of them

received a positive assessment.

As for the costs of intelligence in this case, as the reader can see, they turned out to be more than modest.

For great and fruitful work in obtaining information from the American Air Force base in Morocco, "Francois" was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

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viennese solitaire

On February 16, 1955, the Soviet press and radio broadcast a TASS report from Vienna about a failed attempt to persuade the Soviet consuls of Austria not to return to their homeland through blackmail and bribery. At the epicenter of those events was a Soviet intelligence officer, now a retired colonel Boris Yakovlevich Nalivaiko (for convenience of presentation, let's give him the pseudonym Klaus). His memoirs make it possible to recall this not without interest

episode.

well well

Austria in those years occupied a special place in world politics and the struggle of the secret services of the West and East.

Unlike Germany, on whose territory two states were formed shortly after the war, differing from each other in their socio-political system and belonging to opposing blocs, Austria avoided division into four zones of occupation. There were no restrictions on movement across sectors. In this regard, a space was created in Austria, as it were, free for the initiatives of the opposing sides. And this confrontation sometimes took on sharp forms, although it did not reach such tension as it was in Berlin, which had a special status and where phases of tension periodically arose, close to serious international crises.

At the same time, Vienna, the capital of Austria, has become an important center of international politics. It competed with Berlin both because of its central European position, its traditional mediating role between East and West, the presence of a number of international organizations here, and because of its proximity to some countries that were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, such as Hungary, which became a non-aligned Yugoslavia.

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The former allies of the USSR, relying on their positions in Austria, conducted subversive activities against the socialist countries, primarily the GDR and Hungary, as well as Romania and Yugoslavia.

Special scope in these conditions opened up for the work of the special services, which tried to compromise the enemy, one way or another to weaken his position. Among such attempts was a provocation with the aim of winning over the consul of the USSR in Vienna.

To make it easier for the reader to understand the maze of intricacies of the moves and actions of the planned action, it is necessary to return to the work of an intelligence officer in Berlin, where Klaus represented the consular service in the first post-war years.

It was then that he met the American journalist Robert G. Klaus's professional interest in G.'s personality is not difficult to understand. In the pre-war years, the American lived for several years in the Soviet Union, where his father worked under contract on the construction of one of the industrial facilities in the Urals. Then he married a Ukrainian

named Galina, with whom he returned to the USA. Based on the impressions of his stay in the Soviet Union, he wrote the book "On the Other Side of the Urals", which is quite objective.

Nalivaiko and G. got to know each other as families and kept in touch from time to time. Intuition told the intelligence officer that G. was not quite the person he was trying to impersonate. The operative was convinced of this during one of the meetings in G's house. This was at the end of 1948.

No sooner had we sat down at the table than the phone rang. The wife picked up the phone, but immediately handed it to Robert. There were exclamations of surprise, joy, and then an appeal to the guests: would they mind if he invited one of his close friends to dinner, who happened to be passing through Berlin, and should fly to the USA the next morning. There were no objections, and after 10-15 minutes "friend" G. joined the company. It turned out that he was fluent in Russian.

The conversation at dinner was, as it is customary to say in such cases, secular.

Political issues, despite the fact that the cold war made itself felt, were not touched upon. Everything looked pretty decent. But there was some tension in the behavior of the family.

Saying goodbye, the Nalivaiko family thanked for the pleasure they had brought, expressing their hope for a new meeting.

But there was no new meeting in Berlin.

The Cold War was gaining momentum by this time. Official contacts between Soviet and American representatives began to take on an emphatically official character, and private meetings ceased. In February 1952, due to the end of a business trip

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Klaus left for Moscow. But a year and a half later he was again sent abroad. This time to Vienna, to the post of head of the consular department of the Soviet part of the Allied Control Commission for Austria (SKKA).

After the war-torn Berlin, Vienna appeared in all its splendor. The city did not feel at all that it, like Berlin, was divided into four sectors: the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France. There were no prohibition or restrictive signs or signs like "You are leaving the Soviet sector of Vienna" or "You are entering the French sector of Vienna", not to mention checkpoints or barriers. The central part of Vienna, the so-called international district of the Ring, did not fall under the jurisdiction of the former Allied powers at all.

Unlike Berlin, the military commandant's office in Vienna was the same for the whole city, the commandants were replaced in turn. In accordance with this, a mixed crew of patrol cars, nicknamed the "Hearts of Four", also moved around. That was the name of the popular Soviet film comedy. Not only the city, but the whole of Austria was not divided either politically or economically. The powers of the Austrian president, chancellor, government extended to the entire territory.

The intelligence officer's arrival in Vienna coincided with the preparation by the USSR, the USA, Britain and France of concluding with Austria a State treaty on the restoration of an independent and democratic Austria. After seventeen years of occupation, first by German, and after the defeat of Germany by allied (USSR, USA, England and France) troops, this country was on the eve of its revival - gaining sovereignty and independence, lost by it in 1938 as a result of violent accession to Germany. Literally the whole country and every Austrian lived in anticipation of this truly historic event.

By this time, the American intelligence services timed the planned action, the purpose of which was to compromise the representative of the country that made a decisive contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany, the country whose troops in 1945 liberated the capital of Austria - Vienna.

The Soviet consulate was located on Argentinienstrasse, in a rich mansion in the Soviet sector of Vienna. One day, in early 1954, the bell rang at the consulate. G. Nalivaiko was on the opposite end of the wire and asked how he ended up here. G. said that in the early 1950s he was transferred to work in Vienna, and while getting acquainted with the new directory of the diplomatic corps (they are republished annually), he learned that Boris Yakovlevich was in the Austrian capital. The question of the meeting was not raised. The interlocutors undertook to convey

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this "good news" and greetings to the wives. Naturally, the scout reported to the resident about G.'s call, telling the background of the acquaintance.

Their first meeting after calling the consulate took place only a couple of months later, on May 1, 1954, when Klaus and his wife and daughter went out into the street to look at a demonstration organized by the communists together with the socialists. The column moved along one of the main streets of the city center. Suddenly the scout felt that someone was touching his sleeve. Looking around, he saw a smiling G. He pointed to his wife standing at a distance. We met as if only yesterday we parted. The wife spoke about the children. Robert said that in the next month or two they would probably leave Vienna, as their stay in Austria was coming to an end. He, however, hopes that before leaving they will be able to meet. When and where - agreed to agree on the phone. Warmly saying goodbye, the Americans headed towards the hotel.

About two months passed, G. was silent, and Klaus began to wonder if they had already left for home. But G. showed up again. When he called, he said that he must see his Russian friend in order to report something very important. I proposed to meet somewhere in a restaurant or cafe.

After weighing the pros and cons, it was decided to accept the proposal, especially since the meeting was supposed to be in a public place, moreover, together with their wives.

They met in one of the restaurants in the "international" district of Vienna. By the time the scout and his wife arrived at the restaurant, the couple G. was already in place. The table they had booked was in the center of the room. After a glass of champagne, wife G. invited Klaus to dance, while Robert danced with his wife. At the end of the dance, they sat down in pairs: men and women separately. G. was obviously nervous and finally said why this meeting was organized. One of his acquaintances, according to the American, has accurate information that Klaus allegedly has disagreements with the Kremlin, and therefore he will be recalled to Moscow in the near future, where he will face big troubles. Considering Klaus a friend, Robert couldn't help but tell him about it. Moreover, he is ready to provide any assistance, although he did not specify what kind of assistance could be discussed.

The scout's attempts to express doubt about G.'s words, since there are no grounds for them, did not lead to anything. G. continued to refer to the fact that the person who informed him about the recall had access to the most secret information. Klaus thanked him for the information and said that time would put everything in its place.

This conversation was a kind of reconnaissance in battle. Robert soon left the country. But less than two months later, the operative began to notice that some strange thing was going on around him.
fuss.

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Once, when he was receiving visitors, a young married couple entered the office and literally from the doorstep asked for political asylum. He is a Latin American, the son of a hereditary diplomat, a diplomat himself, works in Germany. She is German

Originally from Germany, they came to Austria for a few days on vacation. Neither he nor she could give intelligible explanations for their step. They just heard a lot of good things about the Soviet Union, and therefore they want to live there. At the request of the consul, they wrote down the essence of the issue, filled out questionnaires and wrote autobiographies. The matter was asked to be considered in an expedited manner. A couple of days later they again visited the consulate, but they again did not show much interest in them, and they disappeared from the horizon.

Some time later, at the end of the working day, a huge fellow stumbled into the consulate. Posing as an American student, he asked for a visa to the Soviet Union, about which he heard a lot of interesting things, right now, immediately. Playing a simpleton, he immediately offered to continue the conversation in some restaurant. Refused to complete the forms. Having met no support, he left the consulate and no longer appeared.

Around the same time, a local Soviet citizen living in the American sector of Vienna visited the consulate. This was not her first visit to the consulate. She visited him before, like other local Soviet citizens. This time she said that it would be a good idea for the consul to occasionally visit local Soviet citizens at home. She was smartly dressed, behaved coquettishly. Everything was calculated to ensure that she was noticed as a woman. Of course, Nalivaiko refused the invitation, citing the fact that he was very busy at work - the end of the year.

Each of these episodes by itself said little. But taken together, they provided food for thought. Otherwise, everything seemed to be calm. This continued until the end of January 1955, when the course of events accelerated.

One day at about half past eleven the bell rang at the consulate. The wife asked to urgently come home, explaining this by her daughter's illness.

By this time, our employees lived in the embassy, in the English sector of Vienna. Before Klaus crossed the threshold of the apartment, he felt something was wrong. The daughter ran out to meet him, and the wife immediately took her husband to the kitchen, the window of which overlooked the courtyard of the embassy, where she told him about what had happened. After seeing him off to work, she and her daughter went to the bakery. Two blocks from the embassy, I suddenly saw Robert get out of the car. After explaining that he was in Vienna on a business trip, he introduced his "friend" who got out of the same car. No name, no surname wife

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didn't remember. Having said that his "friend" had an important matter for Boris, G., referring to being busy, immediately left, saying that he would call later.

A "friend", according to his wife's description, an athletic, large man of 40-45 years old, took out a package from the side pocket of his overcoat and in the purest Russian asked to hand it over directly to her husband. Having coped with her excitement, the wife declared that she was not going to accept any packages. If there is a need, he can visit the consulate and convey to the husband what he considers necessary. The American, however, continued to insist. He said that the package contained very important documents, that it was, as he put it, about the well-being of the whole family.

Realizing that a provocation was being played out and there was nowhere to wait for help, she, taking her daughter by the hand, quickly entered the laundry located nearby. Taking a deep breath, I went to the bakery. Having bought bread, she glanced around the street, but did not notice anyone, left the store to get home faster. But before she had time to take even ten steps, the same "well-wisher" again turned out to be next to her. Apologizing for his intrusiveness, he said that, in her husband's interest, he and Robert would not like to appear in person at the consulate. Since she refuses to accept the package, he asks her to at least skim through the contents. At the same time, he pulled out of the envelope and unfolded before the eyes of Nalivaiko's wife a page of the local newspaper Wiener Kurir (Vienna Courier). The imprint of the signal number, typed in large type, caught my eye. Under

under the heading "Soviet consul - spy" there was placed an article occupying almost the entire page and two photographs of the intelligence officer. There were also photographs of two German citizens of the GDR, one of whom Klaus' wife knew in Berlin.

Before she could finish the story, the phone rang. In an apologetic tone, Robert began to explain why they had decided to meet with his wife first and not with Klaus himself. Abruptly cutting him off, the operative stated that he did not expect anything like that from him. His wife, he said, is very upset and still cannot recover from everything that has happened, and if G. wants to tell something, he is waiting for him tomorrow morning at the consulate. Having finished this conversation, Klaus hung up.

So the workout is over. The case was coming to an end. The material accumulated by the American intelligence services on our intelligence officer, apparently, was decided to be implemented. The time and place of action are appropriate - the eve of the signing of the State Treaty with Austria.

As a result of the analysis of the situation, the residency developed a plan of action. In accordance with it, the enemy had to strengthen himself in the idea that neither the officer nor his wife had told anyone about what had happened to them. At the end of lunch time, he must return to the consulate every time and continue to work, as

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if nothing had happened. Do not appear at the Imperial Hotel, where the residency was located. Issues that arise should be discussed with the resident or his deputy at lunchtime or in the evening at the embassy.

The minimum task is to drag out the denouement so that it happens in February, when a representative of the Soviet occupation forces will be at the head of the allied commandant's office.

At a personal meeting with G. at the consulate or talking on the phone, as a condition for continuing contact, insist that the American no longer call either home or office, but give a telephone number by which he can be contacted.

The next morning, Klaus was at the consulate, receiving visitors. G. never showed up. However, before the scout had time to come home for lunch, the phone rang. Robert called. He confusedly explained that he did not go to the consulate because he did not want to aggravate the difficult situation in which the security officer found himself. He offered to meet in the city. Following the puff tactics, Klaus after "some hesitation" agreed to a meeting, but only with him alone. He said that he would inform about the time and place later, for this he asked for a phone number by which he could contact. G. readily called the number. He promised not to call again.

It was a victory, albeit a small one. The initiative to maintain contact passed into our hands.

Having received the consent of the Center, the intelligence officer called G. from the city pay phone. The tube was removed instantly. The impression is that they are on duty near the telephone. Robert was on the line. Beyond expectations, the conversation turned out to be easy. No reproaches for the long silence. G. agreed with everything that the worker offered him.

Apparently, after an awkward meeting with his wife, the Americans decided to be content with little.

We agreed to meet the next day in the Stadtpark near the Strauss monument. The officer warned G. that if he was not alone, he would not approach him. G. assured that he would come alone.

From the very beginning it was clear that a meeting with Robert's partner could not be avoided and that the last point in this confrontation would be put at this meeting. So far, the residency knew only about the fabricated page of the Wiener Kurir newspaper marked "signal number". Did not have

there is no doubt that in case of failure in the main thing that G. and his partner were striving for, this "signal number" will be published.

At the appointed time, Klaus was at the meeting point. G. immediately appeared. He was clearly agitated. Our scout took the initiative of the conversation into his own hands, but he could not really find out anything. For all questions G. sent him to his partner - Francis Manning. So prog

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Noise about the inevitability of a meeting with a partner was confirmed, and then the worker agreed to a meeting with Manning. But on the condition that he documentally confirms his authority to conduct negotiations. G. tried to explain something, but the officer interrupted him, saying that such things are not joked about. This ended the meeting. The scout told Robert that he would call in a couple of days.

The development of events has reached the finish line.

The plan of priority, urgent measures was practically implemented. February came, and the allied commandant's office, which the residency counted on for help in case of need, was headed by a representative of the Soviet occupation forces. The enemy, apparently, was convinced that neither the scout nor his wife had told anyone about the incident. The initiative in the question of when and how to meet now belonged to our employee.

Further plans boiled down to the following. The meeting with Manning's participation is held in a public place (cafe or restaurant) immediately after work, on Saturday. In the course of the conversation, when it comes to blackmail, Klaus makes a public scandal. The High Commissioner formally protests the incident to the American side.

The most difficult was the choice of meeting place. The residency decided to take a flexible position. Offer not one, but several places, but such, among which the American side would be satisfied with only one. As a result, we settled on the respectable Gartenbau cafe. Located in the center of the city, moreover, in the "international" district of Vienna, it should have been of interest to the Americans. Two other places (it was decided to offer a choice of three) for the Americans were unacceptable. One, although located in the same "international" region, was quite often visited by representatives of the Soviet colony. The other was generally located in the Soviet sector of Vienna.

Two painfully long days passed. The American side strictly adhered to the agreement. Not a single call.

On Friday, on the eve of the operation, the intelligence officer stopped the car at a pay phone and called his "guardians". As in the previous time, the tube was immediately removed. The apparatus was Robert. After greeting him, Klaus said that he was ready to meet with Manning the next day on Saturday evening, after finishing work. I immediately asked how things are with the fulfillment of the conditions set. G. again tried to explain something, but the officer interrupted him, saying that otherwise there was no point in the meeting. Then the American, exchanging a few words in English with Manning, said that yes, of course, the conditions would be met. As if thinking, Klaus named three predetermined

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places. G. asked to wait. After consulting with Manning, he opted for the Gartenbau Cafe. Everything worked as intended.

If the employee was under surveillance, and it must be assumed that this was the case, then a call from a pay phone should have reassured the organizers of the surveillance.

The evening before, together with the leadership of the residency, the details of the upcoming operation were clarified. Cover in the restaurant was provided by two people. Physical protection, if necessary, was entrusted to one of the recently arrived in Vienna employees of the residency, not yet known to the Americans. The second was the residency interpreter, who was also not in the field of view of the Americans. She had to come to the cafe in advance, take a place closer to the front door and carefully monitor what would happen. As soon as a scandal arises, call the commandant's office from the pay phone located at the entrance. The actions of the commandant's office were clearly specified during a personal meeting with the commandant.

On Saturday, February 5, the consul finished his work somewhat earlier than usual. When I got home, I put on a dress suit. He had a diplomatic passport and money with him in case he had to pay for dinner. The scout went to the meeting calmly, being self-confident.

Exactly at six o'clock in the evening he entered the cafe. It was packed with visitors. Sliding his eyes around the hall, he saw Robert giving a sign with his hand. We must pay tribute to Manning and G.: they chose the place correctly. A table for three people was located in the left corner of the back wall of the hall. Next to it is the entrance to the kitchen and work rooms, and hence the exit to the street. They settled down opposite each other, leaving a free place, taking which, the consul turned out to be with his back to the hall. Apart from a palm tree in a tub on the left, a curtained window in front of him, and one table on the right, he could see nothing else. G. was on the left, Manning on the right.

After exchanging greetings and introducing Manning, Robert offered them something to drink.

The beginning of the conversation was banal: about the weather, the cozy atmosphere in the cafe, about Vienna and the crowns. Both apologized for their tactlessness towards the diplomat's wife. It was a bridge to take the conversation in a different direction.

One could only guess about the arsenal of means of influence that Manning intended to resort to in order to persuade the employee to go over to the West, they were talked about by the CIA concocted issue of the newspaper Wiener Kurir. Klaus took a wait-and-see attitude, mostly listening, getting off with insignificant remarks.

But nothing new was said to substantiate the motives why they decided to provide him with "help". When it comes to mother

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The intelligence officer, interrupting Manning, said that before discussing specific issues, he would like to make sure of his powers. Manning replied that he was aware of the demand from G. and that he had such authority. But the document is written in English, which the diplomat, as far as he knows, does not speak. Somewhat bluffing, Klaus replied that although his knowledge of English was limited, it would be enough to understand what the document was about.

Everything went to the point that in a couple of minutes the document could be in the hands of our employee. But how do you keep him? There are two of them. Moreover, Manning is an athletically built man, head and shoulders above our scout.

Only extraordinary, resolute actions could ensure success. The countdown was in seconds. The scout ordered a fresh glass of beer. Then, turning to Manning, he asked him to give a document for review. Slowly, he pulled out a thick paper folded four times from the inside pocket of his jacket, unfolded it and moved it towards the scout, without letting go, however, from his hands. Here our colleague pretended to be offended and declared that if there was no trust in him even in such a small matter, then there was nothing more to talk about. At the same time, getting up from his chair, he made it clear that he was leaving. This had an effect on Manning. He apologized. He said that he was misunderstood, let go of the document, asking, however, to familiarize himself with it unnoticed by the neighbors. Putting the document on his knees, the operative worker began to study it. Precisely consider

and study, not read. He really did not know English, but he figured out that it was dated January 18, issued by the State Department, and his entire family appeared in the text. In the upper left corner is a large embossed seal. Below is a signature, whose one, of course, he could not make out. Manning and G. watched carefully. Meanwhile, the waiter brought three glasses of beer, wished him a pleasant appetite and left. Continuing to hold the document in his left hand and pretending to carefully read it, the scout took a glass in his right hand and instantly threw its contents into Robert's face. Later he regretted that G. was sitting on the left side, and not Manning. Immediately placing the glass on the table, he shifted the document into his right hand and, thrusting it into his pocket, slapped Manning with his left. Unlike Robert, who stood at the table in confusion and wiped his face with a handkerchief, Manning quickly grabbed Klaus by the right hand, which he had not yet managed to pull out of his pocket, and bent him to the floor, bending himself. But it was too late. The document was already hidden in the inside pocket of his jacket. At that moment, our "bodyguard" jumped up to the table.

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tel" and delivered a glancing blow to Manning's neck. From surprise, he jumped to his feet, grabbed a chair standing nearby, lifted it up and brought it to hit the huge window overlooking the street, apparently intending to leave the cafe in this way. Seeing, however, that no one was kidnapping him, Manning put the chair back in its place. Meanwhile, the visitors got up from their seats and approached the fighters. The owner of the cafe appeared, accompanied by waiters.

Loudly for everyone to hear, Klaus expressed his indignation in German at the provocative actions against the Soviet consul by the Americans. By the reaction of the hall, he felt that the sympathy of the visitors was on his side. The front door opened wide, and about fifteen grenadiers in black greatcoats and helmets with two huge German Shepherds on a leash burst into the cafe. The Consul even lost his head. But then I realized that it was the Austrian police. Apparently, the owner or someone else from the service staff called the police station located around the corner, and literally in a matter of minutes the team was on the spot. Since the conflict took place between representatives of the occupying authorities, the policemen limited themselves to the fact that, lining up in a semicircle, they separated the three from the rest of the public.

A few minutes later, a patrol car of the inter-allied commandant's office arrived. Posing as a Soviet consul and informing the arrived outfit about the essence of the conflict, Klaus asked to bring the Americans to the commandant's office in order to establish their identities. Manning immediately declared that without a representative of the American consulate they would not leave the cafe and would not go to any commandant's office.

By order of the senior patrol team, its American representative contacted his leader by phone and asked to send a consular representative to the conflict site.

Considering their mission ended, the Austrian police left the cafe. A few minutes later, a car with an American diplomatic representative drove up. He invited Menning and G. into his car, in which they were taken to the commandant's office.

The audience calmed down and sat down again at their tables. The scout was left alone. After asking the waiter if the bill was paid, and having received an affirmative answer, he headed for the exit.

After walking a few steps, I saw my kind "bodyguard". Shaking hands, they silently walked on. Before reaching the hotel, he took out of his pocket and handed over to the consul a package hidden by the American during the conflict behind a tub with a palm tree. As it turned out later, the same ill-fated but

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measures of the newspaper "Wiener Kurir". Apparently, frightened of capture, G. decided to get rid of compromising material.

Arriving at the hotel, the consul found a smiling resident, his deputy, an interpreter who participated in the operation, and a cipher clerk. They were already informed about the final operation. The commandant reported that both Americans had been taken to the commandant's office.

Klaus gave the Resident the document he had taken from Manning.

Here is the text of this document:

United States Department of State Washington DC

January 18, 1955

SPECIAL DIRECTION

In accordance with the decision of the Secretary of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, establishment in the United States of America is permitted under Act No. 110 named persons:

Boris Ya. Nalivaiko, 2nd Secretary, Consul of the USSR Embassy in Vienna. Yanina A. Nalivaiko, wife. Svetlana Nalivaiko, daughter.

The named persons were instructed to be accompanied by Colonel F. Manning of the American Army. This officer is responsible for following the procedures prescribed by Law No. 110, which he must strictly follow.

The Head of the US Mission in Austria, as well as the Commander-in-Chief of the US Forces in Austria, are ordered to provide Colonel Manning with every possible assistance in the successful completion of the mission entrusted to him.

For Secretary of State (signed)

Special Assistant Roger D. Forkswart

On the same evening, the US High Commissioner in Austria, L.E. Thomson was sent a note of protest about the provocative actions of American officials against Soviet diplomat.

On Sunday, all of Vienna knew about the incident. As for the document confiscated from Manning, this was not mentioned either in the note of protest or in the newspapers. This was done by the residency deliberately, for tactical reasons.

Two days later, on Tuesday, Austrian newspapers published a brief information from the American side, from the text of which you

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flowed approximately as follows: an American citizen Robert G, a journalist by profession who served after the defeat of fascist Germany in Berlin, is currently finishing work on a book in which he describes Germany of those years based on personal impressions. To collect the missing material, he arrived in Europe, where he decided to meet to clarify some details with his old acquaintance from Berlin, now the Soviet consul in Vienna. During the meeting, which took place at the end of January, the consul, unexpectedly for G., turned to him with a request to assist him in leaving for the United States. Not knowing how this was done, G. promised to arrange a meeting of the consul with one of the Americans competent in such matters. When such a meeting took place, the consul made a scandal and accused both of provocations,

which he organized. Similar in content, although without details, was the response of US Deputy High Commissioner D.K. Penfield to our protest.

After analyzing both, the residency came to the conclusion that Manning hid from the local leadership the fact of the loss of the document issued to him by the US State Department. The next day, a photocopy of the document confiscated from Manning appeared in the pages of the Austrian newspapers with a comment that brushed aside the American version. It was noted that the State Department document authorizing the consul and his family to settle in the United States was dated January 18, while, according to the American version, the Soviet consul turned to G. for help in the last days of January.

Two days later, the newspapers published an official report that Colonel Manning and Robert G. had left by plane for the United States. The Americans did not dare to go for a backup variant of our worker's promotion. After all, the signal issue of the Wiener Kurir newspaper also ended up in our hands.

On February 23, the embassy hosted a traditional reception on the occasion of the Day of the Soviet Army and Navy. This was the first publication of our colleague after the events of February 5. He involuntarily appeared almost in the center of attention. The greatest interest, oddly enough, was shown by the Americans. Many of them approached him, teasing their unlucky compatriots. On the offer to drink on the occasion of the holiday, they answered with humor that with pleasure, but not beer.

On May 15, the signing ceremony of the State Treaty on the Restoration of an Independent and Democratic Austria took place at the Belvedere Palace. On the part of the allies, it was attended by foreign ministers specially arrived for this purpose: the USSR - Molotov, England - Macmillan, France - Pinay and US Secretary of State Dulles. After signing the contract, all

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they went out onto the central balcony of the palace together with Austrian Chancellor Raab and Foreign Minister Figl, holding an open folder with a treaty in their outstretched hands. They were greeted by thousands of jubilant crowds gathered on the vast green lawn in front of the palace.

On the same evening, at the Schönbrunn Palace, the summer residence of the Habsburgs, the Austrian government gave a big reception, and six months later, on October 25, the last foreign soldier left the territory of Austria.

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Operation Turtle

Christmas holidays in Germany, as well as throughout Europe, are fun, festive days. Children and adults are busy with pleasant chores - they buy gifts, various cracker jokes. A traditional Christmas goose is being prepared for the table.

But the resident of the foreign intelligence service of the KGB of the USSR in Bonn in December 1957 had no time for holidays. For the third day now, he had kept a telegram from the Center at hand, which said: "Take measures to obtain the necessary information about the last meeting of the NATO Chiefs of Staff in Brussels on the issue of increasing the number of nuclear weapons in Europe."

By this time, he had prepared a list of persons who could have the necessary information about the last meeting of the NATO Chiefs of Staff. It included high-ranking employees of the German Foreign Ministry, the Office of the Chancellor, several generals of the Bundeswehr and two secretaries involved in the processing of materials.

The residency did not have direct approaches to these persons, and time passed - the task of the Center was rather urgent. The resident looked thoughtfully at the women's photographs several times. Especially one of them, a blond woman with large dark eyes, whom he dubbed "Margaret" to himself.

We managed to get a brief description of "Margaret": German, thirty years old, divorced from her husband, no children, very attractive appearance, not indifferent to men, but picky in relationships, as she would like to have a permanent partner. She enjoys dancing and attends dance clubs. They also found out the address in Bonn, where "Margaret" lived alone.

well well

Excited couples ran out of the doors of the dance hall every now and then, cars drove up and drove off, laughter and music were heard.

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On the opposite side of the street, near a tobacco shop, stood a tall young man in a dark mid-season coat and a gray velor hat. He carefully peered into the faces of people around the ballroom, especially those who entered and left it.

Suddenly, a man appeared at the door wearing a coat slung over his shoulders. He disappeared among the cars in the parking lot, after a while drove up to the exit in a large Ford and remained behind the wheel. The man at the tobacco kiosk was alert. Soon two girls and a guy in a leather jacket came out of the door. All three, laughing merrily, got into the car, and the Ford took off. In one of the women, the observer recognized the one he had been waiting for. He slowly lit a cigarette from an expensive fashionable lighter and discreetly glanced at the small photograph, which he pressed to the box of cigarettes. There was no doubt. It was Margaret.

The next day "Marcello", a handsome 33-year-old Italian, bought a huge bouquet of roses and went to the address known to him to "Margaret". "Marcello's" face is swarthy, his eyes are brown, the same as those of "Margaret", on his forehead there is a small old scar left from a wound, which in the eyes of women gave him a special attractiveness.

Climbing the stairs to the third floor of the house where "Margaret" lived, "Marcello" mentally repeated his legend once more. He is an international journalist, interested in the problems of armaments, lives with his mother in Cologne, came to Bonn for a few days to one of the editorial offices. And yesterday at the dance I saw "Margaret" and decided to get to know her.

"Marcello" was indeed a professional international journalist who collaborated not only with many newspapers and magazines, but also with Soviet intelligence, and for several years had maintained close relations with it. The profession of a freelance journalist, that is, a person not associated with a specific editorial office, allowed him to freely travel to various cities.

In front of the door "Marcello" stopped, thought, and then sharply pressed the bell button. Nobody opened. Marcello called again. Finally, footsteps were heard and the door opened. On the threshold, dressed in a dressing gown, stood "Margaret". Today she seemed to "Marcello" even more attractive, although she was in home clothes.

- Whom do you want? - the young woman looked with surprise and curiosity at the tall, handsome man, at his tanned face and a small, barely noticeable scar on his forehead. But more often than not, her gaze rested on a large bouquet of tea roses.

- Who do you want? she repeated her question, never taking her eyes off the delicate pink and white petals.

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"You," "Marcello" took off his hat and smiled, which made his face more friendly.

- Me? "Margaret" asked with even more surprise and embarrassment.

- Yes, you.

"I don't know you, it's the first time I've seen you..."

"The fact that you do not know me is true, but what you see for the first time is not. I even danced yesterday you.

"I danced with many yesterday, but I don't remember you," Margaret said quietly. Then, already completely embarrassed, she asked: ~ And the flowers for me? - and suddenly, recollecting herself, she said quickly: - Why are we standing on the threshold, go into the apartment.

"Margaret" invited "Marcello" into a small, tastefully furnished dining room, offered to sit in an armchair, poured water and put flowers in a vase, turned on the kettle in the kitchen and, apologizing, went to change. A few minutes later they were already sitting at the table and drinking coffee. And "Margaret" with undisguised curiosity looked first at "Marcello", then at those standing between them flowers.

"So you say," "Margaret" continued the interrupted conversation, "that you danced with me yesterday. May be. But how did you get my address?

- I liked you so much that I decided to wait until you left the hall, took a taxi and followed your car.

And "Marcello" described in detail the companions of "Margaret" and the car in which they left.

"Noah, I don't even know your name..." "Margaret" blushed.

"Aya you," "Marcello" laughed and kissed her hand.

So the acquaintance took place.

well well

On that first evening when they met, "Marcello" could have stayed the night, but deliberately did not do this, but returned to spend the night at the hotel. The next Sunday they went for a walk out of town together, and again "Marcello" returned to his hotel for the night. His trips to Bonn became more and more frequent - now to the editorial office of the newspaper "Anzeiger", then to another, and relations with "Margaret" are getting closer and stronger. And only when "Marcello" was convinced that "Margaret" was attached to him with all her heart, he allowed himself closeness with her.

"Margaret" was interested in his work, and "Marcello" told her about his trips not only to the cities of Germany, but also to other European countries.

One night, "Margaret", in turn, told where she had been abroad, and in particular about the last trip to Brussels. Speaking of this, she remarked that the general with whom she

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traveled to Brussels and for whom he works as a secretary, invites her to marry him.

"But he is much older than me." "Margaret" paused and gently clung to "Marcello". Now I don't know what to do...

"Marcello" repeated not for the first time that he was a confirmed bachelor, had never been married and was not going to do so.

Arguing with "Margaret" about her upcoming marriage, "Marcello" was most interested in the content of the meeting of the NATO Chiefs of Staff and, finally, asked her, if possible, to show him specific documents, on the basis of which he could more plausibly prepare your articles, and with the fee received to buy her a gift.

The next day at lunchtime, "Margaret" brought the promised documents. "Marcello" in secret from "Margaret" re-photographed them, and she took the papers to their original place. The assignment was done.

"Margaret" gave "Marcello" a copy of the minutes of the secret meeting of the NATO Chiefs of Staff in Brussels. The alignment of forces between the member states of the North Atlantic bloc and their positions in relation to the members of the Warsaw Pact became clear.

well well

Returning to East Berlin, "Marcello" reported to the resident about the solution of the task and the establishment of close relations with "Margaret", which made it possible to complete this task. Unexpectedly, the resident recommended "Marcello" to continue and expand good relations with "Margaret", taking into account her connections in NATO structures. The Resident hoped that "Marcello" in this way would be able to continue to receive secret documents from NATO headquarters.

So he did, although, returning from Bonn and considering the task completely completed, he did not intend to maintain relations with "Margaret".

The unexpected proposal of the resident excited and delighted Marcello at the same time. He really liked this beautiful and intelligent woman, he liked her even, non-capricious character.

But "Margaret" wanted to get married, wanted to have a permanent life partner, and "Marcello" was not at all going to part with his single position.

"Well, okay," thought Marcello, clutching a bouquet of tea roses, "come what may, further life will show..."

He knew that she loved tea roses, preferring them to other flowers. And he liked, giving flowers, to see the joy in the eyes of "Margaret".

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They often spent time together. We walked along the Rhine embankment in Bonn. We went to Kassel, visited the castle of Wilhelm and the State Museum of German Wallpaper. We were on the island of Neuwerk near Hamburg, which at low tide can be reached by sea on a cart.

Years passed. The relationship between "Margaret" and "Marcello" was constantly growing stronger. They spent more and more time together. "Marcello" practically attracted "Margaret" to constant cooperation with Soviet intelligence, without fully revealing all the cards, that is, as they say in intelligence, "in the dark." The resident was right. "Margaret" constantly handed over to "Marcello" secret documents about the position of NATO and other blocs created at the initiative of the United States, which he asked to get under the pretext of writing journalistic articles. Blinded by love, she did not give much thought to their real purpose. And "Marcello" sometimes showed her "his" articles on this topic in the central newspapers and magazines of the FRG, and if other names were indicated there, he explained that these were his journalistic pseudonyms. For fees, he presented "Margaret" with gifts.

As a result, Soviet intelligence for many years had the opportunity to obtain documentary information not only on NATO bodies, but also secret documentary information about the activities and intentions of the governments of the FRG and West Berlin.

Once "Marcello", leaving for another business trip, gave "Margaret" a small turtle in memory of their meetings, which he named after her.

But everything in life comes to an end. For a number of reasons, "Marcello" was not in Bonn for a long time, and when he came back to this city, he found out that "Margaret" had married the old general and moved to another apartment. When leaving, she did not forget to take a little turtle with her.

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"Rosemary"

The people I want to talk about, unfortunately, are no longer alive. Only the memory of their doomed love and a random color photograph broken off at the edges remained. Nearly half a century ago, in the very late 1940s, it was apparently taken by a street photographer at the noisy, frothy rapids of a waterfall fifteen miles northwest of Washington.

I do not presume to assert (no one will ever know this), but the picture of two carelessly smiling people coincided, it seems to me, with the beginning of their acquaintance. In any case, neither before nor after this meeting, they have not been in those parts, just as they did not find themselves twice in the same place. But there were serious reasons for that.

Two sympathetic young people are looking at me from the photo, not at all expecting that the impassive lens of the camera will choose them from the idle crowd of tourists. In Yevgeny Samoilov, a film actor surprisingly similar to everyone's favorite of the early 1940s, I immediately recognized Alexei Kirillovich Morozov, then a young diplomat who had come almost straight from the front to work at our embassy in the United States. Even before the war, he completed short-term courses for diplomats at the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and was preparing for distribution.

The woman was unfamiliar to me. A mop of jet-black curly hair framed a ruddy face with wide-set dark blue eyes.

"This is Eva Fischer," a member of the intelligence archive told me. ~ Haven't you ever heard of her?

In response, I just shook my head and shrugged.

"This was my first operational case, which I started working on when I was still a very young intelligence officer. I remember that at first the management of the department treated this story as a banal

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noah "love story" and did not attach much importance to it. I was forced to prepare a telegram to the Washington residency with the following content:

Washington, com. Klim!

As we have learned, one of the senior officials of the embassy (now Groom) has established suspicious off-duty connections with an American citizen (now Rose-Marie), who is suspected of collaborating with local counterintelligence. Given the possibility of organizing a provocation against the Bridegroom by the American intelligence services, we suggest holding a preventive conversation with him, reminding him of the basic rules of conduct.

Soviet citizens abroad. During the conversation, make it clear to the Bridegroom that in the event of continued unauthorized contact with Rose-Marie, he will be recalled from a business trip to give appropriate explanations.

- And the information, I remember, - continued the employee of the archive, - was obtained from the most "reliable source" - from the wife of Alexei Morozov. In a conversation with one of the embassy ladies, she jealously complained that her husband began to linger more often at work and a couple of times he was accidentally seen in the company of a young woman while visiting art salons. Later, Alexey explained to his wife that this was Eva Fisher, an American art critic. Her parents are from Russia, and she intends, with the help of the State Department and the Soviet Embassy in Washington, to organize an exhibition of paintings by old Russian masters in one of the local art galleries.

Everything was so. Alexis didn't lie. He did not have this habit at all. The only thing he was capable of in this situation was not to tell the whole truth, to keep silent about something. But about the most important thing - the feeling of spiritual tenderness for Eve - he still kept silent.

Soon this tenderness grew into passion, into the torment of anticipation of the upcoming meeting, which was more and more difficult and dangerous for violators of the "moral code" to organize. What naive tricks lovers did not go to! But fate wanted the denouement of this romantic story to follow a completely unpredictable and unexpected path. And it happened like this.

Urgent embassy affairs did not allow Alexei to see his beloved for two weeks even for a minute.

Finally, life went back to normal for Alexei, and the lovers met in one of the suburban restaurants.

"I thought a lot about you and me, Eva," Alexei gently stroked the graceful hand of a girl with impeccable manicure. - What is boo

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do we have more children? Every minute I thought about you, literally imagined where you are, how you look, what you are doing. I even sometimes thought that I hear your voice

"I, too, have been with you all this time in my heart. But unlike you, I had the opportunity to follow you more specifically. Eve glanced playfully at the agitated man.

- What do you mean? Alexey was worried.

"Don't worry, dear, as long as we are together, nothing threatens us. Except, of course, your wife and the "all-seeing eye" of your embassy staff...

~ And the notorious "cap" F-bi-ay? Alexey objected.

"Don't let that worry you. I... and there is FBI, FBI, - stammering, like a schoolgirl who hasn't learned her lesson, Eve exhaled and immediately added: - Calm down. I know everything about you and your friends at the embassy. I receive and pass every day to the FBI leadership reports of covert surveillance of you. I know almost everyone who is following you, who recruits provocateurs and whom exactly, I know who the FBI has especially "laid" its eye on and whom it intends to try to attract to secret cooperation. But I love you, Alexei, and I won't hurt you. You can trust me and count on me.

"So you played this comedy with me from the very beginning?" - Alexei, stunned, asked almost in a whisper.

— No, dear! We met quite by accident, and you are my first and only love. I cursed myself for not telling you about everything earlier, but I was afraid of losing you, pushing you away, scaring you... I am doing everything in my power to take our employees away from you. I explain to our management that I personally want to succeed in working with you and that I have already succeeded a lot ... For your sake, for the sake of our happiness and our future, at any moment when you say, I can prove to you the sincerity of my feelings. Maybe this will help you somehow...

Eva excitedly opened her purse embroidered with black beads.

- Here, Alyosha! Take it. You can throw it away right away, you can read it and hand it over to your security service. It doesn't matter to me anymore. This package contains my fear, my destiny. If they find it with you or with me, it's over. At best, a hard labor prison ...

Morozov hesitantly took the package and looked inside.

- What is this?

- Secret reports from FBI agents last week about the surveillance of the Soviet embassy. These are not originals, I had to hand them over to the management," Eva explained, "but copies. I took them off myself. If your superiors are interested in my information (she used this very word), then I ask you to arrange a personal meeting for me with a responsible employee of your embassy to find out exactly how I can be useful to you ...

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Moscow, Comrade Biryukov (personally). Out of turn

The fiancé, after a thorough two-hour conversation with him at the direction of the Center, did not heed our recommendations and continued secret meetings with Rose-Marie, about which he later reported to the leadership of the embassy. He was forced to do this because Rose-Marie gave him today copies of secret FBI documents on the activities of American intelligence agencies against the Soviet agencies in Washington. She motivated her act with love for the Bridegroom and the desire to protect him and his friends from possible actions by the American counterintelligence. Rose Marie has shown a willingness to continue to provide us with such classified information in the future. The materials received from Rose-Marie are currently being processed and translated. In connection with the current situation, we consider it expedient to transfer Rose-Marie to permanent contact with an experienced employee of the residency Peter and withdraw the Bridegroom from further operational actions related to this operation. The further stay of the Bridegroom in Washington is at the discretion of his department and the Center. We are working on the possibility of a reasoned return of the Bridegroom to his homeland. I ask for instructions. Klim.

The answer was not long in coming. A far from ordinary situation developed, and it was felt at the Center earlier and more deeply than at the scene of action.

Washington, Comrade Klim (personally). Out of turn

The Center reviewed the materials received from Rose-Marie and highly appreciated their operational significance and the possibility of obtaining them in the future. The need to maintain constant contact with Rose-Marie is undeniable. We consider transferring it to Peter to be unpredictable in terms of possible consequences, and therefore erroneous. Contact with Rose-Marie should be maintained only by the Bridegroom, clearly instructed by you on issues of comprehensive secrecy. Tomorrow you will receive questions to ask Rose-Marie during her next upcoming meeting with the Bridegroom. Make sure that no personal or domestic worries distract the Bridegroom from meeting with Rose Marie and carrying out our assignments. Biryukov.

So, thanks to the Center's decision, meetings between Alexei and Eva became more frequent. They felt good together, they forgot about everything and everyone on

light, and each of their dates seemed only a prelude to a new one, even hotter and more joyful. They forgot about the danger that lay in wait for them at every step, naively believing that everything would work out, settle down, and pass them by.

But the intelligence resident could not think so, who rightly believed that it was necessary to take all possible measures to ensure their safety in order to prevent the FBI agents from getting on the trail of the lovers. In the residency, a special meeting was held in a narrow circle on the issue of ensuring the safety of the Bridegroom and Rose-Marie, and none of the participants were told the names of the real characters of this important and delicate operation. Each of those present received a personal task from the resident: one selected meeting places, the other developed check routes, the third came up with combinations to distract FBI surveillance officers.

The most difficult and delicate role was assumed by the resident - a middle-aged man and experienced in life's collisions. He came up with the idea to load the impressionable Lyudmila Vasilievna - Alexei's wife - with useful work and distract her from thoughts that are dangerous for the business about her husband's off-duty activity. So Morozova became responsible for the mass cultural sector of the trade union committee of the Soviet embassy in Washington.

And a miracle happened! If earlier collective trips to the city on excursions or trips to memorable places in nearby states were a big event in the life of the Soviet colony in Washington, now, with the arrival of Lyudmila Vasilievna as a cultist, everything has changed.

Travel and excursions began to be organized on weekdays, and not on Sundays or holidays, which caused some surprise. But the organizers found a quite convincing explanation: on weekdays everything is much cheaper and there is no large influx of local American tourists. And only the insiders knew the real reason for such a travel schedule: as soon as the embassy bus driven by the "team captain" Lyudmila Vasilievna Morozova left the District of Columbia, Alexei, as agreed in advance, disappeared from work to go to meeting with Eva.

They always had topics for conversations and memories. We talked about childhood, student years, hobbies. Alexey talked about the war in which he happened to participate, and Eva talked about the situation in the highest echelon of the Hoover FBI. She told why she, a bachelor of arts, was suddenly "pulled" into the dangerous sphere of the police service, which at that time was literally obsessed with hunting for the "reds". The atmosphere of "McCarthyism" choked America in those years.

Sometimes they talked about the family life of Alexei and his wife Lyudmila Vasilievna. It was during one of these conversations that Eva,

tearing her eyes away from her knitting, she calmly, even somehow unnecessarily casually said:

— You know, Alyosha, the other day I received an interesting offer! What do you think?

- For work? Alexei asked.

- No, it's personal.

- Isn't it love? - Alexey remarked jokingly.

- Exactly! How did you guess?

"I would be surprised if such a beauty as you were not offered this kind of offer every single day.

"People like this," Eve answered thoughtfully, "no. And my old friend from university made it. I even had a little crush on him. His name is Mark Goldberg. He studied at a course older than me and tried to look after me. So, the other day, Mark called me at work and invited me to lunch. We met and Mark got right down to business. He invited me to California with him, and forever.

Cold sweat broke out on Alexei's forehead. He never expected such a turn.

Are you kidding, Eva? Are you playing me?

- Not at all. Mark has hinted at this possibility before, but I've always shied away from the conversation. Now, it seems, he put the question squarely. His father recently died in San Francisco, the owner of the second largest insurance company in California in terms of influence and volume of operations, and Mark became the sole heir to his father's business and capital. So he decided to invite me to his "business" not only as a partner, but mainly as a wife.

- And what did you answer him?

"As before, nothing. Although, you understand, such a chance in life may never happen again. But I love you, and that makes me take my time answering Mark. And our common work with you is not finished yet...

The resident, to whom Alexei told in detail the next day about this meeting with Eva, he understood that at that moment one should not torment the soul of a person who already could not find a place for himself. He tried in every possible way to encourage Alexei, to calm him down, to pay tribute to him for "a highly responsible and important work for the Motherland." The resident entrusted his own personal emotions only to the telegraph form.

Moscow, Comrade Biryukov (personally). Out of turn

During the next meeting of the Bridegroom with Rose-Marie, an unexpected complication occurred. Rose Marie said she could forever poke

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take a job in the department of interest to us and move to permanent residence in California. The reason is her possible marriage. I believe that this turn of events poses a serious threat to our work with Rose-Marie.

The hot, stuffy Washington summer came that year somehow at once, bypassing the freshness and joy of spring coolness. Asphalt has already begun to melt on the streets of deserted Washington.

Alexei hardly slept that night before the next meeting with Eva. The damp pillow now and then slipped to the floor, and the sheet rolled into a tight tourniquet. Thoughts about the upcoming meeting did not go out of my head. He understood that he had become a "victim of the circumstances" that were against him. He was especially worried about some kind of duality and unnaturalness of the situation: on the one hand, a boyishly passionate love for Eve, on the other hand, a desire to fulfill the "secret mission" that suddenly and unexpectedly fell on him as best and more honestly as possible. But these nightly thoughts did not lead to anything, and life seemed hopeless to him. He couldn't change anything.

In the morning, he got into a car hot by the merciless sun, so that, breaking away from possible surveillance, in the evening he would arrive at the place of rendezvous with Eva. He knew the exact working hours of the "police guard" - two or four surveillance teams, which almost around the clock, replacing each other in turn, monitored almost all employees at the height of the cold war.

Soviet representations and institutions in Washington. He also knew about the schedule the FBI had set for him.

Alexei rushed through the still deserted Maryland suburb of Silver Spring with a breeze, turned onto the Beltway, Washington's twelve-lane ring road, and, mingling with the general traffic, drove towards the nearest exit from the highway, where it was possible to almost unmistakably determine the presence of police surveillance. The FBI "tail" was by no means always at the height of the situation and flawlessly performed the role of invisible detectives: they either approached almost bumper to bumper with the car of their "subject", then let it go a fairly considerable distance to change wigs, stick on mustaches and even change cars. But if the persecutors received an order to "try hard," then, as they say, it's all gone. Brigades of other "objects" immediately joined the surveillance, sometimes a police helicopter came into action, which corrected the "chase of the hare" from the air. At that time, technical tricks were still relatively rarely used. Embedding radio beacons in the body or car trim of the surveillance team began a little later.

But the next morning, Alexey did not notice anything suspicious behind him. Obviously, it was. Therefore, after winding an hour or two along washing

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On the outskirts of London, he pulled up to the zoo and, leaving the car in the parking lot, walked up to the fashionable hotel on the side of the ravine and through the underground garage to the exit to Sixteenth Street. He raised his hand, and immediately a taxi driver's Plymouth pulled up to him.

"Dupont-seucler," said Morozov. - To the cinema, please.

The main thing for Morozov was once again to make sure that he was not being followed, and to kill the time left until the moment of meeting with Eva. A week ago, they agreed to establish preliminary visual contact in a small popular jewelry store in Georgetown (an aristocratic district of Washington), and then, if there was no danger, one by one and in different ways to get out of the city "to nature" in advance checked by the forces of the residency secluded

place.

At the appointed hour, Alexey went up to the massive door of the store and took hold of the bronze handle. The door opened unexpectedly easily, and the melodic chime of silver bells informed the owner that a new buyer had arrived. There was a solemn twilight inside, but the showcases richly decorated with jewels were brightly lit. There were three or four more customers in the store, but their faces could not be seen, since they were far away, at the end of the store.

- How can I help you? the salesman inquired kindly, shifting his gaze from the two twin girls standing at the counter to Alexei.

— I would like to choose some kind of ring, preferably with a stone, — answered Alexei. He really wanted to buy a present for Eva: she had her birthday in a couple of weeks.

The seller slowly turned around, opened the door of an old carved cupboard and took out an oblong board covered with black velvet, with slots for the rings inserted into it.

"Please," he said somewhat formally. Here are our latest additions. Please pay attention to these rings: fine workmanship, rare Brazilian turquoise.

At this moment, two visitors standing at the far end of the store, as if on command, quickly ran to the counter where Alexei was standing. From the frightened expression on the faces of the teenage girls, he knew that something serious and unexpected had happened.

Alexei turned his head and saw two strong men. Having pressed their backs to each other, they took up all-round defense, sending multi-charged

pistols.

- Don't move! We shoot without warning! shouted one of the intruders. - Money and gold! Fast!

The one who was facing Alexei grabbed a velvet tablet from his hands and with a deft movement threw the rings into the bag. It was his

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an obvious miscalculation. The bandit lost some fractions of a second and lost sight of the nimble owner of the store. The same one used his chance. Falling down behind the counter, he instantly pressed the hidden button. A powerful siren howled, the lock clicked, and the shop began to fill with bright orange suffocating SMOKE.

And at that moment someone pulled the doorknob and knocked on the door.

"Eve!" – like a fire burned the brain of Alexei.

"Eve," he whispered through white lips.

One of the bandits raised his pistol and fired without aiming towards the door. Then both of them ran up to the counters and, like two wound up automatic machines, began to clear the cabinet, showcases and cash register from jewelry, dropping everything into an open bag.

The howl of the store's sound "surprise" was suddenly blocked by a powerful police siren. The blow of a forged boot on the door, the ringing of broken glass of a shop window - and a police patrol burst into the store, as if into a besieged fortress. Aleksei's strength returned. With one jump, he was at the door and was horrified to see that Eve was lying on the pavement. She was still alive.

Alexei bent down and carefully lifted Eve in his arms. He bowed his head to her and sobbed for the first time in years.

"I refused him, Alyosha," Eva said slowly, emphasizing each word in a whisper.

Those were her last words...

... The working day in the archive was running out, but I still could not force myself to turn the last page of the personal file of Alexei Kirillovich Morozov. However, I already knew that he did not much outlive Eva. A few months later, a severe massive heart attack brought him to the grave. Aleksey Morozov was buried in his native Belarusian land, not far from Gomel, and Eva was buried in the city's Washington cemetery. Death parted them in different lands...

! Alias of the resident.

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Odessa Odyssey

Conventional truth: scouts are not born. They become. In the proposed essay, we want to tell the story of a scout who, having once chosen this profession, did not part with it all his life. At least by choice...

We will talk about Semyon Markovich Semenov, who was born in 1911 and lived in Odessa. A pupil of an orphanage, he began his career after graduating from school as an apprentice at a local rope factory. Then he moved to Moscow. Entered and in 1936 graduated from the Moscow

textile institute. Good command of English. In 1937, he was hired by the state security agencies and sent to the United States a year later.

Semyon Semyonov is an operative who made a significant contribution to the activities of the New York foreign intelligence station in pre-war and wartime conditions.

"Working from 1938 to 1944 in the United States, Major Semenov proved himself to be one of the most active employees of the residency. In fact, he created a line of scientific and technical intelligence in the prewar years, - we read in the official description of the intelligence officer. "He received valuable materials from dozens of agents for explosives, radar equipment, aviation..." Resolution of the head of intelligence P.M. Fitina on the document: "A capable, enterprising, persistent and disciplined worker. Hardworking."

And yet the main human quality of Semyon Markovich was, perhaps, his enthusiasm. Enthusiasm for work, people for whom the scout was not only a "colleague in a common cause" and a charming guy, but also a devoted and sincere friend who simply could not

refuse attention and help.

Twain (this was the operational pseudonym of S.M. Semenov, which he "borrowed" from his favorite writer Mark Twain), seemed to never know peace - he was always in business. Then he excitedly told colle

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din something interesting, then he made some not always clear devices for his home workshop or drew diagrams of his mysterious reconnaissance trips on a slate board. Sometimes he, with his head going into business, literally forgot everything around.

— Twain! - there was no answer.

— Twain! - silence.

- Twain, answer me at last! - followed by a long catchy phrase ...

The role of the famous Aunt Polly and the mischievous Tom Sawyer in this impromptu dialogue was repeated almost verbatim more than half a century ago in the New York residency by two quite worthy and highly respected people - a resident of Soviet intelligence and one of his most active operatives. None of them resembled their literary prototypes in any way. The resident was tall, stately, with a noticeable military bearing. The operative was the exact opposite: small, swift, like a ball of mercury escaping from a broken thermometer. True, at the moment of the dialogue cited above, Twain was sitting at a folding country table without moving, afraid to spill the jelly-like, sharp-smelling liquid in a small thermos, which he had just taken out of the refrigerator. It was necessary to solve the problem of manufacturing a container in which the "kissel" would go to Moscow.

Twain was so engrossed in his work that he did not hear the voice of the resident addressed to him, who decided to remind him once again that the diplomatic post was tomorrow, that all operational and personal letters should be packed today, that the diplomat on duty was distinguished by increased pedantry and would never take and a matchbox after the "closing of the post office".

"Moonshine mash," as Twain himself called the contents of the thermos, he received late the night before in one of the New York bars. It was a strain of purified penicillin - the same miracle drug that Soviet hospitals desperately needed to save the lives of thousands of wounded in the last months of World War II. The American allies were generous with ready-made medicine, they released batches of penicillin on credit, but when it came to technology production of this most effective medicine at that time, here, as they say, "friendship is friendship, and tobacco is apart." And what does a consignment of medicine to the whole front mean? A drop in the ocean, nothing more. So the energetic Twain had to act in conditions

close to combat. He was not used to this. It is necessary - it is necessary. "Motherland is calling!" he repeated the words of a military poster known in those days.

However, Moscow's latest assignment regarding purified penicillin did not arouse great positive emotions in Twain. And deal

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was not even in the complexity of its implementation. Twain knew the address of production well, was friends with one of the leaders of the laboratory, bowed affably at receptions and parties with two more biochemists who knew how to "make" purified penicillin. It would seem that the cards are in hand, but... For the past three weeks, Twain has been, like Gulliver in the land of Lilliputians, entangled around the clock with threads of police surveillance that prevented him from moving around the city without the knowledge of the all-powerful FBI. It was worth popping out early in the morning to a newsstand - the night porter whispered something into the receiver of a phone that went out to the city. As soon as he crossed the street and entered the store, the rapid breathing of the pursuer was heard behind him. From four to six surveillance teams worked on Twain every day. The numbers of the cars and the cars themselves changed, the teams of white detectives who had finished shadowing were replaced by colored ones; wigs and various hairpieces were put on, a masquerade with disguise was practiced with might and main.

What attracted the close "personal" attention of FBI agents to the seemingly modest engineer Semyon Markovich Semyonov, who was on the staff of the Soviet trade representative office Amtorg in New York? If you answer this question in monosyllables, without going into details, then with your indomitable activity and, if you like, with your unique crafty ingenuity.

She, this ingenuity, more than once rescued Semyon in the most difficult and seemingly hopeless situations.

One day he was given the task to find a person whose address or phone number were not known. They only knew the area of New York where he lived. What to do?

"Why don't I work for a week as an insurance agent?" Semyonov turned to the resident.

- Why not? - the resident answered in the tone of the operative.

Business cards were ordered, a "branded" hat was bought, an advertising badge with the name of a non-existent insurance company was attached to the lapel of the jacket. Block by block, Semyonov walked around the area of the alleged residence of the person who was interested in the residency, talked with the concierges of apartment buildings, with hired gardeners who look after perfectly manicured lawns. I walked and walked until I found it. But then a new danger awaited him. Suddenly, a guard appeared. Who it? Where? What does he need?

"Mr. H., who lives here, is running out of insurance, and his secretary called our company to renew the contract," Semyonov blurted out without hesitation in his voice. - Therefore, I must definitely meet with him one of the next few days, or better - today.

The detective frowned, wondering what to do with the intruder.

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"Are you yourself unwilling to insure yourself, like Mr. H.?" - Semyonov asked sympathetically, peering intently into the detective's face.

"Yes, yes, of course," the interlocutor mumbled uncertainly, "but not today. I have to talk to my wife. And to get rid of Twain, he politely suggested:

- And you pass. Mr. H. has just arrived and will probably receive you.

"Thank you, friend," Semyonov thanked the detective and thrust a silver dollar prepared in advance into his hand.

In the office of the owner of the apartment, Semyonov already felt at ease. In any case, he again became a graduate student dealing with problems close to the work profile of an American, although he received the specialty of an energy engineer at the Moscow Textile Institute. But Semyonov's brain was arranged in such a way that he, like a sponge, absorbed the foundations of a wide variety of technical knowledge. And when he found himself in the company of technical specialists, he amazed everyone with the breadth of erudition and originality of thinking. There was a huge charge of positive emotions in him and some kind of special trust, which it was impossible not to reciprocate. Did Semyon, when he was a student, think that he would become an intelligence officer, one of the pioneers of Soviet scientific and technical intelligence? Of course not. But life is full of wonders.

Twain leisurely finished packing the container of the priceless strain of penicillin and pushed the unstable "table" against the wall again. This piece of country-garden furniture set ended up in the residency by accident, "through the fault" of Twain himself. Previously, there was a normal desk with drawers and capacious bedside tables, in which the staff of the residency usually kept stationery common to all, and the secretary kept a typewriter ribbon and a manicure set. On the table there was usually a photographic enlarger and a couple of trays for washing photographic paper. But after one incident that cost Twain a huge amount of nervous tension, the resident ordered that this "damn thing" be taken out of the laboratory and replaced by a forgotten table for a beach lunch that was aimlessly standing in the corridor.

And here's what happened.

Twain somehow brought the original secret drawings of one of the types of new American weapons.

"Only for one hour, and only for you, Sema," his close friend warned Twain. - Today, this document should lie in place. I signed him up.

Twain burst into the residency like a whirlwind.

- Guys, all to me. Drop everything you do and get to work. In ten minutes it should all be re-photographed! And I return the material to the "owner".

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The officers rolled up their sleeves and set to work.

In the allotted time met, satisfied Twain jumped out with a folder of materials on the street. The operational driver of the residency quickly drove him to Park Avenue.

The "owner" of the materials skimmed through the sheets and suddenly found that three pages were missing at once.

- Where are they? he asked Twain gloomily. Semyonov went cold with horror.

"They were all here," he answered confusedly. - I now! - and ran out the door. Thank God that the operational driver was in the car.

- Let's fly back! Quicker! said Twain, wet from the excitement he had experienced. The car sped off places.

- What's happened? the resident asked, raising his eyebrows in surprise.

Three sheets are missing. I sowed them somewhere, - Twain barely said.

- Sowed - so look for it! And we will help you - and everyone rushed to the photo lab.

Turned over everything that was on the table. No trace. Examined the floor - with the same success. And suddenly someone moved the table towards itself from the wall. I heard the rustle of snakes falling on the floor sheets of paper. Here they are found! Three sheets with a stamp of special secrecy ended up in the hands of the resident.

- Do not waste time and take them to the "owner".

But Twain did not seem to hear this order. He sat down on the first chair he came across and put his head in his hands. This went on for several moments. Then the pale Twain collected the lost sheets in a folder and again drove to Park Avenue. For two days he did not appear at the residency, and no one asked where he was. Everyone knew ~ Twain comes to his senses.

And now Semyonov is back at work. As if nothing had happened, he warmly greeted his colleagues, treated the secretary to a chocolate bar, shook hands with the resident and joked good-naturedly about his recent "embarrassment" with the missing sheets.

- Now everything is ok. Enough to rest and idle. It's time and honor to know. What shall we do now? Chemistry? Aviation? Physics? Twain asked the resident cheerfully. He literally radiated energy and vivacity, and a new elegant suit, bought in a prestigious English store, made him fit and more slender.

"Neither the one, nor the other, nor the third. At least here in the States," the resident replied.

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- Major Semyonov, for your work, the leadership of the Center expresses gratitude to you and transfers you to Paris with a promotion.

— I serve the Soviet Union.

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Paris met Twain with pouring rain and some kind of soul-crushing, hard to convey feeling of proximity to his native home. After all, France is not distant America.

"Coming and leaving in rainy weather," joked an employee of the Paris residency who met Semyon Markovich, "good luck. And I hope you are successful here.

"If only a person's luck depended on this," Twain replied, "then all schedules for the movement of trains, steamships and planes would probably be drawn up taking into account bad weather. I'm afraid that climatic weather and political weather give rise to different signs.

And, alas, he was not mistaken. Already the first conversation with the resident alarmed Twain.

"In America, you spent a lot of time chasing technical innovations and secrets," said the resident. But Europe is concerned about other problems. Gunpowder is not invented here. By the way, it has long been invented by the Chinese. Here it is being used with might and main, or is about to be used. And your new French friends should help me figure out who exactly is going to do this against our country and when. Therefore, I would rather see you as a specialist in political problems than in purely technical and scientific ones.

- But what about my contacts and connections with the "techies"? Twain asked uncertainly.

"In principle, I don't mind," the resident replied, frowning. - Obtain information and materials. We'll send them to the Center, and then we'll see.

It was difficult for the sociable Twain to take root in Paris - the soul of any company, a joker and an inventor. He knew the language poorly, his wife Glafira Mikhailovna, a classmate at the Moscow Textile Institute, did not speak French at all. Often sick sons - Victor and Ilyusha. To top it all off, he didn't like purely political subjects. He was clearly not an erudite in her, and this was depressing. Twain was eager to get into business, a real, in his opinion, business, when the result could be brought in the hands in the form of a document or an intricate formula and joyfully said to the resident: "Look what I brought!".

But weeks, months passed, and no one demanded this of him. We needed connections and information of a purely political nature.

And then one day Twain could not stand it. He checked carefully to see if he was being followed, and called his friend, an electronics engineer.

— Sema? Are you here! What fates? Let's meet and talk. Do you want today?

That evening, friends sat for a long time in a cozy cafe over a cup of coffee. One cup replaced another.

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— Are you saying that cybernetics is the future? Semyon asked his friend. - Are you sure about this?

"Of course, as in myself," answered the Frenchman. – We already have very interesting developments. I brought them from America...

The next day, Twain reported in detail to the Resident about his initiative meeting with the French engineer.

Cybernetics you say? the resident said thoughtfully. - But we will ask the Center what it thinks about this.

And a telegram went to Moscow.

For some reason, the answer from the Center took a very long time. It was as if he was being carried on a sling along a broken, bumpy road. The answer was that cybernetics is a pseudoscience and that the residency is being deliberately pushed onto a false, anti-scientific path.

But Twain did not give up. He fruitfully conducted operational work, acquired a number of valuable sources in the line of scientific and technical intelligence. After returning to Moscow from a business trip at the end of 1949, a new entry appeared in his operational file: "In France, Twain tried to revive work along the line of scientific and technological revolution: aerodynamics, physics, aviation. Loved working with youth. I established not just business, but spiritual ties with agents.

For the fulfillment of special tasks of the Soviet government and the courage and high professional qualities of the intelligence officer S.M. Semyonov was awarded the Order of the Red Star in 1944 and the Order of the Red Banner of Labor in 1949.

In 1953, the head of the department, Lieutenant Colonel Semyonov, was dismissed from the state security agencies without a pension. In the department where Semyon Markovich worked, there was a major failure. On the corner of the telegram sent to the residency, the vigilant investigative commission examined Semyonov's signature. The "extreme", as always, was found, and it turned out to be Semyon Markovich. They blamed him for the failure...

Semyon Markovich began his new life "in civilian life" with his family in a 14-meter room near the Kaluga outpost. There was no work, and he was not accepted anywhere: dismissal from the "authorities" was then tantamount to a court verdict.

Once an old institute friend, having heard about Semyon's troubles, suggested that he go to work in a boiler room at a textile factory, where he was a technical director. Semyonov agreed. He remembered his college specialty as an energy engineer. Work in the boiler house gave a modest income, free heat and, most importantly, time. The former scout began to translate English.

The volume of transfers, and hence the fees, did not come immediately. Semyon Markovich, out of inexperience, made a mistake: he took up translations of fiction. His first book, published in Moscow,

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called "Lonely Sky" - about military pilots during the Second World War. Semenov got the translation at the cost of great efforts and long sleepless nights: fiction was not his element. He was a born "techie", but by no means a writer.

"I will never be a writer, and don't convince me otherwise," he told his friends who had gathered "for a glass of tea" about the release of the book. – I'd rather try my hand at technical translations.

And indeed, things went right away. First, a catalog of some foreign technical firm, translated and significantly revised by Semenov, was published from afar, then a reference book on energy was published, and, finally, a textbook on that very "pseudoscience" was published, the name of which some time ago was pronounced with caution. but: "cybernetics".

The family got more money, they managed to join a housing cooperative and buy a cozy, "cheap" two-room apartment by today's standards. Ironically, the Semenovs built their new family nest a stone's throw from the Semenovskaya metro station.

The firstborn of Semyon Markovich, Ilya, graduated from the institute and began to "cast a coin" - to work as an engineer at the Moscow Mint. The famous theater director Yuri Lyubimov drew attention to the younger, Victor, and invited him to the troupe of the Taganka Theater.

It would seem that everything is fine and everything fell into place.

- Semyon, why don't you write a letter to the leaders of your old department and ask them for a well-deserved pension? The days of arbitrariness are over. Why be ashamed? the former intelligence officer was often asked by his close friends. But Semyonov did not want to ask for anything.

What are you, Rothschild? - insisted classmates at the institute.

And Semyonov finally gave up. Surrendered, perhaps, for the first time in my life. He sent a letter to the Lubyanka, to the KGB cadres. Three months later came the official refusal. And then Semyon Markovich felt pain in his chest for the first time. Heart!..

In the hospital, kind people suggested: "And you write to Andropov personally. Maybe he can help?"

And again, the former intelligence officer modestly reminded himself that so, they say, and so, for many years faithfully served the Fatherland, he was early dismissed and left without a pension.

Some time later, Semyon Markovich got a tight package with pension documents and a certificate. From the documents it followed that he was given a personal pension of republican significance.

However, the years took their toll. Health did not improve. Semyon Markovich left the boiler room and switched completely to technical

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translations. After a while he became one of the best translators in Moscow. At night, however, he often thought about the days long past, recalled the details of the operations in which he had once taken part. Undercover intelligence was his true calling.

... At the end of 1995, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service was preparing to solemnly celebrate its 75th anniversary. The intelligence units were asked to tell "for history" about the most interesting facts and information about the soldiers of the "invisible front", whose names, according to contemporaries, have not yet found a worthy reflection on the stands of the Cabinet of Intelligence History. They brought up old cases again, made inquiries in the archives, and talked with veteran intelligence officers. That's when they remembered the great worker Semyonov. For the first time, a portrait of a modest inhabitant of Odessa, Semyon Markovich Semenov, for whom the profession of an intelligence officer was a vocation of his whole life, appeared for the first time at the stand of the best employees of scientific and technical intelligence.

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Extraordinary story

– I recently learned that our illegal intelligence officer worked as a foreign ambassador abroad.

- Did they come up with a new Stirlitz?

- No, they talked about the real after.

- This can not be. This can never be.

From a conversation in the Moscow metro

Headquarters of the Foreign Intelligence Service on the outskirts of Moscow. A spacious room is dedicated to the Cabinet of Service History - from the beginning of its foundation in 1920 to relatively recent times. The presented materials are displayed according to all the rules of museum art: on the stands there are numerous photos of men and women, scouts of different generations, and brief explanations of their merits are given. Irreproachable typeface, elegantly designed glazed shelves with original documents, orders, medals, diplomas and other exhibits.

In hall number 3, the visitor will definitely pay attention to the series of original Latin American documents exhibited here: a Chilean identity card for a foreigner, issued in Santiago in 1945; a similar Brazilian certificate, issued in Rio de Janeiro in 1946; diplomatic passport issued in December 1951 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of one of the Central American republics to the first secretary of the diplomatic mission of that country in Italy. The photographs on all the documents, although they were taken at different times, clearly depict the same face. The name is the same everywhere. And if you ask an employee of the Cabinet of History accompanying you: "What would that mean?", He will most likely modestly remark: "A unique case in the history of our intelligence. Can't tell you briefly...

Indeed, a detailed narrative is required here. We will try to do this in a short form, based on the real

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the location of the event, confirmed by the archival documents of the intelligence services.

This story began like this. After the end of the Great Patriotic War, a married couple of Soviet illegal intelligence agents returned to Moscow. It was Max! and Louise. Each of them was a little over 30 years old, but they already had significant experience in intelligence work behind them. Report submitted. They rested well. Became considered

the question of their further use. They agreed to go back to work illegally and themselves proposed a scheme for their work somewhere in a European country. This coincided with the interests of the Center.

Illegals had to settle in the country for a long stay, to create a cover that would provide sufficient independence and freedom of action. It was supposed to open a small commercial enterprise. It was planned to transfer several agents to Max for communication - sources of information. He was also faced with the task of acquiring new sources. It was planned to organize two-way radio communication between the residency and the Center.

The scouts went on a business trip as a married couple: he is from Central America, she is from Uruguay. For them, they prepared a minimum of necessary personal documents and developed biographical legends related to their actual stay in the past in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Brazil.

Let's leave the technical side of documenting illegal immigrants beyond the scope of the narrative. Let's just say that Max had a genuine foreign passport of "his" country. Below, the reader will learn curious details on this subject, since the legendary origin of Max will cause amazing perturbations and paradoxical turns, which at first no one could have foreseen. But more about that later.

So, at the end of 1949, illegal immigrants arrived in Italy. We entered on tourist visas with the right to stay in the country for three months.

Having settled in a modest hotel in the capital, they began to study the situation. They didn't really know the country, they didn't know the language, they didn't have any connections here. One of the questions that could and did later arise in their new environment was the reasons that prompted them, prosperous Latin Americans, to settle in troubled post-war Europe. If necessary, they explained that the move to Europe was caused by purely personal tragic circumstances: the unexpected death in infancy of their son, which really happened immediately after the war. This explanation seemed convincing.

The couple intensively studied the Italian language, got acquainted with various aspects of the extremely colorful and intricate social and political life.

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They considered it natural to pay visits to the diplomatic representatives of "their" countries: the honorary consuls of Max's country in Rome and Milan, the Uruguayan Consul General in the capital. They got close enough to the latter, made friends with his wife, with their adult sons. The consul had wide connections. Illegals intended to use it to take the first steps to gain a foothold in the country. Hopes were justified. The diplomat first applied for an extension of tourist visas, and then, through acquaintances in the police, obtained a permanent residence permit for them. The consul agreed to "accept" Max to his job, of course, without paying a salary, which allowed him to be officially considered an employee of the consulate general in Rome. It was already a success.

The legend was that Max had amassed some capital by doing business in Latin America and now intended to invest it in some suitable enterprise. He interested his new friend, the consul, in this idea. They discussed possible options for a long time and settled on the idea of organizing an export-import company, inviting an Italian (to facilitate the procedure for registering a company), a retired army colonel, a close friend of the consul, as a partner. Each contributed a corresponding cash share. Registered the company with the local authorities; found an office space, made a sign, hired technical staff.

The partners began to study the market situation, look for commercial partners, and advertise their "extremely attractive" opportunities. The result is a clientele

the first deals were made. A wide variety of goods became the subject of export-import: cement, furs, canned food, sewing machines, bicycles and much more. Soon the company's business ties spread to a dozen countries. A lively commercial correspondence was carried on, the telephone did not stop in the office. Outwardly, everything looked quite convincing. True, the profit was insignificant.

By that time, Max and Louise lived in a small apartment rented from the widow of a soldier who died in the war. This woman and her friend, who was also a business partner, were speculating on the black market. From them, Max received useful information, as well as information about persons who were involved in dubious commercial transactions. And among them were government officials and political functionaries.

Communication with the Center was not always maintained regularly and promptly. Neighboring countries served as the main meeting place, where the spouses sometimes traveled together, sometimes separately, when necessary or on a call from the Center. Reports were made there, further actions were planned. Serve as a fallback

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There were secret meetings with employees of the "legal" residency in Rome, but they resorted to them extremely rarely.

At the end of the first year of their stay in Italy, the illegal immigrants, as Moscow considered, confidently fulfilled the planned plan.

In the autumn of 1950, a group of prominent political figures arrived in Europe from Latin America: the former president of the country - Max's "homeland", a former minister and ambassador to France. All of them were with their wives. The visit pursued, along with recreation, commercial goals: to establish in Europe, including in Italy, the marketing of their own products - coffee, since they all owned large coffee plantations in their homeland.

Honorary consuls in Italy - and there were about a dozen of them - warmly welcomed influential guests: they provided them with all kinds of assistance, provided them with information, and introduced them to the right people. One of them offered to introduce Max, a compatriot and successful businessman, to the guests. In this situation, he himself had to make a responsible decision - whether to make contact with visitors. He had just returned from another trip to a meeting with a representative of the Center, and it was impossible to quickly organize an additional consultation.

From Max's report on the motives for his decision:

"The meeting with the former president and his group, of course, contained some risk. I have never been to my "homeland", my acquaintance with the country was limited to geographical reference books and contacts with two or three "compatriots". There was a danger that I would seem suspicious to them and they would start checking me. On the other hand, it was impossible to avoid this and similar meetings in the future. Therefore, I decided to take the opportunity to make contact and try to enlist the support of these influential people, which would strengthen the legend and cover, thereby creating reliable conditions for the development of the program outlined in the Center.

Max and Louise were introduced to the former president and his friends, their wives. For more than two months, they closely communicated with each other: they traveled around the country, made business acquaintances, and discussed economic and political problems. Max managed to win their trust and make a favorable impression with his erudition and dynamism. Louise made friends with them

wives.

Contacts with these people put the legend prepared at the Center to the test, which was unexpected for Max.

Here it is appropriate, finally, to tell what this very legend was, which allowed Max to become the owner of a real foreign passport and gain a foothold in Italy as a citizen of this Central American country.

While working in Argentina at the time, he occasionally traveled to neighboring countries, including Chile. There was a group of his trusted

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persons, among them was one Central American, let's call him "Amigo", who had long lived there as a political emigrant. Max shared his concern with him: he did not have secure, durable personal documents. He gave the idea - to make Max a citizen of his country, offered to dream up and came up with the following version: let him be the illegitimate son of a real-life, famous "Amigo" of his compatriot, who had already died. He was a man from a noble family, wealthy, famous in his homeland for extravagant antics, adventures and parties. The calculation was that this legend was almost impossible to refute. "Amigo" and Max worked hard to compile a "plausible" biography of the South American "lieutenant Kizhe", who supposedly left his homeland in childhood and then lived in Chile for more than 20 years.

"Amigo" knew the ambassador of his country in Santiago well and believed that he would believe the legend. And so it happened.

Here is a fragment of Max's note, where he, in his characteristic figurative language, with his inherent sense of humor, recalls the final stage of obtaining a passport.

"The first step is Amigo's visit to the ambassador. He, as it turned out, knew "my" father very well and, it was said, more than once took part in his dashing adventures with him. He took a keen interest in my personality. "How, son of my old friend here in Santiago? Why didn't I know about this?" "Amigo" explained, emphasizing how modest and virtuous I was and how hard it was for me to endure the ridicule of those who found out that I was an illegitimate son. "I want to see him!" exclaimed the ambassador. And here I am in front of him. The reaction was unexpected, I could not even imagine that this would happen. "The spitting image of dad," the ambassador was amazed, examining me. "I recognize your father, a bully!", and he climbed up to me with his arms. The ambassador was, of course, already a bit old, and therefore, probably, he could not see well, otherwise it would not be easy to understand why he suddenly recognized in me the son of his former drinking buddy.

He questioned me, however, in great detail, but after such a reception, I, frankly, "carried away." What I just did not say. And he wrote about wanderings in a foreign land, and wept about his unfortunate mother, whom her father abandoned in such an ungentlemanly way. He also added that, although I was not lucky with my parents, I still managed to get out, get on my feet, and start a business.

The ambassador agreed to give me a passport right away, he was not even particularly interested in why I needed it. I was quite satisfied when I said that I was tired of hiding my origin from people. "Papa is now dead," I sighed, and even shed a tear. "I don't need an inheritance, I'm not poor myself, but it's time to formalize everything according to the law." In general, we parted with the ambassador as almost friends. When he escorted me to the door of his office, he kept repeating: "Well, the spitting image of dad!"

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Frankly, Amigo and I were desperately bluffing. And not only because they passed me off as the son of a man who was quite famous in his homeland. The fact is that I have never been to this country at all. And therefore, when the ambassador tried to start a conversation with me about the country, I kept repeating as usual: "I haven't been there for a long time, too long. My father forced my mother to leave, and she took me with her. So I can't remember anything..."

Although we bluffed, but everything went well. A week later, I had a brand new passport in my hands. Shortly before leaving Chile, in August 1945, I received (and initiated myself)

at the Consulate General of "my" country in Santiago, a letter recommending the next text:

"I am pleased to confirm that (name) has been involved in commercial activities in Santiago for many years, where he is well known and appreciated for his personal merits and interest in social activities. (Imjarek) is one of the most distinguished members of our national colony in Chile.

Consul General ... (signature, seal)".

Later, this paper turned out to be very useful to me.

When the possibilities of further use of Max were being studied at the Center in the late 1940s, it became necessary to check the reliability of this legend of his. From Moscow, he went on a business trip abroad, illegally, of course, and there, at the embassy of "his" country, he easily extended the foreign passport received in Chile in early 1949, which had expired by that time.

And now, in the autumn of 1950, meetings with "compatriots" took place in Rome. And with what...

The surprises continued. Having learned the details of Max's biography, the former president suddenly declared: "And you and I are distant relatives. Yes, don't be surprised. If I'm not mistaken, your late father was Don K's nephew. And he was married to my mother's aunt. Isn't it funny?" Further more. "Why did you not come home for so long? How is it that nothing has been heard of you until now?"

Questions are not pleasant, tricky. Max's answers "I felt flawed like a bastard", etc. and so on. as if they satisfied the former president, who, however, severely reproached him for being too modest and scrupulous. Later it turned out that the former president made inquiries about him both in Italy and in Latin America. This did not lead to any negative consequences.

One of the results of the arrival of guests from across the ocean was the connection of Max's trading company to the sale in Europe of the product they offered - coffee. Max's relationship with the former president acquired a friendly and businesslike character. They switched to "you". Another surprise was the guest's suggestion that Max

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became his confidant not only in commerce, but also in the political field: the illegal was privy to his far-reaching ambitious plans to return to power through democratic elections.

By the time of the events described, the former president and his closest associates headed an opposition bourgeois group in their homeland and planned to form a political party on its basis. They were quite experienced, cunning, distrustful politicians prone to risk and adventure, and they understood that Washington's course was aimed at the political and economic subordination of their country to the interests of the United States, but they believed that it was necessary to "skillfully" coexist with the Americans. The former president confided to Max: "The Yankees are most afraid of the Communists. We Latin Americans must take advantage of this fear and make them pay dearly for our anti-communism." At the same time, he was aware that it was impossible to make a political career on naked anti-communism in a country with deep-seated democratic traditions. Therefore, he was ready to undertake certain social reforms in order to "let steam out of the boiler", to ease the class tension, which, as he believed, gives rise to communists.

Assessing Max's broad outlook, his knowledge of international affairs and political issues, the former president asked him to draw up an election program for their group based on the slogan: "Against imperialism and against communism." The illegal immigrant had to perform this unusual and difficult task. The customer highly appreciated the presented work,

promised Max friendship and all kinds of support (this program, with some amendments, was officially approved by the congress of the party he later created).

Then, in the fall of 1950, these influential people, on their own initiative, put forward the idea of appointing Max to a diplomatic post in Italy. They pursued, first of all, their own selfish goals: to secure Max as a profitable commercial partner and at the same time to thank him for the services rendered. A new situation arose, again requiring a difficult decision to be made. Max's entry into the diplomatic arena assumed wider fame than that of a businessman and did not rule out an in-depth check of his past by interested special services. The latter, of course, was

unwanted.

Initially, the Center was inclined to ensure that the illegal refused the offer made to him. Max himself was of a different opinion. "Today my position is much stronger than it was at the end of last year," he reported to Moscow. This, of course, does not mean that I have nothing to fear. As connections expand, so does the risk, and the unforeseen factor multiplies. But after all, all this is part of the rules of the game and is an inseparable part of the life of an intelligence officer.

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chica. I think we should take this risk, because in this case it justifies itself."

The former president and ambassador left Rome first. The former minister stayed for another month. In an effort to maximize his personal relationship with him, Max invited him to move from the hotel to his house. He agreed. Before leaving, they parted as "great friends" (later, the former minister actively promoted Max's diplomatic career).

In the meantime, Max's commercial activities have revived. From across the ocean, goods began to arrive regularly at his company. It happened that in a month 250-300 standard bags of coffee came in with a total value of up to 40,000 US dollars. Max sold coffee, sent the proceeds to the owners, as a rule, to accounts in American banks, received his insignificant share. The degree of trust that he enjoyed from partners is evidenced by the fact that he received expensive goods "on parole", without providing guarantees and performing other contractual formalities.

Now Max now and then began to be visited by guests who came from the "homeland": business people, political figures, etc. New acquaintances were established, the volume of postal communications with "friends" across the ocean grew. The couple were persistently invited to visit Max's homeland. In the correspondence, the issue of formalizing the appointment of Max to a diplomatic post was constantly discussed (by this time the Center had given its consent). And finally it really happened.

The Italian authorities issued Max with local documents for a diplomat (the right of immunity!) A diplomatic number appeared on his car. His name and position were entered in the official directory of members of the diplomatic corps. The premises rented for the mission received an appropriate sign (the couple moved there to live), three technical employees created a proper working environment. Max made obligatory protocol visits, began business correspondence with his Foreign Ministry, with the country's president, and got involved in the routine life of the capital's diplomatic corps.

Let us point out that this post was granted to Max without payment of a salary, which, however, the Italian authorities did not know about. It was only later that he was given a salary of \$150 a month.

In connection with the transition to diplomatic work, according to the existing rule, he was deprived of the right to engage in commercial activities. Therefore, the trading company in Rome had to be liquidated. However, the enterprise, in which the former president and co. were still interested, was preserved under a different name. Her office was in Milan, and Max

worked in it as an unspoken companion. Coffee plantation owners continued to receive regular revenue from the coffee sold in Italy.

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Max's business and personal correspondence with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of "his" country took a peculiar turn. Having shown official "zeal", the illegal immigrant obtained from the Italian Foreign Ministry an invitation to the minister and his wife to visit the country. In gratitude, the minister appointed Max as an adviser to their delegation at the 6th session of the UN General Assembly, which at that time was working in Paris. The head of the delegation was the vice-president of the country, with him Max managed to establish good personal and business relationships.

In November 1951, Max left for Paris. Participated in meetings of the General Assembly and meetings of the regional committee of Latin American countries. This event was a bright episode in his operational activities. And since the very fact of participation in such a forum of a Soviet intelligence officer is by no means an ordinary phenomenon, we will talk about it in more detail.

Immediately upon arrival in Paris, Max plunged into active diplomatic work. The agenda of the session was packed. Committees, subcommittees, commissions met. At the highest international forum, a political struggle was going on according to all the rules of the Cold War that was raging at that time.

Let us recall that in relation to the activities of the UN in the lexicon of the Soviet press of those years, the term "voting machine" was firmly in use. This was the name given to the mechanism of diktat by the Americans in relation to the voters in the interests of supporting the political course of the United States. Westerners were annoyed by such a Russian wording, and they, in turn, were not shy in choosing labels, characterizing the policy of the USSR. And although this biting comparison - "voting machine" - may indeed seem somewhat excessive, in essence it corresponded to reality. This was also evidenced by the Paris experience of Max, who, as a direct participant in some events in the UN, experienced the action of this "machine" and even became its unwitting "victim". And the following happened.

This is not the first time that the Greek question has been on the agenda. During the civil war in Greece and after the defeat of the democratic army in 1949, a significant group of Greek children, about 15 thousand, were evacuated with the consent of their parents to the countries of people's democracy. They were mostly children of democratic army fighters, political prisoners, people who helped the country's patriotic forces. Their evacuation became a manifestation of international solidarity and actually saved the children from the terror that reigned in Greece at that time.

The Athenian government, backed by the Americans, launched a massive campaign to repatriate the "kidnapped" children. Disinformation, fakes, slander were used. It was alleged that children are being kept there almost in concentration camps, trying to make them forget their homeland, infecting them with "germs of communism", etc.

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As conceived by the Americans, the discussion at the session of this issue should have resulted in another accusation of the countries of people's democracy and the USSR that allow "anti-humanism", "separate" families, etc. The Soviet Union used the UN rostrum to expose both the myth of "abducted" children and the authors of this political campaign.

The Americans energetically prepared for the forthcoming meeting, they were constantly processing partners. The US delegation was led by an experienced diplomat, Secretary of State Dean Acheson. First, he held a separate meeting with Western partners. Then, at the American embassy, he gathered representatives of the Latin American states and addressed them with an appeal to "give battle to Bolshevism." He expressed his opinion about the usefulness of participating in the debate and a diplomat from Latin America and then, quite unexpectedly, called Max. He motivated his choice ingenuously: "You seem to be a newcomer to the session. And so much the better. Need novelty and natural

emotions of a person who has not yet had time to dry the previous many hours of discussion. It was obvious that Acheson had only announced the decision he had prepared in advance.

Max recalled:

"I could not refuse to speak, Acheson would not have forgotten me and my vice president would not have forgiven me. But to act as Washington expected, to throw mud at the Soviet Union? I had to make a decision, there was no one to consult with. In the end, I did find a way out. He sat down for reference books and works of historians to study the subject, select facts and compose the text of the speech.

I was given ten minutes. Fortunately, I was not the first to speak, the delegates were already somewhat weary and listened without much attention to what I was talking about. And I talked about philanthropy, about humanism, about children as the future of mankind, quoted the ancient Greek classics, referred to the Bible, fell into pathos, then into sorrow. He said many touching words about children. Towards the end of my speech, I noticed that the Soviet representative Vyshinsky, who had previously been talking animatedly with his assistants, suddenly began to listen to me. I ended the same way I started - with some general, little meaning words. In any case, no one could say with certainty later that the speaker supported the draft resolution introduced by the United States.

The next day, when the debate was drawing to a close, Vyshinsky took the floor. I don't remember exactly what he said. But one thing stuck in my memory quite distinctly.

"I had to listen to a speech by a Latin American delegate," Vyshinsky said. – I will not hide that in terms of eloquence, he reached great heights. But as a politician, he is an empty shell. This is just a talker, and his place is not here, on this representative forum, in the circus ... "

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I listened to Vyshinsky and Acheson. When later we talked with him on the sidelines and I, assuming an offended pose, expressed regret that, on his advice, I spoke at the Assembly and incurred the wrath of the Soviet delegate, the Secretary of State, slapping me on the shoulder in a friendly manner, replied: " My dear! If Vyshinsky scolds someone publicly, this only adds more weight to him and adds

notoriety..."

The Vice President was completely satisfied with Max's work in Paris. A report on the very successful work of the delegation at this session of the General Assembly was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Two or three months later, Max decided that the time had come, using the goodwill of his coffee partners, to take the initiative and hint in letters to his "friends" that he was not appreciated "at home" according to his merits and that he could be promoted to diplomatic rank to extraordinary and plenipotentiary envoy. The most surprising thing is that they reacted calmly to this impudent idea, they promised to think it over and take measures.

As already mentioned, Max and Louise had invitations to visit their "homeland". It became unnatural to constantly refuse them, and they decided to let Louise go. They picked up an excuse - to look after the land for building a house.

In the spring of 1952 the trip took place. Louise was received by the incumbent president, the new minister of foreign affairs. She constantly met with the former president, his associates, their families, and other high-ranking officials. Everyone in these circles spoke of Max with praise, highly appreciated his diplomatic work, in particular, the trade agreement with Italy that was being prepared for signing, in which the local authorities were extremely interested.

Louise used her stay overseas to accelerate the promotion promised to her husband. And she succeeded. The President signed a corresponding decree, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared

credentials, and Louise sent them to Italy by airmail.

Soon, Max presented his credentials to the President of Italy, Luigi Einaudi, as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Central American Republic.

As required by protocol, Max began to pay visits to his colleagues in the diplomatic corps. He reported to the Center: "I was accepted as an equal by professional diplomats in Italy, no one had any doubts."

Max recalled some of the details of US Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker's first visit.

"Oh, dear colleague, I am very glad to see you," the American said amiably, inviting me into the office. — Frankly, I have already despaired of ever meeting, a month has passed since your appointment ... Do not apologize, dear friend. I know very well that you have a lot to do now and I really appreciate that you have made your first diplomatic visit

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decided to inflict it on us." Further conversation of the usual secular nature was interrupted by a telephone call. Picking up the phone, Bunker said "Hello, hello" for a long time, then tossed me: "This is from Washington," and gestured to the table with drinks - they say, dispose of it yourself.

Preparing for this meeting, I had in mind to ask the ambassador about something, as a "diplomat's diplomat", of course, but reality destroyed these intentions of mine, and the content of his telephone conversation turned out to be the reason for this. Along the way, it became clear that, upon request from there, Bunker had to give an assessment of the internal political situation in the country. It must be admitted that he did this clearly, with good knowledge of the matter.

Further conversation, already with glasses in hand, is better to portray in faces.

- I feel that you were not indifferent to what I spoke with Washington on special communications. Isn't that right, dear friend?

— On the contrary, Mr. Ambassador, I was extremely interested in your assessments. I will not hide, you have facilitated my task for me.

— Is that how?

— Do not be surprised, because we are diplomats, although I am not completely used to this position yet. And our tasks are basically the same: to inform our governments about everything that is happening and what is yet to happen. In your message to Washington, I found quite a few answers to questions that I have to deal with ...

"Your frankness is simply captivating," the American laughed. - I noticed that you listened to the telephone conversation, but I was convinced that as soon as I asked you about it, you would begin to refuse, say that you didn't need it, that you were completely busy preparing a drink and the like. .. Such frankness suits you, I like you
by her."

Max's diplomatic and social activities took on a fairly active character. As an official representative, he participated in the sessions of the FAO - the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations with headquarters in Rome, was a delegate at the International Conference on Cotton, at the International Catholic Congress dedicated to the problems of peace, was a participant in the 1st World coffee conferences in Trieste. He repeatedly lectured at the Italian Academy of Culture and Art on the history of the ancient culture of Latin America, was elected by it as an honorary academician. He spoke on the radio and in the local press. Prepared for publication a brochure on the countries of Central America.

In one of his reports, he wrote: "It is needless to say how hard and thankless work is my participation in all these congresses, congresses, conferences, how much time I have to spend

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to prepare speeches, to edit reports. Of course, this strengthens my position both here and in my "homeland", but this does not make it any easier for me."

Any work performed is evaluated by the achieved result. In other words, quality. In exploration, it's the same.

In general, the Center recognized the information activity of Max as positive. Of course, without having the appropriate agents, he could not get secret documents from government and top political circles. But his materials well supplemented and clarified other information available to intelligence. The information on the Vatican was of the greatest value, since it came from the very "outback" of the world Catholic center and from a very competent sources.

Purposefully, stubbornly, Max made contacts among churchmen of different levels and persons associated with them. He used every opportunity - commercial affairs, official receptions, cultural events, feasts, etc. (Let's note in parentheses that work in these circles, simple communication with churchmen required specific knowledge in matters of religion. Superficiality, amateurism were excluded. With this in mind, Max constantly studied this issue).

Even at the beginning of the business trip, Max's attention was attracted by Prince Giulio Pacelli, the nephew of Pope Pius XP. He came from a noble Italian family. An aristocrat, a snob with wide connections in church and secular circles. Held a number of significant positions: member of the board of Banca di Roma, president of the directorate of the Vatican merchant marine company, colonel of the papal guard etc.

It was not possible to meet him immediately, but after the first courtesy visit, a good acquaintance began. Then the meetings became regular. The fact is that Pacelli became interested in Max's entrepreneurial activities when he learned that he, in cooperation with the former president and his friends, was establishing coffee exports to European countries. Pacelli expressed a desire to mediate in the supply of coffee for the Vatican and receive certain benefits in the process. He didn't care about money. We agreed to conduct the first test deal - 150 bags of coffee. It took place, and after that Max became a regular supplier of coffee for the Vatican and, as an intermediary, carefully received his share.

Pacelli introduced Max to his close friends: to Cardinal Borgoncini-Duca, secretary of the congregation of the "Holy Department" (Vatican Police Service), he presented Max with his treatise: "A Study on the Exact Date of the Birth of Christ", to the secretary of the congregation for propaganda, responsible member of the Vatican Diplomatic Academy. An acquaintance with one of the leaders of the Italian military counterintelligence, confidentiality

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whose real information, as it was established later, was highly valued in the parallel service of the Vatican.

With the assistance of Pacelli, Max gained access to two salons of the Vatican nobility, where politicians, big businessmen, and important foreign guests were invited. The chief of the civil administration of the Vatican, one of the legal advisers of this state, the editor of a newspaper of the leading bourgeois party, appeared on the list of his connections.

In the search for information, Max made full use of all his contacts in the diplomatic corps. His Latino colleagues tended to be frank in sharing information. Sometimes they were

interesting, but often based on rumors and gossip. Relations with diplomats from the American embassy improved. There were "heartfelt" conversations with Ambassador Bunker, and then, though not for long, with Mrs. Claire Luce, who succeeded him in 1953, a woman of sharp mind and very independent. Meetings at official receptions with a career intelligence officer - air force attache, as well as with the second secretary of the US embassy, turned into lengthy interviews. I had to discuss with a strict pragmatist, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany Clemens von Brentano. Let us add that Max met several times and spoke confidentially with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Italy de Gasperi, with his deputies, with the ministers. There was regular communication with employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Some surprise at the Center was at first aroused by Max's information about the deployment by the United States of advanced nuclear weapons at their bases abroad, about American assessments of the military potentials of the USSR and the USA. It would seem, where could he get such information from? It turned out that he accidentally met a retired American general, a big businessman, a former employee of one of the US intelligence agencies. The scout's intuition suggested that it was worth working here. It was necessary "only" to interest the American in maintaining acquaintance with the representative of such an exotic state and to "talk" him in the right way. Max's experience in the art of "human science" and this time helped him acquire a useful informant. Another acquaintance of his turned out to be the same - a cipher clerk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Max most often transmitted the information he obtained when he met with our employees of legal residencies in other countries. Sometimes other channels of communication were used (but not by radio; this system could not be put into operation). From him regularly received current information about ongoing events. Pre-prepared detailed reports were also sent. For example, "On some new points in the foreign policy of the Vatican", "On the reaction of Italian business circles to the aggravation of the international situation

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ki", "On the position in the ruling group of the Italian Democratic Christian Party", "Latin American states and their policy towards the USA and the Soviet Union". And many many others. Upon his return from a business trip, Max presented a number of fundamental analytical materials: "The New Political Situation in Europe", "The Vatican's Crusade Against Democracy", "The Vatican is a "Black International", etc.

In addition to political information, the intelligence officer received a lot of operational information: characteristics of persons who might be of interest to intelligence, data on four agents of British and American intelligence, about a diplomat from a Western country - a hidden supporter of the Communists. He provided specific information about the methods of falsifying the materials of the photo exhibition "Beyond the Iron Curtain", organized by anti-Soviet people in Rome. The material was used by the "legal" residency in Rome to carry out counteractions.

There was such an episode. One of the Latin American diplomats offered Max to go with him to Czechoslovakia, to pick up and take out of the country jewelry belonging to the former owners of breweries in the city of Pilsen. For this, a large reward was promised. Max, of course, refused, and the information was transferred within the framework of existing cooperation to the security authorities of Czechoslovakia.

It is worth recalling that Max had no auxiliary information sources (agents). He obtained all the information personally, as they say in intelligence, "in the dark", from his connections.

During his stay in Italy, Max met many times with the head of the Catholic Church, Pope Pius XP. This happened when one of the high-ranking guests from across the ocean visited the Vatican. Once there was a private conversation. This happened shortly after his return from Paris from the session of the General Assembly. It is interesting to note that

the invitation to the audience came from the pontiff himself, who, according to Pacelli, who conveyed the invitation, became interested in the details of the Paris session. The meeting took place in the office of Pius XP on the third floor of the papal palace, next to the private apartments, which emphasized its private nature.

Max recalled:

"The High Priest asked me to tell you more about how the meetings of the General Assembly took place, since the newspaper reports that he happened to read did not give a complete picture. He also asked for my assessment of certain aspects of the international situation.

I answered something like this. Firstly, the Russians are behaving very confidently, enjoying undoubted success with many delegations, as they oppose the colonial

politics west

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other powers. Secondly, the Soviet Union tirelessly talks about peace, while Westerners talk all the time about armaments. This is incomprehensible to public opinion, and it tends, "unfortunately", to the side of the USSR ... The impression is that, despite the sonorous speeches, the Western delegates are mortally afraid of the Russians ... I told how once, having come to a meeting, noticed the excitement among the delegates. It turned out that's what happened. Usually the Soviet representative Vyshinsky, whose place was next to the British delegate, would come and sit in an armchair without greeting his neighbor. But on that day it was different: Vyshinsky said to the Englishman "Hello!". And on the basis of this insignificant fact, it is concluded that the Russians are changing their policy, becoming more accommodating.

After listening to me, the elder said in a trembling voice: "My son! Indeed, the situation is very, very serious... Our trouble is not a lack of strength, but the moral crisis that society is going through. And a new world war can therefore bring only misfortune and no consolation."

Of course, we are far from thinking that this miniature "active measure" had any significant impact on Pius HP and he started talking about the perniciousness of the war. Nevertheless, the revelations of a Western diplomat could add something to the pontiff's reflections on the problems of war and peace. In the early 1950s, the theme of peace between peoples began to take up more space in Vatican speeches.

To be received by the Pope is considered a special honor in Europe. Each such case is an event. The press writes about him widely, it is reported in the latest news section on the radio.

In terms of information, Max's close relationship with the leadership of the well-known "Order of Malta" turned out to be useful. There, political and financial machinations were developed and carried out in the interests of the reactionary wing of the Catholic Church, the democratic Christian parties of Italy and the FRG. The degree of Maltese confidence in Max is evidenced by the fact that he was awarded the Order of the Maltese Cross and elevated to knighthood. The order and the corresponding diploma are now kept in the Museum of the History of the Foreign Intelligence Service.

The reader, of course, has the right to doubt and ask: was Max always and in everything a "lucky one", a perspicacious and resourceful, never mistaken intelligence officer? And the reader will be right. There were also miscalculations, mistakes were made.

..Max did not like to remember this incident. Therefore, let the most objective witness of the incident, Louise, tell:

"My husband has just returned from a short business trip, where he reported on current affairs. Naturally, conversations there were conducted in Russian. A day later we were invited to the vernissage,

exposing

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there was painting of European celebrities. One of our acquaintances asked my husband, pointing to a canvas placed in a conspicuous place, whether he liked this picture. And he take yes answer: "No!". Said in Russian. I almost got mad. What will be next? He caught himself, repeated "no" again in Russian and only then in Italian: "It seems that they say so in the country whose artist exhibited this daub." And the picture belonged to the brush of Chagall. My husband was very fond of his work. Subsequently, analyzing our situation from the point of view of security,

we have always remembered this ill-fated "no".

If in the described episode the reason for the breakdown was an understandable, purely human weakness - overwork and tension that had not yet subsided from a recent business trip, then another case already testifies to a miscalculation of a political nature. We are talking about the situation around Trieste.

Recall the history of the issue. For almost ten years after the war, the problem of the state ownership of this territory remained unresolved. Since 1947, the so-called "Free Territory of Trieste" was formed, which was under the control of the Anglo-American authorities. The rivalry between them for supremacy, the legal claims of Italy and Yugoslavia - all this is woven into a tangle of complex interstate contradictions. Reliable information about the maneuvers of the interested parties in relation to Trieste was of some value. Of course, it was most advantageous to receive such information directly on the spot.

Max came up with the idea of establishing a consulate of "his" country for this purpose in Trieste. Conceived - done. An official letter of request was sent to the British occupation authorities for an agrément for a person selected by Max as consul. The idea seemed to be promising, but it failed miserably.

Firstly, Max did not coordinate this step with "his" Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and it is far from certain that he would have received approval. Secondly, the opinion of the Center was not requested. Most likely, Moscow would be against it. This distracted the scout from solving more important tasks. And finally, he did not calculate the possible reaction of the Italians. And this followed immediately. Max was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they made a strict suggestion and resolutely demanded to withdraw the request sent to the British. All that remained was to submit and express regret for the anxiety caused to the Italians.

What was the miscalculation? The British were interested in their actual domination in Trieste being reinforced by international recognition. The desire of a Latin American country to open a consulate there was in line with their intentions. However, it was fundamentally contrary to the interests of Italy, which, like Yugoslavia, was striving for complete

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elimination of Anglo-American control over Trieste (the corresponding agreement was concluded in 1954).

You can't say anything, an unpleasant episode in the career of a scout. But - you can't throw out the words from the song.

Max had incidents of a different kind, for example, road accidents. Troubles began already when leaving Moscow for Italy. He went to Warsaw by train, having a foreign passport in his hands. At the border, he declared in the declaration only the approximate amount of currency imported into Poland, without taking the trouble to remember well how much money he actually had. The Polish customs officers, however, decided to check the veracity of the entry in the declaration and found a larger amount than Max had declared. As a result, more than 100 US dollars were confiscated from him, which was regarded as contraband, which was in full compliance with international rules.

From time to time, unforeseen circumstances arose that required Max's ingenuity and non-standard actions. For example, it so happened that the envoy of the People's Republic of Poland in Italy at that time was a man well known to Max from his joint revolutionary activities in bourgeois Poland. There was a real danger of meeting at protocol events. There was a task - not to catch the eye of an old friend. I had to dodge. Fortunately, the term of stay of the Polish diplomat in Rome will soon

expired.

Some former participants in the Spanish Civil War, who may have known Max in 1936-1937 as an active republican, permanently resided in Italy or came there for a while. Some of them became known to him, and he had to constantly monitor all his old contacts that led to Spain.

Or such a problem: whether to attend receptions at the Soviet embassy? The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of "his country" did not advise doing this, and Max strictly followed these recommendations. In moral terms, it was hard for him to ignore the invitations coming from the USSR Embassy, but he had to make this sacrifice as well. Then it turned out that the Soviet ambassador M.A. Kostylev was surprised by the strange position of the official representative of this small country, with which the Soviet Union had de jure diplomatic relations. Somehow, Kostylev made inquiries about Max and sent information to the Foreign Ministry, describing him as a reactionary and an enemy of our country.

It would be fair to emphasize the role played in Max's intelligence activities by his constant companion Louise. She was born in 1915 to a middle-class Mexican family. Having received the necessary education and training, she began to teach in one of the capital's schools. Her family ties, her inner circle belonged, as they would say now, to the left layers of mexi

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Kanese society, and she naturally fit into this environment. In 1938, she met with Max, who was then in Mexico, performing tasks for Soviet intelligence. Their acquaintance developed into a marriage, and it lasted restlessly, anxiously, sometimes at the risk of health and life itself, but in a family way happily - exactly half a century.

This outwardly fragile, modest, charming, intelligent woman shared with Max all the difficulties of the intelligence profession for many years. She helped her husband from the time of his stay in Mexico, worked with him during the Great Patriotic War in Argentina, became in fact the main cover and an important participant in all his activities in Europe. So, she was actively engaged in providing communication with the Center. In necessary cases, she traveled to other countries for secret meetings. She performed not just the functions of a courier, but presented qualified operational reports. Employees of legal residencies who worked with her noted her exceptional memory, constant composure, and secrecy.

Let us recall Louise's very risky trip to her "homeland", which ended in significant success. She, unfortunately, suffered from yellow fever there, and this disease later affected her state of health.

Her working day usually ended late in the evening. She is both a secretary-clerk, and a secular lady, and a hospitable hostess. Frequent receptions, meetings and seeing off the right people, exhausting correspondence with overseas "friends"...

Louise was not spared the troubles (to put it mildly) that illegal immigrants sometimes encounter when they unexpectedly meet people who previously knew them under other names. And it was like that. According to the established tradition, meetings of the wives of employees of official Central American missions were periodically held in Rome, a kind of "gatherings". The ladies exchanged their news over a cup of tea, carried on trifling secular conversations, discussed "everything and everything". One day, Louise returned from one of these meetings completely depressed. It turned

that on that day, the cultural attache of the Mexican embassy in Rome, a pleasant middle-aged woman, came to them "for a light". So what? Is this a reason to be upset? Louise further recalls: "She comes up to me and says, 'You strikingly remind me of someone. I just can't remember who. Tell me, have you ever been to Mexico?'" She replied that she had once been in transit. "And yet we met somewhere. Now I'm looking carefully, you are very reminiscent of one of my former students, and I used to teach in Mexico City." Anything is possible, I say, but I myself feel that I am about to break loose. But she held back. Then she moved away, but the whole evening did not take her eyes off me.

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Indeed, it was Louise's school teacher in Mexico City, with whom she studied for almost five years in her homeland. More than 15 years have passed since then... Such is the meeting. Louise immediately recognized her mentor, but she hoped she would carry it. It didn't. Together with her husband, a line of Louise's further behavior was worked out - not to avoid meetings, to behave with this lady in a friendly, even manner.

Whether the doubts of the former teacher were dispelled by her former student, we will not know this now. In any case, this meeting did not entail negative consequences for illegal immigrants.

During Max's stay in Italy, unpleasant messages came from across the ocean. The presidential election in May 1953 was won by the previously mentioned former president, but instead of Max's expected next promotion to Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Italy, one of his close associates was appointed to this post. Thus, Max's future prospects became very uncertain.

Considering the current situation and Louise's state of health, the Center decided that the business trip of illegal immigrants should be completed. They were offered to return to Moscow. They determined that the departure should be organized in such a way that it would not look like a sudden disappearance, but would have convincing explanations for their environment.

First of all, the pretext for leaving the diplomatic service was chosen. Max acted out an extreme "resentment" against the new president and his former friends "at home", who had not kept their previous promise. First, he asked "his" Foreign Office to grant him a long-term leave, and after some time he resigned. The legend of "resentment" was spread among his inner circle in Italy and connections in France.

An additional motive for this decision was Louise's state of health, which required long-term treatment (which was not far from the truth). Switzerland was chosen as the country of the legendary temporary stay and treatment of Louise.

Preparing to leave the country, Max made the necessary farewell visits, settled accounts with the mission staff, liquidated property, and did other work related to the upcoming departure, making sure that he did not have any obligations here.

Max and his wife sent letters to some officials, business and personal contacts in Italy, where they made it clear that after treatment in Switzerland, the family intended to settle "somewhere in Latin America".

When all this preparation was completed, Max and Louise with their daughter left for a short time in Switzerland, from where they safely arrived in the Soviet Union in December 1953 along a specially designed route.

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Judging by Max's report at the Center, he was able to successfully "cover up the traces" of his stay in Italy. During 1954, there were no signals about his possible decoding as a Soviet intelligence officer. The Center, however, was not entirely satisfied with these somewhat subjective and, with

on the other hand, objective information and decided to conduct an additional check. For this purpose, an experienced illegal agent "Tinto" was sent to Europe from Moscow. Before leaving, he received a full orientation about Max's work.

The trip took place in March-April 1955. Tinto collected useful information for the case. Its brief content was as follows.

Documents and legends-biographies of our illegal immigrants did not cause any doubts. Most of their connections believed that Max and his family were in Latin America. His rejection of a promising diplomatic career and departure from Italy then caused a lot of talk. The opinion was expressed that Max, "a man with a somewhat heightened ambition", could not forgive the injustice to him from his former friends, who came to power in "his country" in the middle of 1953. One of the diplomats stated: "Being very capable, on the one hand, on the other hand, he was not prepared for the dangers of political life. He had illusions about the appointment as ambassador to Rome, but he was removed due to a change in government in his homeland. Two of the acquaintances speculated about the disappearance of Max behind the Iron Curtain.

As it turned out, many people around Max paid attention to some oddities in his behavior: sometimes he disappeared for a while, and no one knew where he was. It was believed that he had a weakness for cards, although, as one of the interviewees stated, "he was not a good player." Or: "How could an envoy of a Catholic country, a friend of high-ranking figures of the Vatican, not baptize his daughter, give her the name of this or that saint, and also not be a believer himself and not demand this from his wife?"

There were reasons to believe that the Italian secret services checked Max in Brazil, but "nothing suspicious was found." It was also tested and studied in Italy. It was not possible to find out the true goals of the special services. Most likely, it was about the routine work usually carried out by counterintelligence in relation to diplomats accredited in their countries.

A year and a half after leaving Italy, Tinto did not receive any unexpected or disturbing information about Max and the situation around him.

Thus, the analysis of all the materials about the work of Max in 1949-1953 allowed us to draw a confident conclusion that this operation of the illegal Soviet intelligence service was carried out at a high professional level and by the special services of the Western state

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gifts were not disclosed at that time. Some objectively existing unfavorable factors: not quite reliable communication with the Center, as well as individual mistakes in Max's actions and behavior, did not have an impact on the given assessment.

Having finished his work in the intelligence service, Max did not lose touch with her until the end of his days.

Colleagues and close friends from past joint work maintained deeply respectful comradely relations with Max, often turning to him for advice on various professional issues. Max periodically spoke in intelligence teams with memories. Louise also willingly responded to requests: she helped young intelligence officers to improve their knowledge of the Spanish language.

Max died in 1988 after a serious illness. Louise died in 1997.

! For Max's initial steps in intelligence, see History of Russian Foreign Intelligence, vols. III and TU.

The fatal year of 1948 for Soviet-Yugoslav relations still hides many mysterious and not entirely clear pages, despite the great attention paid to this problem by historians and scientific research in this area. Was the motivation of the quarreling parties exhausted, for example, by officially made statements? What factors subsequently contributed to overcoming the conflict, etc.? The intelligence archives shed additional light on these problems, in particular on the role of intelligence itself as an important tool in shaping the foreign policy strategy of the Soviet state in the postwar period.

After the end of the war in 1945, it seemed that throughout Europe the USSR had no more reliable ally than people's Yugoslavia. Under the leadership of the CPY, the Yugoslav people liberated a significant part of their territory from the Nazis, and this was not a political myth, it was in fact. Half a million Yugoslav partisans, and according to some estimates, up to 880 thousand, by that time, with Soviet organizational and material assistance, had turned into a regular army, which was a solid military force, and Yugoslavia dominated in this regard throughout the entire region of South-Eastern Europe. . According to the decisions of the Yalta Conference and relying on the support of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia was able to significantly move its borders in the west, joining the peninsula of Istria, the Kvarner archipelago, the northern and middle parts of Dalmatia with the largest in this parts of the Mediterranean by the ports of Koper (Capodi-Istria) and Rijeka (Fiume). There was serious talk about the creation of a Balkan federation consisting of at least Yugoslavia, its actual core - Bulgaria and Albania. Stalin supported this project up to a certain point. The positions of the Yugoslavs in Greece, engulfed in civil war, were very strong, especially

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but in Aegean Macedonia, among the ethnic Slavs. The influence of the CPY in Europe was such that, for example, the Italian researcher J. Boffa spoke of the situation in the international communist movement as "Soviet-Yugoslav hegemony". The confidence in relations between the USSR and the SFRY is evidenced, for example, by the fact of the initiative of Beria and Merkulov supported by Stalin on June 29, 1945 (after the appeal of the ambassador to Yugoslavia Sadchikov) to send a group of 30 employees of the Sixth Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR to Yugoslavia in led by his deputy chief, Commissar of State Security Shadrin to strengthen Tito's personal protection. At the same time, Shadrin's assistant Lieutenant Colonel Glukhovtsev was appointed deputy head of the Yugoslav leader's security guard. For a certain time, this group carried out the physical protection of Tito and was engaged in the establishment of the entire system of protection of state institutions in Yugoslavia.

At the same time, factors of both an objective and subjective nature, a whole complex of intricately intertwined historical circumstances, acted against this "fraternal union" from the very first days, at first gradually, and then more and more openly. Not everything, for example, coincided with the national-state interests of the parties, when Tito demanded from Stalin to more resolutely seek the annexation of Trieste or the Austrian provinces to Yugoslavia, without taking into account the real possibilities of the USSR. There is no doubt that the devastated After the war, the Soviet Union could not act exclusively as a donor to its newfound allies in Eastern Europe and sought certain advantages for itself in certain economic deals. Unable to compete with the Americans here in the bitter post-war confrontation, he tried to compensate for his weaknesses by demanding greater discipline and self-restraint among his allies. Problems in this regard arose with the Germans, and with the Hungarians, and with the Romanians, but the Yugoslavs, as more independent, they apparently hurt more

Total.

The personal ambitions of the leaders also played a significant role, especially such authoritarian leaders as Stalin and Tito, who initially claimed a special status in the world revolutionary movement, thereby challenging the hitherto indisputable "leader of the peoples". A special contribution to the rivalry was made by the influence of a part of their entourage, who tried to use it in the framework of the eternal struggle of those close to them for influence. Undoubtedly, in separating Yugoslavia from the USSR, they were interest

western states. By all means, including with the help of their special services, they "thrown apples of discord", taking into account the "national-communist" moods of the Yugoslavs and the psychological characteristics of the representatives of both sides known to them.

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The leadership of the NKGB intelligence, headed by Fitin, took a tolerant and flexible position towards the Yugoslavs. The deputy resident in Belgrade, Colonel Tishkov, in March 1945, informing the Center about the inclusion of the bourgeois politicians M. Grol and S. Kosanovic in the Yugoslav government (which caused criticism from Stalin as well), claimed that Tito thereby showed that he intends to pursue an independent policy and "not to take into account the opinions of the Soviet government." Tishkov described such a course as "wrong and harmful for the Soviet Union." Signed by Fitin, the following response was sent to Belgrade: "In the current situation that exists in Yugoslavia, Tito cannot behave differently. We have no reason to suspect him of insincerity with us or of a change of sympathy. Do not do it
hasty conclusions.

In July of the same year, the Center received a letter from the head of the sub-residency in Zagreb. In it, referring to conversations in the "middle party ranks of Croatia", it was stated that "Rankovič, together with Kardelj and Djilas and others, created an anti-Soviet party group in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which Tito, due to insufficient intellectuality, cannot resist." The letter emphasized that Rankovich and Kardelj allegedly often use expressions like "let the Russians sweep the rubbish out of their hut, we will sweep the rubbish out of our hut."
themselves."

Fitin's reaction to this letter was sharp and emotional, as evidenced by his remarks directly in the text: "the author of this writing has anti-Soviet interpretations", "how can you write such nonsense?".

In August 1945, a letter signed by Fitin was sent to the NKGB station in Belgrade, where, in relation to the report from Zagreb, it was said, in particular, that the Center had already repeatedly requested all documents that in any way indicate elements of a disloyal attitude towards us from individual Yugoslav workers, to supply their critical assessments. The Resident was reproached that, while forwarding direct accusations against the main leaders of the party and government, he considered it possible to confine himself to the remark: "There is a lot of tendentiousness in the report." "Such statements without facts and evidence cannot be tolerated," the Center wrote in a letter. "We believe that the authors of these rumors can either be victims of an English provocation or active promoters of it." Fitin demanded to carefully analyze the information of such sources. At the end of the letter, the head of intelligence expressed a wish, largely prescient:

"Once again, when receiving such data, we ask you to remember that the Anglo-American intelligence agencies are vitally interested in creating

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an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion towards the leaders of the current government of Yugoslavia. One must think that there will still be many attempts by our hands to remove the most loyal and devoted Yugoslav Communists. This, of course, does not mean that we generally exclude the possibility of the political degradation of individual communists under the influence of the external situation and artificial influence from outside (the history of our party teaches us that such cases are possible). But such signals should be studied in the most detailed and conscientious way before drawing conclusions about degradation and treason."

Attention should be paid to the balanced approach of foreign intelligence to the rather difficult situation that developed at that time in Yugoslavia, to the requirement of its leader to show tolerance and understanding of local realities, and to his civic position. Subsequently, when

the conflict between Stalin and Tito nevertheless broke out, Fitin had to go through many difficult moments because of this position. In the meantime, he took concrete steps to neutralize the source of possible complications in bilateral relations.

In general, all the work of Soviet intelligence officers in Yugoslavia in the post-war period was aimed primarily at assisting the Yugoslav secret services without interfering in their affairs.

In the "Proposals for the organization of the apparatus of communications officers of the NKGB of the USSR in the federal units of Yugoslavia", approved by Merkulov on July 7, 1945, in particular, it was said:

"5. Allow our operatives to recruit agents for the development of Anglo-Americans and white émigrés, leaving in place the previous prohibition of recruitment in the Yugoslav state and party apparatus (CPY), the army and persons associated with the OZNA ("Organs for the Protection of the People." - Auth.).

6. Allow persons of the above categories to be carefully used in order to establish personal friendly contact with them in order to obtain from them the information of interest to us."

In the already cited letter to the Belgrade residency dated August 23, 1945, in addition to analyzing the report from Zagreb, the tasks were also set "to create a small but strong network that could deeply and fully cover and develop the Anglo-Americans in the country, their work and plans to develop white emigration and local reactionary elements who previously collaborated with the occupiers. It was emphasized: "We do not rule out the possibility that in the future the foreign agents most proven at work, acquired by you, will be transferred to other countries. Please note that the old prohibitions on recruiting agents among the state and party apparatus in order to obtain materials on the activities of the Yugoslav government

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remain in force..." And this prohibition was strictly enforced. So, when in August 1946 our operatives suggested using a source who worked for Tito to collect information about his entourage, Kubatkin, who by that time had replaced Fitin as head of the First Main Directorate, replied that such a decision would be erroneous and contrary to would 'our installation on this matter. The task of selecting proven people worthy of Tito's trust is within the competence of OZNA."

At the talks with Rankovich, a wide range of issues of mutual cooperation in the field of intelligence of the two countries was discussed in detail. Abakumov asked Rankovich to share with the MGB advisers who were with him the most interesting data of a general political nature. In addition, it was about helping Soviet intelligence in facilitating the transfer of our agents, who were supposed to live in Yugoslavia for some time, to other countries, as well as helping us in supplying such agents with the necessary documentation. The recording of the conversation recorded Rankovich's promise to willingly do everything in his power in this area.

Indeed, at that time there was a fairly wide exchange of information on issues of interest to both sides of world politics. The following characteristic episodes of cooperation can be distinguished.

With the help of the Yugoslavs, at least seven agents of the First Directorate of the NKGB were brought to the West. Despite the subsequent chill between the FPRY and the USSR, the subsequent check showed that there were no failures among these agents, and this, of course, is an essential point.

Around the middle of 1946, the Yugoslavs obtained and handed over to us through Rankoviĭ photocopies of the diplomatic ciphers of one of the Western countries.

In April 1947, we handed Rankovic captured German documents: one volume of the file of the Belgrade security police with reports on the mood of the Yugoslav population for 1943 and

two volumes of the police file with reports on the political situation in Serbia and Yugoslavia for 1941-1942, as well as materials collected by the Germans about the atrocities of the Ustashe against the civilian population. It is easy to imagine the value of these documents for the Yugoslavs, not only in terms of identifying fascist accomplices, but also in view of the far from over struggle for power in Yugoslavia itself.

For his part, Rankovich sent us a warning that the French counterintelligence in Paris had established meeting places for Soviet intelligence officers with their agents.

In August 1947, a representative of the NKGB told the Yugoslavs the coordinates of an illegal radio station spotted in the Belgrade region, which regularly contacted an English correspondent.

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In January 1948, Rankovich handed over to us the former SS Colonel Otto Reich, arrested in Zagreb, who had carried out punitive operations in Novgorod and commanded a police regiment in Ternopil.

Close ties between the two intelligence agencies, primarily in the identification of former Nazi criminals, were maintained in Vienna. In April 1948, when the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict was already gaining momentum, Rankovich's closest associate A. Stefanovich expressed the hope on his behalf that cooperation on these issues would continue.

Outwardly, everything was also going well at the state-party level. Thus, on September 8, 1947, Tito's initiative was finally implemented to create, instead of the Comintern, a new coordinating center of the international communist movement, called the Information Bureau, but better known as the Cominformburo, whose headquarters was located in Belgrade.

In fact, this was the "second edition" of the Comintern with a center parallel to Moscow and moved closer to the West, which, of course, spoke of the exceptionally important place of Yugoslavia in the system of Stalin's preferences. But this undeniable success of the Yugoslav initiative also posed a serious danger for Tito.

From now on, due to the delicate nature of the mission entrusted to the leadership of the CPY, all its actions began to be weighed in Moscow, as if on an apothecary's scales. The former pragmatic approach to the Yugoslavs, which was adhered to by Soviet intelligence and which allowed them to "forgive" some self-will and actions that were really not always plausible, has now acquired a pronounced ideological character. From that moment on, the desire to control the behavior of the Yugoslavs increased in Moscow, since all their possible innovations in building socialism were directly reflected in the authority of the "old center". It is no coincidence that the main initiators of the increasingly sharp criticism of the CPY that unfolded from that time, which eventually led to an interstate crisis, were, apparently, primarily representatives of the leadership of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks who were responsible for ideology - A.A. Zhdanov, young then, but already influential M.A. Suslov, and in Belgrade - the philosopher P.F. Yudin. In some publications, it is precisely the role of the latter in promoting all sorts of accusations and draft documents against the CPY in the Politburo that he is even mistakenly called the ambassador. In fact, the ambassador to Yugoslavia at that time was A.I. Lavrentiev, subsequently, in October 1948, was appointed a resident of the CI, but Yudin, obviously, had his own direct access to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party

It is also generally accepted that the main suppliers of critical material to the Soviet representatives of the CPY at that time

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there were a member of its Politburo S. Zhuyovich and A. Hebrang, who was previously removed from the candidates for this body, who were even accused of working for the intelligence of the USSR. It has already been said above that the figures of such

level, in accordance with the strict rules in force, could in no way be its agents, and they openly expressed their criticism of certain decisions of their colleagues in the Yugoslav leadership, including to Ambassador Lavrentiev. It is much less known that in the previous period Tito's "secret" critics in conversations with Soviet intelligence officers were his closest associates: in Ljubljana - E. Kardelj, and in Zagreb - V. Bakarić. Perhaps their "revelations" were a reflection of the struggle for power and the desire to be noticed in Moscow. But it is also possible that these figures from the very beginning deliberately provoked a conflict in which they took the side of Tito, although before that they themselves blasphemed him in front of Stalin. Noteworthy in this sense is the extremely unseemly role of Josip Kopinich, who worked in Zagreb, was a resident of the Comintern during the war years in Croatia. Despite the statements of this figure that it was he who saved Tito from Stalin's purges both in the 30s and after the war, the archives of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service show that in the period 1945-1947 Kopinich was the main source of negative information (perhaps, not without the knowledge of V. Bakarich) about the Yugoslav leadership.

The participation of intelligence in the preparation of the letter of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the Central Committee of the CPY dated March 27, 1948, which marked the beginning of the conflict with Yugoslavia, which pointed out the numerous mistakes of the Yugoslavs and required them to be eliminated immediately, was insignificant, as evidenced by archival documents.

Only on March 25 of the same year, an intelligence report was sent to Stalin and the Politburo, prepared at the request of party organs by the former deputy resident of the NKGB in Belgrade Tishkov, "On the actions of some leaders of the Yugoslav government and the Yugoslav Communist Party, directed against the interests of the Soviet Union". This document brought together the main criticisms of the Yugoslavs from the previous telegrams.

Later, when Tito was already declared a "fascist executioner and murderer", a certificate was attached to this report, which at that time could cost dearly to the entire intelligence leadership and Fitin in particular. It stated: "None of the facts cited in Tishkov's memorandum were ever reported to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. The Belgrade residency was repeatedly instructed not to collect information about the leadership of the CPY. In April 1948, a review was made of all materials available in the KIU about the Central Committee of the KIU and about individual leading figures of Yugoslavia ... Most of the materials on this

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The question belonged to the military unit of the CI, received from the heads of the military mission of the USSR in Yugoslavia.

In June 1948, at the initiative of the USSR, the resolution of the Information Bureau "On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia" was adopted, which served as a strict guideline for the countries of the socialist community in relation to Yugoslavia and the Tito regime.

The discord that began in 1948 continued until 1955, it was accompanied by the most severe controversy and the rupture of many ties, primarily military and economic. Whatever motives Tito and his associates were guided by, but at that moment they showed themselves far from the best side. Tens of thousands of supporters of the Cominformburo resolution were repressed in Yugoslavia. Thousands of them were killed or tortured to death in such infamous camps as, for example, Naked Island. It seemed that the ideological confrontation was about to develop into a military one. Every year until Stalin's death, the West predicted an imminent invasion of Yugoslavia by Eastern European countries and the USSR. But still this did not happen.

It seems that there was no real danger of such a development of events. Long ago and on various occasions, a strange combination in Stalin of dogmatically intolerant approaches with extremely pragmatic and balanced actions was noticed, especially in the sphere of foreign policy. The explanation for such contradictory behavior is usually found in personality traits.

Stalin, however, another factor also played a role here - the information flow in which he was and which, by its very content, pushed him to quite definite and rational conclusions. Undoubtedly, intelligence could play its role in that period, since in the overwhelming majority of cases it reported objective information and, with rare exceptions, did not face the need to adapt to anti-Tito sentiments.

Since diplomatic relations between the two countries were not interrupted, this allowed intelligence to maintain control over the coverage of events in Yugoslavia. An even larger amount of important documentary information, which made it possible to see the true motives of the policy of the Yugoslav leadership, the attitude of the Western states towards it and the trends in the development of the situation, came from foreign residencies, primarily from London, Paris, Washington, Rome and some others. .

So, for example, despite the propaganda noise about the almost nationwide uprising against the "Tito regime", the residency in Belgrade reported at the beginning of 1949 that in the armed resistance in Montenegro, which was spoken of as the most powerful performance, in reality only a detachment of the secretary of the Bielopol district committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia Bulatovich, numbering only 30 people, participated,

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besides, this detachment was quickly defeated. The residence informed about the reports of the plenums of the republican communist parties, from which it was clear that only a few in the party "top" took the side of the resolution of the Cominformburo. The process of purges in the army, which eliminated officers and generals loyal to the Soviet Union, was covered in detail. The construction of defensive lines along the eastern borders, the strengthening of the military industry and the armed forces of Yugoslavia were monitored in detail. Finding itself in extremely difficult working conditions, the Belgrade intelligence apparatus, all of whose contacts were taken under close surveillance by the Yugoslav security authorities and immediately prophylactic, and some were arrested and sent to camps, nevertheless did not try to present the Tito regime as weaker than he was in fact, albeit extremely negatively, for obvious reasons, assessed him. The station's information was basically objective, and this in itself had a deterrent effect on possible attempts at a forceful solution from Moscow. From intelligence reports, it was clear, for example, that the point was not only in Tito's personal behavior, but also in the solidarity position of a large group of his closest associates, such as Rankovic, Djilas, Kardelj, K. Popovich, and others. - nothing could be changed by the Yugoslav leader's opinion, and all the plans in this regard, which P. Sudoplatov writes about in his book "Intelligence and the Kremlin", if they were, remained nothing more than "theoretical developments" that did not pass into a practical PLANE .

Intelligence work in Yugoslavia was also extremely hampered by the ongoing trials of yet another "Soviet spies", most often fictitious ones. Russian white émigrés suffered the most from this. The fault of some of them was only in the adoption of the citizenship of the USSR, and the tragedy of others - in connections with the SMERSH group, established during the war years in order to fight the Nazis and their accomplices. At that stage, this was not very much hidden from the allies and partners from OZNA.

From the information reported by the intelligence, it quite definitely followed that it was precisely further pressure on Yugoslavia or attempts at a forceful solution that could lead to its complete transition to the camp of the enemy. Thus, it was necessary to choose between keeping the FPRY as a not quite friendly, but still neutral country, or very likely, in case of ill-conceived actions, its transition to the opposite grouping, with a significant strengthening of the overall strategic positions of the newly created NATO bloc. There is nothing surprising in the fact that the arsenal of pressure on Belgrade never went beyond the ineffective propaganda and even less effective economic measures on the part of the Soviet Union, which were more than covered by Western assistance.

In the period from 1949 to March 1953, foreign intelligence obtained a significant amount of important, including documentary, information from the government and political circles of Western countries on a wide range of problems related to Yugoslavia.

Thus, at the beginning of 1949, Stalin and other members of the Politburo were presented with the text of a letter from the Austrian envoy to Yugoslavia, Rosenberg, to the Austrian Foreign Ministry, in which the Western diplomatic corps assessed the position of Tito and noted that it had become stronger. It was also pointed out that "the tactics of encircling Yugoslavia by Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and now also Greece, carried out by the Soviet Union and its satellites, only accelerated the revelation of negative results for the USSR... the Kremlin's policy gradually pushed Yugoslavia into the camp of the Western powers. This situation, of course, was actively used by British and American diplomacy".

Obviously, corresponding conclusions were also drawn from such assessments. In September 1949, the text of a telegram from the French ambassador to the United States, Bonnet, was reported to Stalin and other Soviet leaders, stating that "the State Department is following developments in the Balkans with particular vigilance in connection with reports of the movement of Soviet troops in towards the Yugoslav border. However, American observers note that the almost open nature of these movements, the scale of which is much smaller than the press imagines, indicates an intensification of the war of nerves rather than preparations for armed conflict.

In March 1950, the Committee of Information reported to the country's leadership the contents of Tito's conversation with the US Ambassador to Yugoslavia Allen, during which the Yugoslav leader said that he was afraid of a possible agreement between the great powers on the division of the world into spheres of influence, and at the same time emphasized that he was particularly concerned about the possible division of the Balkans to the detriment of the freedom and independence of Yugoslavia. "Tito complained to Allen about Adenauer, who tried to put pressure on Tito, demanding the release of clear war criminals."

Around the same time, the cipher-correspondence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia Kardelya with the Ambassador to the United States Kosanovic, from which the categorical unwillingness of the Yugoslavs to join the Marshall Plan because of fears of losing independence, was seen on the table of the Soviet leader.

Tito's striving for independence was evidenced, for example, by V.M. Molotov, a recording of the conversation between the French ambassador to Yugoslavia, Bode, and UN Secretary General Trygve Lie, who shared his impressions of conversations with Yugoslav leaders in the spring of 1951, who insisted that the UN consider

dealt with small peoples and did not give everything into the hands of the great powers. In particular, Tito, whom Trygve Li "found physically very tired", showed "an unshakable will to maintain his independence in relations between the two blocs." At the same time, Trygve Lie remarked that "he was very surprised by the excessive display of pride on the part of Tito, who should have taken more into account the advice of the Western powers."

At the same time, an assessment of French intelligence was received, according to which "from the point of view of Marxist dialectics, despite the disagreements between the governments of Tito and the Cominformburo, Yugoslavia is still a people's republic, and Tito is a "Trojan horse" in the block of Western Europe, which the USSR can use in its own interests after a certain time.

At the same time, information was constantly coming in about attempts by Western countries to completely drag Yugoslavia to their side. So, in September 1950, intelligence reported the text of the telegram of the Italian ambassador to Yugoslavia Martino about the visit of a delegation of British

Laborites, led by the well-known politician Davis, who insisted on the expediency of Yugoslavia's refusal of its positive neutrality in the event of the creation of European or Atlantic armed forces. The telegram stated that its distancing from the Atlantic Pact would have not only military but also political significance "in connection with the future reorganization of the world on the basis of a peace treaty or as a result of war, since it is envisaged that only countries members of these blocs will take part in resolving political issues."

Approximately during this period, Moscow was also informed about the constant pressure Tito was under in Belgrade from the American Ambassador Allen, who urged him to openly join the Security Council resolution on the Korean question. Tito repeatedly expressed "moral support for the United States," but refused to grant their request.

On February 10, 1951, Stalin received a message about the conference of American ambassadors to the countries of Western Europe, which had ended two days earlier in Frankfurt am Main, at which, among other things, a proposal was put forward about "the need to put pressure on Yugoslavia, with so that it hastens its official accession to the Atlantic Pact." As an intermediate version of this process, in particular, the Italo-Yugoslav military alliance was considered.

However, the main efforts of Western countries to involve Yugoslavia in their military structures, as follows from the documents reported to the leadership of the USSR by intelligence, were aimed at creating a Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish alliance, or the Balkan Pact, as the southern axis of NATO. Intensive contacts on this issue have become

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carried out in early 1951. The USA was the main initiator. Interestingly, not all Western countries shared their position. Thus, the Soviet leadership knew from the message of the Italian Ambassador to Yugoslavia Martino to his Foreign Ministry that London was against such a regional association. The British pointed out the danger that, in the proposed union, Yugoslavia could exercise political dominance over other members, thus not moving closer to NATO, but, on the contrary, moving Athens and Ankara away from it. This revived the old fears in the West that Tito was nothing more than her mishandled Trojan horse, and this was also regularly reported to Moscow.

In February 1952, intelligence informed the Soviet leadership about US policy towards Yugoslavia. The note stated that this policy was mainly aimed at "turning Yugoslavia into a military springboard for attacking the USSR and the countries of people's democracy". It was also noted that for these purposes, negotiations are underway on the direct entry of Yugoslavia into a regional union with Greece and Turkey, with the help of which the Americans intend to indirectly "join Yugoslavia to the North Atlantic Alliance". However, it was stated that the Americans, "while using the Tito clique, still do not fully rely on it, and therefore support the old bourgeois parties of Yugoslavia."

In January 1953, the Center received a detailed intelligence report about the preparations for the creation of the Balkan Pact, from which it was clear that "the Titoites, for internal political reasons," still consider it undesirable for themselves to sign it officially, but want to limit themselves "secret military conventions. The Balkan Pact, despite the signed agreements, never entered into force.

It should be noted that certain conciliatory signals were received by the Yugoslavs during Stalin's lifetime, which was also recorded by Western representatives. Thus, in October 1952, Stalin was informed by intelligence that the French Chargé d'Affaires in the USSR, Brionval, had reported to the French Foreign Ministry about the changes he observed in Soviet-Yugoslav relations during that period. "The attacks of the Soviet press on Yugoslavia have noticeably softened. According to rumors, secret negotiations are being held between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaders... Allegedly secret meetings took place. In addition, the Soviet delegation to the Danube Commission

made concessions to the Yugoslavs and allegedly made advances to them. And although in a conversation with him, the Yugoslav attorney in the USSR, Žagar, denied this, Brionval concluded that the USSR made concessions to Yugoslavia at the "Danube Conference, and therefore an attempt to rapprochement between them really took place." In general, this commission, whose permanent seat was in Belgrade and where both sides are mainly

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were represented by scouts, in fact, it was almost the only place where, throughout the entire conflict, the Yugoslavs and Russians could agree on everything.

As you know, after the death of Stalin, L. Beria advocated the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia. At that moment, this did not find understanding among other members of the Soviet leadership, and during his trial it was one of the charges of "revisionism". Having got rid of Beria, the new leaders of the country, nevertheless, rather quickly began to take a similar position on the Yugoslav issue, relying largely on intelligence information in the process of gradually normalizing relations with Tito.

Thus, the text of a letter dated May 8, 1953 from the British Ambassador to Yugoslavia Mallet to Churchill was received from the resident in London and sent to Malenkov, Molotov and Khrushchev. It said that in Belgrade they were closely following Soviet policy after the death of Stalin, showing so far a certain skepticism about the possibility of an "instant" change in the views of the comrades-in-arms of the deceased leader, but attached great importance to their statements and considered it necessary during this period to "avoid any appearance of threats and ultimatums against Russia".

In August 1953, the memorandum of the British Foreign Office, obtained by the residency in London, was reported to the leadership of the USSR. It stated: "Although Russia, by appointing an ambassador to Belgrade, took the first step towards the normalization of its diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia for the first time since the formation of the Cominform, its motives for such a retreat remain unclear." The British speculated on the generally correct suggestion that this first step was taken to try to disrupt Yugoslavia's growing closeness to the West and encourage her to return to working-class cooperation with the Soviet bloc. "At this stage," the document noted, "this policy may be calculated to revive traditional pro-Russian and pro-Soviet feelings in some Yugoslav circles and arouse Western suspicion of Yugoslavia." At the same time, the authors of the memorandum relied primarily on the benefits that Yugoslavia receives from its cooperation with the West, and considered it very unlikely that there would be a change in Tito's position, "unless there is a sharp turn in the general policy of Russia, so that the Russians can show in their relations with Tito, such respect for his independence and such generosity in terms of economic assistance, for the sake of which it would be worthwhile for him to change his policy.

It was clear to the Kremlin that the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia would require not only the elimination of the existing problems between them, but also the neutralization of the sharp opposition to this process from the West, which uses powerful material and financial resources for this.

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financial resources. Very characteristic in this sense is the information sent by intelligence to the leadership of the country at the end of 1954, about the negotiations in the USA of the Deputy Chairman of the Federal Executive Council of Yugoslavia S. Vukmanovich-Tempo (at the same time, another member of the government left for Moscow almost immediately after that - M. Todorovich). The resident in Belgrade, citing circles close to Kardelj, reported that during the negotiations the Americans promised Vukmanovič to provide a loan and economic assistance to Yugoslavia if the Yugoslav government fulfilled the following conditions.

1. All persons oriented to the East and anti-American must be removed from the government.

2. Yugoslavia must change its policy towards the Soviet Union and the people's democracies and completely stop further normalization of relations with these countries.
3. Restore diplomatic relations with the Vatican and end the persecution of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia.
4. Yugoslavia must join the North Atlantic Pact.

It was said that Vukmanović informed Tito of these conditions and was instructed by him to tell the Americans that such conditions were unacceptable for Yugoslavia and to break off negotiations. The source also said: "The further line of the Yugoslav government in the matter of normalizing relations with the East and foreign policy towards the West will be determined upon the return of Todorovich from Moscow due to the fact that Yugoslavia still does not know in what as far as she can count on the Soviet Union, and are the statements of the leaders of the Soviet government really sincere?"

Since all this information came from the Yugoslavs, intelligence assumed that they were playing a certain game in order to influence the course of economic negotiations in Moscow in the direction they desired. This was made a corresponding reservation in the text of the message. The general nature of Yugoslavia's relations with the West, the real presence of fluctuations between it and the East, was confirmed by numerous documents coming from other intelligence residencies. They testified that not only rapprochement with Belgrade, but also its preservation as a neutral entity in world politics would require decisive steps from Moscow, some sacrifices in terms of prestige and material costs.

By the beginning of the 1960s, a certain modus vivendi was gradually built up between the parties through mutual efforts. According to an assessment of Soviet-Yugoslav relations by the ambassador of one of the NATO countries in Yugoslavia, "thaws and coolings, periodically repeated in them since reconciliation in May 1955, by 1961 were replaced by a steady rapprochement, which is especially expressed in support

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Yugoslavs of Soviet theses on the Berlin question. The position of Yugoslavia at the Belgrade conference, in particular on the issue of the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union, the ambassador argued, gives the USSR new reasons for satisfaction. The Yugoslavs positively assessed the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, and this also contributes to rapprochement. The ambassador made a forecast: "If we assume that the Soviet Union intends to accept from the Yugoslavs the services that they can provide by pursuing an independent line outside the socialist camp, but close to the Soviet one and agreed with the USSR, then one can imagine what will be prospects and limits of rapprochement between the two countries". Not only the "Khrushchev team" in power, but also Brezhnev, who soon replaced him, were indeed guided by this approach, which made it possible in the mid-1960s to bring relations between the two countries to a fairly stable level.

After the normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, contacts were resumed between the special services of the two countries. At the initiative of the central intelligence apparatus and the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the USSR Ambassador to Yugoslavia N.P. In 1956-1957, Firyubin twice handed over to A. Rankovich lists of persons suspected by Western European counterintelligence of intelligence activities in favor of Yugoslavia, as well as those who had been recruited by them. At the same time, Rankovich, according to Firyubin, was extremely embarrassed, thanked him many times, in a word, behaved as if "the persons mentioned are well known to him, and information about them is very important."

Unfortunately, the lion's share of the efforts of the Yugoslav secret services, both inside the country and abroad, was spent on fighting not with the real destroyers of its unity, but with the so-called Cominformburovites, whose entire fault was the belief that Yugoslavia had no alliance with Russia. There is no future for the Soviet Union.

Baghlag Pact - CENTO: Birth and Death

In Berlin, in Karlhorst, in 1945, in the early hours of May 9, the signing of the Act of the unconditional surrender of Germany was completed. Day 9 May became a national holiday of the Victory. Streams of jubilant people flocked to Red Square, Okhotny Ryad, Manezhnaya Square. Strangers hugged each other, laughed, cried...

US embassy adviser J. Kennan, watching the enthusiastic manifestation from the window, said quietly: "They are rejoicing... They think that the war is over. And she's just getting started! Upon taking office as president, Truman declared that "the Russians will soon be put in their place, and then the United States will take the lead in the development of the world"?. The US administration was preparing to jettison President Roosevelt's policies. Echoing Truman, Winston Churchill in March 1946, visiting Truman, delivered a speech in Fulton (USA), announcing the beginning of the Cold War.

The path from declarations to deeds was short-lived: already in July 1945, one of the most well-informed agents of Soviet intelligence, Guy Burgess, announced the development in the UK of the "Security of the British Empire" document, in which the USSR was declared the "main enemy" of England and the entire West. Measures were outlined to isolate the former ally and prepare for war against him. Some time later, the full text of this document lay on the desk of the chief of foreign intelligence. He was reported to I.V. Stalin.

This document is kept in the archives of the SVR of Russia. It deals with the preparation of an offensive war against the USSR, for which, in particular, it was stated that it was necessary, together with the United States, to create a network of military-political blocs directed against the USSR. British military strategists recommended organizing this system of blocs and bases in the most important areas of the world: in the eastern Mediterranean, in the Near and Middle East. It was understood that the cohesion of these unions would take place under the auspices of England.

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Even in the first post-war months, life itself set a task for foreign intelligence that required concentration of efforts on revealing these plans. Assignments were sent to Rome, Cairo, Ankara, Istanbul, Tehran, Baghdad, and in subsequent years to Karachi, Tel Aviv, Damascus and Amman, as residencies were opened in these capitals, to monitor the activities of the Western powers to form military-political alliances hostile to the USSR.

Such information began to arrive regularly in Moscow from the middle of 1947. In August of the same year, a report was obtained from the French ambassador in Athens on the trip of Greek Foreign Minister Tsaldaris to the United States, where plans to create a Mediterranean military bloc were discussed. The Greek minister expressed serious concern that the Americans assigned a key role in this alliance to Turkey, traditionally hostile to the Greeks. On the way back, Tsaldaris met in Rome with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, Sforza, and confirmed the positive attitude of Athens in principle towards the plans to create an "entente in the eastern part of the Mediterranean, directed against the Slavic expansion." Both ministers, however, were reserved about the American idea of giving Turkey a leading role in the bloc.

In November 1947, the London station informed him that during Sforza's visit to England, he was given to understand that the initiative to create the Mediterranean bloc should come primarily from the Mediterranean countries themselves, so that they play the main role in it. Anglo-American contradictions came to light already at the first stage of the implementation of the plan.

In December 1947, the Center, summarizing the intelligence reports received by that time, reported to the country's leadership an analytical note stating that "at the initiative of the United States, there are attempts to create a Mediterranean bloc within the United States,

England, France, Turkey, Greece, Italy, which has an anti-Soviet orientation. Anglo-American controversy over the leading position in it was also reported.

Some time later, a French intelligence document was obtained confirming the desire of the United States to involve practically all Mediterranean countries—Spain, Italy, France, Turkey, and Greece—in the military-political bloc they are creating, which is closely linked to NATO. Such US plans alarmed the British. They understood that in such a broad association, the leading role would belong entirely to the United States. According to our intelligence, they would be more comfortable with the combined efforts of Greece and Turkey. In early 1952, the London residency reported that during a visit to England by Turkish President İsmet İnönü, he was dissuaded from plans to participate in the formation of a broad bloc and focused on the need to develop primarily the Anglo-Turkish

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cooperation in "the matter of protecting the Mediterranean from the penetration of the USSR." Anglo-American rivalry for influence over the Mediterranean states was evident.

In the same period, our intelligence sources began to report attempts by the British and Americans to draw Yugoslavia into the planned military-political bloc. This information was of particular value to the country's leadership, given the tense relations that developed at that time with President Tito. Intelligence received information that the US Secretary of Defense, prominent statesmen and politicians of the US and Great Britain Harriman and Eden went to Belgrade to negotiate with Tito. The Turkish Foreign Minister met secretly with the Yugoslav Ambassador in Paris. This meeting became known to our intelligence. The Turk proved to Yugoslavia the benefits for Yugoslavia of participation in the "continuous front of the Alps-Dardanelles", aimed at protecting the Mediterranean from Soviet threats.

The Italians followed with particular attention and jealousy the attempts of the Americans to involve Yugoslavia in the planned military-political bloc. Intelligence managed to obtain the text of the message of the Italian ambassador in Washington to Rome, in which he informed about the results of Harriman's visit to Belgrade and his negotiations with Tito. "The United States," the Italian diplomat expressed his opinion, "would suit any option that would allow effective control over Yugoslavia and the full use of its potential in a form that would not threaten the Yugoslav government with an internal crisis and would not give serious reasons for open manifestation of the left opposition in the country".

Summarizing the available information, in the first half of 1952, foreign intelligence sent a special message to Stalin and other top leaders of the country, which stated that "in order to strengthen the anti-Soviet foothold in the Mediterranean, the US leaders are currently trying to create, along with Middle Eastern Command a military-political bloc consisting of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, in which Italy, other Mediterranean countries and Austria could also take part.

The creation of a military-political bloc in the Balkans, closely linked to NATO, the special report emphasized, would allow the Americans to strengthen their strategic positions near the countries of their native democracy and the southern regions of the USSR. The United States intends to link the military-political bloc being created with the North Atlantic Alliance and entrust it with part of the tasks of this alliance in the South European strategic direction.

The note noted that General Eisenhower held a series of negotiations with the leaders of Greece and Turkey on the creation of a bloc, during which they considered the most suitable forms for

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attracting Yugoslavia to it. The Americans also do not rule out the possibility of a number of Arab countries joining the bloc in the future.

Tito, however, did not succumb to the persuasion and refused to participate in the bloc.

The opposition of Soviet diplomacy and the contradictions between the countries that initiated the idea ultimately led to the fact that the bloc was never created. However, the failure did not stop either the Americans or the British. They shifted the geography of the alliance to the East. In the early 1950s, Moscow received intelligence reports about attempts by the Anglo-Americans to cobble together a military-political pact that would include Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Foreign intelligence sources reported that at the end of 1951, the Americans proposed the creation of the so-called Middle Eastern Command with the participation of France, Italy and Turkey. The British, not wanting to concede to the Americans, put forward, in turn, a plan for the formation of the "Middle East Defense Organization" (MOOSV). In order to secure a dominant position in the OECD, they provided for the participation of even New Zealand, Australia and South Africa, and they planned to place the bloc's headquarters in Cyprus. An English general was to command the combined forces. This, of course, could not suit the Americans.

The importance attached by the Soviet leadership to the attempts of the Anglo-Americans to put together a military-political alliance in the Near and Middle East is evidenced by the fact that intelligence information on this problem was repeatedly addressed in 1951-1952 to Stalin, Malenkov, Beria. Foreign intelligence closely followed the "undercover struggle" between the United States and Britain around the creation of military-political alliances. Thus, according to the Cairo residency, the United States even promised Egypt, in case of joining the bloc, to support its demands for the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal zone. These actions of the Americans were qualified by intelligence as the desire of the United States to push the British out of the Arab world. Ultimately, the Anglo-American contradictions did not allow the implementation of England's plans to form the OSV.

However, neither the United States nor Britain backed down from their intention to forge a military-political bloc near the borders of the USSR. An important role in it was assigned to Iran and Turkey. Moscow was well aware of the potential danger of the Anglo-American undertaking. In March 1950, an information task was sent to the Tehran residency, which required "to take the necessary measures to identify and highlight the plans and practical measures of the United States and England to include Iran in the military anti-Soviet bloc." The necessity of obtaining information "on the specific facts of the impact of American and British monopolies on the foreign and domestic policy of the Iranian government" was emphasized. It was proposed to timely inform the Center "about the activities of the American military

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mission in Iran for the rearmament of the Iranian army and the retraining of its personnel". Finally, the task was once again concretized: "to obtain reliable information about the position and practical measures of the Iranian government on the issue of creating a Muslim Union consisting of Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey and Arab countries."

The Tehran residency at that time had specific opportunities for solving the main task. Veterans recall that in those years, intelligence messages were sent from Tehran to Moscow on a wide range of foreign policy issues. A significant part of the information was made up of reports that covered various aspects of the Americans' activities to draw Iran into the anti-Soviet bloc. The center, however, was not satisfied with this.

After an unsuccessful assassination attempt on the Shah of Iran in February 1949, committed by religious fanatics, the operational situation became more complicated. The residency had to reduce its activity, go to the conservation of a number of agents.

Nevertheless, it retained quite a strong position in the important objects of Iran. Among the agents who collaborated with our intelligence for a long time were political and statesmen, generals and officers of the Iranian army, gendarmerie, officials,

journalists, etc. So, one of them, "Dignitary", was a close associate of the Shah, the other, "Bedouin", was the authority of a large and influential tribe of Southern Iran and also had free access to the Shah's court, another, "Kommersant", supported friendly relations with the mother of the Shah Taj ol-Molyuk. I must say that the Shah's mother had a great influence on her son. A useful role was played by the agent "Chancellor", recruited on a material basis back in 1934. He cooperated with many news agencies of the world and had great intelligence gathering capabilities. The courier of the Iranian Foreign Ministry "Chapar" regularly handed over sealed packages with secret and unclassified materials to the residency for clarification, which he was supposed to deliver to the Shah's office. In short, the forces and means of the Tehran residency were sufficient. All that was needed was purposeful efforts in the work. That was done.

In November 1953, the Tehran residency received documentary information about the Turkish probing of Iran's position regarding the idea of reviving the so-called Saadabad Pact, which was concluded in 1937 in Tehran and included Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and Iraq. In the event of its re-creation, as was planned in Washington, Pakistan was to join it.

Soon this information was confirmed in the messages of the residencies in New York, Karachi and Ankara. It followed from them that the idea of a military alliance between Turkey and Iran was put forward by an American

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who, however, would like to remain in the background for the time being, presenting the matter as if the initiative comes from the Turkish government.

According to the Tehran residency, the Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi took an ambivalent position. On the one hand, they did not want to rush to conclude a military alliance with Turkey, realizing that this would complicate the already tense Iranian-Soviet relations, and on the other hand, they could not ignore Washington, from which they hoped to receive financial support. and military help.

Among other things, according to intelligence data, the Iranian government sought to find a solution to the painful "oil conflict" with England and "put things in order" in the country, agitated by the period of Mosaddegh's rule and Zahedi's military coup, which put an end to the struggle of the Iranians for national independence and liquidation The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which shamelessly plundered Iran for decades. Therefore, under any pretext, they tried to delay the start of negotiations with Ankara, but at the same time they tried to convince the Americans that Iran would definitely join the Middle East pact in the future, and now it needs more American economic and military assistance.

Such a position of Tehran, as reported by agents, irritated Washington. US Ambassador to Iran Henderson proposed to the US Administration that Vice President Nixon be sent to the Iranian capital as "heavy artillery" for a decisive attack on the Shah and Zahedi in order to draw Iran into the bloc. A campaign was launched in the Iranian media to prepare public opinion for the conclusion of a military Iranian-Turkish alliance.

At the same time, the Tehran residency sent documentary information to the Center about the arrival of a group of American military experts in Iran with the task of "studying the issue of establishing military bases on Iranian territory." It was reported to the leadership of the USSR, which instructed the Foreign Ministry to issue a statement on "the inadmissibility of pressure on Iran by the United States in order to force it to provide its territory for foreign military bases." The Soviet demarche forced the Iranians to take a more restrained position.

In early December 1953, intelligence obtained information about a conversation between the US Naval Attaché in Tehran, Joseph Pashkoski, and an influential person from the Shah's entourage, which discussed the forthcoming visit to Iran by R. Nixon. American said

interlocutor: "During his visit to Tehran, US Vice President Richard Nixon will have to identify obstacles to Iran's entry into the Middle Eastern military-political bloc and outline measures to eliminate these obstacles. The United States will go to provide Iran with assistance in such quantities that

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will be necessary to remove all obstacles to Iran's entry into the bloc".

A few days later, the residency received another piece of information about a conversation between a close friend of the Shah of Iran and the Swiss military attache in Tehran. The interlocutor confidentially told the attaché that on the eve of Nixon's visit, the Shah was still hesitating about making a final decision on the country's entry into the new bloc.

He also spoke about the fears of the British that the implementation of the US plans would lead to the displacement of England from Iran, to its complete subordination to the Americans. He added that in Iran the position of the British is shared by Foreign Minister Entezam.

At the end of December 1953, on the basis of information reports received from Tehran, intelligence provided the Soviet leadership with a note on the results of the visit of US Vice President Richard Nixon to the Iranian capital. It reported that Nixon asked Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, "What's stopping Iran from joining the Middle East bloc?" The Shah said in response: "I have always believed and believe that Iran should build its policy in line with the US foreign policy and take into account the recommendations of the Western powers. However, two obstacles remain: the neighborhood of the USSR, which, of course, will not be indifferent to Iran's entry into the Middle East bloc, and the economic situation in the country, which is still difficult.

Nixon objected: "Look, Turkey is a neighbor of Iran and the USSR, but has long been pursuing an independent policy, despite pressure from the Soviet Union. And Turkey's position is constantly strengthening. In this regard, Iran could and should follow the example of Turkey." Nixon, on behalf of the US administration, promised to provide Iran with another \$100 million in addition to the \$45 million already allocated as emergency aid, but said that Washington "would be very dissatisfied if the Iranian government agreed to successfully complete ongoing negotiations with the USSR". He added: "There is no need to make any agreement with the USSR because of some \$9 million, while the Americans can give Iran ten times more."

In 1954, while continuing to monitor this topic, the station noted that Iran was still taking a wait-and-see approach to its entry into the new bloc, despite the promises made to Nixon. The American Ambassador in Tehran, Henderson, during meetings with the Shah, Zahedi, and Foreign Minister Entezam, always reproached them for the fact that the Iranian government did nothing concrete to fulfill its promises.

In addition to constant pressure on the Iranian leadership, the Americans persistently "worked" with the British. As a result, the British agreed to influence Iraqi leader Nuri Said.

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in order to speed up the accession of Iraq to the Middle East bloc, however, on the condition that the United States will support Britain in negotiations with Cairo. This information has been obtained by our London and Cairo residencies from reliable sources.

Intelligence also closely followed the position of Turkey, which took an openly pro-American line on the issue of creating a new bloc. Sources from the New York residency informed that in January 1954, the Turkish Foreign Ministry officially notified the US State Department and the Pakistani Foreign Ministry that the Turkish government was ready to conclude a military alliance with Pakistan, and this alliance would be the first step towards creating a Middle Eastern

block. In February of the same year, the Ankara residence reported to Moscow that Turkish President Celal Bayar was negotiating in Washington on the conclusion of a Turkish-Pakistani agreement on cooperation and mutual security and at the same time asked for additional American assistance to his country.

At the same time, the residency in Karachi received information about the trip of Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan to Tehran, where he discussed the conditions for the participation of Iran and Pakistan in the new bloc. In particular, he raised the issue with the Iranians of placing at the disposal of Pakistan the port of Chakhbar (100 km west of the Iran-Pakistan border), and as compensation, the Pakistani government undertook to build the Chakhbar-Zahedan-Bajigiran highway, which would be of strategic importance for the planned military-political union. This affected the interests of India.

Intelligence data from the New York residency testified that the Americans were aware of the negative reaction of the Indian government headed by J. Nehru to the creation of a military bloc with the participation of Pakistan and foresaw that it might protest against Pakistani-Turkish military alliance. As a "compensation" the Americans intended to offer India a loan in the amount of \$25 million, that is, exactly the amount that they had previously promised to Pakistan. Sources from the New York residency reported that the United States plans to increase pressure on Iran after these issues are settled, hoping that by that time the controversial problems related to Iranian oil and Iranian-England will also be resolved.

relations.

The residencies in Tehran and Karachi informed that the Americans, seeking to create a new bloc, made preliminary calculations that showed that the participating countries could put under arms up to one million soldiers and about two million reserve reservists. Equipped with modern American weapons, they could pose a serious danger to the USSR.

At the end of December 1953, residency sources in Karachi informed about meetings of the US military attaches at the embassies

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in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. Pragmatists-Americans, not waiting for the final formation of a new military-political bloc in the Middle East, calculated in advance its possible military potential, determined the number of troops that could be allocated by Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan under the "joint command" - naturally, American, - considered the issues of interaction between the armed forces of the future pact. According to the same information, the military attaches carried out a reconnaissance of the area in the areas of Kandahar (Afghanistan), Quetta (Pakistan) and Zahedan (Iran) in order to select the most convenient routes for the transfer of troops, if necessary, from Pakistan to Iran and from Pakistan and Iran to Afghanistan.

Ultimately, on February 24, 1955, an agreement on a military alliance was signed in Baghdad between Turkey and Iraq, England joined in March, Pakistan in October, and Iran in November. At a meeting of the prime ministers of the five countries that signed the military agreement, which took place in Baghdad in November 1955, the creation of a military-political union, called the Baghdad Pact, was officially proclaimed.

In December of the same year, a detailed note was sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU, in which, based on intelligence information, it was said that a new military-political bloc appeared near the borders of our state. In particular, it contained excerpts from the speech of British Prime Minister Macmillan at a closed meeting of the heads of governments - the founders of the pact. The British Prime Minister formulated the tasks of the bloc in the following way: "To snatch the initiative from the hands of the Soviet Union in the Middle East by means of a compromise solution of the Palestinian problem; block the Soviet Union from penetrating the Middle

and the Middle East; isolate Egypt and tear it away from Syria; seek the involvement in the Baghdad pact of the Arab countries, and primarily of Lebanon and Jordan. Among the military tasks, Macmillan put in the first place the development of plans for the joint defense of the straits, the oil-bearing regions of Iraq and the Persian Gulf in case of war, the strengthening of the military potential of each country included in the pact, the creation of a military infrastructure, and in the future - common armed forces and joint command. These were the plans of the West.

Reliable sources in the countries participating in the pact informed that, however, not all of them held the same views. The ruling elite of Pakistan, for example, according to the station in Karachi, did not want to get involved in Arab affairs at all. It saw a threat to itself not from the USSR, but from India, and would like to use its membership in the pact to solve the Kashmir problem with India and the Pashtun problem with Afghanistan. The Tehran residency reported on the basis of documentary materials,

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that the Iranian leadership is primarily concerned with the security of its northern territories, populated predominantly by Azerbaijanis, and intended to receive guarantees of their inviolability from the pact. It also counted on the assistance of the pact in settling in its favor territorial disputes in the Persian Gulf zone and with Afghanistan.

The United States, while not formally a member of the Baghdad Pact, nevertheless had observers in all of its bodies. They sought the creation of unified armed forces and a single command under their command, the deployment of nuclear missile bases on the territories of the member states of the pact. However, Iran, Pakistan and Iraq were not very willing to do this, and the British opposed the transfer of all command posts in the pact to the Americans. And only Turkey supported the United States, including in the issue of deployment of nuclear missile bases of the United States.

Could not stand the Baghdad Pact and the test of time. The rapid development of events in the post-war era - the collapse of the colonial system, the struggle of the peoples of the countries of the Middle East region for their national interests and the impressive success of Egypt under the leadership of Nasser against the background of this struggle, who resolutely and consistently opposed the Baghdad Pact, the events connected with the Suez crisis, showed more and more clearly where the true friends of the peoples of these countries were. The imaginary slogan of the "Soviet threat" worked less and less. Yes, and Soviet foreign policy did a lot to help understand the true intentions of the creators and creators of the pact - the United States and Britain.

Foreign intelligence played a significant role in this. The missions of the countries of the Middle East and the Middle East were tasked with obtaining information revealing the plans of the United States and Britain aimed at using the pact primarily in the interests of strengthening their positions in the region to the detriment of the interests of other countries, creating a springboard for aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. Union. The foreign intelligence stations, through their capabilities, carried out active measures in this direction.

All this taken together weakened the Baghdad Pact, blunted its anti-Soviet orientation, and intensified the contradictions in the ranks of its participants.

After the July 1958 revolution in Iraq, that country withdrew from the pact, and from August 1959 it became known as CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). As an example of the work of residencies under the Baghdad Pact - CENTO, we will cite excerpts from the report of the Tehran residency for 1968. It said: "There are no special CENTO institutions on the territory of Iran. All functions related to the coordination of Iran's activities within the CENTO are assigned in the political field - to the department of regional organizations

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zation of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, in the military - to the General Relations Department of the Headquarters of the Iranian Army High Command. Significant work has been done to control the radio relay communications of CENTO,

passing through Iran, as well as CENTO telephone channels with telegraph seals. Having a reliable agent in the Iranian Ministry of Defense, who held a high position there, the residency received from him on a regular basis documentary materials related to the activities of CENTO and Iranian-American bilateral military cooperation, which, as a rule, were implemented and sent to the authorities. and concerned departments.

Intelligence paid particular attention to US efforts to create and expand a network of military bases on the territories of the bloc's members. The information she received was quite complete and specific: intelligence knew where, what weapons were deployed, what their purpose was, what were the plans for a possible attack on the USSR, what targets were planned for destruction, etc.

In the 1950s, the US administration repeatedly declared its readiness to use armed forces to protect the Near and Middle East from "open armed aggression", since such aggression poses "a serious threat to the vital interests of the United States." In 1957, these US approaches to securing its "vital interests" in the Middle East region were formulated in the "Eisenhower Doctrine", and then developed in the "doctrines" of Nixon and Carter.

Vice-President R. Nixon during his visit to Tehran in December 1954, in conversations with representatives of the highest Iranian state and military leadership, frankly stated that if Iran does not join the "defensive alliance", then in the very first days of the new world war, he will be captured by the Russians, and in this case, America will not be able to provide him with effective assistance.

The Chief of the Iranian General Staff, General Batmanklych, after the departure of R. Nixon from Tehran, said in his close circle: "In the event of a new war, Iran will oppose the USSR together with Turkey and Pakistan. Our front in a future war will stretch from the Bosphorus to the northeastern border of Pakistan."

The greatest success can be considered the secret plans of the Military Committee and the Joint Organization for Military Planning of the Baghdad Pact obtained through undercover means in 1959. Of particular interest were plans and maps with targets for delivering nuclear strikes "in the event of an offensive by Soviet troops", in which the Americans took into account, on the one hand, the possibility of seizure by Soviet troops in the event of their successful offensive after the start of the war, territories and facilities states in the front line from the Bosphorus to Pakistan, and on the other hand, they were ready to launch nuclear strikes not only on the USSR, but also on the facilities of the countries allies of the United States,

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if they are under the control of the armed forces of the USSR The atomic bombing of individual cities and towns of these countries was not ruled out. In the report of the Military Committee of the pact "Selecting Targets for Delivering Nuclear Strikes", approved by the governments of the United States and Britain, objects of atomic bombings were outlined in the USSR and in the territories of other countries in order to create "nuclear barriers" there. Intelligence allowed the leadership of the USSR to instruct TASS to announce on August 19, 1961 that from military bases located in Turkey, the United States plans to launch nuclear strikes on the USSR and the cities of Iran, Pakistan and other states in case of war. This demarche of the Soviet leadership made it possible to largely neutralize American plans in the Middle East.

The Baghdad pact - CENTO never became an analogue of NATO, despite all the efforts of its initiators. Already in 1956, from the intelligence reports of our residencies, it became clear that the contradictions between its members had intensified. Iran, Iraq and Pakistan have lost interest in the military aspects of the bloc's activities. A trend in the moods of the leadership of these states in favor of the development of regional cooperation began to be more and more clearly traced. Intelligence informed the Center about the evolution in the approaches of the countries participating in the pact to its activities in the military sphere. According to intelligence data, in 1969 the Iranian government came to the conclusion that CENTO was losing its former importance for Iran in the light of the improvement of the Iranian-Soviet

relations. Iran's activity within the framework of CENTO has fallen sharply. Based on the available materials, it can be stated that foreign intelligence saw the internal weakness of the pact and actually predicted its collapse.

After the overthrow of the government of Mossadegh in 1953 with the active participation of American intelligence services and the defeat of the national democratic movement, the Iranian Shah found himself in fact a vassal of the United States, and already in the early 1960s, anti-Shah and anti-American sentiments became widespread in Iran. His participation in CENTO served as a catalyst for popular demands for a change in the unilateral pro-American policy of the country's ruling elite. It was then that the future leader of the "Islamic revolution", Ayatollah Khomeini, loudly declared himself, publicly speaking out against the American dominance and complicity of the Shah, for which he was expelled from the country.

Intelligence information about the situation in Iran formed the basis of an important decision taken by the leadership of the USSR, which instructed foreign intelligence to try to establish unofficial contacts with representatives of Iranian nationalist and other anti-Shah forces, to find out their real possibilities and plans for coming to power. Taking into account the delicacy of the assignment and for the purpose of strict secrecy, it was decided not to use the possibilities of "legal" residency in Tehran directly. The secret mission was entrusted

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to the experienced intelligence officer Fadeev (surname changed. - Auth.). In 1961, he arrived in Iran at the head of a group of intelligence officers.

The tasks assigned to Fadeev's group were successfully solved, informal contacts were established with people who were interested in intelligence, including those who were directly related to the military side of CENTO's activities. The Americans never succeeded in deploying nuclear missiles in Iran; the Shah did not dare to take this step, given the general situation in the country. The implementation of the US plans was also hampered by the joint efforts of the Soviet foreign policy agencies, which used intelligence coming from Tehran.

Fadeev's mission was unexpectedly interrupted: it was let down by the public realization of the obtained information. Such paradoxes happen from time to time in intelligence as well. N.S. Khrushchev, at a meeting with US President John F. Kennedy in 1962 in Vienna, apparently wanting to demonstrate the capabilities of the USSR and impress, said that he was well aware of the US plans in Iran, the implementation of which was personally promoted by Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, but his regime is doomed and will soon fall. Fadeev's group had to leave Iran in order not to be under attack.

The brainchild of the United States - the CENTO bloc - existed until February 1979, when the Iranian people made an anti-monarchist revolution. Both the Shah and the dominance of the Americans in Iran, whose instrument was the CENTO bloc, formerly known as the Baghdad bloc, have gone into political oblivion.

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Information comes from Tel Aviv

It was a stuffy August evening in 1950. Passers-by in Tel Aviv, like sleepy flies, moved slowly through the streets. And only in bars and cafes, where the air was conditioned or, at worst, fans were spinning overhead, there was a revival.

Perhaps the only person in the whole city who did not notice either heat or stuffiness was Vladimir Ivanovich Vertiporoh, a resident of Soviet foreign intelligence in Israel. He's already two

I drove around the city for an hour, visited four shops, a hairdresser, picked up linen from the laundry, stopped by a travel agency.

Such a long trip around the city was not caused by household chores, but by operational necessity. A very important meeting with an employee of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs was scheduled for this evening, and therefore it was necessary to carefully check for possible surveillance. The official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was characterized by a person friendly to the USSR, and our reliable agent from among the Israelis turned to him with a request to provide assistance to Soviet intelligence.

The diplomat did not give a direct answer to this appeal, and then the agent suggested that he meet with a responsible person from the Soviet embassy in order to see for himself who he was dealing with. After some hesitation, he agreed to the meeting.

A rather unusual situation developed. On the one hand, the object practically did not accept the proposal of the Soviet intelligence, and on the other hand, agreed to a meeting with a representative of the Soviet embassy. The question arose whether this was some kind of trick or, even worse, an insidious trick of the Israeli counterintelligence. If the object reported to the special services about the approach to it by the Soviet intelligence, then the Israelis can carry out a major provocation, despite the fact that the residency has taken certain security measures.

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After a thorough study of the situation and consultation with the Center, it was decided to go to the meeting. And the resident himself decided to do it. Of course, there was a risk, but there was also a certain confidence that this person would not go for a provocation.

Vladimir Ivanovich, after a two-hour check in the city, was on his way to the meeting place. The interview was scheduled to take place in one of the cafes not far from the shopping center. Arriving 15 minutes before the appointed time, the scout walked down the street, went into the store opposite the cafe, simultaneously observing the situation on the approaches to the meeting point. Everything was calm. Exactly at 19.30 the object appeared. The resident recognized him from the description. He leisurely walked into the cafe, five minutes later Vladimir Ivanovich entered there. He saw the Israelite at a table in the far corner of the hall and went straight to his table. There was a Time magazine on the table. It was an identification mark. Vladimir Ivanovich asked permission to sit down at the table and put before him, as was determined by the terms of the meeting, a newspaper in English. Contact was made quickly and easily. A lively conversation immediately ensued, first about the weather and health, and then the interlocutors moved on to discussing the issue for which this meeting was organized.

The conversation was very fruitful. The Israeli agreed to continue the meetings. The conditions of secret communication were discussed with him.

Thus, contact was established with a very informed source, who later received the pseudonym "Ural" in Soviet intelligence.

The residency of Soviet foreign intelligence in Israel began to operate at the end of 1948, six months after the formation of this state. It had to fulfill a very important mission: to promote the foreign policy activities of our state in this strategically important, explosive Middle East region with its information and intelligence activities. The Tel Aviv station was tasked with monitoring the development of the situation in the Middle East and in the main countries of the region, revealing the aspirations, plans and specific measures of the US and British governments regarding Israel and neighboring countries, obtaining information about plans, foreign and domestic policies Israeli leadership, about the activities of the leadership of international Zionist organizations, about the situation in Israel, to give their assessments, to predict the development of events.

An analysis of the materials received by the residency showed that the situation in Israel at the end of the 40s was generally favorable for Soviet intelligence. Although the structure and personnel

government institutions of Israel were formed for a long time, even before the creation of the state, the regime of security and protection of se

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Kretov was still not strict enough and left the possibility of access to secret information of interest to intelligence.

The mood of Israeli society and the situation in the country contributed to the work of Soviet intelligence. The population was extremely heterogeneous. Among the immigrants who arrived in Israel in the 1940s, anti-fascists and representatives of the working class prevailed. Many of them participated in the fight against the fascist army, in the liberation from the occupation of the Eastern European countries. Among them were people who spent the war years in the USSR, fought in the ranks of the Soviet Army, partisan detachments and considered the Soviet Union as their second homeland. They dreamed of creating in Israel a state of social justice, pursuing a peaceful, independent policy in the international arena. At that time, the road to work in Israeli state institutions and special services was not yet closed for these people, they were willingly accepted into their ranks by political parties of all colors.

But gradually, many became convinced that the British, having lost their mandate to govern Palestine, sought to maintain their positions and, to this end, skillfully sowed national discord between Arabs and Jews.

The residency, through a reliable source, "Sam", received a number of documents aimed at discrediting Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East. Among them were:

1. Photocopies of two imaginary letters of Mufti of Palestine Amin al-Husseini. One was addressed to the USSR embassy in Cairo with a report on the spending of money allegedly received from Soviet representatives, the second was of a similar content to Egyptian intelligence.
2. "Lists of agents" of the intelligence service of the MAPAI party! and the Jewish Agency? in Romania Czechoslovakia and Poland.

As the source pointed out when handing over these documents to a representative of Soviet intelligence, they were fabricated by the British Intelligence Service with the aim of exacerbating relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine and compromising the Soviet Union in the eyes of the Jewish public. These documents revealed the true intentions and methods of action of the British to achieve their goals. Subsequently, these documents were successfully used by Soviet foreign intelligence to expose the subversive activities of the British in the countries of the Middle East.

Occupying a solid position in the state apparatus, "Sam" timely warned about the turns in political life, the plans of the Israeli leadership, the intentions of the opposition parties, behind-the-scenes conspiracies of the Israeli ruling elite with the United States and other Western countries. His wide information capabilities, combined with outstanding analytical skills, made him very useful for intelligence.

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Subsequently, under the leadership of "Sam", a separate intelligence group was created. At different times, from three to seven agents worked in its composition, extracting information. Individual agents dropped out of the group for various reasons (loss of intelligence capabilities, going to work abroad, transfer to direct contact with operational workers, etc.), others were acquired instead of them.

Naturally, the work of the group was subject to all the rules and requirements of intelligence activities, primarily the requirements of secrecy and security. There were only vertical lines of communication in the group, that is, the members of the group, apart from "Sam", were known only by the resident Vertiporoh, who made contacts with most of the members of the group, gave tasks,

received information and reports on their work, instructed on the methods of performing tasks, safe behavior, resolved personal issues of agents, etc. There were no contacts between the members of the group, and they did not know each other.

The group included a professional photographer, Roker, who took photographs of information materials that were obtained and prepared photocopies of them to be sent to Moscow. "Roker" worked with documents in a safe house. The owner of the apartment was unaware of its use by Soviet intelligence and believed that he was providing the apartment to an opposition group of one of the parties.

In this apartment, Vertiporoh's meetings with agents were occasionally held.

The members of this intelligence group, like "Sam", were Israeli patriots and a bit idealistic. Most of them, fleeing the invasion of fascism, came to Israel in the only change of clothes and with a small suitcase, which contained all the "family wealth".

On the spot, they faced reality - material difficulties, social injustice. We were convinced that small Israel, due to its strategic position - next to the countries where oil production is concentrated, and due to the likely armed confrontation with its Arab neighbors - attracts a lot of attention from world oil monopolies and large arms manufacturers, is used in the fight against "international communism" and the national liberation movement in the Middle East. As a result, they quickly developed anti-imperialist views, especially since they had only recently left the Soviet Union at a mature age, and this circumstance could not but affect their political convictions. In addition, many of them went through the horrors of Nazi concentration camps.

All members of the intelligence group were opposed to the subjugation of Israel to foreign, primarily American, capital. By this time they had freed themselves from Zionist illusions,

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because they saw that foreign Zionists, who paid for the immigration of ordinary Jews to Palestine, are primarily concerned with increasing their incomes, acquiring land plots, enterprises and other property in Israel.

Nevertheless, even such seemingly unshakable people, strengthened in their views, from time to time found themselves under the influence of individual events and related anti-Soviet campaigns in Israel, the United States and other Western countries. In the midst of such campaigns, there was a noticeable decrease in the activity of the group and its individual members in intelligence work. The members of the group at that time more than usual expressed critical remarks about the Soviet policy in the Middle East and about the "Jewish question" in the USSR. Such a decline in the work of the group and the mood of its members occurred, in particular, in 1953-1954 in connection with the so-called "doctors' case" in Moscow.

The members of the group were mostly people with an active life position, adhered to leftist, progressive views and cooperated with Soviet intelligence quite consciously (in professional language - "on an ideological and political basis"), that is, by virtue of their convictions, life goals and settings. None of them thought of personal gain in helping us. For example, when one of the members of the group was offered money to pay for medical expenses, he categorically refused, saying that he could handle the financial difficulties himself.

The only exception in this regard, perhaps, was the photographer "Roker", who spent a lot of time photographing intelligence information, and also ensured the safety of intelligence operations carried out in a safe house.

Since he had no other sources of income, he was given a monthly sum to pay for photographic materials, maintenance of an apartment, and for modest personal expenses.

The Center warned the Tel Aviv residency of the need to exercise extreme caution and ensure the safety of the group's work.

The measures taken fully justified themselves: as a result, for the entire long period of operation of the intelligence group in Tel Aviv, there was no leakage of information about its existence and activities, none of the members of the group was disclosed by Israeli counterintelligence.

The picture of the activities in Israel of the undercover group of Soviet intelligence will be incomplete if you do not talk about some of its members.

Suffice it to say that the group obtained information on the most important issues of the foreign and domestic policy of the Israeli government, the activities of the Israeli special services (political and military intelligence, counterintelligence), the policies of the United States, England, France

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tion, Italy in the Middle East and the interaction of these Western countries with the leadership of Israel.

During the entire period, the group had sources of information in the Israeli Foreign Ministry. In particular, for several years such a source was "Ural", which was discussed at the beginning of the essay.

At first, Ural recounted at meetings the content of those telegrams with which he had to work. Then he began to send photocopies of documents. Communication with him was carried out by Vertiporoh, and later, when "Ural" began to transmit documentary materials, their reception was entrusted to the messenger "Margarita". According to a predetermined scheme, she took materials from Ural in various places in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa.

The intelligence group had another source of classified information in the Israeli Foreign Ministry. The staff of the residency had no contact with him, it was a personal connection of "Sam". In Soviet intelligence, he had the pseudonym "Mark". In the late 1940s, he joined the Israeli Foreign Ministry.

"Sam" met "Mark" shortly after arriving in Palestine. Their life paths often crossed: they had to travel abroad together, meet with foreign representatives, and prepare political documents. They had a lot in common, they became friends and often discussed the future of their people and state, expressing a desire to devote their lives to building a happy Israel. "Sam" had a great influence on "Mark" and helped to strengthen his progressive views, primarily the ideas of social and national justice. "Mark" was an adherent of Western, parliamentary-type democracy, but he considered the United States of America to be the conductor of a neo-colonialist policy that posed a serious danger to the young states of Asia and other continents.

"Mark" deeply experienced the enmity and clashes between the Arab and Jewish populations of Palestine, and then the conflict between Israel and the Arab countries. He considered it his duty to promote mutual understanding between Jews and Arabs, to reach an agreement between them.

"Ural" and "Mark" left a good memory of themselves with Soviet intelligence officers who knew them personally or in absentia. These two men were the perfect combination of intelligence sources. If "Ural" was a so-called documentary and obtained documents for intelligence, then "Mark" collected mostly oral information, which overlapped and supplemented the information of the first source.

"Mark" provided information about the most important problems and cases that the Israeli Foreign Ministry was working on at any particular moment, the reactions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the government to the policies of certain

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states and international events, about what proposals and recommendations are being developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the field of Israeli foreign policy and for individual events and actions of the government in the international arena, about documents being prepared for visits and negotiations abroad, draft agreements with other countries, statements by Israeli statesmen on foreign policy; the content of meetings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, disagreements in the government on the problems of Israel's foreign policy.

Thanks to the help of Ural and Mark, Soviet intelligence had complete information on the entire spectrum of the activities of the Israeli government in the external sphere. Naturally, with such awareness, the leadership of the Soviet Union could more successfully carry out its foreign policy course, make the necessary decisions in time, and neutralize actions that created tension in the Near and Middle East.

After the formation of the NATO bloc in 1949, the United States and Britain set about creating a military alliance along the southern borders of the USSR and integrating the countries of the Middle and Near East into the Western military-political system.

The leadership of the Soviet Union could not calmly observe this dangerous activity for our country and region. In counteracting the anti-Soviet plans, a large role was played by the Soviet intelligence, including the station in Tel Aviv, in particular, the sources "Ural" and "Mark". Thanks to intelligence information, the leadership of the Soviet Union had the idea that this bloc was being created against the interests of the USSR and the peoples of the region. There was information about the efforts made by the United States, Britain, Israel, the puppet leaders of certain countries of the region dependent on the West to create the so-called Middle Eastern Command, the positions of different countries on this issue, and the contradictions between them.

When in October 1951 the plan to create a Middle East Command was officially put forward, the leadership of the Soviet Union was ready for an effective response. On November 21, 1951, the Soviet government addressed the governments of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen with the corresponding notes, and on November 24 to the USA, England, France, Italy and Israel, indicating that "the allied command pursues aggressive aims in the Middle East and is directed against the USSR and the socialist countries. The plans of the organizers of the new military bloc were revealed, the cards were mixed, and a powerful political opposition formed in the Arab countries. There were serious obstacles to the implementation of plans to create a bloc.

However, the United States and Britain continued to work on integrating the countries of the Middle and Near East into a military-political bloc. This deya

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The activity of the USA, England and Israel was well traced with the help of the Tel Aviv residency.

On the basis of its data, the Soviet leadership had the opportunity to counteract Western plans in various ways, including intelligence means. As a result of the efforts of the West and the allies of the United States and England in the Middle East (regimes in Turkey, Iraq, Iran), in February 1955, the Iraqi and Turkish governments decided to sign the "Defense Treaty", which was to serve as the core of the planned block. In March 1955, England joined the treaty, in October of the same year, Pakistan joined them, and in November, Iran. The Baghdad Pact was created, which, however, did not justify the hopes of the West, since it did not have the necessary power and influence in the region. In addition, after the revolution in 1959, Iraq withdrew from this pact, and it became

be called CENTO. It finally collapsed in February 1979 after the "Islamic revolution" in Iran.

Since this bloc was sufficiently compromised in the international arena (including due to the actions of Soviet intelligence) even before its institutionalization, the United States did not dare to join the Baghdad Pact as a full member, joining only its economic and military committees with observer status. Many countries of the Middle East not only remained outside the bloc, but also condemned the fact of its creation. Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia came out most strongly against the Baghdad Pact, which already in October 1955 concluded bilateral agreements against the bloc, and in March 1956, as a result of a conference in Cairo of the heads of three states, published a charter that emphasized the growth patriotism and the role of the Arab nation in the international arena and contained the call: "The Arab nation must itself defend the Arab homeland and security and be outside of foreign blocs." The fight against the Baghdad Pact and the Cairo Charter laid the foundation for the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab

unity.

Based on the information received by the Tel Aviv station, Soviet intelligence was able to trace the development of the conflict between Egypt, on the one hand, and England and France, on the other, over the Suez Canal from its inception in 1952. year before the triple armed aggression against Egypt in 1956.

The knowledge of the government of the Soviet Union about the plans and activities of the Western countries and Israel in connection with the Suez crisis helped frustrate the plans of the aggressors and stop armed actions. But the prestige and positions of England and France were damaged, from which England, in particular, was no longer able to recover and was gradually forced to leave the Middle East (the region "east of Suez").

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"Mark" reported back in 1952 that the Ben-Gurion government had developed a plan to seize the Arab territory of Gaza and annex it to Israel. Further information showed that the Israeli leadership considered the Anglo-French conflict with Egypt over the Suez Canal favorable to the achievement of its plans to seize Gaza with the least political and military costs.

Naturally, the true goals and plans for Israel's participation in the Suez crisis were carefully concealed and disguised. However, the information received by the station in Tel Aviv showed that the plan to seize Gaza was repeatedly discussed with the Americans, British and French by Israeli representatives, up to the Prime Minister. The Israeli government constantly fueled the Suez crisis and pushed Britain and France to unleash military operations against Egypt.

It should be noted that Israel's assertiveness in forcing the anti-Egyptian situation irritated even its Western allies. At the disposal of the Tel Aviv residency, for example, there was a copy of the telegram of the Israeli ambassador to Paris, Jacob Zur, in which he reported to his Foreign Ministry at the end of 1954 that the French leadership "suggests the Israeli government to make an official statement about its non-intervention in Anglo-Egyptian conflict. The residency also received a copy of the Israeli Foreign Ministry's response to this French "recommendation." It stated that in Tel Aviv "it is not considered expedient to make such an official declaration."

In addition to the aforementioned "Sam" agent group, another group operated under the leadership of the residency, consisting of agents acquired in the Israeli special services. Perhaps the most active and informed of them was Luch, who cooperated with our intelligence for a long time and obtained important secret materials, including documentary ones.

Luch's information indicated that Israeli intelligence was intercepting and reading telegrams from the diplomatic departments and intelligence agencies of France, Belgium, Greece, Australia, Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Iran (and this despite the fact that Iranian intelligence worked closely with the Israeli secret services under the personal control of Shah Reza Pahlavi).

It was known that Israeli intelligence was working on deciphering the Soviet ciphers and the ciphers of the countries of Eastern Europe. Luch's information about the status of this work helped to purposefully increase the strength of the ciphers of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs intelligence and other Soviet departments, to suggest to the representatives of the countries of Eastern Europe the direction of work to protect their ciphers.

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Luch was characterized by activity that went beyond the scope of official duties. He often acted on the verge of risk. Verbally agreeing with the remarks of the operative, he, nevertheless, continued risky operations, up to breaking into the safes of his colleagues at work.

Due to the constant tension in the Middle East and the danger of armed conflicts between Israel and the Arab countries, information on military activities in the region of various states, the military policy of the Israeli government, the situation in the Israeli armed forces. Answers to many questions were provided by documentary materials obtained by Luch. The text of a secret agreement between Israel and England on the exchange of military intelligence information about the Arab countries was received from him.

Important information about Israel's military activities was contained in the reports of Israeli military attachés. In this regard, of particular interest were the reports of Israel's military attache in Washington in the early 1950s, Chaim Herzog, about his meetings and conversations with American high-ranking military and political figures.

The agent network of the residency made it possible to obtain documentary materials that the Israeli military intelligence obtained in its own interests. Moreover, these materials showed that Israeli intelligence was actively working not only against the enemy states, but also in relation to Israel's closest allies.

In 1953, Luch handed over documentary materials concerning the creation in Israel of the so-called special unit No. 131, headed by Mordechai Ben-Zur, and the transfer of its militants to Egypt at the same time to carry out acts of sabotage against the institutions of the Soviet Union, the USA and England. This subversive action on an international scale, involving the killings and explosions of peaceful objects and later called the "Lavon Affair", was planned to undermine Egypt's relations with the great powers and had the goal of hastening British military aggression against Egypt because of the Suez Canal. It was carried out under the personal supervision of the Minister of Defense of Israel. Thanks to the activities of the Soviet intelligence residency in Tel Aviv, the Soviet leadership had the opportunity to timely reveal the intentions of the Israeli military leadership that were dangerous for the international community and contribute to the failure of the operation and the arrest of militants of special unit No. 131 in Egypt. In view of the scandal that broke out, the Israeli government considered it the best way out for itself to dissociate itself from the sabotage action in Egypt, to declare that Minister of Defense Lavon is an adventurer who created and sent a team of saboteurs to Egypt in secret from the government.

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Saving the prestige of the state and government, Lavon resigned, but the official Israeli investigation into his "scam" was not destined to end, and the public never learned the truth about this operation.

Of great value was the information received by the residency from the Israeli political intelligence service Mossad and the Shabak security service.

Thus, the residency obtained useful information from Mossad intelligence reports on the situation in the Middle East and in individual Arab countries, as well as from individual secret reports on the policy of the USA, England, France, and the Soviet Union in the region.

The Mossad actively obtained information on the USA and other Western countries. Soviet intelligence was interested in such materials as copies of messages from the ambassadors of England in Egypt and other Arab countries about the outbreak of an Anglo-Egyptian conflict in 1952 due to the presence of British troops in the Suez Canal zone. These materials, and especially a copy of the recording of the conversation between the heads of the British and American foreign affairs agencies, Eden and Acheson, from which it was clear that Britain did not want to withdraw its troops from Egyptian territory and that the United States approved of such a position, allowed Soviet intelligence to fix the moment of origin, and then follow in every detail the preparation and implementation of the plan for the trilateral Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1956.

Despite the fact that in the early 1950s, interaction between the Mossad and the Turkish intelligence service MIT was established and began to develop rapidly, the Israeli intelligence service recruited one of the leading employees of the Turkish partner as an agent and received a lot of valuable information through him. , which then fell into the hands of Soviet intelligence. In the early 1950s, copies of secret documents were obtained in this way: "On US military assistance to Turkey", "Agreement between the governments of Turkey, Iraq and Iran of 1949 on joint actions against Kurdish tribes", "Iran-Iraq agreement on struggle against communist organizations", "Secret annex to the Turkish-Italian agreement of 24.03.50", etc.

Naturally, Soviet intelligence was interested in the work of the Mossad against the USSR, and such information was regularly received by the residency through undercover channels.

From these sources, for example, it became known that in 1952 the CIA turned to the Mossad with a request to purchase large sums of money from the USSR and Eastern European countries for the operational purposes of American intelligence. To fulfill this request of the CIA, the head of the Mossad, Shiloah, specially traveled to Europe. On time by

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The received information allowed the USSR state security agencies, together with a number of intelligence agencies of the countries of Eastern Europe, to carry out retaliatory secret actions, which subsequently made it possible to block the channels for transferring the money purchased by the Mossad to American agents and arrest a number of CIA agents in the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

No less valuable was the information about the work of the Israeli counterintelligence (Shabak) against the USSR, the countries of Eastern Europe, their citizens and institutions in Israel. Thus, information was received from Shabak about the creation in Israel in 1952 with the assistance of the secret services of the so-called Democratic Anti-Communist League. This league then prepared and carried out on February 9, 1953, the bombing of the Soviet legation in Tel Aviv, which led to the first break in Soviet-Israeli relations. And although the official representatives of Israel expressed their regret over the anti-Soviet act of sabotage and assured the leaders of the USSR mission that the Israeli "competent authorities" were conducting an energetic search for the persons who carried out this action, hinting that it could be carried out by Arab terrorists in order to complicate relations between Israel and the Soviet Union, for the Soviet side there were no secrets in this

deed.

Thanks to information from the Israeli counterintelligence, it was known that the Israeli intelligence service had installed eavesdropping equipment in foreign embassies. Western embassies were also eavesdropped. For example, using the eavesdropping technique at the US Embassy

counterintelligence established in 1952 that Doron Ohr, an employee of the Israeli bank, had given his consent to representatives of American intelligence to carry out their tasks of collecting information among immigrants from the USSR and countries of people's democracy. Ohr was warned by counterintelligence about the termination of cooperation with the CIA, however, auditory control showed that he continued to maintain contact with American intelligence officers, and the special service applied additional tough measures against Ohr.

According to Soviet intelligence, listening devices were detected and eliminated in the Romanian and Hungarian missions in Tel Aviv, and a provocative action against the Hungarian cultural attache, who was suspected by Shabak of belonging to the Hungarian intelligence service, was prevented.

Thanks to this information, the residency in Tel Aviv was able to track the work of a special department headed by Yehuda Bai for work with immigrants from the socialist states, as well as the activities of the counterintelligence department with the code name "Bilu" (the head is Moshe Chervinsky, nicknamed "Dwarf", due to small stature), which organized the illegal exit of Jews from the USSR, countries of Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The composition of the department

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It included a bureau for sending fictitious calls (and parcels) to Jews in the USSR and other countries.

Since the functions of the political police were also entrusted to the Israeli counterintelligence, the Tel Aviv residency received from this body, through agent capabilities, comprehensive information about the domestic political situation in Israel, about the situation in all opposition parties.

The residency thoroughly studied the operational situation in the country, the objects of intelligence penetration, personnel and the regime in state institutions that were of interest to intelligence, the activities of Israeli counterintelligence, etc. This facilitated the fulfillment of the recruiting tasks of the residency. Using information about individuals, the residency was able to acquire new sources of information by the mid-50s, which significantly increased its potential.

Mapai - the so-called Workers' Party of Israel, in the late 40s

20th century - the largest political party of the Jewish community of Palestine. After the emergence of Israel, she led all government coalitions for many years. The Jewish Agency was created to represent the Jewish community of Palestine before foreign governments and international organizations. After the proclamation of the State of Israel, it served to encourage the immigration of Jews there and the placement of newcomers.

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Operation "Rescue"

In this essay, I would like to tell about one truly humane action of intelligence in the 60s. The time has come to lift the veil of secrecy over the operation of the Kabul residency to release from Afghan prisons 16 illegal Soviet agents arrested in Afghanistan in 1945-1946 and languishing in prison for more than two decades. This operation was called "Release".

The fate of these people was truly tragic. Not all of them - and there were more than a dozen of them - survived to return to their homeland. The path to their release from the medieval eastern casemates was long and difficult. Great and persistent efforts were required to save Soviet citizens who, through no fault of their own, got into trouble. This indicates the multifaceted work of the residency in Kabul, which was not limited to solving purely intelligence tasks.

For what purpose, with what tasks were these agents illegally taken to Afghanistan? There are no clear answers to these questions in the surviving materials. Most of them were abandoned in the northern Afghan provinces by the intelligence department of the Turkestan military district, and some by the security agencies of the Soviet republics of Central Asia. Most likely, the decision to send them in was made to collect information about the desire of the Anglo-Americans to strengthen their positions at the southern borders of the USSR, including in Afghanistan, where there was a significant layer of anti-Soviet emigration.

Selected from among the inhabitants of the Central Asian republics - Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens - agents underwent appropriate training, which, as a rule, was fleeting and often superficial, and then secretly crossed to Afghanistan through the "green border". They were trained in the basic techniques and methods of conducting intelligence work;

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the languages of the indigenous population of the northern provinces of Afghanistan, as well as the Dari language (a dialect of Persian).

Among these people were health workers, teachers, government employees, mostly young or middle-aged men and women. For obvious reasons, we are not entitled to disclose their names, and therefore, talking about some of them, we will limit ourselves to the pseudonyms assigned to them.

Afghanistan is a multinational state where the main nation is the Pashtuns, the historical creators of the Afghan statehood. The national question has always been acute in this country. If you ask an Afghan what his nationality is, the answer will be the usual: I am an Afghan, or: I am a Muslim, but if you specify from which tribe, you can hear: from Tajiks, from Persians, from such and such a Pashtun tribe. Non-Pashtun peoples inhabit mainly the northern provinces of Afghanistan, and it was there that a significant part of the emigration from the USSR settled after the Civil War and the defeat of the Basmachi movement in Central Asia.

During the Second World War and before it, when the positions of fascist Germany in Afghanistan were strong, the Afghan authorities considered emigrants from the USSR and at the same time the indigenous population of the North as a potential force against the Soviet Union, but after the war they saw in them potential power against themselves. In Kabul, it was believed that this population, due to its ethnic unity with the peoples of Central Asia, was the base for the activities of Soviet intelligence. It is no coincidence that the ruling circles of the country hatched plans for a cardinal solution to this problem: it was supposed to evict the indigenous population of the north to other regions of Afghanistan, and in its place to resettle part of the Pashtun tribes from the south and southeast. This program was only partially implemented: by 1951, more than 10,000 Pashtun families were resettled in the northern provinces, who were provided with land plots and funds for settling in a new place. How many indigenous people were evicted, remained unknown.

The intelligence network of the Kabul residency made it possible to know about the mood in the Afghan elite and its measures to control the northern provinces of the country. King Zahir Shah and especially Prime Minister Hashim Khan (1933-1946) seriously feared in 1946 that "the USSR intends to take part of Afghanistan, following the example of Iranian Azerbaijan." They have publicly stated more than once: "We, the Afghans, will fight to the last for our land."

The Afghan government has long pursued a policy of forcible Pashtunization of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens and other nationalities living in the north of the country. It was obligatory to study the Pashto language, the very word "Tajik", for example, was not officially used, it was replaced by "Kukhistani".

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In 1946, the Kabul authorities decided to carry out a general passportization of the entire population of the northern provinces. New passports were sent there in large numbers, and a campaign began in Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat and other cities to identify emigrants and other non-Afghan nationals. They were included in special lists, which were sent to Kabul for a "separate decision".

The territory of Afghanistan, especially its northern provinces, was controlled by the security service, police, gendarmerie and border commissioners, who had a wide network of agents. In addition, in each village there were quarter elders. They literally immediately learned about the appearance on the territory entrusted to them of any unknown or outsider. The owner of the house, to whom such a person came or turned to him for help, was obliged, under pain of punishment, to immediately report him to the district headman or to the police. If for some reason he did not do this, then his neighbor had to inform both the owner and the unknown stranger. Finally, in every settlement there was a mullah who knew everything about everyone. It was almost impossible to bypass such a dense network of surveillance and denunciations. Once in Afghanistan, our illegal agents inevitably came to the attention of the local population, after which they were arrested and imprisoned.

The Kabul residency in 1945-1946 repeatedly informed the Center about the capture of Soviet agents abandoned in Afghanistan from the USSR. So, in January 1946, on the basis of undercover data, she reported that "three months ago, the Afghans detained three Soviet intelligence officers in the Shindand region (Herat province), a search is underway for four more, abandoned in the Mazar-i-Sharif region, in the Kunduz region was detained another Soviet spy." At the end of January of the same year, the head of the First Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR P.M. Fitin was informed about the arrest by the Afghan authorities of Vg. Khanabad two local residents who were found to have a radio station and intelligence documents. Then several more people were arrested in a number of cities in Northern Afghanistan.

In those years, reliable agents reported that King Zahir Shah, Prime Minister Hashim Khan, Interior Minister Navruz Khan and other Afghan officials spoke in a narrow circle about the capture of Soviet agents thrown into Afghanistan from USSR

We do not know the total number of illegal agents withdrawn to Afghanistan, since there is no information on this in the archival materials of the Foreign Intelligence Service, but there were at least two or three dozen of them. Their failures shortly after the covert crossing of the border were due, on the one hand, to poor preparation, poor encryption, and careless

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behavior on the territory of Afghanistan, and on the other - the all-encompassing system of investigation, denunciations and surveillance mentioned above, which reigned in the country during the reign of Prime Minister Hashim Khan. Arrested Soviet agents were tried and sentenced to long prison terms. The conditions of their detention in places of deprivation of liberty were extremely difficult. Many could not stand the torture and beatings during interrogations, others died while serving their sentences, but there were also those who managed to adapt, gain confidence in the prison authorities and become an overseer of their comrades.

The fate of the Mukhabat radio operator, who was 20 years old by the time she was sent to Afghanistan, was tragic. She was caught red-handed: a walkie-talkie, weapons and other evidence materials were found on her. She was immediately escorted to Kabul, where she was interrogated with passion. She was sentenced to a long term of imprisonment and kept for a long time in the so-called "zindan" – an underground prison cell with bars on top. There, the health of the young woman was almost completely undermined, the blooming girl turned into an old woman.

Until the mid-1950s, no one in the USSR raised the issue of releasing our citizens before the Afghan authorities; they seemed to be forgotten, as if they did not exist at all. The situation changed when Prime Minister M. Daud came to power in Afghanistan, who

resolutely reviewed the state of Afghan-Soviet relations. During his reign (1953-1963), Soviet-Afghan relations developed, large-scale cooperation began between the two countries, and by the end of the 1950s, thousands of Soviet specialists were working in Afghanistan. Under these conditions, to leave the question of Soviet people languishing in Afghan prisons without reaction and attention was already simply blasphemous. Moreover, in the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet leaders met quite regularly with King Zahir Shah, Prime Minister M. Daoud, and other Afghan officials.

However, neither N.S. Khrushchev, nor other leaders of the USSR of that time, who visited Afghanistan or received representatives of the top Afghan leadership in Moscow, did not want to take responsibility and raise the issue of the fate of Soviet citizens who were serving sentences in Afghan prisons before the Afghans. As a rule, this issue was "descended" to the level of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and our embassy in Kabul, and even then with the reservations that it should be brought before the Afghan side at an opportunity and carefully. With this approach, our timid attempts to achieve the release of former illegal agents invariably ran into a negative attitude of the Afghan authorities of the appropriate level. They usually referred to the fact that "these persons have committed especially grave criminal

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acts against Afghanistan", and the issue remained in limbo, the prospects for its solution were unclear.

The case dragged on, Prime Minister M. Daoud was dismissed, cabinets of ministers succeeded one another, the most favorable moment was missed. Then Erik Ivanovich Nekrasov, who was a resident of foreign intelligence in Kabul in 1964-1968, decided to achieve the release of the surviving illegal immigrants with the forces and means of the Kabul residency. He was humanly worried about the hard fate that befell our fellow citizens, who by the will of fate found themselves behind bars in Afghanistan. He put before the Center the question of their release in an expeditious manner with the help of agents and trusted connections that were in a position to assist us in this matter. Consent was obtained. E.I. Nekrasov rightfully owns the personal merit in the implementation of the "Rescue" operation.

The plan of forthcoming events was developed in detail, preparatory work began. It was decided to involve in the operation several reliable and trusted agents who were part of the environment of King Zahir Shah, as well as holding responsible positions in the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At the first stage, it was necessary to obtain clear information about the number of Soviet citizens who were in prisons, about their basic data, health status, places of detention, etc. It was important to find out whether all of them wanted to return to their homeland, since those of them who had confessed at one time could fear criminal prosecution upon arrival in the USSR. Such information was essential for the second stage of the operation, and it was soon received. agency way. She gave answers to all questions of interest to the residency.

Now the task was to find a direct way to the king in order to conduct an appropriate conversation with him at the right moment, since it was clear that this issue could not be resolved without Zahir Shah. We settled on the candidacy of the agent "Hamid". Cooperating with the Soviet intelligence, "Hamid" proved to be a diligent and reliable agent. He had a higher legal education, was well versed in Afghan legislation and knew how to use it to resolve the issue that worried us. "Hamid" played a major, if not decisive, role in the successful implementation of the "Rescue" operation.

"Maryam", a member of Zahir Shah's family, also made her contribution to the liberation of our fellow citizens. This remarkable woman, who helped Soviet intelligence for decades, is described in the previous volumes of the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence. By the time the residency took measures to release former illegal agents, it was already in

old age, but imbued with a desire to do everything in her power to rescue
Soviet

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people from prisons. "Hamid" and "Maryam" gave concrete and practical advice to the residency on how best to get down to business in order to achieve the desired result, taking into account the personality and character of King Zahir Shah.

"Hamid", adhering to the developed legend and seizing the moment, started a conversation with an influential dignitary close to the king about Soviet citizens accused of espionage in the mid-1940s and serving sentences of imprisonment in Afghan prisons, although since more than 20 years have passed since their arrest. Our agent spoke in a conversation from the standpoint of a lawyer and gave the dignitary strong arguments in favor of the speedy release of the convicts, who, according to him, fully repented of their deeds, do not pose any threat to Afghanistan now and, in addition, - the court terms for their imprisonment have long passed.

The story of the agent and the arguments given by him made a proper impression on the dignitary. After some thought, he said: "In addition to the legal side, there is also a political side to this story. The Afghans and the king personally will look very ugly in the eyes of the leadership of the USSR if it comes out and gets publicity. The very fact that Soviet people are kept in Afghan prisons in the conditions of the development of fruitful Afghan-Soviet cooperation and friendship between the two countries looks ridiculous and is difficult to explain." He added: "This issue should have been resolved and closed a long time ago. I will speak to His Majesty."

Simultaneously and in parallel with Hamid, Maryam also operated. She approached the question in a slightly different way, in a feminine way. Under a plausible pretext, she started talking in the family of Zahir Shah that recently, quite by accident, she became aware of the presence in Afghan prisons of Soviet people arrested after the end of World War II in Afghanistan. "Horrible! she exclaimed. "They are kept in horrible conditions, and there are women, aged and sick people among them!" Is this possible in a state that professes Islamic principles of justice? These people are all Muslims. How can friendship be strengthened with the country of whose citizens these unfortunates are, and at the same time these people be kept in prison? Something needs to be done! Can't leave

everything is as it is."

Soon, the dignitary, during his next report to the king on current affairs, mentioned former Soviet intelligence officers who were still serving their sentences in Afghan prisons, although many years had passed since their conviction. He suggested that the Soviet side may have forgotten about them because of the prescription, but it can somehow remember its citizens, and if it becomes aware of the unfortunate fact of their detention in Afghan prisons, this may adversely affect the Afghan-Soviet relationships and create misunderstandings

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between the leaders of the two states. In addition, he said, the release of these people, who are Muslims and have fully repented of their deeds, will undoubtedly be a humane step by the Afghan government and the king personally, will be a sign of goodwill for the northern neighbor, and, of course, he will appreciate it properly. . Finally, such an action will be beneficial to Afghanistan itself, which has embarked on the path of civilization, and will further strengthen the prestige of the king in the eyes of the Soviet leadership, and throughout the world.

The king, of course, knew about the Soviet intelligence officers who were in Afghan prisons, but pretended that this was unexpected news for him, and expressed surprise. He scolded the interlocutor for not reporting this question to him earlier, and asked for his opinion on how best to proceed.

The dignitary recommended that the monarch take a decision on the release of all the convicts in his

the time of Soviet intelligence agents and release them without unnecessary noise, publicity and generally as inconspicuously as possible. The issue has been resolved.

A few days later, an order was issued to release all former Soviet intelligence officers from prison. Through its agents in the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the residency monitored the passage and execution of this secret order of the king. Thus ended the operation "Rescue".

Sixteen former illegal agents, including Mukhabat, were taken to their native land, which they kissed, kneeling and crying with joy.

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Suez Crisis

On the day of the nationalization of the Suez Canal, British Prime Minister Eden hosted a dinner in London in honor of his loyal Arab allies, King Faisal of Iraq and his Prime Minister Nuri Said. In the midst of dinner the secretary quietly entered and handed Eden a small piece of paper. They say that after reading it, the English Prime Minister turned pale, and Nuri Said, looking at the face of the host of the banquet, awkwardly got up and knocked over his glass. The Iraqi guests realized that something extraordinary had happened.

A minute later Eden raised his eyes and said quietly: "Nasser has nationalized the channel." Although London and Baghdad were waiting for some action from the Egyptian president, no one could imagine such an unexpected announcement and immediately take control of the canal into their own hands.
could.

Nuri Said was the first to speak. He offered to immediately land troops in the canal zone, occupy Egypt and thus put an end to the obstinate Egyptian leader once and for all. Eden supported the Iraqi premier, but did not discuss this issue. The dinner was crumpled, and the guests hurried out of Downing Street.

The reaction to the events in the Middle East in England, as well as in France, was stormy. The next day, the British "Times", expressing the sentiments of financial and political circles, called on the British and French governments to take decisive action. "The capture of the canal," she emphasized, "is an act of international robbery. If Nasser proves that he can seize Western property with impunity, then others will undoubtedly follow his example!

An alarm was announced in the military departments of England and France, the troops were put on alert. A telegram was sent to US President Eisenhower informing him of the intention to use force against Egypt.

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However, gradually the intensity of passions began to subside. Without easing psychological pressure, British and French politicians decided to use the pressure of "world public opinion" and with this help to force Egypt to give the Suez Canal under the control, if not of the old masters, then of some international organization, where the key role would belong to them.

In order to correctly understand what happened, it is necessary to at least briefly dwell on the history of the construction and use of the canal, the agreements concluded on this matter and the events after the July 1952 revolution in Egypt.

The Suez Canal was built by an Anglo-French company in 1869. It was built on Egyptian soil and by the hands of the Egyptians. The Suez Canal Company was registered as an Egyptian enterprise. After gaining as a result of the revolution of 1952 the actual

Independence by Egypt and the evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal zone in June 1956 naturally raised the question of establishing national control over all key sectors of the economy. With the advent of Nasser to the presidency of the country, the popular movement for the nationalization of foreign property began to grow even more. The company received considerable income. In 1955, its profit was 35 million Egyptian pounds, of which Egypt received only 1 million.

The young Egyptian state took all measures to revive its economy. It was planned to build a mineral fertilizer plant, textile, food, pharmaceutical and other industries. A special place among economic activities was occupied by the project of construction of the high-rise Aswan dam. All national aspirations were embodied in it: economic, political, cultural.

To finance the planned projects, the Egyptian government negotiated with the United States of America. The fourth point of the "Truman program" was extended to the country, which concerned assistance to "underdeveloped countries". In 1956, the issue of granting a loan to Egypt in the amount of about 40 million dollars for the development of transport, agriculture and other areas was decided. Negotiations were also underway on the construction of a high-rise Aswan dam.

At the same time, Nasser pursued an independent foreign policy based on the principle of non-alignment with military blocs. At this time, diplomatic and trade relations were established with Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, Romania and China.

Egypt, as an independent country, needed to purchase the required amount of weapons. With this question, he repeatedly turned to the United States and England. However, these countries insisted on Egypt's entry into the Baghdad Pact, which was an indispensable condition for the supply of weapons. This approach of the Western powers contradicted

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Egyptian foreign policy. Then the country's government in September 1955 concluded a trade agreement with Czechoslovakia on the supply of weapons in exchange for cotton and rice.

This move caused dissatisfaction in Western countries. A frenzied anti-Egyptian campaign began in the press. On July 19, 1956, US Secretary of State Dulles announced the US refusal to give Egypt the previously promised loan for economic construction. The issue of the construction of the Aswan dam was also removed. England also refused loans.

In response to this demarche of Western countries, on July 26, 1956, the Egyptian government promulgated a decree on the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Funds from the operation of the canal were planned to be used for the construction of the high-rise Aswan dam.

As V.A. Kirpichenko, who at that time worked in the foreign intelligence station in Cairo, the operation to nationalize the canal was carefully designed by the Egyptians. They sent the right number of people with good education to work in the company in advance. To replace each foreign employee, an Egyptian of the appropriate qualification was prepared in advance. The operation was led by a competent and energetic officer Mahmoud Younis. As soon as Nasser finished his speech at the rally in Alexandria, where he announced the nationalization decree, Mahmoud Younis signaled to take control of the canal in his own hands. This was done quickly and without major excesses. He also became the first director of the national company of the Suez Canal, and in 1966 was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of the United Arab Republic.

The foreign intelligence station in Egypt closely followed the developments. Information began to come in that England and France, having developed a storm of activity in search of a political solution to the Suez problem, were at the same time actively preparing aggression against Egypt. Israel joined these two countries. The role of the United States was unclear.

The situation became more and more tense. The Arab states, which almost unanimously supported Nasser's actions, threatened to cut off oil supplies to Western countries in the event of aggression against Egypt. The Soviet Union fully supported Egypt. However, despite this, England and France continued to prepare for military action.

The British and Americans took vigorous measures to disunite the Arab countries on the question of the nationalization of the Suez Canal. At the end of August, intelligence received secret information about the conversation between the British ambassador and King Hussein of Jordan. The Ambassador tried to find out the position of Jordan at the meeting of the Political Committee of the League of Arab Countries, which opened on August 12, 1956, and

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influence it in the interests of England. However, nothing came of this. The king told the ambassador that in resolving any issue that affects the interests of the Arab nation, the Arabs act as a united front.

Moreover, Hussein sent a letter to King Faisal of Iraq and urged him to support Egypt in connection with the nationalization of the Suez Canal.

On August 16, a conference convened by England to discuss the problem of the canal opened in London. 22 countries – users of the channel were invited to the conference. The countries were selected by England at its own discretion. The purpose of the conference was to impose on Egypt a decision favorable to Western countries to establish "international" control over the Suez Canal. The draft of this decision was developed by the US delegation and was called the Dulles Plan.

However, in opposition to the American project, the Indian plan was put forward, supported by the Soviet Union, Indonesia and Ceylon. According to this plan, Egypt retained sovereignty over the Suez Canal.

Feeling that public opinion was not in their favour, England and France launched a fierce campaign, accusing Egypt of disrupting navigation through the Suez Canal and violating the 1888 convention.

To prove Egypt's inability to manage the Suez Canal, its former owners decided to recall pilots and other foreign specialists from work on the canal. Egypt did not have its own pilots, and it is impossible to train specialists in a short time. However, the adventure of the West failed, as the USSR and other countries helped, foreign volunteers appeared. The channel continued to work.

The solidarity of the Arab countries played an important role in supporting Egypt. Strikes swept the entire Arab world. As a result, the supply of oil through oil pipelines passing through the territory of Syria was stopped for several hours. It should be noted that Syria acted most actively in support of Egypt, it announced a partial mobilization in case of providing military assistance to Egypt if the Western countries commit aggression.

The general strike deeply shocked public opinion. It was reported by telegraph agencies and radio, and written by influential newspapers around the world. American television interrupted its program, which was watched by 20 million people, to announce that 15 million Arabs had gone on strike to protest the London conference, that this was the largest strike in the history of the Arab world.

The London Conference supported the American resolution by a majority of votes. It was sent to Nasser for consideration. However, the Egyptian government rejected it.

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In September 1956, a second London conference was held, which tried to create an association of canal users and leave it the right to manage this waterway. However, the decisions of the conference were vague, there were differences between its participants, who had previously unconditionally supported England.

From a secret document obtained by intelligence from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of one of the participating countries, it followed that the second London conference had failed, that the proposed association was inoperable. The document cited a number of reasons for the failure, one of which sounded rather curious: "While Mr. Eden and Mr. Guy Mollet were mobilizing their forces against Egypt, the US Ambassador in Cairo, Byroad, pursued a completely different policy, undermining Anglo-French diplomatic maneuvers despite the Anglo-French-American tripartite declaration. The position of the American government ... strengthened Nasser's position."

It should be noted that the US approach to the Suez conflict was ambivalent. On the one hand, they supported England and France, on the other hand, they sought to use the difficulties that arose in these countries in order to take their place in the Middle East. They were especially interested in oil and therefore did not want to quarrel with the Arabs.

Having failed to achieve positive results through the conferences, on September 23, 1956, Britain and France appealed to the Security Council with a complaint against Egypt. They invited the United Nations to condemn Egypt's actions. In turn, Egypt on September 24 filed a complaint against England.

After discussion and lengthy negotiations, six principles for resolving the Suez crisis were developed. They basically met the requirements of all users of the channel and Egypt. However, England and France, with the support of the United States, tried to push through another point in this resolution, which referred to the establishment of "international control" over the Suez Canal. In this situation, the Soviet Union was forced to use the right of veto.

Having failed to achieve the desired results in the UN, Britain and France set about preparing a direct armed attack on Egypt.

Foreign intelligence constantly received materials about the preparation of aggression against Egypt by England, France and Israel. This information was brought to the attention of the Egyptian leadership through appropriate channels. But there was other information as well. The United States knew in detail about the impending aggression, but sought to misinform Nasser. Thus, literally two days before the aggression, the Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Hussein was received by the responsible officials of the State Department, Roosevelt and Henderson. In a secret document about this

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At the meeting, it was noted that both officials expressed the opinion that the danger of war is now over, unless some new developments occur that threaten the security of foreign nationals in Arab countries or the oil pipelines of Western oil companies.

At the same time, Britain and France launched a powerful campaign to disunite the Arab states. In order to appease the public opinion of their countries, they sought to present the matter in such a way that there was no Arab solidarity regarding the support of Egypt.

French Foreign Minister Pinault made a statement in which he stressed that he was not sure of the solidarity of the Arab States with Nasser and that some of those States viewed his actions as extremist.

In response, the Arab ambassadors met in Paris and then told reporters that all Arab countries supported Egypt and that they had been instructed to bring this to the attention of the French Foreign Minister.

Pino refused to receive all the ambassadors at once. The first to arrive at the reception was the Lebanese ambassador. From a secret report obtained by intelligence, it can be seen that the ambassador's statement was rather harsh. He said that President Chamoun telephoned him last night and demanded that he reaffirm the full solidarity of the Arab countries and convey his concern about the concentration of French troops on the island of Cyprus. Lebanon sees no justification for such a concentration, because nothing threatens the security and interests of French citizens.

The Minister replied that the purpose of the concentration of French troops in Cyprus was to ensure the safety of the French and their property, which could be plundered in Egypt and Syria in the event of an aggravation of the situation in connection with the Suez Canal problem.

Along with the concentration of troops near Egyptian territory, the Western states made great efforts to exert psychological and propaganda pressure on the Arab countries. The aim was to isolate Egypt and present the case in such a way that in the event of a war, she would be responsible for it, and the consequences of the war could lead to the loss of her independence.

The Egyptian ambassador to Lebanon, Galeb, realizing that aggression against Egypt could be prevented only if all the Arab countries acted as a united front on his side, wrote to his government in a secret note that Western propaganda and psychological indoctrination had a negative impact on Arab countries, including Syria, which is the most reliable ally of Egypt. In particular, he suggested taking advantage of the stay in Cairo of the ministers of foreign affairs of the Arab countries and the Arab delegations who arrived at the meeting of the Political Committee of the League of Arab States in order to strengthen morale

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ny spirit among the leading figures of these states. Ghaleb also advised trying to nullify the impact of propaganda claiming that the Egyptian policy would eventually lead to a war, as a result of which the Arab countries would lose their independence, to reassure the leaders of the Arab states, proving to them that Egypt is capable, both in practical, and technically to manage the Suez Canal, to convince the Arab countries that the Egyptian army is well prepared and can successfully repel an attack from Israel.

England and France understood that Egypt should not be given time to strengthen a solid all-Arab front. According to the developed plan, on the night of October 29-30, 1956, Israeli troops, without any reason, went on the offensive and began to advance in the direction of the Suez Canal. To meet them on the Sinai peninsula, the Egyptian army was deployed, which started fighting with the Israelis. Meanwhile, the British and French bombed Egyptian cities - Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, Ismailia and others.

It became clear that the Israeli offensive was aimed at luring the Egyptian army to the Sinai, while England and France landed their troops behind Egyptian troops and occupied Egypt without resistance. Having figured out this plan, Nasser hastily withdrew most of his army from Sinai and blocked the path of the Anglo-French troops.

On November 5, British and French troops nevertheless landed at the entrance to the Suez Canal and captured Port Said, where fierce street fighting unfolded. The official propaganda of these countries stubbornly asserted that the landing of troops was required in order to prevent a war between Egypt and Israel. Meanwhile, Egyptian cities were bombarded,

People.

The very fact of the landing in Port Said shows that England and France had the goal of at least gaining a foothold in the Suez Canal zone, and then act depending on the development of events. Western strategists also hoped that the landing of their troops would cause internal political complications in Egypt, which would lead to a coup and the destruction of the Nasser regime. However

none of this happened, the people of Egypt showed firmness and solidarity around a patriotic government.

Egypt received tangible support from independent Arab countries, many of which broke off diplomatic relations with England and France. In Syria, an oil pipeline owned by foreign companies was blown up, and militias began to form. Even Saudi Arabia has stopped pumping oil to British tankers and oil refineries. Jordan imposed a ban on the use of its military bases by England. wave under

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Liberty in Iraq forced the pro-Western government of Nuri Said to break off diplomatic relations with France and condemn Britain for its part in the aggression.

India, Pakistan, Ceylon and other countries condemned the aggressive policy of England, France and Israel. Even the United States, at the meeting of the Security Council on October 30, 1956, was forced to submit a proposal for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli troops behind the armistice line. All members of the Security Council voted in favor of the resolution, except for Britain and France, who used their veto.

The US position on the issue of ending the war and withdrawing foreign troops from Egyptian territory was vague. Instead of a resolute suppression of the aggression, the Americans wanted to impose a discussion of the Palestinian problem and thereby divert the UN General Assembly from the main issue and force it to deal with matters not directly related to the aggression committed.

The United States maneuvered, while the aggressors, meanwhile, continued to intensify their actions. There were fierce battles in Port Said, Port Fuad was occupied. Israeli troops approached the eastern shore of the Suez Canal and moved along the coast of the Suez and Aqaba gulfs.

The Anglo-French invasion forces numbered 65 thousand people, 430 tanks, 520 guns and mortars, 700 aircraft, 122 ships, including 6 aircraft carriers.

The position of Egypt was difficult, it was difficult to resist such a military armada. It seemed that the victory of the aggressors was very close. But here the Soviet Union had a weighty word to say. On November 5, 1956, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR sent a telegram to the Security Council demanding that the aggressors immediately stop hostilities and withdraw their troops from Egypt within three days, and in case of failure to comply with this demand, provide Egypt with assistance from all UN members. , and above all the USSR and the USA. Following this, the Soviet government proposed to the US President, with UN sanction, to jointly use the armed forces to suppress aggression. The United States rejected the proposal of the Soviet government.

Behind the steps of the USSR were the strenuous efforts of Soviet intelligence officers. Every day, fulfilling the requirements of the Center, in conditions when Cairo and other cities were bombarded and there was a blackout everywhere, the workers of the residency reported to Moscow the latest information about the situation in Egypt, the determination of its leadership and the main political forces to fight aggression, about the mood in the diplomatic corps of the capital, about the state of the country's armed forces.

Moscow sent messages to the heads of the governments of England, France and Israel. The Soviet leadership warned them about the most serious consequences of the continuation of aggression and the readiness of the Soviet

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Union to take decisive action to restore peace in the Middle East. The persistent steps of the Soviet government had a sobering effect on the aggressors. On November 6 and 7, messages were received in response from the governments of England and France, in which they

reported that they had given the order to cease fire on the night of 6/7 November. On November 8, a similar message was received from Israel.

However, the cease-fire did not yet mean the end of the aggression. The troops of England, France and Israel continued to be in Egypt. Moreover, the Soviet foreign intelligence began to receive materials about the preparation of aggression against Syria. As a pretext, it was planned to use the presence of Soviet aircraft in Syria and the need to restore oil pipelines that were destroyed at the direction of the Syrian government. Turkey and Iraq were also planned to be involved in the attack on Syria. Turkey deployed two divisions to the Syrian border, and another division was prepared to be transferred to the area. From the same secret information it was clear that the British were taking measures to organize a coup d'état in Syria. They began preparing an uprising in the Jebel Druz region. Many Druze figures have been called to Iraq for instructions. For the same purpose, the transfer of large quantities of weapons to Syria from Iraq began.

Taking into account the developing situation, on November 15, 1956, the Soviet government sent new messages to England, France and Israel, in which they urgently demanded the immediate withdrawal of interventionist troops from Egypt.

The resolute position of the Soviet Union on the question of ending the aggression and the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli troops from the territory of Egypt received a wide response in the world. It was met with great enthusiasm in the Arab countries and contributed to the strengthening of their unity and cohesion. The countries of Asia reacted with approval to it. In England and France, public dissatisfaction with the aggressive actions of their governments intensified. In political circles, the attack on Egypt was clearly considered a gamble and demanded that it be put to an end.

The leaders of these countries, Eden and Guy Mollet, were confused. In the words of one politician, Eden these days looked like both a swindler and a coward.

The US position has changed somewhat. Realizing that the tripartite aggression had finally failed, Washington began to flirt with the Arab countries and, in particular, corrected its approach to solving the Suez problem. According to intelligence data, the ambassador of one of the European countries to the United States wrote to his leadership that after a conversation at the State Department, he was convinced that the US representative to the UN, Lodge, began to take a pro-Egyptian position.

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The change in the American position was largely influenced by the fact that at that time the US foreign policy agencies were actively pushing the "Eisenhower Doctrine", and they needed allies in the Arab world.

All this taken together led to the disruption of the plans of the aggressors and forced them to withdraw their troops from Egypt. This happened in December 1956, when British and French troops left the Suez Canal zone. In January 1957, the Israelis also left the Sinai, and in March they also left the Gaza Strip.

The attack of the aggressors caused great damage to international shipping. The Suez Canal was disabled. As a result of the bombing, the port facilities were damaged, the banks of the canal were sprinkled in many places, and the navigation system was disrupted. A lot of work was needed to clear the canal.

On March 18, 1957, the Egyptian government, in connection with the resumption of navigation through the Suez Canal, issued a memorandum in which it stated that the canal would again become a link a link that brings good and peace to the peoples of the whole world. The Egyptian government, the document emphasized, continues to insist on the observance of the 1888 Convention of Constantinople. An important point of the memorandum was the statement that the administration of the Suez Canal would take measures to expand navigation through the canal and expect further cooperation with the countries of the world.

The Suez Canal is up and running. At first, its throughput was half as low as before the aggression. Then the former capacity was restored, and the expansion of shipping began gradually. The channel was inactive for only a few months, it seemed that this difficult period had gone far into the past. The water artery connecting the Red and Mediterranean Seas has been revived.

Those who have had to pass on a ship through the canal will never forget the peculiar charm of this piece of Egyptian land. The canal runs like a narrow ribbon between the desert shores, dividing the boundless space into two continents - Asia and Africa. There is a road nearby, the ship is moving slowly, and it seems that it is not moving on water, but on the sand of the desert, and that you can jump onto the road and go along with it. In several places, the channel expands, forming bays, where other ships wait for their turn, the traffic here is "single-track". It's fun on the deck of passenger ships. There is laughter, there is music.

The canal did not work for only a few months, and no one even thought that traffic along it could be interrupted again. The Egyptians did their job well, and the waterway worked no worse than under foreign ownership.

But what seemed incredible happened. On June 5, 1967, Israel attacked Egypt and Syria. Israeli troops came to

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the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and interrupted traffic on it for six whole years. It was only in 1973 that the Egyptian troops expelled the invaders from the banks of the canal, and a few months later, as a result of great efforts, it became possible to move along this economically profitable and at the same time long-suffering path.

But that is another story.

1 Tÿe Tÿtes. - 1956. - 28.07. ? Kirpichenko V. From the archive of a scout. - M., 1993. - S. 40.

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Foreign intelligence in post-war Iran (1945-1953)

The Second World War ended in September 1945 with the surrender of Japan, and allied relations between the victorious powers became a thing of the past. Their place was taken by the struggle for influence in the post-war world.

As in the war years, Iran again found itself among those countries where the interests of the world's leading powers clashed. It still played the role of a springboard for hostile actions against the USSR, but the struggle of the Iranian people for the nationalization of the oil industry and the liquidation of the predatory Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which owned the concession for the exploitation of South Iranian oil since 1901, came to the fore. In 1950, Iran ranked fourth in the world in terms of oil production.

The smell of Iranian oil disturbed not only the British. Lloyd Henderson, former head of the Middle East Division of the US State Department, formulated the objectives of American policy in Iran in 1950: "Within a radius of 800 km around Tehran there is an area that contains 33 billion barrels of oil - almost half of the world's reserves. We will never allow this territory to fall into the hands of a power hostile to the United States." It is not difficult to guess what kind of power Henderson had in mind.

In fact, he only announced the plans of the Rockefellers, who sought to establish American control over the oil fields of the Middle and Near East. US oil production coordinator Ickes in 1944 in American Magazine

outlined their essence: "If we want to preserve and develop our civilization, relying on oil, we must be ready to go where there is oil".

On April 19, 1945, the leadership of the NKGB of the USSR summed up the main results of the activities of Soviet intelligence in Iran during the war years. "Important

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The new intelligence information received by Soviet intelligence officers in Iran, the adopted document said, "played a significant role in the adoption by the country's leadership and the military command of certain political and military-strategic decisions." Foreign intelligence proposals regarding the tasks of residencies in Iran were considered and approved, taking into account the changed situation. The previously existing division of the Tehran residency into intelligence and counterintelligence was abolished, and from now on all work was to be concentrated in a single residency. New staffs of foreign apparatuses were introduced in Tehran and other cities of the country. "The leading residencies in Iran, Egypt and Turkey," the decision emphasized, "if not quantitatively, then qualitatively, must be staffed no worse than the main European residencies."

On June 11, 1945, on the basis of the decisions taken, the Center in a letter to Tehran set the task: "Regardless of the timing of the withdrawal of the Red Army units? it is necessary to immediately start organizing work in the changed conditions. From now on, intelligence attention should be focused on the comprehensive and active development of the anti-Soviet activities of the British and Iranian intelligence and counterintelligence institutions of Iran, as well as the remnants of German agents.

In January 1947, the tasks of the Iranian residencies were specified: "From now on, the main task is to develop the activities of the British and Americans in the field of political, diplomatic and economic."

In June of the same year, the Center underscored the importance of the "oil issue" for Iran: "Back then, and now we believed and continue to believe that the main issue that needs to be explored comprehensively is the question of oil and the positions that are taken in the English, American and Iranian governments." "So far, little has been done in this area," the Center's letter noted, "there is no documentary information on the basis of which it would be possible not to be confused in guesswork, but to accurately and definitely inform the appropriate authorities about the situation

cases."

Taking into account the development of the situation in Iran, the aspirations of the United States and England, Moscow concluded that the struggle against the pro-Western course of the Iranian government would meet the state interests of the USSR. The question was put like this: "How could it be practically possible to unite the elements in opposition to the shah and the military clique in order to intensify the struggle against the involvement of Iran in the Anglo-American bloc?" This was a new approach, a year ago the Center had a different position: "Do not carry out any activities to develop the democratic movement in Iran, which would set themselves the task of changing the social or state system."

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However, the Center was not completely satisfied with the quality of the intelligence network and in a rather strict form demanded to acquire new reliable sources in the personal office of the Shah and the office of the Prime Minister, where the most important documents were concentrated, as well as among the leaders of the main political parties and leaders Majlis.

On March 23, 1950, the Center demanded to receive information "on the activities of foreign oil companies in the territory of Iran, in particular AIOC, and other issues related to oil."

By the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s, these tasks, although not in full, were solved: a "documentary" agent in the prime minister's office, sources in the leadership of political parties, the Majlis, among the clergy, in surrounded by Anglo-American representatives in Iran, etc.

The Center was also not satisfied with the way the work in the US was carried out in the Iranian residencies. A letter to Tehran in October 1950 said, in part: "At present, work on the Americans is one of the main tasks in Iran. So far, despite our reminders, you have not received any practical proposals on this issue, although you have all the necessary conditions for this. This situation can no longer be tolerated." Appropriate conclusions were drawn from this harsh criticism, and already in 1951 the Center noted the improvement of work in the "anti-American" direction and wrote to Tehran: "The materials received from you made it possible to inform the authorities on all issues related to the national oil industry, mainly on the basis of documentary information about the correspondence of the Iranian Foreign Ministry with Iranian diplomatic missions abroad, which made it possible to know about the positions of England, the USA and Iran on the issue of nationalization.

The defeat of fascist Germany served as a powerful impetus for the rise of the democratic movement in Iran. Progressive forces advocated the liberalization of public life, the liberation of the country from foreign domination and the nationalization of Iran's main wealth - oil. However, the development of a broad democratic movement ran into resolute opposition from the Iranian authorities, who received material and moral support from the British and Americans.

After the entry of allied troops into Iran, the young Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who took the throne after the abdication of his father, Reza Shah, signed a decree on September 27, 1941 on the release of all political prisoners and exiles. It was then that political parties, trade unions and peasant unions began to form. After the end of the war, the intelligentsia, the national bourgeoisie, part of the Shiite clergy began to actively put forward demands for the return of national dignity and complete independence to the country.

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bridge that found support among the people. The cabinets of ministers in those years, having no support in society, constantly succeeded each other, without staying in power.

In January 1946, Qavam es Saltane, whose pro-Western sentiments were widely known, was appointed prime minister. At first, taking into account his reputation and the situation in the country, he widely resorted to rhetoric about the need to democratize public life, preserve the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Iran, maintain friendly relations with the USA, Great Britain and the USSR. However, in reality, with the advent of Kawama es Saltane, the country's obvious drift towards the KAnglo-American bloc began. In 1947, he signed a secret military agreement with the United States that made Iran dependent on the Americans. At the same time, a line was outlined towards curtailing relations with the USSR. In domestic politics, a course was taken to defeat the democratic forces and establish a military police regime using openly violent methods.

Kavam-es-Saltane was a seasoned and cunning politician, he did not hesitate to resort to direct deceit, to behind-the-scenes intrigues and immediately took advantage of the situation that arose after the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Iran. Violating the earlier Soviet-Iranian agreements, he managed to get the Mejlis obedient to him to torpedo the agreement on granting the USSR a concession for the development and exploitation of oil fields in northern Iran. The Prime Minister did not take into account the agreement on the autonomy of Iranian Azerbaijan, where the Democratic Party was in power. As soon as the Soviet troops left the territory of Iran, the Shah's army began a campaign against Tabriz. Martial law was introduced, the leaders and activists of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan were brutally massacred. They were shot, hanged, repaired over them

violence in the streets. More than 700 people were shot and hanged, hundreds were killed and tortured as a result of unauthorized reprisals.

The Shah's punishers also entered Iranian Kurdistan, where the same bloody operation was carried out against the Kurds. The leader of the national liberation movement Kazi Mohammed and his closest associates were hanged. In 1947, repressions swept the whole country, thousands of people were thrown into prison. The committees of the left parties and trade unions were closed, newspapers were banned; the peasant movement was suppressed, the peasant unions were crushed. Medieval relations between peasants and

landowners.

During the mass repressions, the agents of the Soviet intelligence also suffered. Some agents were arrested for participating in the democratic movement, others were placed under police surveillance. There were

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those who preferred treachery and exposed the activities of our intelligence. A revision of the intelligence apparatus was needed.

The center demanded that urgent security measures be taken, personal meetings with valuable agents be reduced to a minimum, and those who fell under the suspicion of the authorities or were under threat of arrest were conserved. After the "cleansing" by 1948, the intelligence apparatus was reduced by almost half.

In connection with rampant punitive elements, the threat of reprisals hung over hundreds of pro-Soviet individuals. In 1947-1948, intelligence provided concrete assistance to many of them, dozens of people were secretly transferred to the USSR. Often, such activities were carried out by residencies at their own peril and risk: lack of time often did not allow them to be coordinated with the Center in a timely manner.

Nevertheless, despite the repressions, the democratic forces were not broken, they were supported by the national bourgeoisie and part of the influential clergy. The people's rejection of the anti-democratic course of the authorities was especially evident after the appointment in June 1948 of the new Prime Minister Khazhir, who had a strong reputation as an "old servant of the British." Under him, attacks on progressive forces intensified even more. In 1949, Soviet consulates were closed in all cities of Iran, with the exception of Isfahan and Mashhad. Khazhir's policy caused open discontent among the people, and at the end of 1949 the prime minister was killed as a result of a terrorist act.

By that time, the struggle of the Iranians for the nationalization of the oil industry and the liquidation of the AIOC had reached great intensity. She, in fact, was a "state within a state", occupied 250 thousand square meters. km of Iranian territory and had its own government, its own officials and subjects, its own fleet, its own trains, ships, planes, its own police. The General Director of AINK was in fact the king of this "state". The company owned the Abadan oil refineries, oil pipelines, oil tankers, airfields, and a radio station. AINK's net profits over the entire period of its existence amounted to more than 400 million pounds sterling. In 1947 alone, it produced 20 million tons of oil and received £81 million in profits, while Iran got only £7 million.

The working conditions of workers at the company's enterprises were slavish. With a 12-16-hour working day, oil workers received 12-16 rials a day, which was not even enough for food. This was four times less than the wages of Venezuelan oil workers, who were considered one of the

of the lowest paid.

Under the pressure of public sentiment, the shah was forced to turn to England with a proposal to change some of the clauses of the

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cession agreement with AINC and increase the share of Iran's income. In London, of course, they were not going to do this, and negotiations in early 1949 did not bring success to Iran. Demands for the liquidation of AINK intensified in society.

In the autumn of 1949, the National Front of Iran (NFI) was established. Among its founders were prominent political and religious figures - Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh and Ayatollah Abol Qasem Kashani. The NFI program contained the main requirement: the activities of AINK should be banned, and the oil industry should be nationalized. Kashani's appeal was read in mosques: "Down with the British! From them all the troubles, they captured our wealth - oil. Take it away from them!"

Kashani was very popular in the country, he was revered as a kind of "Eastern Pope". He was sure that he could raise the entire Muslim world to fight against the British and declare a holy war on them. Back in 1941, he publicly made furious statements against the "English colonialists". Unlike other confessors of the highest rank, he openly touched on acute political problems in his sermons and tirelessly urged the people not to obey the dictates of the British, to fight against them. In 1942, Kashani was arrested on charges of links with Nazi intelligence and imprisoned, from where he was released in 1945, and became involved in political life. He repeated in sermons: "The English must go. As long as they remain in our country, they will have the opportunity and the right to interfere in our internal politics and our way of life. We must throw them out of Iran, we will do it, and nothing will stop us."

Small in stature, frail, in a large black turban, easy to handle, Kashani had a strong will and the gift of persuasion. He had a pale, thin face with clearly drawn features, like in a Persian miniature, a small gray beard, he exuded deep intelligence and wisdom - this is how the Italian journalist M. Machokki described Kashani, who visited Tehran in 1951 and accepted by the ayatollah.

At one time, Kashani was the spiritual leader of the religious terrorist organization Fedayan-e-Islam (Sacrificing themselves for Islam) and was involved in its activities. On her account there was more than one terrorist act against Iranian statesmen. She was also credited with an unsuccessful assassination attempt on the Shah in February 1949. Then the enraged Shah expelled Kashani from the country, but the expulsion of the ayatollah caused a storm of indignation in society, and the Shah was forced to allow him to return to his homeland.

Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was nothing like his stern and despotic father Reza Shah, who went through his "universities" in the barracks of a Cossack regiment, where discipline.

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Thanks to his zeal in his service, he managed to get first into non-commissioned officers, and then received an officer's rank and reached the rank of general. The son received a European education, was fluent in English and French, was not a stranger to new cultural trends, but by nature he was a suspicious, indecisive person, subject to the influence of people with a stronger will. With the passage of time and the strengthening of his power, he developed a complex of megalomania, but after an unsuccessful assassination attempt on him in February 1949, the young shah was very afraid in all my life.

After that, the shah began to shun all strong, independent, independent political figures, even from his inner circle. So, at first, he quickly elevated the influential General Bakhtiar, instructing him to command a special service - the Organization for Information and Security of the Country (SAVAK), while this appointment also took into account Bakhtiar's relationship with the shahina Sureya, to whom he was an uncle. But very soon Bakhtiar fell into disgrace due to the fact that he concentrated great power in his hands, he was sent to Iraq, where he was soon killed

Shah's agents.

Another distinguishing feature of the Shah was his intolerance of criticism of his person, no matter who it came from. He was greatly influenced by his mother Taj-ol-Moluk and his twin sister Ashraf, whose advice and recommendations he listened to.

In June 1950, by appointment of the Shah, the government was headed by a direct henchman of the palace, the Chief of the General Staff of the Iranian Army, General Ali Razmara. The highest Iranian circles understood the need for a number of measures aimed at improving the situation of the distressed population. Thoughts were repeatedly expressed in these circles at that time that if some reforms were not carried out, the revolution might become inevitable. Simultaneously with the declarations and promises of reforms, the authorities launched a broad propaganda campaign in order to win over the broad masses of the people, and especially the middle strata, to the side of the court. The new premier got involved in all these events initiated by the court, he even went to discuss the draft education reform with representatives of the intelligentsia. He decided to ban the broadcast of Voice of America programs for Iran, on December 26, 1950, in a special declaration, he proclaimed a policy of neutrality and took a number of steps to improve Iranian-Soviet relations. However, on the issue of the nationalization of the oil industry, Razmara took an inconsistent, ambivalent position.

Despite his closeness to the court, Razmara adhered to nationalist convictions and had his own point of view on some aspects of domestic and foreign policy. Very soon he aroused open dissatisfaction with large landowners, khans of influential tribes, large merchants and clergy, who feared

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weakening of their positions as a result of Razmar's activity. After he spoke of the planned establishment of provincial and village councils, as well as guarantees for the independence of the courts, his fate was sealed. On March 7, 1951, he was shot from a revolver while leaving the mosque by a fanatic of the extremist religious organization Fedayan-e Islam. In any case, this was the official version of the assassination of the Prime Minister put forward by the authorities. Two weeks later, the Minister of Education was also killed.

There is no information in the archival materials of the SVR who specifically stood behind the assassins of General Razmar, but the terrorist act itself was committed by a member of the Fedayan-e-Islam organization. This fact of terror caused a state close to panic in palace circles.

The new Prime Minister Hossein Ala, who replaced Razmar, was a former Minister of the Court and Ambassador to the United States, who was forced to meet the demands of the people and make a decision to nationalize the oil enterprises of AINC, but in fact, he sabotaged practical steps in every possible way to implement it. Mossadegh and Kashani, acting together, were able to direct against Hossein Ala the general dissatisfaction with his behavior, and the latter hastened to resign.

In the midst of a government crisis and popular unrest, the Shah, against his will, agreed in April 1951 to the appointment of the leader of the National Front of Iran and an influential member of the Majlis, Dr. Mosaddegh, as the country's prime minister. From that moment on, Iran found itself at the epicenter of political passions.

Mossadegh was undoubtedly one of the most interesting and colorful political and statesmen of his time. He had the courage to openly challenge the mighty powers of England, the US, the oil corporations and magnates.

Mossadegh was already over 70 years old when he became the head of the government. He had extensive political experience behind him, he was the leader of the leading party, the National Front of Iran, and was popular in the country. M. Machokki, a correspondent for the Unita newspaper, described his appearance as follows: "He had very energetic, firm facial features, expressing the will and determination of character, which, however, were often lacking in his practical affairs. Bald skull, long and thin neck, hooked nose, large ears, running around

look, manner of constantly turning the head. He was distinguished by a natural mind, cunning, insight and observation.

Mosaddegh's coming to power was unexpected for the Tehran residency, it was unable to obtain proactive information on this score, which was the reason for the Center's impartial criticism of the residency. "Immediately and in the shortest possible time, study the possibilities of using in the interests of the USSR ~ it was indicated in a letter to the residency, - nationalist-minded

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circles of Iran, grouped around Mossadegh, Kashani, Bagai and other opponents of the Anglo-American dominance in the country who are in opposition to the Shah. Moscow demanded that measures be taken to acquire sources in the environment of the new prime minister and in the leadership of the NFI. The solution of this problem took some time, but nevertheless it was solved.

As soon as Mossadegh headed the government, the Majlis approved a law on the nationalization of the oil industry. On April 30, 1951, it was approved by the Senate, and on May 2 it was signed by the Shah. From that day on, relations between him and Mosaddegh became seriously aggravated: the Shah was looking for a compromise and did not want complications with England, while Mosaddegh decided to go all the way. On May 20, 1951, the residency, citing a reliable source, reported that the Shah had become convinced of the need to remove Mosaddegh from the post of prime minister. The same position was taken by the British, who wished to see their man, Kawam es-Saltan, as the head of the Iranian government.

By virtue of the law on the nationalization of the oil industry, the British lost their concessions in southern Iran. They hoped that it was still possible to improve the matter, to agree with Mossadegh and held a series of negotiations with him, but to no avail. Then London switched to methods of force pressure. First of all, the British began to create economic and financial difficulties for Iran. London prevented both the acquisition of oil tankers and the transportation of Iranian oil.

Intelligence managed to obtain a memorandum from the British Foreign Office on policy towards Iran, dated January 27, 1948. In particular, it stated: "Do not allow the creation of a democratic government in Iran, as this would mean the spread of communist influence in the Middle East, and oil supplies from the concessions of the Anglo-Iranian Company would become dependent on the Soviet government ... The main thing is to ensure the security of British oil interests in southern Iran, up to the entry of British troops into Iran, if the Iranian government fails to ensure order in the southern regions of Iran." And already in March 1951 ships of the British navy entered the Persian Gulf.

On July 15, 1951, thousands of demonstrations took place in Tehran and other cities of Iran in support of Mosaddegh's policies and against foreign domination. The demonstrations frightened the prime minister: he was afraid of the scale of popular uprisings and the loss of control over the development of events. The demonstrations were dispersed by the police and troops, resulting in 120 dead and 300 wounded. Martial law was introduced, mass arrests were made, left-wing newspapers were closed.

At first, the appointment of Mosaddegh as head of government was met with satisfaction by the Americans, which was more than proof

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due to the contradictions between them and the British in Iran. At first they kept a low profile and even leaned towards helping Mosaddegh, fearing that the national democratic movement would escalate into a revolution. But the oil tycoons thought otherwise, they could not allow Iran to provide an independent entry into the world market.

London, interested in Washington's support, "bought" it at the price of agreeing to take the side of the Americans in the economic blockade of the PRC and to recognize the island of Taiwan as a territory to which mainland China has no right. This information was received by the residency from a "documentary" agent and it was immediately reported to the leadership of the USSR.

In August 1951, President Truman's special envoy, Averell Harriman, arrived in Tehran and tried in vain to reconcile the warring parties and persuade Mosaddegh to accept the British oil proposals. The latter, however, did not succumb to either persuasion or pressure, and Harriman's mission was not crowned with success. Soon the Americans stopped playing the role of a mediator in the Iranian-British dispute. In 1952, US Deputy Secretary of State Byroad, in a conversation with Mossadegh, was already pursuing a different line and persistently urging him to "give way to the Americans on the oil issue," for which the US promised to provide Iran with "a loan in the amount necessary to restore the oil industry", and gave guarantees that "no one but the Americans will enter the limits of the AINC." The contents of this conversation became known to the residency in an operative way, and the relevant information was sent to Moscow. The obstinacy of Mossadegh, who did not want to listen to American proposals, led Washington to the conviction that he could not be dealt with and that it was best to remove him.

In 1951-1953, the Tehran residency regularly informed the Center on practically the entire range of issues related to the vicissitudes of the struggle for Iranian oil, Mossadegh's policy, and the positions of the United States and Britain. Much of the information was documentary. Nevertheless, given the urgency and importance of the problem, on August 10, 1951, the residency was severely criticized: "You failed to understand the growing movement for the nationalization of oil in a timely manner," the Center's letter noted, "and use it to weaken the American and British influence. The growing movement in Iran for the nationalization of the oil industry and for liberation from American-British influence created a favorable environment for intensifying intelligence work.

The Center not only criticized the residency, but also provided it with specific assistance. An additional five intelligence officers with knowledge of the Persian language were sent to Tehran. Center gave uka

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the idea to return to the question of the agents that had been mothballed earlier and to restore contact with those agents who could be useful in the new situation. The restoration of work with former sources and the study of their capabilities led the residency to new interesting contacts, made it possible to acquire a number of useful agents.

For almost a year, the British were secretly preparing to remove Mosaddegh from the post of prime minister. In mid-1952, they moved to decisive action. On July 31 of the same year, the residency reported to the Center that the Iranian intelligence services had informed Mosaddegh about a plot against him. From the obtained document, it followed that Shah's brother Ali Reza, sister Ashraf, General Zahedi, pro-British political figures Seid Zia-ed-Din, Hakim-ol-Molk and others were taking part in the conspiracy. Behind the conspirators are the British, who are actively working among the authorities of the southern tribes, who are hostile to the central government. Acting resident of the Republic of Ingushetia. Inoyatov considered this information reliable and worthy of serious attention.

By that time, the influx of American military, political and economic advisers to Iran had significantly increased; they, in fact, controlled the situation in the Iranian army, police and gendarmerie. Under the "roof" of the US embassy in Tehran, the "legal" CIA residency functioned actively. It is worth noting that, starting from the war years, all subsequent years, until the "Islamic revolution" in Iran in 1979, this residency included, among others, intelligence agents who spoke Russian, often of Russian origin. They were engaged in the development of Soviet institutions and their employees in Iran.

During the years of Mossadegh's rule, the Iranian authorities tightened the police regime against Soviet citizens. Restrictions were imposed on their movement around the country, demonstrative external surveillance was carried out, threats and demands were made to the Soviet diplomats to expel some of them from the country and calls to close the Soviet embassy - the "spy center", to break off diplomatic relations between Iran and THE USSR. Not a day went by without Iranian newspapers fanning a campaign of spy mania. Crude attempts were made to recruit Soviet citizens both on the part of the Iranian counterintelligence and the American special services.

Despite the complication of the operational situation, the residency in Tehran worked actively. It received undercover information about covert contacts between representatives of the American and British embassies with the main figures of the anti-Mossadegh conspiracy. Reliable sources reported that British Embassy advisers Zaner and Payman, secretaries Jackson and McKenson coordi

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nirovat the actions of the conspirators. Among them were the Shah's mother Taj-ol-Molyuk, Princess Ashraf, generals Zahedi, Hejazi, Ariana, the Shah's confidant, the Swiss Peron, who lived in the Shah's palace, and other influential persons.

Meanwhile, Mossadegh began to gradually lose his former positions and support in the Majlis. His relations with Kashani, who took the post of speaker of the Majlis, cooled noticeably, and then became hostile. The case ended in a complete breakdown. Mossadegh watched with apprehension the rise of Kashani's influence and political activity. He increasingly opposed the line of Mossadegh and leaned towards the Shah and his entourage.

In July 1952, Mossadegh demanded that the Majlis give him emergency powers for a period of six months. If given such powers, the prime minister could control the armed forces. In addition, this would mean the actual removal of Kashani from policy making. The latter strongly opposed the granting of emergency powers to Mossadegh. The Majlis followed Kashani and denied Mosaddegh a mandate for emergency powers. On July 18, 1952, he resigned. The delighted Shah immediately instructed Kawam-es-Saltana to form a new government. This decision, however, caused an outburst of indignation throughout Iran, a powerful wave of protest swept through the country, and already on July 21, Mosaddegh again headed the cabinet, and on August 3, despite the resistance of the Shah, the Majlis granted him emergency POWERS.

A year later, Mossadegh called a referendum on the dissolution of the Majlis, which ceased to be his mainstay, but Kashani and his supporters condemned the decision of the prime minister. They sent a letter to the people, in which they called: "Not a single Muslim and patriot should participate in the referendum!" But the people took the side of Mossadegh, and in August 1953 a referendum was held. On August 12, he announced the dissolution of the Majlis, and then the Shah suggested that he resign. But Mossadegh firmly refused. The confrontation had reached a climax, the end of the drama was drawing near.

Mossadegh knew about the conspiracy being prepared against him and took preventive measures of a political and military nature. He closed access to the Shah's palace to the pro-British politician Seyid Zia-ed-Din, appointed people loyal to him to the posts of Minister of Foreign Affairs and head of the main police department, and dismissed many senior army officers associated with the British and Americans. But these measures were not enough: by August 1953, the overall balance of power was no longer in favor of the prime minister. The united alliance of the West, the Shah, the palace circles, part of the generals, the disgruntled clergy, the lumpen of the city who followed him, predetermined the defeat of Mossadegh and his followers.

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On August 16, the conspirators made their first attempt to topple the government and arrest Mossaddegh, but failed. The Shah fled to Italy. The decisive days of confrontation have arrived. However, Mossaddegh missed the time, did not take advantage of the favorable situation. He was afraid to address the people directly, did not mobilize his supporters and did nothing to block the conspirators. On the contrary, he gave them the opportunity to regroup their forces and prepare a new action. At the same time, he unleashed repressions on left-wing parties and organizations and deprived himself of their support. Meanwhile, his opponents did not doze off. With the direct participation of American intelligence services, they prepared a new strike and delivered it on August 19.

General Zahedi led the Shah's Guard and other military units loyal to the Shah. A military coup has begun. After two days of fierce street fighting, Mossaddegh was overthrown. He and members of his cabinet were arrested. The Zahedi government came to power. On August 22, the Shah returned to Tehran.

The CIA put a lot of effort into defeating the conspirators. It not only directed their actions, but also provided them with everything they needed: large sums of money, weapons, armored vehicles, means of communication. General Schwarzkopf, a former American military adviser in Iran, who actually led the Iranian gendarmerie, arrived in Tehran on the eve of the coup, met with the Shah and Zahedi.

After the military coup, Iran actually turned into an American fiefdom. The dictatorship of the Shah was established in the country, based on the military-police regime. The democratic forces were defeated, the National Front lost its influence, the leftist parties went underground. And yet it was a Pyrrhic victory: the Iranian people did not bow to the Shah's and American dictates. Already in the early 1960s, there was a new upsurge in the national-democratic movement, and in the 1970s it took the form of open uprisings, including armed ones, against the Shah's power and American dominance. In February 1979, the "Islamic revolution" led by Khomeini won and the Iranian monarchy fell.

The United States suffered a sensitive moral and political defeat in Iran. The struggle of the Iranians to nationalize the oil industry under the leadership of Mossaddegh was undoubtedly the historical prelude to the "Islamic revolution".

During the years of Mossaddegh's rule, Soviet foreign intelligence worked in Iran in a difficult operational environment and, as always, relied on dozens of reliable and selfless assistants from different walks of life. I would like to talk about some of them, although everyone who helped intelligence deserves good memory. First of all, let's talk about the agent "Avval", which means "First" in Persian.

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He was a colonel in the Iranian army, a staunch opponent of the Shah's regime, an adherent of leftist views, a true Iranian patriot. Outwardly stern, laconic, strong-willed, wholesome and principled person, "Avval" was one of the most reliable sources of residency. He was entrusted with the most delicate tasks, he was a recruiting agent, with his help valuable sources of information were acquired. He was the first to receive information about the Anglo-American conspiracy against Mossaddegh and the composition of its participants.

"Awval" was one of the leaders of the "military organization" of the People's Party of Iran, which consisted of about 600 officers of the Iranian army and was a powerful force that opposed the regime. In Iranian conditions, at the right time, she could do a lot. The Center categorically forbade the use of the "military organization" in the interests of intelligence. In 1952, he demanded: "Given the possibility of the failure of the 'military organization' of the NPI, it is advisable to cut off communication with 'Avval', stipulating a password and ways to restore communication in case the need arises."

Soon the failure of the "military organization" really followed. During a raid in June of the same year, the organization's liaison officers were accidentally seized, they found ciphers, codes, lists of members, places of appearances ... "Avval" was arrested and brought before a military tribunal. At the trial, he behaved courageously, did not give any evidence, did not betray anyone. Nor did he reveal his connection with Soviet intelligence, although the prosecution tried in every possible way to prove it. "Avval" was sentenced to death and shot.

A colorful and non-standard figure was an agent of the Tehran residence "Tond". He began voluntarily collaborating with foreign intelligence in 1946 as a young man, and this collaboration continued fruitfully for more than 30 years. Over the years, Tond has become one of the brightest agents of the residency. At one time he held a high position in the leadership of Iran. He had a myriad of connections in Tehran and was always up to date on what was going on. The Tonda information was distinguished by its accuracy, reliability and relevance. He knew how to present his messages meaningfully and concisely, and they were sent to the Center almost without editing.

"Tond" was an energetic, cheerful person, prone to mischief. Sometimes he could, as they say, throw out his knee, and in the most inappropriate circumstances: hide at the hiding place, watching who will withdraw the material he laid, and then suddenly appear in front of the intelligence officer, chase the car of the residency officer if he, without waiting for a late agent, left the meeting place, turn on the light in the car

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tires when our employee was there, etc. Unfortunately, Tond passed away in the prime of his life, and the residency immediately felt the loss not only in information and analytical work,

but also in a purely human way.

The prominent agent was "Iman", a colonel in the Iranian army. He was endowed with the gift of a recruiting agent, energy, self-confidence, conviction in the rightness of the cause emanated from him. On everyone who communicated with him, "Iman" made a deep impression. He managed to attract several important sources to cooperate with Soviet intelligence, including "documentary" agents. One of the agents he acquired cooperated with foreign intelligence for about 30 years and was perhaps the most significant supplier of documentary military political information. The fate of this agent, unfortunately, was tragic: in the mid-1970s, he fell victim to betrayal, was exposed as an agent of Soviet intelligence, and was sentenced to death by a military tribunal.

Agents "Makarych" and "Saadi" were of a different kind. "Makarych" was a kind of analogue of the fascist agent "Cicero", who served as a valet for the British ambassador to Turkey during the war years. With his help, secret documents were regularly seized from the safe of the consul of one of the Western European states. For 20 years, our intelligence knew almost everything that happened in the consulate where "Makarych" worked.

"Saadi" was attracted to cooperation by our Mashhad residency, but his truly unique abilities as an "installer" agent were revealed in Tehran, where he moved to live with the help of residency. He was a true master of finding the people needed by the residency: in a multi-million eastern city with a confused system of addresses and street names, he managed to "calculate" and find any person, and not only find, but also collect detailed information about him, even find out if he was not connected whether he is with the police. For more than 30 years, the agent has been indispensable for solving the auxiliary tasks of the residency. He was a true Muslim, enthusiastically met the "Islamic revolution" and in his declining years returned to the sacred Mashhad to serve Allah.

Of course, in a brief essay it is impossible to tell about all the assistants of our intelligence in Iran, there were many of them.

In the complex, contradictory and dynamically changing environment of post-war Iran, the foreign intelligence stations, according to the Center, worked quite successfully on the whole. Most of the information received was documentary, on its basis "it turned out to be possible to establish the positions of England, the USA and Iran on the oil issue." Intelligence was able to timely uncover the secret plans and measures of the Anglo-Americans to remove Mossadegh from power, to deepen economic and financial difficulties, from which

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we faced his government. Far from everything, of course, went smoothly in the work of the Iranian residencies. But in the main, during the years of the Iranian oil crisis, they were up to the task. And this is the merit, first of all, of her Iranian assistants, patriots of their country and their people.

! Machokki M. Iran in the fight. - M., 1953. - S. 58. 2 Soviet troops left Iran in May-June 1946. 3 Machocchi M. Decree. op. - S. 100.

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The Kashmir problem in India-Pakistan relations (1947-1965)

1947 The departure of the British from India and the emergence of independent India and Pakistan on the territory of the largest British colony were accompanied by unprecedented chaos, crowds of refugees, clashes and massacres on religious grounds, death and ruin of tens of thousands of people. Seeing the terrible consequences of this "most difficult divorce in history", the head of the commission to determine the boundaries between the two new states, the British lawyer S. Radcliffe, refused the fee assigned to him for this work, not considering it worthy to accept a reward for spending on the map of British India line that cut the great country literally to the living.

And yet, there was hope that with time the passions would cool down and the two countries - the heirs of British India - would establish relations of peace and good neighborliness. They were connected by many things: a common history and languages, cultural traditions, the interdependence of economies. Until recently, businessmen and politicians, officials and military men of both countries worked together, fought in the same army, studied at the same universities and colleges.

Reality did not live up to these expectations. For many years, India and Pakistan became irreconcilable opponents, and their troops repeatedly converged on the battlefield. The key point in this enmity was the dispute over which of the two countries has more rights to the North Indian principality of Jammu and Kashmir, often called simply Kashmir.

On the territory of Kashmir, great mountain systems converge - the Himalayas, the Hindu Kush, the Karakorum. The spurs of the Kuenlun and the Pamirs approach its borders. But besides the mountain systems, the very names of which reflect such different languages, there are also such dissimilar cultures as Islamic, Hindu, Tibetan, Chinese. Kashmir is a great crossroads in the primordial

meaning of this word:

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there are passes and roads leading to India and Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia, to China (Tibet and Xinjiang).

Since the partition of British India, Kashmir has been a bone of contention between India and Pakistan, who have repeatedly tried to resolve this territorial issue by force. As a result of the first such armed conflict between India and Pakistan in 1947, after both states gained independence, the territory of the principality was divided: the north remained with Pakistan, the south - with India. None of the mechanisms – bilateral negotiations, British and Australian mediation under the British

Commonwealth of Nations, UN intervention - did not work as soon as the issue concerned Kashmir. Moreover, according to Western analysts, Pakistan's decision to orient its foreign policy towards the United States, to provide them with territory for military bases, to join the SEATO and CENTO blocs was clearly anti-Indian in nature: Pakistan sought to enlist external support in the confrontation with India over Kashmir.

The tension between the two countries in January 1965 escalated into another armed conflict in the area of the disputed border section in the Kachch Rann, a desert territory on the Kachch peninsula. In April, the parties put tank units and artillery into action. True, at the end of June, with the mediation of Great Britain, the hostilities were stopped. But in August, fighting flared up again, this time along the ceasefire line in Kashmir. And in September, hostilities began on other sections of the Indian-Pakistani border.

The positions of the leading world powers in relation to the 1965 conflict largely coincided, at least in that no one was interested in its expansion and deepening. The United States saw this as a threat to the SEATO and CENTO blocs, and they feared the strengthening of China's influence in the region. The position of Great Britain was threatened by the fact that the war was between two members of the Commonwealth of Nations headed by it. The interests of Washington and London would be met by an alliance between India and Pakistan, which could serve as a shield against the spread of influence of the USSR from the north and the PRC from the east. China was not ready to engage in another war against India for the sake of Pakistani interests. The USSR, sharing the fears of the United States about a possible increase in the influence of China, obviously did not want to lose the fruits of the successes achieved in 1965 in bilateral relations with Pakistan.

In such a situation, to end the conflict, it seemed justified to use the West's leverage of influence and pressure on the warring partners. In terms of the power of influence, these funds incomparably exceeded the degree of influence in the region and the possibilities that Moscow or Beijing had at their disposal. Enough

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It should be mentioned that by 1965 the main part of the military equipment the parties received from the West: India - 530 combat aircraft and 360 tanks, Pakistan - 230 combat aircraft and 200 tanks. These 1,320 units of military equipment could not be compared with the share of the USSR, which was limited to six MiG-21 aircraft delivered to India.

It was the cessation of arms supplies as the most powerful means of reinforcing calls to end the conflict that Washington and London decided to use. The decision to do so was announced on September 8, 1965. However, the effect turned out to be exactly the opposite of what was expected. Instead of a cease-fire, both sides showed increased determination to continue the fight.

Indeed, the "East is a delicate matter": Western diplomacy was not only unable to achieve an end to the conflict, but also led to the strengthening of the "war parties" in both countries and caused a wave of distrust in their policies. And when, on September 23, as a result of the direct efforts of UN Secretary-General U Thant, the fire was nevertheless ceased, neither the United States, nor Great Britain, nor the United Nations any longer enjoyed the same confidence in Delhi and Karachi, and therefore they could not count on the role of a mediator in the ceasefire. conflict.

The country that made a seemingly hopeless attempt to untie this knot was the Soviet Union, declaring its readiness to act as a mediator in the search for ways to resolve the conflict. India's and Pakistan's rejection of Moscow's first proposal underlined the complexity of the task that the Soviet side was taking on, but two weeks later it confirmed its readiness and offered to hold a conference in Tashkent.

The Soviet leadership, already at the stage of developing its initiative, used, among other things, intelligence information. Now, when the USSR, by its proposal, took upon itself serious

commitments, the Soviet intelligence stations in Delhi and Karachi entered a particularly tense period.

At the same time, one should not forget that the residencies were working in the capitals of states at war with each other, which established a tough counterintelligence regime corresponding to wartime. And the local intelligence services were far from amateurs: the counterintelligence services of India and Pakistan, who had been trained by the British, acted assertively and energetically, using the entire arsenal - surveillance, organizing setups, etc.

Under these conditions, the residencies in Delhi and Karachi were faced with the task of ensuring the most effective use of all available opportunities to obtain up-to-date intelligence information on the subject of conflict resolution.

One of the important channels for the receipt of such information was an undercover group led by an agent-group leader "Jake".

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At the first stage of contact between Victor, a stationer in one of the two capitals, and "Jake", a local small businessman, there were no prospects for work. "Jake" did not have intelligence capabilities, he did not feel much desire to help the Russian, and he did not see the need for this. This had been going on for several months, and more and more often Victor thought about giving up maintaining contacts with a foreigner. However, the subsequent course of events changed their relationship. At one of the meetings, the usually balanced "Jake" came completely upset. He lamented that his wife is seriously ill, doctors predict a deterioration in her health, and she needs expensive medical care, which will require medicines from Europe. Out of nothing more than genuine human sympathy for "Jake," Victor gave him all the money he had in his wallet at the time. Touched, "Jake" accepted the money, promised to return it and again referred to the difficulties in obtaining medicines.

Returning from the meeting, Victor reported the results of the conversation to the resident, who approved the actions of the operative and suggested using the current situation to intensify work with "Jake" and more effectively involve him in obtaining relevant political information. Through the Center, the purchase of necessary medicines in Switzerland and their transportation through diplomatic channels to the residency were organized. The drugs were given to "Jake" in a timely manner and helped his wife's recovery. And "Jake", subdued by the readiness of the operative to help him in difficult times, made an important decision: he must help Victor. At one of the meetings, he directly told Victor about his decision. Discussing with the operative the possible channels for obtaining the information of interest to him and those institutions where it could be concentrated, "Jake" said that some of them employ his relatives and friends from university and business school, with whom he could easily maintain contacts. Moreover, "Jake" for his part provided assistance to these people in solving material and domestic problems and in this regard could count on their support.

Of course, the necessary verification activities were carried out (who could then guarantee that "Jake" was not another counterintelligence set-up?), the necessary legends, communication conditions were worked out, and "Jake" was prepared for conversations with his connections. For each meeting with "Jake", Victor began to prepare a list of issues that interested him, which were then discussed by "Jake" with his connections - employees of various government agencies of the country. Thus, bit by bit, up-to-date information was obtained, which was sent to the Center in a timely manner and taken into account by the Soviet government when planning political actions, including

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Kim Philby

Kim Philby speaking to foreign intelligence officials

STATE COMMITTEE USSR SECURITY

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Certificate of awarding Philby with the badge of the Honorary State Security Officer

Donald McLean Appointed 3rd Foreign Secretary

Donald McLean of Great Britain

Guy Burgess while working in British counterintelligence

Checkpoint at the entrance to the Los Alamos Research Center

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Test of the Soviet atomic bomb. August 29, 1949

Rudolf Abel (William Fisher)

Test of the Soviet hydrogen bomb. August 12, 1953

American reconnaissance pilot F. Powers, shot down near Sverdlovsk in 1961

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American exchange letter (Abel - Powers), signed by US President John F. Kennedy

The Glinke Bridge, where R. Abel was exchanged for the American pilot F. Powers on February 10, 1962

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Rudolf Abel gives an autograph to a worker during a visit to a construction site

about "No. Illegal scout Konon Young in 1944 Konon Young

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Donatas Banionis and Konon the Young during a break between the filming of the movie "Dead Season"

English merchant Wynn,

for whom K. Molody was subsequently exchanged, delivers the last word at the trial in his case

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Heroes of Russia Leontina and Morris Coen

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Prison Wormwood Scrubs, where M. Cohen served his sentence

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Soviet spy George Blake

George Blake in 1944

Port Said during the Triple Aggression in 1956

Monument to the sailors of the Russian cruiser "Peresvet" in Port Said

Tehran. 60s. Soldiers in front of a monument erected to commemorate the national democratic movement led by

with Mosaddegh

L.G. Podgornov, resident in the Congo B.S. Voronin, resident in the Congo in 1959-1962. in 1962-1963

The building in Leopoldville, acquired by the Podgornov group for work. Later became the building of the Soviet embassy

in Congo

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YAG“ Pieces >

Leaders of the patriotic forces of the Congo Gizenga (left) and Boshele arrive at a parliamentary session

Famous scout F.A. Skryagin

Minister of the Interior of the GDR Erich Mielke in Star City

Head of Intelligence of the GDR Head of Foreign Intelligence Markus Wolf in 1946-1949. P.V. Fedotov

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Head of foreign intelligence in 1949-1953. S.R. Savchenko

I.A. Fadeikin from 1966 to 1974 headed the Office of the Commissioner, and then the Representation of the KGB of the USSR at the Ministry of State Security of the GDR

Head of foreign intelligence in 1955-1971. A.M. Sakharovsky

IN AND. Vertiporoh, foreign intelligence resident in Iran, Israel

The famous intelligence officer M.I. Zaitsev Well-known intelligence agent N.P. Lysenkov

Heroes of Russia who got the secrets of the atomic bomb. From left to right: A.A. Yatskov, P.R. Kvasnikov, V.B. Barkovsky, A.S. Feklisov

putting forward initiatives in establishing a political dialogue between India and Pakistan, which were in conflict at that time.

The information received by the Jake group played an important role in the preparation and holding of the 1966 conference in Tashkent. But the Jake group was not the only channel for information that allowed the Soviet leadership to competently plan and accurately implement such an important foreign policy action as the meeting in Tashkent. His comrades worked alongside Viktor, the residency in the neighboring country was no less active, information on the subject of the conflict and ways to resolve it came from other residencies.

This is not yet the time to talk about the funds of the assistance actions that were carried out by the residencies in Delhi and Karachi. But their effectiveness can be judged at least by the fact that they contributed to Pakistan's agreement to see the leader of the USSR as a mediator in negotiations with India, that is, the country that for many years was considered in Pakistan as India's main ally in the Kashmir issue. (What was worth even the statement of N. Khrushchev in 1955 that this issue had already been resolved by the people of Kashmir in favor of India, and this was said not anywhere, but in the capital of Kashmir!)

Negotiations between the leaders of India and Pakistan, with the participation of A. Kosygin, took place in Tashkent from January 3 to 10, 1966. The fundamental issue of confrontation, the Kashmir one, was not passed over in silence. It was his discussion that concealed the main danger of disrupting the negotiations. As the British researcher A. Lam wrote, "the prospects for success seemed insignificant. Positions

India and Pakistan were too far apart." Apparently, the fact that there was no breakdown, and the art of Soviet diplomacy was manifested: the most dead-end issue was raised, discussed, included as the first point in the joint declaration of both sides and did not become an obstacle to reaching constructive agreements on a number of aspects.

What played a decisive role here: the political art and purposefulness of A. Kosygin, who held fifteen (!) summit meetings in a week? The statesmanship of the President of Pakistan, M. Ayub Khan, and the Prime Minister of India, L.B. Shastri, who also thought first of all about their countries, and only then about their personal political destinies?

Probably both the first and the second, and many other factors, including the work that was carried out by the Soviet intelligence residencies in Delhi and Karachi, proving that, although the East is indeed a delicate matter, but for professionals who understand its intricacies, quite feasible.

In accordance with the Tashkent Declaration signed by the parties, India and Pakistan withdrew troops from the line of control and restored diplomatic and other relations.

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In a separate paragraph of the declaration, the leaders of India and Pakistan expressed their gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union "for the constructive, friendly and noble role in organizing the meeting, which led to mutually satisfying results."

Having successfully implemented its political initiative, the Soviet Union not only really contributed to ending the dangerous conflict, but also solved a number of important foreign policy tasks, strengthening its positions in the region and in Asia as a whole for many years to come.

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On the Korean peninsula

After the end of World War II, universal peace, alas, did not come. Military conflicts of various scales and intensity broke out in different parts of the globe. Hot spots emerged almost immediately. If we talk about Asia, then this is, in particular, China, Vietnam and Korea. The events on the Korean Peninsula in 1950-1953 and the activities of the Soviet foreign intelligence during this period will be discussed in our essay.

Let us briefly recall the history of half a century ago.

By decision of the Potsdam Conference of the Heads of Government of the victorious powers in World War II, Korea was temporarily divided into two parts in 1945. On the map of the country, a demarcation line was drawn along the 38th parallel, 305 kilometers long. To the north of it were formations of the 25th Soviet Army of the First Far Eastern Front, which took part in the liberation of the country from the Japanese invaders. To the south are American troops who did not fight in Korea, but entered there in September 1945 after the surrender of Japan.

On both sides of the border line, two new state formations emerged: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north and the Republic of Korea in the south. By 1948 each of them had formed its own legislative and executive authorities, armed forces, security services, and so on.

The basis of the political program of the DPRK was the orientation towards the Soviet Union with the task of a gradual transition to the socialist path of development. The leader of the Workers' Party of Korea, Kim Il Sung, became the head of government in Pyongyang. The USSR provided the republic with extensive economic and financial assistance, contributed to the restoration of the economy destroyed by the war. All types of troops of her army were supplied with Soviet military equipment.

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In the south, a government was formed led by Lee Syngman, a former Korean immigrant who had returned from the United States. A regime completely dependent on the Americans arose in Seoul, which did not recognize the government of the DPRK as legitimate and made plans to unify the country by absorbing the "northern provinces" (the population of the south was more than twice the population of the north).

By the beginning of 1949, the ranks of the South Korean army, fully armed by the Americans, consisted of about 100,000 people. Slightly less in the north. A year later, the Lisynmanovites were practically ready to march on Pyongyang "to defeat the communists." Military clashes began in the area of the demarcation line. In each such case - and their number was constantly increasing - the conditional interstate border was violated. The tension has reached a critical

glow.

On June 25, 1950, hostilities began along the entire line of the 38th parallel.

On the same day, "big politics" loudly made itself felt: the UN Security Council, convened at the insistence of the United States, adopted a resolution that accused the DPRK of aggression against the Republic of Korea. Two days later, a new resolution called on the UN members to assist the southerners in military operations against the DPRK. Eight countries of the world community, under pressure from the Americans, sent their military contingents to Korea!, hiding behind the UN flag. These troops became officially known as the "UN Forces", and their leadership became the "Joint Command".

The Soviet Union at that time did not participate in the meetings of the Security Council and had nothing to do with the resolutions adopted on June 25 and 27, 1950?.

The course of the war looked like this.

The first four months of hostilities were characterized by a decisive offensive by the northerners, who managed to occupy nine-tenths of the territory of South Korea. Then followed their retreat under the onslaught of the southerners, supported by a powerful American amphibious assault. In some places, the northerners had to retreat up to the border with the People's Republic of China.

The subsequent period was marked by the entry into the war of the regular army of the People's Republic of China, whose servicemen in our press began to be called "Chinese people's volunteers." Together with them, the northerners completely liberated the territory of the DPRK by the middle of 1951. After that, an unstable two-year confrontation ensued on the lines in the region of the 38th parallel. At the same time, the exchange of numerous, almost uninterrupted ground and air attacks continued. At the suggestion of the Soviet delegation to the UN in June

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In 1951, difficult, protracted negotiations began for an armistice. In the end, such an agreement was signed on July 27, 1953. Hostilities, which lasted 1129 days and nights, stopped.

The residency of Soviet intelligence in post-war Korea was organized in October 1945. The office of the political adviser to the commander of the Soviet troops in Korea served as a cover for the staff of the residency.

Encrypted radio communication between the foreign apparatus and the Center was carried out through Vladivostok. At first, the residency settled in the city of Hechzhu, which is slightly north of the 38th parallel, then it was relocated to Pyongyang.

Operational work began with a "blank slate": studying the complex situation of the transition period, searching for sources of information. Gradually, the Center began to receive useful information.

After the proclamation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in September 1948 and the establishment of diplomatic relations between our countries, the Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from the DPRK at the end of the same year at the request of the Korean side. In this regard, the cover used by the intelligence service, the apparatus of the political adviser, ceased to exist. The residency employees were transferred to various positions in Soviet missions.

By the beginning of the 1950s, the situation in the world had changed. A camp of states that took the path of socialist development began to take shape, countries of people's democracy appeared. The relations of the Soviet Union with them, including North Korea, developed on a fundamentally new partnership and friendly basis. In organizing the activities of the state structures of the DPRK, Soviet specialists provided substantial assistance, who, like in other countries of people's democracy, constituted the institute of advisers-consultants. Our advisers were located in all important state institutions: in the Ministry of Defense (the largest group), in the State Planning Commission, in the ministries of finance, communications and other departments. The Ministry of Internal Affairs had an adviser from the Ministry of State Security of the USSR

As for intelligence, one of the departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 1946-1948, employees of the Smersh counterintelligence department of the 25th Army, which was stationed in North Korea until 1949, assisted in the organization of this service. After a series of structural transformations, intelligence in the form of the 1st Directorate later became part of the Ministry of Public Security of the DPRK. The adviser from our intelligence service was not there.

The current form of interstate cooperation required the adoption of new decisions.

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Since August 1949, the intelligence work of the Soviet foreign intelligence in the DPRK, as in other countries of people's democracy, was terminated. From now on, the residency was forbidden to recruit Koreans.

In April 1950, the Soviet government proposed to the Korean side to establish cooperation between the intelligence services of our countries. A positive response came quickly. "Kim Il Sung accepted this initiative of ours with satisfaction and expressed full agreement." He singled out two responsible officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for a trip to Moscow, where already in May negotiations between representatives of both intelligence services took place. As a result, the main areas of cooperation were determined.

1. Exchange of intelligence information.
2. Provision of mutual assistance in intelligence work.
3. Where necessary, joint operational activities.

We agreed to establish a Representative office (advisory apparatus) of our service in Pyongyang. The material support of its employees - six to eight people - was taken over by the Soviet side, the Koreans provided office space and apartments.

The agreements reached by any document signed by the representatives of the parties were not formalized. For agreement with the leadership in Pyongyang, the Korean partners compiled a concise record of the conversations that took place in Moscow.

In June 1950, the government of the DPRK approved the results of the Moscow talks. Since that time, which exactly coincided with the deployment of hostilities, friendly cooperation between the intelligence services of our countries began.

The Representation began practical work a month and a half after the start of the war. His task immediately became to regularly inform Moscow about the development of the military situation. The tasks of covering Korean problems were set by the Center for our intelligence apparatuses in other countries as well.

The most productive residencies were in Washington, New York, Tokyo, London, Paris, and Rome. Our counterintelligence officers in Moscow regularly obtained useful information. A lot of valuable political and military information came from Chinese partners.

Now looking through the INFO documents in the SVR archive, you discover the scrupulousness and high exactingness of this service in selecting materials on Korea to inform the country's leadership.

Archival materials testify that, on the whole, foreign intelligence informed the country's leadership quite fully about the state of affairs in warring Korea and around it, although in individual

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In some cases, updates were received with a delay. First of all, these were the military-political plans of the Americans and their allies, data on the troops and weapons sent by them to Korea, information about the contradictions in the camp of the Westerners on the tactics and strategy of conducting military operations, about their maneuvers to drag out the negotiations on a truce and on many other important issues.

Sometimes the Koreans themselves made inquiries, for example, about the possible intentions of the enemy to use chemical, bacteriological and nuclear weapons. None of their requests went unanswered.

As for information from partners, it mainly reflected military topics. The agents available in the south were able to cover mainly military movements, the activities of American advisers in the headquarters and units of the South Korean army, the mood in military units and in various groups of the population, and individual actions of American and South Korean special services.

As follows from the partners' information, American intelligence and the South Korean special services were most active in sending agent groups to the north to carry out sabotage and organize a "resistance movement" there. A network of reconnaissance schools was deployed in the south, where American instructors of various specializations took part in the training of agents: subversive work, radio communications, etc. This activity was of an intense nature. For example, to carry out special actions, the Americans formed a brigade code-named "Tiger", subordinated directly to the headquarters of the 8th US Army. The special forces, who were transferred to the north, to the border areas with the PRC and the USSR, were tasked with kidnapping officers of the Soviet and Chinese armies for the purpose of withdrawing to South Korea or destroying them on the spot, taking away their personal documents, and capturing the banners of military units. A kidnapped Soviet officer was to be rewarded in won, equivalent to about \$10,000.

Other facts of American activity against Soviet foreign missions were also recorded. The Americans introduced a Reyanka informant into the technical staff of our embassy. A case was noted when an American aircraft dropped over 500 leaflets in Russian with an appeal to Soviet pilots to go over to their side.

Our Korean partners have established: by order of the Americans, a series of small steel "hedgehogs" was made in Japan to damage tires; for provocative purposes, the Americans repainted their identification marks on several medium bombers with Kuomintang ones; On the territory of the United States there were permanent courses where South Korean intelligence officers were trained.

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The Americans densely planted their agents in the state apparatus, headquarters of military units, public organizations, and other significant objects of North Korea. It must be admitted, and archival documents testify to this, this work of theirs was not without success.

In the autumn of 1951, a confidential meeting was held between the military representatives of the DPRK, the PRC and the USSR, where current events were assessed and further plans were agreed upon. Two weeks later, the Americans knew about the results of this meeting.

A Soviet intelligence agent in Europe reported that the Americans received information from their source in North Korea about the contents of a secret meeting of the military leaders of the DPRK, where strategic issues were discussed. The agenda of the meeting and the date of the meeting were indicated. Having received this orientation through the Representation, the Koreans organized a check and, much to their chagrin, found that the data presented coincided with reality. The partners reported this incident to Kim Il Sung and began to establish an enemy agent (how their search ended remained unclear).

The fact of decryption by American agents of the cipher of the General Staff of the People's Army of the DPRK was revealed. We received information that the enemy en masse recruited teenagers. They were sent to the location of the Korean and Chinese troops for visual reconnaissance. Such tasks were always diligently performed by children out of fear for their parents, who remained hostages. With similar goals, young girls were sent to the location of military units, who did not differ in the severity of their behavior.

One of the important tasks facing the Korean partners was the fight against the American-South Korean agents operating in the north. When planning measures to liquidate bandit formations and the reactionary underground, the partners willingly discussed options and methods of action with our representatives and listened with interest to our advice. Certain successes have been achieved in this area.

With full mutual understanding, the very necessary work was carried out to clear the undercover apparatus of the partners in the south from the ballast. They gratefully accepted the advisory assistance in the development of fundamental documents, instructions and orders that regulated the intelligence and operational activities in the intelligence department.

Close cooperation has developed in the field of application of radio engineering means. Back in May 1950, at the talks in Moscow, the Koreans asked for help in setting up their radio equipment, which was in an unsatisfactory state. They needed

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we are a new radio transmitter for the central communication center, direction-finding equipment, portable transmitters and receivers, and some other equipment. Applications were fulfilled in a short time.

At the request of the partners, a radio specialist was sent from Moscow, who worked side by side with Korean colleagues for a long time and gave them qualified recommendations.

Both belligerents in large numbers deployed agents for reconnaissance purposes behind the front line. Communication with her was maintained mainly by radio. During the war years, and even after the signing of the armistice agreement, a large number of enemy reconnaissance and sabotage detachments and combat groups continued to operate in the north. The practice of conducting radio games was successful. For the Koreans, this was an unknown area of operational activity. The Soviet secret services, as is known, had serious experience in this area, acquired during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Captured radio operators were usually recruited and in many cases successfully used to

transmitting disinformation to the south. In one of the reports to the Center, the operative reported: "We have drawn the attention of our friends to strengthening control over the work of the recruited radio operators. Practical advice is given on how best to do it."

Separate samples of the captured new radio equipment, as well as cipher materials, were regularly handed over to us by the partners.

At the beginning of 1953, the partners were playing several radio games with the American intelligence center and with the British. This made it possible to reveal the plans of the enemy to carry out sabotage, to identify enemy agents that had previously been abandoned to the north.

One of the most successful operations was completed in early 1952. The Koreans captured a reconnaissance and sabotage group, airborne into the area southeast of Pyongyang. It included two radio operators. (It is curious to note that they did not send the message about a safe landing by radio, but by means of a carrier pigeon.) The radio operators were recruited, and they began to transmit "intelligence" information to their center under dictation.

At our prompting, a legend was realized that these scouts had established contact with a partisan detachment of "patriotic" Koreans allegedly operating here, who were fighting against the Pyongyang regime. In the south, this information was met with interest, but with distrust. They offered to provide detailed information about these partisans, biographies of each of them, armament, places of deployment, etc. Twice parachuted to the north and dropped cameras with a supply of film, and instructions were given to photograph each fighter and send the pictures to the south. At the same time

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The "patriots" were airlifted with food, topographic maps, and some equipment.

To increase the enemy's interest in this case, the American intelligence center was informed that several pilots from the downed American B-29 bomber had come into the partisans' disposal (this fact took place, the pilots were taken prisoner). The bait worked. To help the partisans, a task force of four people was sent, led by a teacher from the intelligence school of the South Korean special services. The latter was successfully recruited, and he transmitted to his masters by radio confirmation of the actions of the "partisans", of the American pilots, and all the information that his friends were interested in.

The radio game ended after landing from the south, one after the other, of two armed sabotage detachments in the amount of 50 people. All of them were neutralized.

The consequence of the war was a huge number of prisoners of war on both sides. The DPRK authorities believed that over 75,000 of their soldiers and officers were captured in the south. The opposite side also named a significant number of their prisoners. Moreover, these figures were constantly changing, being specified, and disputes over the repatriation of prisoners of war seriously hampered negotiations on a ceasefire.

The working and living conditions of the employees of the Representation, as well as other Soviet organizations, differed little from those at the front. The first year of the war was especially difficult. In connection with the threat of the capture of Pyongyang, the wives and children of employees of Soviet institutions had to be evacuated to the territory of China, and then to the USSR. All government offices and foreign embassies left the capital. Military and civilian installations in the north were subjected to fierce bombing by American aircraft. So, within two days of November 1950, after Pyongyang was abandoned by the Americans, about 600 sorties were made, several hundred tons of incendiary and high-explosive bombs were dropped.

After the successful counter-offensive of the armed forces of the DPRK, supported by Chinese troops, state institutions and foreign representations returned in December 1950.

to the capital. There are almost no buildings left undamaged by the bombings in the city. The building of the USSR embassy was blown up. They had to settle mainly in the suburbs, in light wooden houses, in dilapidated premises and dugouts.

Due to frequent power outages, the Representation was at times left without radio contact with Moscow. Violation of water supply, an acute shortage of benign food products led to an epidemic of bacillary dysentery. Almost all employees suffered from it. The transport problem was solved with great difficulty. All auto parts to the only one who had

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The Pobeda car could only be obtained from Moscow: tires, inner tubes, brake pads, and so on.

The situation of that time is to some extent characterized by fragments of the correspondence between the Representation and the Center.

From a letter dated December 1950: "Recently, a 500-kilogram bomb exploded 15 meters from the building and the shelter in which we managed to hide. Sprinkled with earth and somewhat deafened. The Americans began to use time bombs... I'm trying to save my comrades, we'll improve the bomb shelter. We live boring. Only M. and I have a bed. Not good with the bath, even worse with the laundry. In the evening we sit with candles when they are. It was bad with food, now it's getting better ... We are trying to work."

From a letter dated February 1951: "We put up with everyday and material hardships, but we don't want to agree with the lack of spiritual food. Maybe the Center will not make it difficult to send us sets of the Pravda newspaper, Novoe Vremya, Novy Mir, Ogonyok, Krokodil magazines with each mail ... The attitude of friends towards us is excellent, they value us and are satisfied with our help. I am sending a box of ginseng. I believe that we have comrades at home who need this medicine... While I was writing this letter, I went into hiding twice. 15 Mustangs have tied up with our area, there are fires one or two kilometers away."

From a postscript to an operational letter in Pyongyang, April 1951: "We are sending some newspapers and magazines, as well as gifts from the leadership and your families by May 1 ... The ginseng you sent was sent to the sanitary department for medical use."

It is also worth noting the attention of the Center to the team working in Korea. In connection with the epidemic of dysentery, a medical memo, first aid kits, and medicines were urgently sent from Moscow. Due to the impossibility of acquiring essential items on the spot, some foodstuffs, clothes, and shoes were sent there on occasion.

In 1953, a group of employees of the Representation was awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union "for selfless work in difficult wartime conditions". (A characteristic sign of the times: in the performances and certifications of that period, it was obligatory to indicate how the officer showed himself in a combat situation, to what extent he possessed such qualities as courage, endurance, determination.) The Korean partners, for their part, noted many of our employees with state awards of the DPRK

The war, which began in 1950 on the 38th parallel of the Korean Peninsula, ended here three years later.

Soviet foreign intelligence began to establish work in post-war Korea under specific conditions that had just been liberated.

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money from the Japanese occupiers of the country. And only five years were peaceful, then the war broke out. On the other side of the demarcation line, we were confronted by an alliance of Western intelligence agencies led by the United States. The confrontation with them, as well as between the security agencies of Lee Syngman and the North Koreans, was also a war, by no means always a secret, as they say about the rivalry of special services, with numerous mutual victims.

A milestone event was the establishment, on our initiative, of cooperation between the intelligence services of the USSR and the DPRK. During the war, Soviet intelligence provided the Korean partners with substantial logistical and advisory assistance, and thereby contributed to the establishment of their intelligence activities. It should be noted that the existing cooperation was an equal and friendly partnership. There were close business relations between the employees of the Representative Office and Korean colleagues. There were no cases of serious controversy or disagreement. All problems that arose were resolved by agreement.

The intelligence of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the intelligence of the Soviet Union during the war years were enriched with useful experience in jointly solving operational problems.

Here are the countries that went down in history as participants in the Korean War: the USA, England, Australia, Turkey, Canada, France, Belgium, Holland, Greece, New Zealand, Thailand, Luxembourg, the Philippines, the Union of South Africa (now South Africa), Colombia, Ethiopia. Eight of them sent their troops to Korea: the USA - 250,000 people, England - 20,900, Canada - 10,900, Turkey - 9350, Australia and New Zealand - 3700 each, Philippines - 2000, France ~ 1000 (data for July 1951). The losses suffered by them - human and material - turned out to be catastrophic in many cases. So, in Korea, a Turkish brigade of about six thousand people was almost completely destroyed. On this occasion, Ankara declared three days of national mourning.

The reasons why the Soviet Union did not participate in the work of the UN Security Council in June 1950 were explained in the statement of the USSR government of June 29, 1950. There, in particular, it was stated: "It was impossible for the Soviet government, with all its desire, to take part in the meetings of the Security Council, since, due to the position of the US government, a permanent member of the Security Council, China, was not admitted to the Council, which made it impossible for the Security Council make decisions that have legal force."

It follows from the text of the document that our country's non-participation in the June meetings of the Security Council had the character of a protest in connection with the fact that the seat of the PRC in the Council at that time was occupied by a representative of Taiwan's Kuomintang.

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It is up to historians and specialists in the field of diplomacy to determine whether this demarche of ours turned out to be effective. It is a fact that a little more than a month later, at the beginning of August 1950, the representative of the USSR in the Security Council resumed participation in the work of this body. However, now that the war was in full swing, our representative had to introduce a draft resolution entitled "On the Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Question". Meanwhile, the Kuomintang member still sat in the Security Council, and this lasted until 1971.

3 INFO - Information department of the central intelligence apparatus. * The Won is the monetary unit of Korea.

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"Swallow of the World"

Immediately after the capitulation of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union deployed troops to eliminate the military center in the Far East. The defeat by the Soviet Army of the Kwantung grouping of the Japanese army in Manchuria, to which our intelligence services contributed,

was of far-reaching significance. After the elimination of the main enemy that stood in the way of the formation of a new, independent China, the regime of Chiang Kai-shek still remained. At the end of the war, the Kuomintang violated the wartime agreements and tried to destroy the areas of China liberated by the communists. On the fields of Manchuria, liberated by the Soviet Army, Mao Zedong's units were given the necessary support from our side, here they were able to reform, and from here they launched their counteroffensive.

By the beginning of November 1948, in fact, the main stronghold of Chiang Kai-shek remained the northeastern regions of China with the cities of Peking and Tianjin. Here, the more than 500,000-strong army of the Kuomintang General Fu Zuoyi fought fierce battles with the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA).

The efforts of the operational staff of the foreign intelligence residencies were aimed at facilitating the victory of the new China with the least possible bloodshed.

Some episodes of this activity of Soviet intelligence officers are of interest to the reader. One of the most striking is described by the late Alexander Titov, a former resident of foreign intelligence in Tianjin.

well well

..At the end of 1948, we lived in anticipation of the assault on the ancient capital of China, Beijing. There were fierce battles. Thought returned to what could be done to get rid of belligerents

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parties - the armed forces of the Communists and Chiang Kai-shek - and the civilian population from unnecessary victims.

At that time, I happened to be a resident of foreign intelligence in Tianjin, a city of 2 million people, a major port in China, where the power of the Kuomintang was still preserved. The center told the station that in Tianjin, 120 kilometers from Beijing, Fu Tung, the daughter of General Fu Zuoyi, commander of the Kuomintang troops in Northern China, was working as a correspondent for the Dagunbao newspaper. After collecting the necessary additional information, it became known that Fu Dong knew the wife of the Soviet trade representative in Tianjin. We made the only right decision - to invite Fu Dong to visit us for dinner. At the end of dinner, under a plausible pretext, she came to them. This was the first personal acquaintance with her. The following Sunday, having received the consent of the Center, which from the very beginning paid the closest attention to this contact, meaning, ultimately, a comprehensive study of the mood of the father of our new acquaintance, I invited Fu Dong and the family of the sales representative to my home. . After some hesitation, Fu Dong agreed to meet me at the apartment, which was located on the second floor of the VOKS (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations of the USSR with Foreign Countries) store in Tianjin.

Fu Dong was then 20 years old. She said that she was an unspoken member of the Chinese Communist Party, but had no contact with the party lately. As for her father, she gave details worth keeping track of. It turns out that even as a young man, Fu Zuoyi joined the revolutionary organization of Sun Yat-sen, participated in the revolution of 1911, when the Manchu Qing dynasty, which ruled China, was overthrown. Until now, he is a follower of Sun Yat-sen and shares his ideas. Fu Zuoyi considers himself a true patriot of China. He dreams of entering the history of the country as an outstanding personality. He leads a modest lifestyle and is respected by the soldiers. Further, Fu Tung said that her father had a good attitude towards the Soviet Union and greatly appreciated the help that Soviet Russia provided to Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese national liberation movement back in the 1920s. According to Fu Dong, her father is also loyal to the Chinese Communists, although he is forced to fight with them. He was a supporter of cooperation with them during the anti-Japanese war of 1937-1945, but he could not put this idea into practice.

The Center approved my line of conduct and recommended to convince Fu Dong, who was extremely concerned about the fate of her father, to meet with him more often, to be interested in the slightest changes in his life and mood, and to provide him with all possible moral support.

Fu Dong agreed and left for Beijing. Upon his return, another conspiratorial meeting took place. Seizing the moment, Fu Dong

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called from the editorial office to my apartment. Hearing the voice, she silently hung up and repeated the call, as agreed, two more times. This meant that the meeting would take place the next day at a safe house known to both of us.

Time passed. Fu Dong, as we planned, repeatedly visited her father, told him about the situation in the country, about the anti-American speeches of Chinese students and their support among the people. She brought to him unknown to him the facts of mass dissatisfaction of the patriotic national bourgeoisie with the policy of Chiang Kai-shek, whose troops he, her father, still commanded.

In mid-November 1948, Fu Dong returned to Tianjing in tears. She reported that her father was extremely depressed. After listening to his daughter with difficulty, Fu Zuoyi asked her if she knew that the Communists considered him one of the main war criminals. This means that they have already sentenced him to death. And, therefore, there can be no talk of negotiations with them. And if so, the father decided to commit suicide, because it is clear to him that the People's Liberation Army will win, which has liberated the whole of Manchuria and is waging successful battles against his troops. He - Fu Zuoyi - does not want and cannot surrender to the mercy of the winners.

By that time, the residency had all the information about Fu Zuoyi, based on the analysis of which the Center offered the residency several options for conversations with the general. Their essence boiled down to one thing: suicide is not an option, the best way is to go over to the side of the communists. In this case, the city will be spared from destruction, troops and residents from unnecessary victims. The Chinese people will express their unconditional gratitude to the patriot general. I recommended Fu Dong immediately return to Beijing and explain to his father that there is another way out than suicide. I advised her to restore her ties with the communists and find out their attitude towards her father, if he goes to peace negotiations.

At a regular meeting upon her return from Beijing, Fu Dong reported the following:

Fu Zuoyi, after a long conversation with his daughter, asked what guarantees she gave that real communists were in touch with her, and not agents of the Kuomintang secret services. The general rejected all the assurances of his daughter and believed that in this way the secret services of the Kuomintang simply checked his reliability. Then Fu Dong, despite my ban, was forced to say that since the autumn of 1948 she had been maintaining a secret relationship with the employees of the Consulate General of the USSR in Tianjin. She told him about the content of our conversations. After some hard thinking, Fu Zuoyi agreed to refuse further cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek, to hold peace talks with the Communists and promised to give me ... a good horse and a herd

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horses. Fu Dong contacted the leadership of the underground organization of the Communist Party in Beijing. Representatives of the PLA began negotiations with the general.

As a result, on January 31, 1949, the People's Liberation Army of China entered Beijing without a fight and thereby saved the ancient city, famous for its historical monuments, and hundreds of thousands of human lives from destruction. The liberation of Beijing marked the completion of the liberation of northern China and marked a turning point in the course of the Chinese civil war.

In May 1949, Fu Dong, whom I referred to myself as "Swallow", appeared at the Consulate General of the USSR in Tianjin and announced that she was leaving as a correspondent for the southern front in order to participate in the final liberation of her homeland from the Kuomintang regime. . A year later, in the spring of 1950, I returned to Moscow. Parting with the "Swallow", he gave her binoculars and a field bag.

As for her father, after the formation of the PRC, he became a member of the Central Chinese Government, was vice chairman of the People's Political Consultative Council of the first and fourth convocations, vice chairman of the State Defense Committee, deputy of the National People's Congress of the first and third convocations, minister water and forestry. In 1955, Fu Zuoyi was awarded the Order of Liberation, 1st Class. In 1956 he traveled to Stockholm for a meeting of the World Peace Council.

Fu Zuoyi died in 1974 at the age of 79. He was buried at the Babaoshan Cemetery of Heroes of the Chinese Revolution in Beijing. The funeral rally was attended by party and government leaders: Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and others. Wreaths were sent by Mao Zedong and Zhu De.

Reporting on the death of Fu Zuoyi, a Reuters correspondent wrote: "Fu Zuoyi was one of the prominent Chinese generals in the 1930s and 1940s; occupied responsible positions under the leader of the nationalists Chiang Kai-shek and at the decisive moment of the civil war went over to the side of the communists. The People's Liberation Army entered the city from the south, and the population greeted it with applause. Later, according to eyewitnesses, communist and nationalist soldiers could be seen working side by side on the streets of Beijing."

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"Knight's move"

In a cozy cafe in Harbin, two people were sitting at a table: a young European, fit, slender, and a Chinese, somewhat older than the interlocutor, with a parchment thin face, yellow teeth and nervous movements. His name was Juan. You could tell by his appearance that he was an opium smoker.

The day was hot. Young people sipped cold beer and talked in Chinese.

Did you bring me money? the Chinese inquired matter-of-factly.

- Yes. Write a receipt for \$50.

The Chinese wrote a receipt, took an envelope with money and began to count them under the table. Having finished sorting through the banknotes, the Chinese looked at his interlocutor with bewilderment.

"Ten dollars is missing again. I thought there was a misunderstanding last time. I give you a receipt for fifty!

The Chinese was right. Last time he wrote a receipt for fifty, but received only forty.

How much did I pay you before? - As if nothing had happened asked the European. - Thirty. And now? Forty. So what are you not satisfied with? Do you want to get thirty again?

The Chinese looked at his interlocutor with curiosity.

- Now it's clear, I agree with your system of work.

The interlocutors left the cafe. And soon the European was sitting in the office of the resident of the Soviet foreign intelligence in Harbin, GI. Mordvinova.

- Well, how did the Chinese behave? the resident asked the "European", in the role of which Baikov, an employee of the residency, acted.

- He acted out indignation that I was underpaid. He seems to think that I'm on their hook.

Mordvinov listened attentively and concluded:

Now wait for the guests.

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Who are they, the Kuomintang? Japanese?

Perhaps the Americans too. Did you say that you are going to Moscow soon on vacation?

- Yes, he said.

- Keep in mind, the "guests" will make themselves felt in the very near future. Be prepared to take action on both options.

It happened in 1946, after the Soviet troops left Manchuria. This summer hostilities broke out between the Kuomintang units and the People's Liberation Army of China. In the areas of Manchuria liberated from the Japanese, secret and police institutions were hastily created. In the conditions of the confusion that reigned at that time, these institutions recruited members of the CPC, and former Kuomintang members, officials of the mario of the inaccurate government of Manchukuo.

In Harbin, under the guise of diplomatic missions, trade and other firms, the secret services of Western countries were actively working. They acted aggressively, often acting under the flag of local special services. They didn't have to beware of the CCP's intelligence agencies, which only were still being created.

One of the aims of Western intelligence and Kuomintang agents was to drive a wedge between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union. For this, local Soviet citizens were used, as well as Russian emigration, some of which collaborated with the Japanese. Until recently, this allowed all Russians to be accused of espionage. The provocative activity assumed such proportions that the Soviet representatives more than once had to protest before the local authorities.

The provocations were organized, as a rule, by the police agencies, which consisted to a large extent of old cadres, and the foreign department of the police department, in which key positions belonged to the Kuomintang agents, was especially active.

The Soviet station in Harbin was given the task of infiltrating this department in order to receive information about impending provocations.

Soon we managed to establish contact with the deputy head of the police department. He was suspected of having links with foreign intelligence services. Baikov met with him. This was preceded by events that should be told in more detail.

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria, the administration of the CER directorate created self-defense detachments from local Soviet citizens, which were entrusted with protecting the property of the CER, warehouses, workshops, locomotive and wagon depots, as well as the personal property of Soviet citizens. They were armed with machine guns, light machine guns and grenades. The creation of self-defense units was an event that helped save the property of the CER from destruction.

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robbery. Among the vigilantes there were different people, most of them honestly treated their duties. But there were also lovers of profit. The leadership of the residency often instructed the residency officer Baikov, who worked undercover in the administration of the CER and spoke Chinese well, to deal with various incidents that happened to the combatants.

One night Baikov received a phone call from the duty officer of the road administration who said that three combatants had been arrested by the police. Arriving at the police department, our representative tried to find out why the combatants of the CER department were arrested, and demanded a personal meeting with the detainees. The deputy head of the department smiled maliciously. The scout noticed his large yellow teeth and thought he was dealing with an opiate smoker.

When the deputy head of the department left the office, the policeman on duty frankly told that all three guarded the warehouse with the property of the railway. Late in the evening they were attacked by the police and tried to take possession of food and other property stored in the warehouse. The combatants put up resistance, but were disarmed and taken to the headquarters.

The "yellow-toothed" returned, he said something to the duty officer, and he invited Baikov to go along with him. When they entered the room, a terrible picture opened up before their eyes. All three vigilantes were stripped naked and hung by the hands from the ceiling, from where water poured in a thin stream on their heads. Such torture was used by the Japanese against Chinese partisans.

Outraged by what he saw, the Soviet representative bluntly demanded the immediate release of the detainees. Baikov announced that he would immediately inform the Soviet Consul General about this and ask him to contact one of the members of the Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in Northeast China.

"Yellowtooth" disappeared into the next room. Apparently, he went to consult with someone. Taking advantage of the moment, the scout went to the telephone, called the CER duty officer and explained the situation to him. Fifteen minutes later, a rapid response detachment from the guards of the road administration arrived.

At this time, the same Chinese man ran into the room, rushed to the window and saw that the police building was surrounded by cars with headlights on, near which there were vigilantes with machine guns, machine guns and grenades. The Chinese man shouted to the duty officer: "Free me!". The iron doors creaked, and three vigilantes appeared in the room. One of them could not stand on his feet, his comrades supported him. As soon as the released people appeared at the door, the combatants picked up the guys and carried them to the cars.

During the liberation of the combatants, Baikov took a closer look at that benevolent employee who tried to assist

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action, made it possible to make a phone call, provided the necessary information about the detention of combatants. Subsequently, contact was established with him, and he provided great assistance to the residency in identifying provocative plans against Soviet citizens and in liaising with a number of senior police officers with foreign special services. Juan was of particular interest, since provocative actions were developed directly under his leadership. The residency decided to hold an event to compromise him.

It was necessary to find out what kind of intelligence he works for. Baikov was assigned to work with the policeman. Visiting the police department by the nature of his work, the operational officer tried to show him some signs of attention. The Chinese behaved outwardly LOYALLY.

On one of the warm spring days, Baikov, taking advantage of the opportunity, invited his friend to a good restaurant. He agreed and arrived exactly at the appointed time. At the request of the scout, Juan personally ordered snacks, drinks, and hot dishes. That evening, the policeman "ruined" the residency for a substantial amount. At the end of the dinner, he drew attention to the fact that Ivan Vladimirovich had paid not in yuan, but in dollars. The eyes of the Chinese lit up when the worker took out a wad of dollars from his pocket.

During lunch, the interlocutor complained that he had a lot to do, that the family had not returned from abroad, where they had to go during the war.

When asked why he would not return the family home, Juan said that so far it is difficult to do so. He is from Shanghai. His house burned down and he doesn't know what to do with his family if they return to China.

When leaving the restaurant, the policeman put into Baikov's pocket an envelope with documents about the surveillance of Soviet citizens by the foreign department. In turn, the scout handed him \$20.

The residency determined that the documents received from the policeman were not disinformation. After the first meeting, several more contacts took place in the city.

At one of the subsequent meetings, he was given not twenty, but forty dollars. This was positively received by the Chinese.

Subsequently, a plan was put in place that involved playing with underpayment of remuneration and receiving receipts from Juan for a larger amount than he actually received.

It was assumed that the "appropriation" of a certain amount by a worker would be considered by the Chinese bosses as serious evidence and would encourage him to use it to recruit a Soviet worker.

Several meetings passed, at which Juan received forty dollars each, and he already received receipts.
wrote sixty.

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Baikov was waiting for the "guests", but they did not appear. The end of August has come, the fishing season has begun. The scout was known as an avid fisherman. The police knew about this, too, since surveillance vehicles repeatedly accompanied him to the banks of the Songhua River. Based on a number of signs, Baikov began to guess that it was there that the enemy would approach him. Mordvinov advised to prepare for fishing in such a way that it would come to the attention of the enemy.

At the end of the week, the scout began to prepare tackle for fishing, examined the car, called the officer on duty at the CER administration, said that he was going fishing early in the morning, named the place where he would be, and asked to record his departure in a log.

Since the phone was tapped, Baikov was sure that information about his trip would be
reported immediately.

Early in the morning he went out into the yard. A familiar Chinese greeted him with the words: "Ni chifanla ma?" (Have you eaten?). So usually in those years, the Chinese greeted each other.

Having passed the city, Ivan Vladimirovich turned into the area where he usually fished. He drove into the parking lot, where at that time there was not a single car, parked and began to prepare gear. It was calm all around, the waves of the river quietly rolled onto the sandy shore.

Before he had time to throw the gear, he heard the sound of an engine. A new Ford 300 was parked next to the scout's car. The door opened and a tall Chinese man stepped out of the car.

good suit of European cut. On the other side of the Ford, there was another guy, about forty, thickset. These, undoubtedly, were those whom Baikov was waiting for.

They parked the car in such a way that they blocked the road for exit.

"What's the matter, gentlemen, I won't be able to leave?"

The tall Chinese man did not immediately answer the question. First, he looked at his partner, as if asking him for permission to start a conversation. He nodded his head. The tall one spoke in pure English:

- Hello, Mr Baikov. We have been looking for an opportunity to talk to you for a long time.

- Who you are? the scout asked in Chinese.

The tall one smiled and said:

— Oh, we know you speak Chinese. Mr. Huang told us a lot about this. You must know me. I am the head of the Russian political intelligence department of the Republic of China - Mi.

His name was familiar to the scout.

- What do you owe?

"We have business with you," the fat man entered into the conversation.

Ivan Vladimirovich noticed that he spoke Chinese in an American manner.

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- On business, I accept in the management of the CER, on weekdays. And today I have a day off.

The officer's tone had an effect on the fat man. He said more peacefully:

- Don't get excited, Mr Baikov. You must listen to us.

- Must?! exclaimed the worker. - On what basis? By what right do you tell me? Who you are?

"I'm from the foreign intelligence department. My name is Shui.

Ivan Vladimirovich immediately had associations in his head: one called himself "Mi", which means "rice" in Russian, the second called himself "Shui", which means "water" in Russian. Thus, there is water, there is rice, you can make porridge.

- I don't want to talk to you!

Mi joined the conversation:

- You are behaving unreasonably, Mr. Baikov.

- This is a provocation! the scout burst out with the standard phrase that a Soviet citizen utters when strangers threaten him abroad. I make a strong protest!

- Do not rush to complain, Mr. Baikov! If you don't listen to us, we can get your bosses to know how you embezzle some of the money you pay your

agents.

Shui began to lay out his trump cards.

"So what's the matter?" — the scout said dejectedly and thought. So this is Juan!

"Well, let it be Juan," Shui agreed.

Baikov paused so that his interlocutors would believe that he was considering the possible consequences for him. After considering everything, he raised his eyes to Shui and said in a low voice:

"I want to speak to you in private.

Shui was apparently satisfied with the answer. Turning to Mi, he briefly commanded:

"Mr. Mi, please sit in the car!"

Mi got behind the wheel of the Ford. Shui bypassed Baikov's car and sat next to the scout, leaving the door open. When Shui sat down more comfortably, the operative asked him a natural question in this situation:

- What you want from me?

Shui, like most Chinese educated in America, answered shortly and in a businesslike manner:

- That's another conversation! We want you to cooperate with us. We will give you the opportunity to acquire valuable agents. You will be successful.

- You are crazy! - the Soviet intelligence officer declared with utmost sincerity. "I won't be afraid of your threats!" I can return to Juan the money that was not given to him, and that's it!

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"Don't be naive," Shui smiled. - You are a professional! You will not be able to get out of this story so easily.

"You don't have any evidence," our worker stubbornly stood his ground. It was very important for him to know what other arguments these two Chinese could bring.

"Yes, Mr. Baikov," Shui replied with the same smile. "First of all, you won't be able to cover up the Juan affair.

"I can prove that he is a provocateur.

The Chinese had to lay out other arguments:

"But you forget that we have a record of your conversations, including those from which it is clear that you are engaged in embezzlement of operational funds.

The clerk pretended to be puzzled by the news.

— Be prudent. We will open a bank account for you for a large amount of dollars, initially for five thousand.

Ivan Vladimirovich pretended to be interested in money.

"Tell me, Mr. Shui," he asked, "what kind of intelligence do you speak on behalf of: American or Chinese?"

- We have already told you where we serve, but in this case we are carrying out the task of American intelligence. Your boss in the future will be American military intelligence. The firm is solid, many would consider it an honor to work for it.

What will be my monthly allowance? – continued to be interested in the operative worker.

Everything will depend on the results. On average, from one to three thousand, you will receive a special fee for especially valuable materials.

The conversation went on for over an hour. What needed to be clarified was done, it's time to act, thought Ivan Vladimirovich. Option number 2 is a counter offer. The task is to recruit Shui and force him to work for Soviet intelligence.

(Option No. 1 provided for measures in the event of a gross provocation by foreign intelligence services or its agents from local police agencies. It was assumed that measures could be taken to compromise our employee before the local authorities with the fabrication of evidence "confirming" the anti-Chinese activity. ness of Soviet intelligence.

With such a development of events, the scout had to give a signal with a car horn or voice, and immediately a support group consisting of two residency workers and five specially selected vigilantes, who were on duty in two cars near the scene, was included in the case. But there was no need to resort to the first option.)

Ivan Vladimirovich moved closer to his interlocutor, looked into his eyes, smiled enigmatically and said in a firm voice:

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"Mr. Shui, I listened to you attentively, and now you listen to me. On behalf of Soviet intelligence, I offer you cooperation. We were waiting for you and you came to us. The money you offered me will go to you. You will become a rich person. And we will provide you with the information you need. As for the information that will interest us, we will agree on this later.

It seemed to Ivan Vladimirovich that the Chinese had a stroke. He opened his mouth, but could not make a sound. At last, having mastered himself, he said in confusion:

— Mister Baykov, you joked badly.

The clerk interrupted him:

- Juan - consider that he burned down. And your other people will follow. You will not be forgiven for this. Yes, besides, look at the prospect of developments. Neither the Kuomintang nor the Americans in China have a future. And if you are a patriot of China, you will understand where your place is.

Shui realized what had happened and came to his senses.

- No, cooperation with the Soviet intelligence is out of the question, because you will fail me or hand me over to the CCP intelligence.

"Don't worry," Baykov said firmly. We know how to take care of our friends. Who knows about our conversation?

"They know about it in Nanjing and Washington," Shui replied. "All this is somehow unexpected..." and without finishing the sentence, Shui clumsily got out of the car. He quickly got into his Ford and left without saying goodbye.

At another meeting with a source who worked in the foreign department, it was found out that Shui and Mi had come to Harbin with false passports disguised as businessmen. After the ill-fated

for them, they illegally left the city, and a day later the "yellow-toothed" disappeared.

We learned about the fate of the tour performers-scouts only three years later. They moved to Taiwan and there, for the time being, they continued their work for two reconnaissance missions.

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Intelligence, Africa and the Cold War

In the post-war period, Soviet foreign intelligence had to work on the hitherto almost unknown African continent.

In the 1950s, intelligence interest in Africa was determined mainly by obtaining information about the plans and intentions of Western countries. At that time, many air and naval bases of NATO member countries were located in Africa. Their interest in the continent was caused not only by strategic considerations: Africa is rich in food and mineral resources, its bowels store such minerals necessary for modern industry as uranium, cobalt, tungsten, copper, nickel, diamonds, oil and much more. other.

To what extent did the NATO countries seek to use the African continent in their confrontation with the Soviet Union? - our intelligence was looking for answers to this question. Previously, for these purposes, it used mainly its capabilities in Western countries. Directly in Africa, its positions were then more than modest. Small residencies were only in Egypt and Ethiopia, and by the end of the 50s, more residencies were opened in Sudan, Ghana and Guinea.

Foreign intelligence began to really work on Africa in 1960, when the process of decolonization of African countries began to gain momentum. Immediately 17 independent states appeared on the map of the African continent. The United Nations declared 1960 the Year of Africa.

In intelligence, an African department was created. His tasks could be summarized as follows:

- to contribute to the speedy elimination of the remnants of the colonial system;
- to help the national liberation movement in the remaining COLONYS;

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- to follow the policy of former and present colonialists: England, France, Belgium, Portugal;

- comprehend US policy towards Africa;

— to analyze the situation in each African country - whether it will remain in the orbit of the old system or go a new way;

to acquire friends and allies among Africans.

To this were added questions of the security of Soviet colonies, embassies and other Soviet institutions.

The 60s turned out to be "hot" for both young African countries and for Soviet foreign intelligence. The newly liberated countries of Africa immediately faced fierce confrontation from the former metropolises, which sought to maintain their political and economic positions in the former colonies. In a number of cases, this has led to crises, such as in the former Belgian Congo.

Coup d'etat that took place with the intervention of the Western powers and their special services, accompanied by civil strife, tribal strife, civil wars,

have become commonplace. Intelligence in each specific case required information about who came to power, what forces carried out the coup, along which path they intended to lead the country. It was not easy to answer all these questions. Sometimes the participants in the events themselves did not put them in front of them. The newly created residencies in African countries, staffed, as a rule, by young employees, could not give exhaustive answers to all these questions. But they conscientiously sent information directly from the scene, and it was useful for Moscow, as it allowed them to see and evaluate what was happening more clearly.

From the very first steps of working in African countries, our employees met with serious difficulties. The disorder in everyday life, the lack of elementary sanitary and housing conditions, interruptions in the supply of food were understandable. It was difficult to expect comfortable living and working conditions in the backward countries, which only yesterday were under the yoke of the colonialists.

But the difficulties in reaching mutual understanding with the Africans were a complete surprise for most intelligence officers. Africans have a completely different mentality, habits and mores. Naivety and hopes for our quick assistance were combined with irritability and distrust. Colonial times taught us not to trust the white man, it was considered merit to deceive him. All these features of the postcolonial African character had to be overcome not without difficulty by our employees.

It would not be entirely correct to say that the mere fact that African countries received independent status prompted

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the Soviet leadership automatically decide to organize intelligence work in the young states of Africa.

The process of decolonization was a natural and historically inevitable phenomenon, which then depended little on the will of the Soviet Union and the Western colonial powers. However, in the context of the Cold War and the confrontation between the two world blocs, this process itself became an object of confrontation.

The loss of colonies weakened the bloc of the Western powers. This was in the interests of the Soviet Union and strengthened its foreign policy positions. Therefore, the Soviet Union supported the struggle of the African countries for their political and economic independence.

In turn, the United States and the colonial countries sought by all means, including the use of intelligence services, to impede this process. The African continent has thus turned into an arena of ideological and political confrontation between the two blocs.

Thus the struggle of the peoples of African countries for their liberation became an object of rivalry between the great powers. Such was the logic of the COLD WAR ERA.

Soviet intelligence conducted work in the state and political circles of the young progressive African countries with great caution, limiting itself, as a rule, to trusting relationships. This was one of the most important features of its activities in Africa: it was not directed against the African countries, on the contrary, it objectively met their interests in the struggle to strengthen their political and economic independence, the formation of their statehood. The interests of the countries of Africa that had liberated themselves from colonial dependence and those of the Soviet Union coincided in these matters.

Therefore, from the very beginning of the organization of work in Africa, the intelligence leadership did not recommend recruiting in the political and state circles of progressive African countries. This by no means made it easier to obtain the information that was so necessary for solving the tasks assigned to intelligence. I had to look for new techniques and methods of work. For example, the processing of open sources of information has acquired great importance ~

various publications, reference books, press, radio and television. However, the main weapon, of course, remained trusting ties in political and public circles.

Such work required good political preparation, knowledge of the problems and great professional skills. Political and public figures, employees of various levels, up to the highest, were willing to establish contacts. Usually relations were built and developed on the commonality of political or ideological interests. However, the art of the scout

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The aim was to give these relations a certain direction, gradually, in a natural way, to make them less noticeable to others and to bring them to such a degree of confidence that one could count on receiving the required confidential information.

Trust relationships have been the dominant form of work in African countries for many years. Our scouts succeeded in this way in making quite a few friends and in obtaining the necessary intelligence information.

In a number of African states, considered by the Soviet leadership as countries of a progressive orientation, such as, for example, Algeria, Guinea, Ghana, Congo (Brazzaville), Somalia, Ethiopia and a number of others, a very peculiar task for intelligence was set before the residencies - to promote by its specific means the development and strengthening of the relations of these countries with the Soviet Union. The alignment of forces among our African partners was not easy. There were supporters of the development of relations, there were opponents, both overt and covert. Sometimes such a position was the result of insufficient information and misunderstanding of the policy of the Soviet Union in African countries. Often a negative attitude towards the Soviet Union was the result of miscalculations in our foreign policy, the narrow departmental approach of foreign policy and foreign trade organizations that carried out cooperation, red tape and bureaucracy.

On the other hand, Western diplomacy and Western intelligence services worked to undermine the relations of the Soviet Union with African countries, manipulated and bribed African leaders, used their agents, and spread disinformation that distorted the policy and intentions of the Soviet Union in Africa. In doing so, of course, they used our mistakes and miscalculations.

Foreign policy intelligence subjected all circumstances related to the problems of relations with African countries to a thorough analysis and reported its proposals to the country's leadership.

The Soviet leadership often used the possibilities of intelligence to bring information of a sensitive nature to the leaders of African countries. For example, through intelligence, the Soviet leadership informed Algerian President Boumediene about the activities of agents of Western intelligence services in the highest echelons of the Algerian leadership.

Of no small importance in the development of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and African countries and the strengthening of their statehood was the cooperation of the KGB with the security agencies of a number of young African countries, which was carried out mainly through foreign intelligence. This collaboration came down

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mainly to the exchange of information of mutual interest, to short-term training of personnel in Moscow and in the field, to help with operational equipment. Certain advisory assistance was also provided in building and organizing the work of the security agencies of African countries. Advice and recommendations were given, but Africans made all decisions

themselves, and they did not always coincide with what was recommended by our advisers. On the whole, the cooperation of the security agencies of the young African countries with the secret services of the USSR helped them in building their own state apparatus.

A very important function performed by Soviet intelligence in Africa was to maintain contact with the liberation movements of countries that had not liberated themselves from colonialism. Help and support was provided not only by the Soviet Union. These movements were oriented towards different countries — the USA, the USSR, China, etc. Sometimes, several countries at once. They were provided with various assistance - political, financial, material, as well as training of personnel, provision of advisers, specialists. This assistance was directed through different channels: state, public, humanitarian, international organizations. Assistance in the line of intelligence was usually carried out covertly. Thus, for a long time the United States managed to hide its support for the Union of the Peoples of Angola (SNA), headed by Holden Roberto, which was implemented through the CIA.

The Soviet Union also provided assistance to these movements through various channels. A significant amount of work in maintaining contacts with the liberation movements and providing them with support was assigned by the international department of the Central Committee of the CPSU to foreign intelligence.

This had its own logic. Most of the liberation movements were illegal. The special services of the metropolitan countries actively worked against them. They tracked the liberation organizations not only in their colonies, but also in third countries where they had their bases and representations, hunted down their leaders, carried out terrorist acts, infiltrated their agents, intercepted communication channels, revealed the contacts of these organizations with the outside world, their sources of assistance. The CIA also carried out similar work on these organizations. The Americans sought to infiltrate the liberation movements and take them under their control in order to establish their positions in the young states after the liberation of the colonies.

The operational environment within the liberation movements was thus complex. Working with them, in addition to good political training, required professional knowledge and skills from the intelligence officer.

Fulfilling these instructions, our intelligence officers established and maintained contacts with the leaders of the majority of the liberators.

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African movements such as the National Liberation Front of Algeria (FLN), the National Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIG), the Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frelimo), the People's Organization of South-West Africa (SWAPO) and others, who, having achieved the liberation of their countries, came to the leadership.

Basically, the leaders and representatives of the liberation movements were filled with a sincere desire to wage the most determined struggle for the liberation of their countries. Others were cautious, choosing their allies in the outside world with caution. Still others, oriented towards Western assistance, made contacts with us in order to find out the positions of the Soviet Union, to find out to whom, how, through what channels it provides assistance. There were also those who politicized, speculated on the liberation struggle, lived off the aid provided to the liberation movements, acquired luxurious villas and cars, traveled to international congresses and conferences, represented, rested and received medical treatment at the invitation of foreign states, gave endless the number of promises and least of all thought about the struggle for the liberation of his country. All of this had to be carefully considered. There were also mistakes, especially when our partners stubbornly argued that they were on the positions of "scientific communism." The "instance", on the instructions of which intelligence worked with the liberation movements, was sometimes difficult to resist dogmatic temptations.